THE ANATOMY OF A MERCENARY: FROM ARCHILOCHOS TO ALEXANDER

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Thesis submitted to the University of Newcastle upon Tyne
in fulfilment of the requirements for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

June 1994

To *Leonidas*

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ABSTRACT

Xenophon, who marched so many perilous Persian *parasangs* as a soldier-of-fortune and survived, has probably penned the most exciting, if not the best, memoirs by a mercenary to date. Moreover, for the military historian wishing to inquire into the human as well as the political aspects of hoplite-mercenary service, the *Anabasis* is the only in depth eye-witness account of an ancient Greek mercenary venture available. Of course the *Anabasis* is partisan and, at times, the contemporary reader cannot help but think that Xenophon's imagination is running away with him a bit. Nevertheless, his inside view of the complex relationships between mercenary-captains, the employers who employ them, the troops who follow them, the Spartans who use them, and those who mistrust them, has much more than just a passing value. Throughout mercenary history the balance between these groups has always been delicate, and, needless to say, the vicissitudes tend to follow the same pattern. Mercenary service was, and still is, a rather uncertain and dangerous vocation. We only have to read, for example, Colonel Mike Hoare's Congo memoirs to realise this.

Apart from Xenophon himself and the mercenary-poet, Archilochos, the ancient literary sources generally supply little by way of data on such matters as recruitment, conditions of service, and the basic hopes, fears, and habits of those many individual hoplites who took up the mercenary calling as a way of life. And so, in order to capture the spirit of mercenary soldiering and thus pursue more closely the pertinent questions of motives, money and the military value of professional hoplite-mercenaries, this thematic inquiry also draws upon first-hand testimonies afforded by more recent mercenary soldiers. In so doing, the inquiry has aimed at a synthesis of the available material, both ancient and modern, and thus, one hopes, has achieved a net positive result in which not only the mercenary-captains are better illuminated, but, also, the rank and file of a mercenary army are partially rescued from obscurity and given a voice.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The research and writing of this enquiry has been like a long trek into the wilderness. I would not have completed it without the love and support of my wife, Helen, and the faith and guidance of my supervisor, John Lazenby. They have my heartfelt thanks and respect.

Like all travellers, I owe a debt of gratitude to the many helpful people encountered *en route*. For their encouragement and assistance, I thank them all. In this regard, I am particularly indebted to Guy Sanders, Penny Wilson-Zarganis, Ilaria Romeo, and Jonathan Hall. To them, a special added thanks for their companionship.

Finally, I would like to extend my gratitude to the British School at Athens and the Greek Government, whose financial aid eased the way.

Nic Fields,
Athens,
April 1994.

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PREFACE

It is a great pity that the predominant influence still exerted upon military historians of the conventional school is that of the high priest of military theorists, Clausewitz. Many military historians are still inclined to view warfare in the ancient world in terms of strategy and tactics: to depict ancient armies as smooth military machines gliding effortlessly over a neutral terrain: and to describe ancient warfare as almost a mundane series of skirmishes, battles and sieges. The somewhat Olympian view adopted by Clausewitz and his disciples can hardly be expected to take much notice of the human involvement in war at the ground level. The perspective, however, of a more socially conscious military historian is different. From this view point, some of the highest concepts of military theory dissolve into thin air: for example, the concept of grand strategy in ancient warfare - so dear to military theorists - seems a mere chimera. To the "socio-military" historian the movement of troops across the ancient landscape appears to have as much direction as ducks on a village pond. Altogether too much military precision has been given to the hurly-burly of the ancient world's endless broils. We must not, however, forget one salient fact. The nature of any war which was fought in an age before Clausewitz was shaped by the reality that military organizations were relatively primitive and armies could not depend upon the regular satisfaction of all their needs by a High Command. Broadly speaking, ancient forces were not self-sufficient, well paid, competently officered, barrack armies. They certainly could not be carefully screened from civilian society, and therefore, to treat them as isolated entities is worse than absurd. Indeed, armies are, to this very day, projections of the societies to which they belong. More particularly, in the polis-dominated arena of ancient Greece, the relationship between city-state army and city-state society was so close that the status of hoplite and that of citizen cannot really be distinquished. And so, the ancient military historian is invited to alter his or her traditional stance and urged to move beyond the "battle-and-leaders" approach, which has made military history seem so narrow in the past, and see war in a proper social context.

So planting my standard firmly in the camp of the socio-military historians, what follows is not an account thickly populated with bland repetitive descriptions of campaigns or unit organizations. This thesis has one prime objective: to shed a chink of human light upon the animal I know as the Greek hoplite-mercenary.

The last in-depth study conducted upon the theme of Greek mercenaries, was that of the late H.W.Parke some sixty years ago; hard on its heels came G.T.Griffith's sequel which carried the theme on into the Hellenistic period. The former was primarily a narrative tracing the history of the Greek mercenary from the seventh century BC down to the end of the fourth century BC. Although

an authoritative work, it did not seek to break with tradition. Parke's objective, therefore, was not to tackle head-on such thorny topics as, for example, the motives that prompted Greeks to leave their city-states, farms and families in order to pursue such an uncertain vocation. In addition, he did not see the need to present the hoplite-mercenary as an individual. I do not wish to rewrite Parke's work, or even that of Griffith; let them stand as they are. I certainly do not advocate that we throw the baby out with the bath water, and neglect the human drama of the battlefield.

The latter becomes apparent when we consider the recent additions to the armoury of the socio-military historian, namely the two latest publications - one written and the other edited - of V.D.Hanson. Through these he strives to offer a stark portrayal of the grim and bloody realities of hoplite warfare from the point of view of the hoplite himself: Hanson, like myself, has been heavily influenced by John Keegan's masterly work, *The Face of Battle*. It is in the footsteps of these scholars that I shall tread. Consequently, I shall be painting upon one broad conceptual canvas an interpretation of the hoplite-mercenary both as a political commodity to be snapped up by any interested party, and as an individual member of a society of professional soldiers.

1 *MERCENARY*

Friars: (giving their usual greeting to wayfarers) God give you peace!
Hawkwood: God take from you your alms!
Friars: We meant no offence, Sir!
Hawkwood: How, when you come to me and pray that God would make me die of hunger? Do you not know that I live by war and that peace would undo me?

Sacchetti *Novelle* clxxxi

The mercenary is a professional soldier whose behaviour is dictated not by his membership of a socio-political community, but by his desire for personal gain; he owes no allegiance beyond the cash nexus. Here, the thorny questions of both motive (money) and status (serving a foreign flag) are extraordinarily complex to decipher, but in short the mercenary is defined by three basic qualities: being a specialist, being stateless and getting paid.[1]

The professional soldier of a Western modern army is a highly respectable member of his society; but the professional soldiers of the ancient Mediterranean world prior to the advent of the Imperial Roman war-machine were, in the main, mercenaries. To us the name is somewhat equivocal, carrying with it romantic associations of far off places with strange sounding names, as well as being tainted as slightly shady and a touch sordid. Indeed, if the profession of mercenary is not quite the oldest - though an interesting case could be made that it is a peculiarly male version of prostitution - it has effectively been around for as long as war has been waged.

The mercenary soldier is to be found in almost every highly organized society throughout history, and is certainly not extinct in our own today. History is littered with examples of powers which have had imperial responsibilities and consequently have almost invariably employed mercenaries. The armies of Egypt and Assyria, of Persia and Carthage, of Rome and Byzantium, of the Emperor Charles V, of Napoleon, of countless other potentates and more recently, of both British and French colonial empires - to name but a few - were made up of large numbers of mercenaries. To produce such an animal three conditions are necessary: (i) war, or the prospect of one; (ii) a man who is either so poor, or so desperate, or so adventurous, that he is more than willing and able to risk life and limb for a livelihood in a cause that generally means nothing to him; (iii) a person or power willing and able to pay somebody else to fight for him or it.

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[1] *Larousse* defines a mercenary as a: "Soldat qui sert à prix d'argent un gouvernement étranger." The official UN definition is a little more verbose: "A specially recruited person that takes part in an armed conflict for private gain and is neither a national or member of the regular armed forces of any party of the conflict."

Since the decline of feudalism, and up to the massacre of Louis XVI's Swiss Guard[2] in the Tuileries at the hands of a screaming Parisian mob during the summer of 1792, universal conscription was unknown throughout Europe. By 1798, however, it had been widely introduced and almost all European wars since have been fought by homogeneous conscript armies rather than by armies of professional soldiers; whole nations were now cajoled and coerced to arms, jingoism had now become the chief whip of the recruiting officer. In an army of conscripts the soldier-of-fortune can have no place. Quite simply, he is a fish out of water. Men must have a moral basis to make unpleasant duties tolerable and the war cry of patriotism readily excuses the heavy burden of military service; for the mercenary soldier that cry of patriotism is the knell of doom.

So, in these last two centuries, the unwritten rule that forbids the deployment of mercenaries in a European theatre of operations has come to be thought of, without any real justification, as almost a moral law. In their colonial and post-colonial skirmishes the European powers used, and still use mercenaries[3] - the much feared Gurkha regiments employed by the British during the Falklands conflict[4] and the legendary *Légion étrangère* still deployed by the French in war torn Chad. But when the cock-pit is Europe itself, the use of mercenaries causes enormous resentment.

In the Great War the Kaiser bitterly condemned all Britain's Imperial Indian troops as an "army of mercenaries"; in the Second World War the Moroccans used by the Free French, the Goums, were particularly detested. In the interim, during the Spanish Civil War, the Republicans felt the same sentiments of hatred and outrage towards Franco's Moroccan soldiery as the followers of the General felt towards the foreigners of the International Brigades. Even today the mercenary is deplored by contemporary leaders: "...small time crooks with records," said Harold Wilson of the British mercenaries in Angola, "have come possessed of vast sums of money, sums far greater than

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[2] The Swiss Guards had a long and loyal tradition dating back to 1474 when Louis XI negotiated a long-term contract for 6,000 Swiss mercenaries to serve the French monarchy.

[3] The United States of America could also be included here. At the height of its involvement in Vietnam, for example, the US employed no less than 42,000 local mercenaries led by 2,650 American officers, NCOs and other US enlisted specialists; these "Special Forces", as they were called by the Pentagon, were commanded by an American Full-Colonel. The best of the US employed local mercenaries were the Nungs (an ethnic Chinese tribe originally from the North Vietnam-China border) and the Montagnards (tribesmen from the central highlands of Vietnam) in Vietnam, and Vang Pao's Meos in Laos. See especially: Sheehan N. *A Bright Shining Lie*, Pan Books (London 1990) 557.

[4] In these times of economic cut-backs, Gurkhas no longer wanted by Her Majesty's Armed Forces are finding a new role in Africa. Following the use of the fierce Nepalese to guard the tea plantations in Mozambique, about 150 Gurkhas are being currently employed in Angola to protect British diplomats and diamond mines. Incidentally, at one point during the Vietnam War negotiations were being carried out between the White House and Whitehall to hire Gurkhas to serve in Vietnam.

they could ever earn in other ways, honestly or dishonestly."[5] Is it right, therefore, for us simply to echo the prejudices and strictures of our contemporaries? The stateless, unprincipled mercenaries of any society have always been the scapegoats for that society's failings. It is far too easy for us to conflate hasty judgements on such men with sweeping assessments of the causes and the effects of their predicament. So strong has this almost instinctive feeling become that to be a mercenary is in itself immoral, that it is generally forgotten how comparatively recent and illogical this sentiment is.

I

For the Greek city-state the condition of war may be regarded as a constant (**e.g. Pl. *Leg.* 625e-626e**).[6] The cardinal political rule of the day was simple: "My neighbour's enemy is my friend!" Pausanias, in his monograph on Attica, tells us that Eleutherai's accession to Athens "was the result, not of conquest, but partly of a desire to share Athenian citizenship, and partly of hatred (*τὸ ἔχθος*) of Thebes" (**1.38.8**). Of course, Athenian citizenship conferred enormous positive benefits, but, equally powerful is assumed to be the dislike of a next-door neighbour, in this case Thebes. In the same vein Herodotos had sought to offer a reason why the Phokians had joined the Hellenic League against Xerxes: it was, he says, "for no other reason (if I argue right) than their hatred (*τὸ ἔχθος*) of the Thessalians [next-door]; had the Thessalians aided the Greek side, then I think the Phokians would have stood for the Persians" (**8.30**). Polybios hits the nail right on the head when he talks about the Peloponnesians. First, he quotes Euripides' *ἦσαν αἰεὶ περισσόμοχθοί τινες καὶ οὔποτε ἥσυχοι δορί*,[7] and then qualifies his thought by saying: "It is only natural that this should be so, for as they are all naturally with ambitions of supremacy (*ἡγεμονικοί*) and are fond of liberty (*φιλελεύθεροι*), they are in a state of constant warfare" (**5.106.4-5, cf Thuc. 1.23.2**).

The conditions, however, of a person or power willing and able to hire mercenaries, and such men being readily available, must clearly depend on social and economic factors which are unlikely to have remained static during a period of some hundreds of years. Mercenary service is by its nature a function of supply and demand. Poverty, despair and the so called love of adventure are readily suggested as the motives most likely to have induced a hoplite to become a soldier-of-fortune. The purely adventurous motive would have been comparatively rare while the desperate man was more

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[5] Speech in the House of Commons, 10 Feb.1976. Cf the Latin rhetoric of Ernesto Texeira Da Silva, the MPLA judge who presided over the eventual Angolan show trial of 13 (9 Britons and 4 Americans) of these mercenaries: "...a pack of dogs with bloodstained muzzles who carved dark wounds across the face of Africa, strangers with knives between their teeth..."

[6] Cf Burton: "Peace is the dream of the wise. War is the history of man."

[7] F.529 (Nauck.).

frequent, i.e. the political exile at variance with the existing government of his city-state. Nevertheless, in the case of most hoplite-mercenaries sheer poverty was the prime motive.

But no matter how many poor, desperate or adventurous hoplites there might be at any given time, keen at the thought of earning their living as professional soldiers, they still required an agent to employ them. The political system of ancient Greece as a whole was not likely, except in truly exceptional circumstances, i.e. civil war or tyranny, to find employment for large armies of mercenaries. The Greek city-states differed, for example, from the Medieval and Renaissance Italian city-states in two fundamental and important factors. Firstly, being a citizen of a Greek polis meant being liable for military service, and thus all citizens accepted it as their moral and political duty to fight in person for their city-state in times of war. Citizen-bodies and armed-forces were indivisible. Therefore, even after the Peloponnesian War, Greek warfare never became, as did Italian warfare after the rise of the Free Companies, almost entirely an affair of manoeuvring mercenary armies. Secondly, was the basic question of hard cash. Even Athens at the apex of her imperial adventure could not afford to employ large standing armies; it was the solid hoplite-citizen who won or lost the day at Leuktra, Mantineia and Chaironeia.

If conditions generally prevailing in Greece were responsible for the limited employment of hoplite-mercenaries, there was however, outside Greece itself, another class of employer which seldom failed; the class represented by Gyges and his ilk, the proud and mighty rulers who reigned in the Near East. They had the vast wealth of the region behind them, and the hoplite was nine times out of ten superior to any "footslogger" the East could conjure up, and so, this technical superiority produced a demand for their professional services overseas. We find hoplites in foreign service almost continuously from the very dawn of hoplite warfare, fighting and dying for the Saïte dynasty and Lydian and Babylonian kings, to that of its rude demise in the age of Alexander and his successor generals. Indeed, even in the Archaic period, hoplites were eagerly employed in copious numbers by Near-Eastern rulers such as Psammetichos I and Kambyses. It would be wrong, therefore, for us to assume that such titanic events as the Peloponnesian War actually created the market for Greeks to seek their fortunes as professional soldiers. The market was already set up and open for business: thirty years of bloody warfare provided customers with just another ready supply of hoplite-mercenaries.

II

It is possible to categorize mercenaries from all historical periods into four general purpose groups: (1) Individual soldiers-of-fortune such as the Wild Geese, the Irish Catholic gentry who, after the siege of Limerick in 1691, refused to swear the oath of allegiance to the hated Protestant King

William of Orange and thus fled Ireland to serve as mercenary soldiers in the armies of Louis XIV and, later, the Hapsburgs. In the ancient Greek world these men would equate with those who had adopted the profession because of political exile.

(2) The various guards with which, by tradition, heads of state or petty potentates have surrounded themselves, e.g. the Varangian Guard of Norsemen, Normans, Frenchmen and Anglo-Saxons that protected the Byzantine Emperors, or the one hundred strong Swiss Guard that still serves the Vatican. The hoplite bodyguards (*οἱ δορυφόροι*) of the Persian satraps and the Greek military tyrants fall into this category.

(3) Vagabond bands of professional soldiers, sometimes dispersing but often temporarily united under charismatic leaders, fighting for pay, loot and victuals but not totally indifferent to the claims of honour and legality or the interests of their country of origin. These would include the Free Companies or *routiers* that were rife throughout the Hundred Years War and the white Congo mercenaries or *les affreux* of the early Sixties. I would claim that Xenophon's Ten Thousand are of such character.

(4) The "respectable" element hired out by a major power to a minor ally or client state. Today, these include the British officers and NCOs seconded to the Arab Gulf States or French Foreign *légionnaires* found in many a presidential guard of West African states; these countries tend to be former colonies of the lending power. Iphikrates the Athenian, Timoleon the Corinthian and the Spartan king, Agesilaos, can be labelled "official soldiers-of-fortune".

Having conveniently pigeon-holed our mercenary we can now ask the burning question: "Is he a dog of war or a soldier of honour?" Ancient Greeks, "lacking" the Christian ethos, saw nothing outrageous in a "love of war" and hence we meet men such as Klearchos the Spartan, the original leader of the Ten Thousand, devoted, according to Xenophon, to war purely for its own sake (***An.* 2.6.6**); here we see parallels in warlike societies such as Dark Age Scandinavia or feudal Japan. Christian society, on the other hand, demands that pleasure in war should be masked under the pretence of devotion to duty, e.g. serving one's flag or defending one's family and hearth. To be more specific, Britain's "Queen and Country" or the United States' "Duty, Honor, Country".

A suitable example are contemporary British mercenaries who tend to be ex-Parachute Regiment simply because they are "bloody good soldiers" who are often not "bloody good civilians". A man trained to be a ruthlessly efficient killer is hardly going to be the most convivial person on this planet; moreover, he is unlikely to settle for a humdrum existence. For men like these, motivation is not some nebulous desire for adventure. It is a quality which service in a regiment as tough and unforgiving as the Paras has nurtured and encouraged in them. Resourcefulness, immense powers of endurance and the ability to kill efficiently without second thought - these are the characteristics for

which they were valued when they were in the British Army. Once out they soon discover that such qualities make them unsuitable temperamentally for many vocations, and suitable only for careers involving covert military action or lucrative, less fulfilling, personal bodyguard work, or worse still, a life of crime. Three sergeants of 5 Commando were collectively asked by their inquisitive commander, Colonel Mike Hoare, why they were attracted to the mercenary way of life: "We feel that it is only in combat that we can use the skills we have acquired over the years."[8] Each man had served as a professional soldier (both in national armies and later as mercenaries) since leaving school. Is it any wonder such men become soldiers-of-fortune?

Unfortunately, there is little direct evidence for the psychology of the hoplite-mercenary. It is difficult to see much of the lives and motives of these men behind the venom of moralists. Pamphleteers such as Isokrates set the moral tone. He was tireless in stigmatising the brigandage, the violence and the injustices of mercenaries, "the common enemies of all mankind" (*τοῖς ἁπάντων ἀνθρώπων κοινοῖς ἐχθροῖς*: ***Pax* 46**) who are "better off dead than alive" (*λυσιτελεῖ τεθνάναι μᾶλλον ἢ ζῆν*: ***Phil.* 55**).[9] Aristotle reckoned that citizen-hoplites willingly surrendered their lives in the service of their city-state, but mercenaries fought merely for a living and, so far from seeking an honourable death, feared death more than dishonour (***Eth. Nic.* 3.8.9; 9.6**). Aristotle's view does conflict somewhat with that of Isokrates over this issue of duty and honour, for the latter, also using the comparison between citizen and mercenary to make this point, believed that even "hireling soldiers" (*τοῖς ξενικοῖς στρατεύμασιν*) were willing to face death in order to gain the riches of others! (***Pan.* 185-6**). There are also the later writers of Middle and New Comedy and their Roman imitators. We are all familiar with the character, Pyrgopolinikes, in the *Miles Gloriosus* of Plautus, a braggart, a rotter, a liar and an adulterer; or Thrasos the Bold, in Terence's *The Eunuch*, the mercenary-captain hoodwinked by the courtesan Thais who saw nothing in him but stupidity and hot-wind.[10] The same stock comic figure of a soldier-of-fortune appears in a fresco at Pompeii, leaning proudly on his spear, while he listens with a hard and obtuse expression to the flatteries of his *κόλαξ*. The picture appears too exaggerated not to be unjust; the hoplite-mercenary was presumably no better and no worse than the hard boiled, grim faced professional troopers of any age.

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[8] *Congo Warriors*, Robert Hale (London 1991(B)) 141.

[9] Such sentiments about mercenaries are still voiced to this day. For example, the headline from the 07 Dec.1981 edition of *The Nation*, the leading newspaper of the Seychelles, ran as follows: "The only good mercenary is a dead mercenary. Let us make them all good ones."

[10] E.g. *Miles Glorious* 1-78; 1040-86; 1222-74; 1394-1428; *The Eunuch* 398-433; 480-94; 771-83; 1091-2. See also, Plautus: (i) *Curculio 423-4; 428-49; 572-6;* (ii) *Truculentus* 482-97; 505-11; 531-2; 926-7.

III

There is no single, simple answer to the question: "What makes a mercenary?" This becomes plainly evident when we consider that the term "mercenary" encompasses a whole host of men. There have always been mercenaries, and the motives why men become mercenaries are many and mixed - money, idealism, plain boredom, craving for adventure. It appears the individual mercenary serves for a number of reasons, amongst which personal gain ranks high. This is certainly the down-to-earth view of mercenary service that Colonel Mike Hoare adopts:

> If there was any single common motive for enlisting as a mercenary soldier then it was plainly the desire to make big money quickly, all risks accepted. Much as I would like to say that we were motivated by anti-communist sentiments I am unable, in truth, to say so. Here and there, there may have been an idealist whose actions were governed by these principles, as there were also some who came for the adventure and not basically the reward, but by and large we were there for one reason only - money.[11]

The wages are, in theory, quite good, the chances of a real windfall in the form of booty, slim, but always possible. Excitement, adventure and the companionship of soldiering are always attractions. But often it was, and still is, the negative pressures which were the most important: the natural desire to escape from rural under-development, or of urban social repression; the need to escape from a stifling family enviroment; the desperate need to escape from justice or creditors. Most men sign up as mercenaries not because they enjoy fighting and looting, but because it is a profession like any other. Mercenary service is not the road to El Dorado!

The final report of the Committee of Privy Councillors, chaired by the Appeal Judge Lord Diplock, set up to enquire into the recruitment of mercenaries in the UK after the Angolan debacle neatly sums it all up: "A spirit of adventure, an ex-soldier's difficulty in adjusting to civilian life, unemployment, domestic troubles, ideals, fanaticism, greed - all play some part in the same individual's motivation."[12] Or as "Jim", a British Serviceman serving in Oman since 1979, bluntly puts it, the three D's - Divorce, Debt, Despair. A joke maybe, but like all good jokes not far from the truth.

Before I finish this introductory account of the mercenary, I shall briefly sketch what I see as the principal catalysts which initiate men into becoming mercenaries:

(1) The most common motive throughout history is the simple hope of making a sizeable pile of money.

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[11] *Congo Mercenary*, Robert Hale (London 1991(A)) 68.

[12] The Diplock Report *Command 6569 (XXI)*, HMSO (London Aug.1976).

(2) The "ichy feet" syndrome, those odd adventurers who quest for glory, power and even plain camaraderie.

(3) The political cause, i.e. the few idealists who see themselves as bright shining crusaders.

(4) The desperate escaping from justice, personal problems, unemployment, boredom or any miserable combination of these.

As a final point of interest, modern mercenaries who have been interviewed tend to offer a couple of possible categories to define their profession: (i) those who leave a national army voluntarily versus those who were dishonourably discharged; (ii) amateurs versus professionals. The problem with the first category is the fact that not all modern mercenaries served in their home armies, or were dishonourably discharged. Nevertheless, it does help to illustrate the feeling that such men do bring an "honourable" trade into disrepute. In the second category, the former only tend to sign up for a single contract, while the latter look upon mercenary life as a career. When reminiscing about the enlisted men who had soldiered under him in the Congo, Colonel Hoare said: "Very few men came for a second contract, whereas the professionals signed on regularly time after time. As far as they were concerned, that way of life could go on indefinitely."[13] Again, this category cannot be pressed too far, and the same should be said of my own categories presented above.

[13] Op.cit.(1991(B)) 139.

2 *ANCIENT AND MODERN*

Ancient Pistol: Why, then the world's mine oyster, which I will with sword will open

Shakespeare *The Merry Wives of Windsor* ii.2

Let us consider two interesting mercenary figures, one modern, the other ancient. The first is Robert Denard, a classic Gallic soldier-of-fortune, what the French call a *baroudeur*, physically large, colourfully dressed, moustachioed, and a Gascon. Age twenty-two, son of a Bordeaux peasant farmer, Marine NCO Denard had fought and survived the colonial mess that was French Indochina. He later served in the security forces in North Africa; this included involvment in shadowy right-wing activities such as the 1954 plot to liquidate Pierre Mendès-France, the radical Jewish intellectual and French political figure - this was to cost Denard a fourteen month sojourn in prison.

I

Bob Denard first pops up as a mercenary during the summer of 1960 fighting for President Tshombe, the rebel leader of the mineral rich, Belgian backed, Congo state of Katanga. He initially served under Robert Faulques, an ex-French Foreign Legion intelligence captain from the recently disbanded *1er REP*. Two years later, after Faulques had left Katanga, Denard took command of the remaining thirty-plus mercenaries for the last ditch battle against the United Nation forces; it was here, at Kolwezi, that he was to earn a reputation for personal bravery and loyalty that his later activities were to do nothing to justify. Incidentally, "Colonel Bob" was too flamboyant a character for the English-speaking mercenaries to take seriously, and was viewed by the Belgians with a mixture of uneasy admiration and deep suspicion. Although defeated in this battle and finally forced to retreat into neighbouring Angola - the Portugese denying that any mercenaries had so much as set foot on their soil - Denard was not to remain idle for long. With a handful of Frenchmen, he followed his former leader, Faulques, to the Yemen in order to help train the Royalist troops of Imam El Badr embroiled in the civil war there.

At the end of 1964 he was back in the turbulent Congo commanding the *Premier Choc*: "A soldier," wrote Colonel Mike Hoare, "of some ability and a well respected leader."[1] A year later he was leading its parent unit, Six Commando, after General Mobutu had toppled President Tshombe in a bloodless coup and subsequently sacked all the latter's white mercenary-captains. The following

[1] *Congo Mercenary*, Robert Hale (London 1991(A)) 221.

summer his loyalty to the new President was sorely tested during a revolt against Mobutu; unlike some of his fellow-mercenaries Denard sat on the fence, and in a short African nightmare of treachery, bloodshed, massacre and sudden death the rebellion collapsed. As Radio Leopoldville announced at the time: "Most of the mercenaries grouped around Colonel Bob Denard at Stan [Stanleyville] have remained loyal to the Republic." In December 1965, however, our faithful Commandant took leave in order to visit his dying mother in France: it was late rumoured that he also took the liberty to meet secretly with Tshombe, now exiled in Madrid. What was to follow was to become known worldwide as the "Mercenaries Revolt".

Mobutu, his country seething with plots and counter-plots, had asked Denard to disarm Ten Commando. This unit was led by the Flemish-Belgian "Black Jack" Schramme, plantation owner turned mercenary-captain of whom the President was particulary suspicious - alongside Mobutu's role of feudal overlord, Schramme played the semi-independent vassal. Denard made no move to follow his orders. Either suspecting his command was next for disarmament, or simply fearing the dilemma where he had to take up arms against a fellow white mercenary, Denard helped in organizing a revolt against his black paymaster. It is highly probable that he was also involved in a French sponsored conspiracy for Tshombe's return. In any case, after initial success, the rebellion faltered; Schramme was cornered and finally besieged in the eastern border town of Bakavu and, despite Denard's gallant attempt to open up a "Second Front" via his bicycle-borne invasion of Katanga from Angola, was forced to hop into Rwanda, where he and his men were promptly disarmed and interned. Moreover, the cause lost its figurehead when Tshombe was eliminated, some say, by the CIA: the CIA's duty and policy was to keep Mobutu in power.[2]

During the next decade, in a flurry of mercenary activity, Bob Denard was to turn up, leading his own band of mercenaries, in various parts of Black Africa. The early summer of 1975 was to find him in the Indian Ocean, more of which later. In the late summer and early autumn he was active in Cabinda and Angola, the latter after clandestine talks with the CIA: they wanted Denard to train the South African sponsored UNITA forces of the bearded and bumptious guerilla fighter, Jonas Savimbi.[3] The following year he was employed by President Omar Bongo of Gabon as one of a select

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[2] And Western imperialism still flourishes in Black Africa. For, in September 1991, 1,000 French and Belgian paratroopers - doing what their fathers had done 30 years ago, and many times since - were deployed in Zaire (formely the Congo) courtesy of the United States of America. Supposedly there to aid the evacuation of their nationals after the recent country-wide spree of looting and violence by Mobutu's unpaid and hungry troops; sceptics would see this as a Western attempt to prop-up Mobutu Sese Seko's 26 year old dictatorship. See for example, Julian Nundy, "Mitterand capitalises on Zaire crisis" *The Independent*, 26 Sept.1991.

[3] Jonas Savimbi was to return to the Angolan capital, Luanda, for the first time in 16 years on 29 September 1991. This was after having signed a peace treaty (now broken!) with the ruling MPLA, thus terminating (temporarily, as it turns out) one of Africa's longest civil wars. See for example, "Crowds welcome back Savimbi" *The Independent*, 30 Sept.1991.

team of "military advisers". His contract was twofold, to help train the *élite* Presidential Guard, and to liquidate some of Bongo's more troublesome opponents. January 1977 and the Gabon behind him, Denard touches down in another former French colony, in this case Benin. Here he was to lead an unsuccessful coup.

II

Now came the crescendo of Denard's mercenary career, for his next adventure was a run-away success. In May 1978 Denard, fulfilled the dream of mercenary-captains throughout history; he took over a country for himself - the tiny Comores Islands. Few people have ever heard of the Comores, fewer yet would be able to lay a finger on the map and proclaim with total confidence: *voilà!* Nevertheless, the four dots that make up this Indian Ocean archipelago have always been strategic. In the era of the "Battling Sultans" the Comores were a nest of slave-trading Arab, Persian and Malayan pirates; and pirates have always had a weather eye for strategic positions. Inevitably, a major European power was eventually lured to this strategic paradise, and one hundred and sixty years ago France annexed the islands.

Bob Denard had already been involved in the islands' politics in August 1975, having aided in the coup that overthrew its president, the Comorian nobleman and French Senator, Ahmed Abdullah. This paved the way for the rise of one Ali Soilih, an easy-going semi-intellectual, steeped in the pot-smoking traditions of the May 1968 Paris student's revolt. The Comores were soon to become the only state in the world where the extravagant ideas of May 1968 were actually put into practise!

Naturally France shuddered: the joint-smoking Ali Soilih had gone too far, too fast, too wildly. So, on the night of 12 May 1978 Denard was back. Leading a group of fifty shot-gun armed mercenaries, he descended upon the beach of Itsandra, Grande Comore, two miles from the capital, captured the president and swept away his government before dawn. Ten days later Ahmed Abdullah, the former president ousted by Denard, flew in from Paris to be welcomed by cheering Comorians: within a week, it was reported that Ali Soilih had been "shot while trying to escape."[4]

The Comores are the back of beyond, difficult to reach, and, more importantly, free of journalists. It took some time for it to be realised that Colonel Hadji Said Mustapha M'hadju, Minister of Defence for the fledgling government, was none other than Bob Denard himself. He was to be seen in white robes and a turban claiming to have been converted to Islam, even making the

[4] Numerous highly coloured accounts of the coup were published at the time. See, for example, David Lamb, "Comoros: a Path to Democracy" *LA Times*, 21 Oct.1978; and Tony Avirgnon, "Col.Denard's Newly Won Kingdom is no Island Paradise" *Guardian*, 19 Aug.1978. One of the more bizarre outcomes was that Denard was condemned to death in absentia by Benin. See especially: *Africa Research Bulletin 16* (1979) Political, Social and Cultural Series, May 1979.

pilgrimage to Mecca. Denard acted as if the Comores were his own personal fiefdom. And so, in a way, they were. His fifty mercenaries mostly also remained. They formed the new Presidential Guard, the only armed force in the islands. But for Denard himself it was a little too good to be true. The OAU, outraged, refused to accept the Comores back into its ranks while a notorious mercenary loomed large in its government, and on 28 September Colonel Hadji Said Mustapha M'hadju was seen off at Moroni airport by President Ahmed Abdullah and all his former cabinet colleagues. At a tearful farewell ceremony the President called the Colonel a "hero" who had saved the Comores, its people, the Muslim religion and "all that is humane in this country."[5]

This was not the end of our hero or his intimate association with the Comores by any means. The mercenary leader was now approaching fifty and looking for a quiet spot for his retirement; as he had said on French television, in one of his very rare interviews: "I hate the traffic jams of Paris but I adore the smell of *ylang-ylang*."[6] The Colonel was soon, much more discreetly, back in the Comores, where he set up a meat-importing company that had the monopoly on meat imports from South Africa. And many of his mercenaries did likewise; they soon eased themselves into Comorian society and became "men of affairs", reorganizing the islands' administration from street-cleaning upwards.[7]

And they stayed, discreetly controlling the Presidential Guard and the islands' security police, and holding the monopolies of various trades with South Africa. For ten years it was a mercenaries' dream, a mercenaries' paradise: a lush and comfortable tropical existence. By 1989, however, the dream had turned sour and, naturally, the Colonel had turned against the President; Ahmed Abdullah was found murdered in his Palace.

On 05 April 1993, Bob Denard had a five-year jail sentence quashed by a Parisian law court. He stood accused of taking part in the attempted coup in Benin; this failed adventure had resulted in the deaths of at least five people. Charges of involvement in the murder of President Ahmed Abdullah, Comorian patrician and French Senator, were also dropped at the same trial.[8] But for all that, Colonel Bob Denard would be wise to remember the words of one of his predecessors, one of

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[5] See Tony Avirgnon, "Comoros Colonel forced out" despatch from Reuters, *Guardian* 27 Sept.1978.

[6] This interview took place on 05 June, 3 weeks after the coup when French journalists had finally uncovered his new identity. The British press were somewhat slower: Robin Smyth, "Mercenary Hangs on to Power after Coup" *Observer*, 25 Jun.1978.

[7] Ahmed Abdullah was prepared to condone openly Denard's continued association with the islands. In an interview given to Jean-Pierre Langellier of *Le Monde* and published 25 Apr.1981, he said: "Pourquoir empêcheras-je Bob de vénir ici, lui qui a libéré mon pays? Est-ce que je protéste contre la présence des Cubains à Madagascar?" See also *Africa Research Bulletin 17* (1980) Political, Social and Cultural Series, Dec.1979.

[8] Although Denard was in the President's office at the time of the assassination, he claims the shots were fired by a panicking soldier.

the leaders of the mercenary Free Companies that terrorized mid-fourteenth century France, the Bascot de Mauléon. "I know of very few [Companions], except myself," the Bascot told Jean Froissart, the fascinated medieval historian, "who were not killed somewhere in battle."[9]

III

The second of my two mercenary figures did, aged fifty, come to a violent and sudden end. Klearchos the son of Rhamphias was an all-Spartan hero turned rogue who, having seen active service throughout the Peloponnesian War, had scaled the traditional Spartan ladder of success: Byzantion's proxenos at Sparta (**Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.35**); strategos in Asia Minor (**Diod. 13.40.6; 51.1-4; Thuc. 8.8.3**); harmost of Byzantion and Chalkedon (**Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.36; 3.15-9; Diod. 13.66.5-6; Thuc. 8.80.1-3**); lieutenant to Admiral Kallikratides at the naval engagement off Arginousai (**Diod. 13.98.1**); and finally harmost of Byzantion and Chalkedon for a second term (**Diod. 14.12.2-9; Polyain. 2.2.7, cf Xen. *An.* 2.6.3** who glosses over this episode).[10] In his lengthy obituary for Klearchos in the *Anabasis*, Xenophon paints a vivid picture of a man of action, a man born for war:

> When he may enjoy peace without dishonour or harm, he chooses war; when he may live in idleness, he prefers toil, provided it be the toil of war; when he may keep his money without risk, he elects to diminish it by carrying on war. As for Klearchos, just as one spends upon a loved one or upon any other pleasures, so he wanted to spend upon war - such a lover he was of war (*οὕτω μὲν φιλοπόλεμος ἦν*). On the other hand, he seemed to be fitted for war in that he was fond of danger (*ὅτι φιλοκίνδυνός τε ἦν*), ready by day or night to lead his troops against the enemy, and self-possessed amid terrors, as all who were with him on all occasions agreed (**2.6.6-7**).

Or in the words of Diodoros, our Spartan was simply "a man who has proved himself in the deeds of war" (*ἄνδρα πεῖραν δεδωκότα τῶν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἔργων*: **13.98.1**); a soldier to the backbone who was naturally fierce and energetic. And so, much like our British ex-Para who becomes a soldier-of-fortune, Klearchos was a warrior and not a civilian. Little wonder then, that we find him attempting to carve out a pocket-sized kingdom for himself as a nest-egg for his dotage.

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[9] *Chronicles*, Penguin Books (London 1978) 288.

[10] See especially: Porella P. *Prosopographie der Lakedaimonier: bis auf die Zeit Alexanders der Großen*, (Breslau 1913) #425.

IV

Klearchos had first been despatched to govern the sensitive city of Byzantion in 411 BC.[11] The importance of the site of Byzantion, according to Polybios, boils down to one simple fact: it blocks the mouth of the Pontos "in such a manner that no one can sail in or out without the consent of the Byzantines" who, therefore, "have complete control over the supply of all those many products furnished by the Pontos" (**4.38.1-3, cf 44 passim**). Corn was the prime product for Imperial Athens, and so, Klearchos' brief was to strangle the Athenian corn supply originating from the Black Sea colonies (**cf Polyb. 4.38.4-5**). It is interesting to note that, according to Diodoros, a year later the good citizens of Byzantion, "hating the severity of his administration (for Klearchos was a harsh man (*ἦν γὰρ ὁ Κλέαρχος χαλεπός*)), agreed to deliver up the city to Alkibiades and his colleagues", i.e. the Athenians (**13.66.6**). Nevertheless, in 403 BC, Klearchos was packed off once more by Sparta to Byzantion, two years after its recapture,[12] so as to "bring order to the affairs of the city" (*καταστήσοντα τὰ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν*: **Diod. 14.12.2**). It seems a hard man was required, for not only was the city having problems with the Thracians without, but also with fractional strife within. However, Byzantion's troubles were only just beginning.

Klearchos, with a liberal use of hard cash, collected around himself a large body of mercenaries and promptly converted his office of harmost into a tyranny (**Diod. 14.12.3**). Klearchos was no stranger to the use of mercenaries, for, as well as Lakonian *perioikoi* and *neodamodeis*, his first Byzantine garrison had included Boiotian and Megarian hoplite-mercenaries.[13] Having in effect seized the reins of power in Byzantion, Klearchos then proceeded to eliminate the opposition. The chief magistrates and thirty aristocrats were quickly dispatched and their property appropriated, while trumped-up charges sent many leading citizens either to their deaths or into exile. His ill-gotten gains soon enabled Klearchos to support an army of mercenaries, thus setting his tyrannical rule on a firmer footing.

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[11] Xenophon places Klearchos' appointment in the year 410 BC (***Hell.* 1.1.36**), but according to Thuc. 8.80.1-3, Klearchos had been sent out in 411 BC, and according to Diod. 13.51.1.4, he took part in the battle of Kyzikos.

[12] For Lysander's capture of Byzantion in 405 BC and his installment of Sthenelaos as harmost see Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.1-2. The Spartans were to hold the city until 390 BC when it was "liberated" by Thrasyboulos (**Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.27**).

[13] Xenophon reports that there were "some" Lakonian *perioikoi* and a "few" *neodamodeis*; the bulk of Klearchos' garrison being made up of 2 contingents of Megarian and Boiotian hoplite-mercenaries under the commands of Helixos the Megarian and Koiratadas, presumably a Boiotian (***Hell.* 1.3.15**) - incidentally, the mercenary-captain Koiratadas turns up again in Byzantion circa 400 BC as a mercenary strategos (**Xen. *An.* 7.1.33-41**) and finally becomes a leading Theban politician 5 years later (***Hell. Oxy.* 17.1**). Earlier, Xenophon informs the reader that Klearchos set out to Byzantion with 15 troop-carriers "manned by Megarians and other allies" (*...τῶν ἄλλων συμμάχων*: **XH 1.1.36**). Diodoros simply says: "*πολλοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει τῶν Πελοποννησίων καὶ μισθοφόρους*" (**13.66.5**). Both historians then mention Klearchos'reliance upon the satrapal purse of Pharnabazos for the garrison's pay (**Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.17; Diod. 13.66.6**). In other words, a task-force prepared to garrison an out-post so far from home are technically professional soldiers at the very least.

An urgent appeal from the Byzantians jerked Sparta into action. At first an embassy was sent to the despot ordering him to lay down his power. Expecting little mercy from his home government,[14] he took no heed and, when they responded with force, Klearchos, with mercenary army and treasure chest, withdrew to the Propontic town of Selymbria which he controlled. No doubt, the bitter memory of how the city was delivered over to the Athenians during the first occasion he was its governor prompted Klearchos' decision to vacate Byzantion without a fight. Outside Selymbria the renegade harmost offered the Spartans battle, but, after losing in a long and bloody struggle, he was shut up with a few companions inside the town and besieged. Never one to give in, Klearchos quietly slips out one dark night and crosses over to Ionia, "where", writes Diodoros, "he became intimate with Cyrus, the brother of the Persian King and won command of his troops" (*ἐκεῖ δ' εἰς συνήθειαν ἐλθὼν Κύρῳ τῷ τοῦ βασιλέως ἀδελφῷ δυνάμεων ἀφηγήσατο*: **14.12.7**).[15]

Thus starts Klearchos' last and boldest enterprise. We now find the exiled Spartan employed by Cyrus the Younger to maintain a force of hoplite-mercenaries in the Chersonese; presumably Klearchos already had with him the remnants of the mercenaries with whom he had supported his unsuccessful reign of terror in Byzantion. Now his efforts against the Thracian tribes earned him the gratitude and, more importantly, material contributions from the Hellespontine cities. So says Xenophon (***An.* 1.1.9**): looking at Klearchos' track-record can we be certain it was not a case of good old fashioned blackmail? The reminiscences of that medieval freebooter and mercenary-captain, the Bascot de Mauléon, tell us that he once gained a princely sum of money through "plunder, protection-money and various strokes of luck": i.e. the stratagem of capturing fortified towns and castles and then ransoming them back to their former owners![16] Perhaps this was the sort of behaviour that Isokrates was attacking when he equated mercenary service with atrocities such as brigandage, violence, extortion and general lawlessness (***Pax* 45-6**).

However, let us move on. The bulk of the Ten Thousand slowly assembled at Sardis under the Greek strategoi who had originally raised the various mercenary contingents for Cyrus the Younger. Klearchos and his contingent, on the other hand, were not to join Cyrus' army until it had

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[14] For example, Pausanias the Regent had been executed after he had over-stepped the mark. Although recalled by Sparta from his post as commander-in-chief of the Hellenic League after complaints of his overbearing behaviour, Pausanias was aquitted of charges (**Thuc. 1.94.1-5**). However, the victor of Plataia, with a trireme from Hermione but no mandate, seizes Byzantion (**Thuc. 1.128.1-3**). Finally removed by the Athenians, he is alleged to have entered into an alliance with the Persian Great King, but wishing to avoid suspicion returns home only to be imprisoned (**Thuc. 1.131.1-2**). Escaping from his confinement, Pausanias is finally cornered in the Temple of Athena of the Brazen House, where he was walled up and left to starve to death (**Thuc. 1.134.1-3**).

[15] Cyrus had been appointed by his father, Darios II, "commander of all the forces that muster in the plain of Castolos" (**Xen. *An.* 1.1.2, cf *Hell.* 1.4.3**); i.e. super-satrap over the provinces of western Asia Minor.

[16] Froissart op.cit.289.

reached the Phrygian city of Celaenae, a month or so after the march inland had begun (**Xen. *An.* 1.2.9**). It was not, however, until the Ten Thousand had crossed Phrygia and thus entered Cilicia that they aired their doubts about Cyrus' punitive expedition against the Pisidians (**Xen. *An.* 1.3.1**). The mercenaries began to suspect that they were marching against the Great King, Artaxerxes, and so mutinied. From this affair Klearchos emerged as the *de facto* Greek commander-in-chief, gaining the confidence, not only of the mutinous mercenaries but of Cyrus also. In doing so, he displaced Xenias the Parrhasian, who had served the Pretender longer and, hitherto, had been the top dog amongst the various Greek strategoi (**cf Xen. *An.* 1.2.10**). Furthermore, when more than 2,000 men from the commands of Xenias and Pasion the Megarian transferred to Klearchos, Cyrus took no steps to restore them, thus endorsing the Spartan's position (**Xen. *An.* 1.3.7; 4.7**).[17]

In the role of a commander, Klearchos was usually a harsh disciplinarian: he thought that an undisciplined army was good for nothing, and was reported even to have said that "the soldier should fear his officer more than the enemy" (*τὸν στρατιώτην φοβεῖσθαι μᾶλλον τὸν ἄρχοντα ἢ τοὺς πολεμίους*: **Xen. *An.* 2.6.10**). It looks as if Klearchos failed, or did not wish to develop the "common touch" of command: the ability to empathize with his men, to take stock of their condition and mood, and then structure his plans accordingly without the threat of brute force. It is this quality of generalship that Xenophon has in mind when he explains that leaders should be just in their dealings with their soldiers (***Oik.* 9.13-5; *Cyr.* 8.2.27**). Nevertheless, in his smooth handling of the mutiny Klearchos showed that, when harshness failed, he could dissimulate, coax, and use honeyed words as cleverly, though not as elegantly, as any silver-tongued Attic orator. A fifty per cent increase in pay was no doubt what most of the mercenaries really desired - pay being a crucial issue in any mercenary force - but they were also given an assurance that they were only marching against Abrokomas, the satrap of Phoenicia. But at Thapsakos on the Euphrates it was necessary to come clean and so Cyrus called the generals and announced his real purpose - to topple his brother, the Great King. Incidentally, Xenophon says that Klearchos was the only Greek who had known this from the very first (***An.* 3.1.10**).[18] In response the Greek strategoi summoned a soldier-assembly, and again the army, after a ready display of anger, was persuaded through promises of more money and gratuities.

Despite outward displays of unity amongst the Ten Thousand, a nasty quarrel arose between the contingents of Meno, a rival for Cyrus' favours, and Klearchos. The latter condemned one of the

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[17] Cf Xen. *An.* 6.1.32 where Cheirisophos refers to the Ten Thousand as "Klearchos' army" (*τοῦ Κλεάρχου στρατεύματος*).

[18] Cf Diod. 14.19.9: from the outset Cyrus informs the commanders but not the troops; however, we are not told if this includes the Greek ones. Also Diod. 14.12.9: Cyrus sees Klearchos as "an apt partner for his bold undertakings"; this does suggest, in the very least, that Klearchos was in the know, thus following Xenophon's view.

former's soldiers to be flogged after a fight broke out among the mercenaries who were purchasing supplies, and so incurred the hatred of his comrades. Klearchos had the arrogance to ride through Meno's camp with only a small escort on his return from supervising the market. An axe was launched at Klearchos; it missed but a barrage of stones soon followed and a riot ensured. Klearchos escaped to his camp and called out his troops. The incident would have led to bloodshed if Proxenos and his men had not intervened till Cyrus could placate the raging Spartan. As a consequence, the two jealous rivals were kept as far apart as was possible. Cyrus continued, however, to trust Klearchos, making him, for example, the only Greek member of the court-martial that condemned to death Orontas, a blue-blooded Persian, who had intended to throw his lot in with Artaxerxes (**Xen. *An.* 1.6.5**).

In the battle of Cunaxa there was no hint of disunion amongst the Greek mercenaries. They acted as one under the leadership of Klearchos (**Xen. *An.* 1.8.4,12; Diod. 14.22.5**). But he refused to comply with Cyrus' battle-plan (**Xen. *An.* 1.8.13, cf Plut. *Artax.* 8.3-7**), and his own tactics proved quite unadapted to the different conditions of a hoplite-mercenary army in foreign service outside Greece. He smashed the enemy left in true Lakonian style but when he found himself outflanked, he simply retired. Consequently, Klearchos discovered the next day that Cyrus had perished in the fray. This left the rebels without a cause; Cyrus' lieutenant, Ariaios, refused the throne of Persia, which Klearchos had quickly offered him (**Xen. *An.* 2.1.4, cf 3.2.5**).

During this critical period, Klearchos confirmed his authority, not merely through his professionalism and stern discipline, but by force of example. "Henceforth he commanded and they obeyed," writes Xenophon, "not that they had chosen him, but because they saw that he alone possessed the wisdom which a commander should have, while the rest were without experience" (*καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ὁ μεν ἦρχεν, οἱ δὲ ἐπείθοντο, οὐχ ἑλόμενοι, ἀλλὰ ὁρῶντες ὅτι μόνος ἐφρόνει οἷα δεῖ τὸν ἄρχοντα, οἱ δ' ἄλλοι ἄπειροι ἦσαν*: ***An.* 2.2.6, cf Diod. 14.26.1-27.2**). In Klearchos, the rank and file saw they had as a leader one who could fight, and one who would punish friend and foe alike: the development of these all-important instruments of command would serve Klearchos well. When Persian heralds came to discuss a truce, for example, his soldierly reply of "no truce without breakfast" obtained both a truce and full stomachs for his men (**Xen. *An.* 2.3.5**). Likewise, when Klearchos had earlier been offered a truce if the mercenaries stayed put, or war if they advanced or retreated, he simply replied that he accepted the King's terms, and when pressed to elaborate he answered: "Truce if we remain; if we retire or advance, war" (*Σπονδαὶ μὲν μένουσιν, ἀπιοῦσι δὲ ἢ προϊοῦσι πόλεμος*: **Xen. *An.* 2.1.23**), and so concealed his intentions.

Left to their own guidance, the Ten Thousand stood on the defensive and resisted Artaxerxes' persistent demands to disarm. Some of the mercenaries however, in an obvious moment of weakness,

did offer themselves for service with Persia against rebel Egypt. Finally, the impasse was broken by that artful satrap, Tissaphernes, who appeared and announced that he had persuaded the King to let him lead them back to Greece. Actually, he led them across the Tigris so as to have the mercenaries isolated and at the King's mercy. Klearchos, in a personal interview with Tissaphernes, renewed the offer of service against Egypt, and hinted besides that the satrap might fill Cyrus' shoes as their leader and thus use the mercenaries in his province of Asia Minor with a view to toppling the Great King at a later date (**Xen. *An.* 2.5.13-5, cf 23**). Tissaphernes pretended to regard this as an honour, and promptly invited the strategoi to come and show their loyalty to him. And so, by exploiting the rivalries and vanities of the Greek commanders the satrap was able to capture and execute Klearchos and four fellow strategoi.[19]

V

But why, you ask, the Plutarchian parallel lives? Well, both Klearchos and Denard were soldiers by nature as well as by trade. Moreover, they were both charismatic commanders of mercenaries which in turn led to the establishment of personal dictatorships. Both easily played the adventurer's role of "King-maker". Both were exiled from their homelands; Klearchos was sentenced to death in-absentia, Denard, until fairly recently, was under a *mandat d'arrêt*. These are the obvious answers to this question.

More importantly, however, both mercenary-captains received some form of covert but none the less official backing for their respective enterprises. The Spartans conveniently overlooked Klearchos' appointment as Cyrus' Greek commander-in-chief and even gave him a modicum of military aid in the form of seven hundred hoplites under the leadership of the Spartiate, Cheirisophos (**Xen. *An.* 1.4.3**). If we are to believe Diodoros, as I think we should here, the despatching of Cheirisophos and his command (he puts its figure at eight hundred) was done "with the consent of the ephors (*τῆς τῶν ἐφόρων γνώμης*). The Lakedaimonians had not yet openly entered upon war [with the Great King], but were concealing their purpose, awaiting the turn of the war" (*...ἐπιτηροῦντες τὴν ῥοπὴν τοῦ πολέμου*: **14.21.2**). In other words, Sparta was eating her cake and having it: posing as "champion of Hellas" she was pursuing her policy of liberation through conducting a war against Artaxerxes by proxy as well as repaying, at a minimum cost in terms of cash and citizen manpower, Cyrus for arranging the massive financial deal which had enabled her to defeat Athens.[20] France

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[19] For another example of Tissaphernes' double-dealing nature see Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.6.

[20] Cyrus and money for Sparta: Thuc. 2.65.12; Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.2-3; 5.3-7. See also: (i) Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.1 where Cyrus had asked the Spartans to "show themselves as good friends to him as he was to them in the war against Athens"; (ii) Isok. *Pax* 98 and *Pan.* 104 where the author reckons that Sparta sanctioned Klearchos' command officially; (iii) Plut. *Artax.* 6.3 where Plutarch tells us that the Spartans ordered Klearchos to give Cyrus "every assistance".

turned a Nelsonian eye to Denard's flamboyant activities in the Comores, which certainly could not have succeeded without the "sedentary" support of the nearby French authorities, i.e. the naval base and garrison of French Foreign *légionnaires* maintained on Mayotte, one of the Comorian islands. At his recent trial Denard was hailed as a true patriot by both the prosecution and the defence. Moreover, several French officials even stood up and "testified that he had always acted with France in mind even if the state could not publicly condone his actions."[21] Again, a case of a nation-state spring cleaning its back-yard without actually getting its hands dirty.

In the strict sense of the definition, a soldier-of-fortune is a man who for pay, or for the pure love of adventure, fights under the flag of any country. In the biggest sense, he is the kind of man in any walk of life who wishes to make his own fortune; who, when he sees it coming, leaps to meet it, and turns it to his advantage. In a nutshell, what Klearchos and Denard both craved was power...not the semblance of power. Such men will shake kingdoms.

VI

In Venice there stands a statue that is unmistakably of a mercenary-captain. Of all the equestrian statues in Italy, and there are a good many, none has quite such an air of naked dominance as Verrocchio's three-dimensional portrait of the fifteenth century *condottiere*, Bartolomeo Colleoni.[22] Man and horse appear to bestride not merely a piazza but a whole civilization, and the bland portraits of countless popes and princes are obliterated by this terrible face, this harsh petrified energy. Here, feels the uneasy spectator, is the brutal force that lay behind the colour and refinement of the Renaissance; a man of war, devoid of pity and scruples, incapable of the finesse that was the hallmark of the civilization around him. Here is the mark of the soldier-of-fortune, the tangible link between mercenary past and mercenary present.

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[21] "Bob Denard" *The Independent*, 06 Apr.1993.

[22] In 1476, after 20 years of retirement in his lavish and brilliant court at Malpaga, Colleoni died leaving 100,000 ducats to his employer, Venice, with a stipulation in his will that led to the commissioning of this commemoration of him.

3 *A FREE-LANCE POET*

Strong characters are, as a rule, rough, disagreable and aggressive.

Charles de Gaulle *Le Fils de l'epée*

Polybios once wrote that it was impossible for a man lacking in the experiences of warlike operations actually to write about war itself (**12.25g.1**). The same could easily be said of the tactical component of warfare, the battle. It is within the arena of the battlefield that a soldier witnesses the greatest violence in war. For him it is a wildly unstable physical and emotional environment; a world of boredom and bewilderment, of triumph and terror, of anger and angst, of courage and cowardice. For the soldier-of-fortune, both past and present, this is the chaotic world where he earns his daily bread.

It was Archilochos of Paros who once claimed that his spear was the provider of his daily bread. Archilochos, unlike my two previous colourful characters, is a voice from the mercenary ranks. However, before I let this voice speak, I must attend to the so-called *Autobiographical Fallacy* and thus meet the possible criticism of those who see Archilochos' poetry as literary fiction.

The question whether a poet is speaking for himself or simply adopting a persona, is usually unanswerable. For me, as a historian, it is also unimportant. When a poet adopts a persona, he judges that his listeners will find it interesting and effective. Its veracity as autobiography is unknowable; its value as evidence for social history is unimpaired.

Of course, many scholars simply do not recognise Archilochos as anything other than a skilful poet who could easily adjust his poet persona to suit the work in hand. On the other hand, even if our Archilochos is not genuine and the ostensibly autobiographical details are plain fiction, there would have been characters like him at large in the Archaic Greek world: if Archilochos had never existed, it would have been necessary to invent him. Besides, to the Parians and Thasians his poetry[1] would literally be what Archilochos is saying, and, it does all seem to hang together and fit the historical context. In any case, the standing of Archilochos himself is really of secondary importance to a historian compared with the vignettes painted in his poetry. In this narrative, therefore, I mean "Archilochos or the persona he is adopting". Naturally, as a historian, I shall put Archilochos into

[1] Sources used for the Archilochos fragments are as follows:
(i) Edmonds J.M. *Elegy and Iambus, Vol.II*, Harvard University Press (Cambridge Mass. 1954).
(ii) Lasserre F. *Archiloque: Fragments*, (Paris 1958).
(iii) Davenport G. *Archilochos, Sappho, Alkman: Three Lyric Poets of the Late Greek Bronze Age*, University of California Press (Berkeley & LA 1980) 19-76.

a historical time frame. There is a sound reason for doing so: it does, at the very least, demonstrate that the phenomenon of hoplite-mercenary service was not just confined to the Classical period alone.

Archilochos refers to Gyges, the Lydian ruler who perished in battle sometime between 652 BC and 644 BC, as a man of wealth and power (**F.25**),[2] a fact picked up by Herodotos in his account of Gyges' rise to the top: "He [Gyges] is mentioned in the iambic verses of Archilochos of Paros who lived about the same time" (**1.12**). Incidentally, Herodotos actually talks of the Lydian King's vast fortune a couple of paragraphs later (**1.14**). Our poet also recalls the destruction of Magnesia (**F.20**); this splendid Ionian city-state was sacked by the Kimmerians just after the demise of Gyges. These nomads had inhabited the northern shores of the Black Sea from the Crimea to the Caucasus around the beginning of the seventh century BC. But, under pressure from the Scythians, they were forced to migrate south into Anatolia, leaving only a rump of a kingdom to survive in the Crimea itself. On their journey southward, the Kimmerians were attacked and held at bay by the armies of Urartu, but by 675 BC they had overthrown Midas' kingdom of Phrygia. The Assyrian records show them causing continual trouble from the second-quarter of the seventh century BC onwards, and the rapid growth of Lydia under Gyges, also attracted the Kimmerians' attention, Gyges finally falling in battle and his capital, Sardis, being subsequently stormed. Beyond the smoking ruins of Sardis lay the prosperous East Greek cities of Ionia ripe and ready for the picking, amongst them was Magnesia.

In addition, Archilochos refers to a total eclipse of the sun (**F.74**).[3] This solar event could either be dated to early April 648 BC or late June 660 BC; the latter was total at Thasos but not at Paros. Archilochos did not reach old age, being slain in combat. His dramatic and turbulent life, therefore, falls entirely within the first two-thirds of the seventh century BC.

I

According to literary tradition, Archilochos was the son of Telesikles, the son of Tellis, a prominent Parian citizen (**Paus. 10.28.3**). He was, however, also born of a slave named Eripo (**Kritias, ap. Ael. *VH* 10.13**) and consequently a bastard; a fact that could have left its mark on him for life. He thus grew up with a "chip on his shoulder", which coupled with his obvious genius, compelled him to sing about himself.

Nevertheless, in due course something that looked like a possible career opened up before him, as before thousands of young and landless Greeks at this time, with the offer of a place in a colony which his father was to lead to the northern Aegean island of Thasos. There, hopefully, would

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[2] All fragments, unless specified, are from Edmonds; English translations, unless specified, are my own.

[3] The first two lines of this fragment remind us of *Ecc.* 1.9: "...and there is no new thing under the sun."

be a plot of fertile land for each colonist, and perhaps the chance of a small fortune from the gold mines, which existed both on the island - already, according to Herodotos, heavily exploited by the Phoenicians during the Bronze Age (**2.44; 6.67**) - and on the Thracian mainland opposite. The Parian colonization of Thasos has been dated to circa 680 BC.

It appears that our young colonist left his homeland without tears:

ἔα Πάρον καὶ σῦκα κεῖνα καὶ θαλάσσιον βίον

(F.51)

Bah! Paros, those figs and the life of the sea!

Likewise, it seems that Thasos was no island paradise either:

ἥδε δ' ὥστ' ὄνου ῥάχις ἕστηκεν ὕλης ἀγρίης ἐπιστεφής·

(F.21)

This island crowned with savage wood
Stands like the backbone of an ass.

Besides, there was trouble with the "Thracian dogs", a ferocious and warlike people who posed a serious threat to this budding colony. Initially, *the Parians had drawn up a treaty with them*, promising not to meddle with local Thracian mining operations. Nevertheless, the settlers could not resist the obvious temptation to out-smart the natives and the treaty was soon in tatters; skirmishes with the Thracians became commonplace (**Archil. F.114, cf F.6; F.97a**):

Θάσον δε τὴν τρισοιζύρην πόλιν

(F.129)

Thasos, thrice-wretched city.

Archilochos, as one of the Parian citizens of this fledgling colony, would have taken an active part in these local difficulties.

At Thasos, Archilochos fell in love. The girl's name was Neoboule, the daughter of Lykambes. He had spotted her when:

ἔχουσα θαλλὸν μυρσίνης ἐτέρπετο
ῥοδῆς τε καλὸν ἄνθος, ἡ δέ οἱ κόμη
ὤμους κατεσκίαζε καὶ μετάφρενα.

(F.29)

She held a sprig of Myrtle she had picked
And the beautiful flower of the rose bush that pleased her most
While her long hair veiled her shoulder and back.

And so he vowed to himself:

εἰ γὰρ ὣς ἐμοὶ γένοιτο χεῖρα Νεοβούλης θιγεῖν.

(F.71)

O that I might but touch Neoboule's hand.[4]

The smitten Archilochos firmly believed that he had been accepted; but something went wrong because her father changed his mind, broke his word, and married Neoboule to someone else (**Archil. F.94; F.96; F.99, cf Lasserre 42/Davenport 195**). Perhaps Lykambes felt some doubt about this turbulent and fierce young man. The knowledge that during a Parian defeat at the hands of the Thracians Archilochos had fled with all speed, abandoning his shield to the enemy, probably rankled in Lykambes' mind. What made this particular episode worse - plenty of other men no doubt had tossed aside their shields in the rout - was that Archilochos had composed a poem about the event:

Ἀσπίδι μὲν Σαΐων τις ἀγάλλεται, ἣν παρὰ θάμνῳ ἔντος
ἀμώμητον κάλλιπον οὐκ ἐθέλων·
αὐτὸν δ' ἔκ μ' ἐσάωσα· τί μοι μέλει ἀσπὶς ἐκείνη;
ἐρρέτω· ἐξαῦτις κτήσομαι οὐ κακίω.

(F.6)

Some Saian warrior now struts with my shield
Blameless armament I threw down by a bush and ran.
What do I care for that shield?
Let the wretched thing go to hell!
I'll get myself another just as good.

If that robust realist, Archilochos, threw away his shield, we can, with justification, assume it was a hoplite shield. He would have hardly left his shield behind if it had been anything but an encumberance, especially if he could have had the safer option of throwing the shield over his back

[4] Davenport 232.

as he turned tail and fled. Moreover, if no discredit had been attached to the event, he would not have troubled to have composed a boastful lyric about it. Finally, in F.2, he does emphatically say that his weapon is the spear (*τὸ δόρυ*), i.e. the single thrusting-spear common to hoplites. Whatever the reason, the wedding was off. According to ancient literary gossip, Archilochos fired off at Lykambes and his family a torrent of verbal abuse so savage that they were said to have hanged themselves (**e.g. Schol. Hor. *Epist.* 6.15**): modern scholars have suggested that what the words actually mean is that they would hang their heads in utter shame. In any case, according to Kritias, having between this quarrel and the loss of his shield made himself "unpopular in Thasos" (**ap. Ael. *VH* 10.13**), he threw up everything on the island and went out into the world a renegade. Following his bent, Archilochos became a mercenary soldier:

καὶ δὴ 'πίκουρος ὥστε Κὰρ κεκλήσομαι.

(F.24)

And I shall be called a soldier-of-fortune like a Carian.[5]

Naturally, there is no conclusive evidence that Archilochos operated as a mercenary, but equally, there is no proof that he did not act in such a capacity. His poetry does suggest that he was sometimes low enough in funds for the prospect to be somewhat attractive:

προτείνω χεῖρα καὶ προΐσσομαι.

(F.130)

I hold out my hand and beg.

Or:

Τοῖς θεοῖς τιθεῖο πάντα· πολλάκις μὲν ἐκ κακῶν ἄνδρας
ὀρθοῦσιν μελαίνῃ κειμένους ἐπὶ χθονί, πολλάκις δ'ἀνατρέπουσι
καὶ μάλ' εὖ βεβηκότας ὑπτίους κλίνουσ'· ἔπειτα πολλὰ γίγνεται
κακά, καὶ βίου χρῆμῃ πλανᾶται καὶ νόου παρήορος.

(F.56)

Attribute all to the gods
They pick a man up,
Stretched on the black loam,
And set him on his two feet,
Firm and then again

[5] Edmonds. Cf Lassere 27; Davenport 169.

Shake solid men again until
They fall backward
Into the worse of luck,
Wandering hungry,
wild of mind.[6]

Pindar, also, once commented on Archilochos' sad financial affairs: *πενία καὶ ἀπορία* (***Pyth.* 2.53-8**). More importantly, however, although Archilochos' wanderings had probably been restricted to the northern shores of the Aegean, his fragmentary verses have crystalised, in my mind, the hardship, the defiance, the lust, the drunken and boastful spirit of the universal soldier-of-fortune.

Despite his nihilistic youth, in rigorous middle-age Archilochos was able to return home. This was not to the miseries of Thasos but to Paros where the islanders had, not for the first time, defeated their neighbours, the larger island of Naxos - ruled by those "mighty lords of Naxos"[7] - in what appears to be a desperate campaign for the Parians, who had to call upon the aid of their colonists on Thasos:

'Ερξίη, πῆι δ' αὖτ' ἄνολβος ἀθροίζεται στρατός

(Lasserre 80)

ἦκε νῦν· πάντεσ γαρ[
ἀμφικαπνίουσιν[
νηυσὶν ὀξείαι δ[
δηΐων, αὐαίνετ[αι δὲ
ἠλίωι, θράσος τε.[
οἳ μέγ' ἰμείροντες[
Ναξίων δῦναι φά[λαγγας
καὶ φυτῶν τομὴν.[
ἄνδρες ἴσχουσιν[
τοῦτό κεν λεὼι μ[
ὡς ἀμηνιτει παρ' ἠ[
καὶ κασιγνήτων κ[
τέων ἀπέθρισαν[
ἤριπεν πληγῆισι δ[
ταῦτά μοι θυμὸς[
νειόθεν· φόβου δὲ[
ἀλλ' ὅμως θανόντ[

[6] Davenport 23. Cf Pind. *Paen.* 4.32-5: "Dear to men is his own city, comrades and kinsmen, so that he is truly content. But to foolish men belong a love for things afar."

[7] See Lasserre 102 and commentary

Ἰ'νῶθι νῦν εἶτ' οι[
ῥήμαθ' ὃς μέλλε[ι
οἱ μὲν ἐν Θάσωι π[20
καὶ Τορωναίων...[
οἳ δ' ἐν ὠκείησι[ι νηυσὶ
καινὸν ἔκ Πάρου τ[
καὶ κασιγνήτοισιν[
θυμὸς ἀλκάμ[ο]ν τ[25
πῦρ ὅ δὴ νῦν ἀμφὶ πύ[ργον
ἐν προαστίωι κε[νωθέντ'
γῆν ἀεικίζουσιν ἡ[μῖν
Ἐρξίη, κακαδραμό[ντες
τῶι 'ς ὅδον στέλλε[σθε 30
μηδὲ δεξιοὺς επ[

(Lasserre 81)

Erxia, Defender how can we muster
Our scattered troops? The campfires
Lift their smoke around the city.
The enemy's sharp arrows grow
Like bristles on our ships. The dead
Parch in the sun. The charges are bolder,
Knifing deep into Naxos lines.
We scythe them down like tall grass
But they hardly feel our attacks.
The people will believe that we accept
With indifference these locust men
Who stamp our parent's fields to waste.
My heart must speak, for fear
And grief keep my neighbours silent.
Listen hear me. Help comes from Thasos,
Too long held back by Toronaios;
And from Paros in the fast ships.
The captains are furious, and rage
To attack as soon as the auxiliaries [from Thasos?]
Are here. Smoke hangs over the city.
Send us men Erxias. The auguries
Are good. I know you will come.[8]

[8] Davenport 175; see note also.

And so, it was as an honest hoplite-citizen that Archilochos died, slain by a Naxian, one Kallondes nicknamed the "Crow" (**Heraclid. Pont. *Pol.* 8; Plut. *The Slow Vengeance of the Deity* 17**).

As a final note on his life, in 1961 a grave marker turned up on Paros close to the Elitas shrine; a mid-sixth century BC column cap, cut to carry a statue and inscribed in fourth century BC script with this dedication: "Archilochos son of Telesikles, the Parian lies here, where Dokimas son of Neokreon set up this monument."[9] It appears that the Parians built a shrine for Archilochos, and later, perhaps even treated him as a demi-god. According to the *Palatine Anthology*, however, the tomb of Archilochos was located elsewhere, hardby the sea and bore for inscription: "Pass softly by, good wayfarer, or you'll stir up the hornets that settle on his tomb" (**71 (Gaetuliais)**). For those who believe in the *Beau Geste* types, a fitting epitaph!

II

Sooner or later settlements had to fight in order to establish or maintain their colony not only against local peoples but often against neighbouring colonists. As we have already seen, the Parian settlement of Thasos was no exception. It was in this bubbling Aegean cauldron of colonization that Archilochos experienced the harsh realities of soldiering. His deep involvement in the soldier's life is abundantly clear: fragments contain references to spears, shields, swords, javelins, bows, slings, trophies, phalanxes and battlements. In one sense, the usefulness of his poetry as a historical source stems from the fact that the poet was flourishing during the evolutionary epoch of the hoplite panoply and the unique tactics of the Greek city-state phalanx.

Sometime around the end of the eighth century BC Greek foot soldiers began to arm themselves with full-protective body armour constructed of bronze: helmet, corslet, greaves, belly, arm, thigh, foot and ankle guards (the last five items were soon to be discarded). This armour was designed specifically for use in close-quarter combat. The Greek foot soldier now attacked with a thrusting-spear some two to three metres in length, opting to close with the enemy and jab his opponent head-on.

On the left arm of this new warrior was firmly clamped a circular wooden shield, leather-lined and faced with bronze, and some seventy to eighty centimetres in diameter; the so-called *hoplon*. This shield was so radically different in concept from its ox-hide predecessor, that it is believed by some scholars that it was from this piece of equipment that the foot soldier derived his name.

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[9] Daux G. "Chronique", *BCH 85* (1961) 846-7.

hoplite.[10] By the aid of a detachable interior forearm strap (ὁ πόρπαξ) and an accompanying hand grip situated at the rim (ἡ ἀντιλαβή), the hoplite could manage the unusually great weight of his large soup-bowl shaped shield, warding off weapon blows solely with the left arm, or at times resting its upper lip on his left shoulder to conserve vital energy.[11] The peculiar profile of the hoplite shield, however, was probably due to the effectiveness of such a shape against stabbing or missile weapons - a flat shield, such as a *pelta*, would have offered a flatter surface, with less chance that blows would glance off. The mechanics of the hoplite shield, therefore, meant that the hoplite could only protect his own left flank. For, despite the shield's great weight and size - more or less determined by the length of the bearer's forearm times two - its round shape and the simple fact that it was clamped onto the hoplite's left arm, meant the shield offered poor protection for the entire body. There was little chance that a hoplite could save himself from most of the traditional sources of assault on the front, flanks and rear. The hoplite shield, therefore, offered no material advantage over its predecessor in isolated skirmishes or individual duels. More importantly, this shield could not be slung over the back, as previous shields had been, to protect those who turned tail and ran.

These warriors now had no other intention but to stand firm together - if the formation was well maintained, the hoplite shield would offer some protection to the hoplite's left-hand neighbour's unprotected right side - and push ever forward against their foe (ὁ ὠθισμός). Here the shield would also act offensively. For, although Thucydides' famous passage presupposes that hoplites stood chest-on to the enemy in the melee (**5.71.1**), I would suggest that this only applied to those hoplites who could have jabbed with their spears, i.e. the front two ranks of the phalanx. On the other hand, hoplites stationed in ranks three and up were not able to bring their spears to bear. Consequently, these individuals could have easily tucked their left-shoulder into their convexed shield and shunted the hoplite to his front.[12] The net result would have resembled the tight scrummaging of rugby

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[10] The noun τὸ ὅπλον, in the singular, is in fact very rare in Greek in the sense of *hoplite shield*: the one notable example being Diod. 15.44.3, when he specifically says: οἱ μὲν πρότερον ἀπὸ τῶν ἀσπίδων ὁπλῖται καλούμενοι (**cf 23.2.1**). The common noun is ἡ ἀσπίς. If, therefore, *hoplites* had been so-called because of their shield, they should have been οἱ ἀσπίσται! τὰ ὅπλα, in the plural, however, is very frequent in the sense *arms*, and J.F.Lazenby (private correspondence) suggests οἱ ὁπλῖται = *armed men*. Indeed, the noun τὰ ὅπλα is often employed for οἱ ὁπλῖται, as in Thuc. 4.74.3. Incidentally, modern Greek still retains this sense with the noun τὰ ὅπλα = *arms*, and the corresponding participle ὁπλισμένος = *armed*. If we take a quick look at Polybios, we notice that he employes the noun τὰ ὅπλα to readily describe *shields arms* (**e.g. 2.2.11; 4.2; 4.58.11; 69.6; 71.11**). If we look at a couple of specific examples from Polybios: τὰ ὅπλα – *(i) Macedonian shield* (**18.23.4; 26.5,7,12**); (ii) *Roman arms* (**18.28.9; 38.15.7**).

[11] See for example: Grave Stele Ap.3379 National Archaeological Museum, Athens; Grave Stele #385 Archaeological Museum, Peiraeus.

[12] For pushing with body and shield in the melee see: (i) Thuc. 4.43.3; 96 passim; 6.70.2; Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.19, cf 6.4.14; Polyain. 2.3.4; 3.9.27; 4.3.8; Hdt. 7.225; 9.62; Ar. *Vesp.* 1081-5 = hoplites; (ii) Xen. *Cyr.* 7.1.33 = Egyptian close-ordered infantry; (iii) Asklep. 5.2; Arr. *Tact.* 10.12; Ael. *Tact.* 14.16; Polyb. 18.30.4 = Macedonians phalangites; (iv) Livy 30.34.2-3 = Republican Roman legionaries. N.b. Theokritos 24.125: Castor's advice to Herakles was "to put his shoulder behind his shield."

football at Twickenham. Hoplites would have massed in files, usually eight to twelve ranks in depth,[13] which not only promoted the offensive power of the thrusting-spear but also offered mutual protection via an accumulation of shields. Toe-to-toe clashes, therefore, between opposing phalanxes were not graceful or imaginative affairs, but required the basic raw ingredients of disciplined cohesion and stout moral and physical courage. This was the school of infantry in which Archilochos had learnt his trade.

III

The poet's vision of warfare is very down-to-earth. Archilochos could be known as the first "war-poet" in the sense of one who treats in his works his very personal experiences as a soldier. His representation of war is one which is squalid and inglorious, it involves both suffering and the loss of life. Archilochos does not offer a dramatic confrontation of brilliant, glittering heroes; on the contrary, we are served up an unending struggle against the hardships of violent conflict, alleviated from time to time by an excess of wine:

ἀλλ' ἄγε, σὺν κώθωνι θοῆς διὰ σέλματα νηὸς
φοίτα καὶ κοίλων πώματ' ἄφελκε κάδων,
ἄγρει δ' οἶνον ἐρυθρὸν ἀπὸ τρυγός· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡμεῖς
νήφειν ἐν φυλακῇ τῇδε δυνησόμεθα.

(F.4)

Come then, pass the mug[14] around the deck
And keep it coming from the hollow barrel,
Let us drain the red wine down to the dregs,
For we no more than others, can remain sober,
On this watch.

and even, perhaps, the occasional bout of fornication:

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[13] E.g. the Athenians were 8 deep at Delion (**Thuc. 4.94.1**), and again at the Peiraeus (**Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.34**); the Spartans at Mantineia were an average of 8 deep (**Thuc. 5.68.3**), while at Leuktra they opted for a phalanx 12 deep (**Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.11**); the Confederates agreed on a maximum of 16 deep at the Nemea (**Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.13,18**); the Syracusans before Syracuse had also formed up 16 deep (**Thuc. 6.67.2**); however, the Thebans stood 25 deep at Delion (**Thuc. 4.93.4**) and at Leuktra their phalanx was beefed-up so as to stand "no less than fifty shields deep" (**Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.12**); curiously, Xenophon informs us that 4 deep was the "customary order" of the Ten Thousand (***An.* 1.2.15, cf 7.1.23**).

[14] Ο *κώθων*: a drinking vessel with a small handle, convenient for stowing away and thus used by soldiers, believed to have originated from Sparta. See also: Ar. *Eq.* 600; *Ach.* 549; Xen. *Cyr.* 1.2.8; Plut. *Lyk.* 9.4; Kritias 34d; *IG* II^2 47.6.

καὶ πεσεῖν δρήστην ἐπ' ἀσκὸν κἀπὶ γαστρὶ γαστέρα
προσβαλεῖν μηρούς τε μηροῖς.

(F.72)

To fall upon a whore's belly
Ramming groin against groin
Thigh against thigh.

The life is made more endurable in the long term only by tough soldierly fortitude. For, when the packed formations of hoplites collided upon the battlefield, what happened was quite impersonal. Pressed forward by those behind them into the anonymous strangers in that part of the enemy phalanx facing them, though it was a pair of warriors who thrust or slashed each other with spear or sword for a few brief moments before one went down, there was nothing personal in the exchange. Here we do not witness the choreographic encounters of heroes. Thus - though every man dies his own death - dead is dead:

Οὔ τις αἰδοῖος μετ' ἀστῶν οὐδὲ περίφημος θανὼν γίγνεται·
χάριν δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦ ζοοῦ διώκομεν ζῶντες ἔτι·
κάκιστα δ' αἰεὶ τῷ θανόντι γίγηεται.

(F.63)

No man dead
Feels his fellows' praise.
We strive instead,
Alive, for the living's honour,
And neglected dead
Can neither honour
Nor glory in praise.[15]

In the same realistic, matter-of-fact fashion Wilfred Owen captures the last dying pulses of a young soldier in the trenches of Flanders:

He lost his colour very far from here,
Poured down shell-holes till the veins ran dry,
And half his lifetime lapsed in the hot race,
And leap of purple spurted from his thigh.[16]

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[15] Davenport 231. In the same vein, Menander penned the line: "Weep not the dead, for tears do not avail an unperceiving corpse" (**F.705(K)**).

[16] *Disabled*, Oct.1917.

Life is what really matters. Compare, for example, Tyrtaios F.10.1-2, where the poet promotes the glories of dying in the front rank of the phalanx, or Alkaios when he proclaims: "*τὸ γὰρ ἄρευι καταθάνην κάλον*" (**F.400 (Campbell)**). At the root of the psychology of war is the myth of glory, first introduced into Western thought by the ancient Greeks and sustained by almost all national and religious authorities of every nation-state ever since. Even today, where modern technology has usurped the traditional role of the individual soldier, the myth that war provides an opportunity for unique virtue remains. No army, to my knowledge, has yet abandoned the custom of awarding battle decorations. Moreover, military institutions remain cluttered with a vast array of trophies from past conflicts and the promise that the brave acts of soldiers will live on in the collective memories of the people remain, especially for the young, as seductive as ever. In reality, the closer you get to the "front line", the fewer abstract nouns you are likely to hear. Archilochos rejects the over-idealized picture of war, especially the cliché-ridden lines.[17] To him war was a horrible trade, where men fought like brutes and hideous things were done. War was to be condemned, as Wilfred Owen once said, as "the old lie":

> What passing bells for these who die as cattle?
> Only the monstrous anger of the guns.
> Only the stuttering rifles rapid rattle
> Can patter out their hasty orisons.[18]

IV

When Archilochos declares himself to be both a servant of the "lord of the battle-cry" - i.e. Enyalios - and also an expert in the delightful gift of the Muses (**F.6**) he is making a double commitment to both war and poetry. Of course, he is not necessarily in the first part of his utterance informing his listener that he is a mercenary soldier, anymore than in the second he is declaring himself a professional bard who earns a living from his verse. Nevertheless, Enyalios is Ares at his most barbaric; Ares the awesome war-god, the fully armoured, brazen warrior whose battle-chariot is harnessed by *Φόβος καὶ*

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[17] E.g. Archilochos' *Shield Fragment* can be considered as an antithesis to Tyrtaios F.11.11-6:

> Those who stand shoulder to shoulder go with a will
> Into the mellay and the van, of these are fewer slain,
> These save the rearward men; as for them that turn to
> Fear and all their courage is lost - no man could explain
> In words every ill that falls upon a dishonoured man.

Although, to be fair to Tyrtaios, his war-poetry does also throw a little light upon the horrors of close-quarter combat, especially with his graphic descriptions of battle wounds (**F.1.18-23; 10.25-7**).

[18] *Anthem for Doomed Youth*, Sept.1917.

Δειμός, an overwhelming, insatiable battle-field deity, totally destructive and man-slaughtering (**e.g. *Il.* 17.210f; 18.309**). So here Archilochos announces that war, as he practises it, is both hideous and cruel, and just like Cyrus' Ten Thousand he will raise a war-cry to Enyalios prior to charging into the fray (**Xen. *An.* 1.8.18; 5.2.14**).

Although Archilochos stripped war of its sham, the warrior-poet did look for virtues that could cover the professional soldier:

> Οὐ φιλέω μέγαν στρατηγὸν οὐδὲ διαπεπλιγμένον
> οὐδέ βοστρύχοισι γαῦρον οὐδ' ὑπεξυρημένον,
> ἀλλά μοι σμικρός τις εἴη καὶ περὶ κνήμας ἰδεῖν ῥοικός,
> ἀσφαλέως βεβηκὼς ποσσί, καρδίης πλέως.
>
> **(F.58)**
>
> I despise a tall or swaggering general,
> Or one proud of his curls or part-shaven
> Give me a man who's short and bow-legged,
> Set firm on his feet and full of guts.

Archilochos refuses to admire the soldier who is outwardly foppish,[19] a characteristic that represents the vanities of epic valour. What a professional hoplite-mercenary required was a no nonsense commander who stood firm in the phalanx rather than the showy handsome strategos who preferred to strut around the agora. Polybios, talking about the Akhaian League strategoi, thought that they, as individuals, were much more concerned about the size of their retinue and the cut of their dress than matters military: these dandies were finally hounded out of the agora and forced into an early retirement by the machinations of one of the League's finest strategoi, Philopoemen (**11.8.4-6; 9.1-5**). Besides, the role of the strategos, who himself fought and often perished in the front rank, was "nearly exhausted with the choosing of a battle ground to suit the phalanx"[20] and, therefore, the hoplite-mercenary leader had to show personal courage and lead his men through example; otherwise he was quickly despised:

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[19] One wonders what Archilochos thought of his friend Glaukos with the well-curled hair? (**F.57**).

[20] Snodgrass A.M. *Arms and Armour of the Greeks*, Thames & Hudson (London 1967) 62. For commanders who fell in the melee see: (i) Hdt. 7.224 - Leonidas, Thermopylai; (ii) Thuc. 1.63.3 - Kallias, Poteidaia; (iii) Thuc. 2.79 - Xenophon, Hestiodoros and Phanamachos, Spartolos; (iv) Thuc. 3.109.1 - Eurylochos, Olpai; (v) Thuc. 4.44.2 - Lykophron, Solygeia; (vi) Thuc. 4.101.2 - Hippokrates, Delion; (vii) Thuc. 5.10.8-11 - Brasidas and Kleon, Amphipolis; (viii) Thuc. 5.74.3 - Laches and Nikostratos, First Mantineia; (ix) Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.6 - Hippokrates, Chalkedon; (x) Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.13 Kleombrotos, Leuktra; (xi) Plut. *Pel.* 32.7 - Pelopidas, Kynoskephalai; (xii) Diod. 15.87.1 - Epameinondas, Second Mantineia.

ἄψυχον ἄνδρα λαμβάνειν συνέμπορον

(Lasserre 283)

Courage comes with the man
Or he's no soldier of mine.[21]

Professional soldiers respect a leader who is competent. They admire a leader who is competent and bold. When he is an accomplished student of war, leads boldly, and also savours gambling his own life, he aquires a mystique. Cautious leaders will shake their heads at this love of danger and condemn it as dare-devilry, which it often is. They secretly admire it and wish they had as much faith in their luck and the power to lead lesser men that the mystique confers. Klearchos certainly had courage, for in the depths of danger his men "were ready to obey him implicitly and would choose no other to command them" (*ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς δεινοῖς ἤθελον αὐτου ἀκούειν σφόδρα καὶ οὐκ ἄλλον ἠρούντο οἱ στρατιῶται·*: **Xen. *An.* 2.6.11**). In short, no commander can offer a soldier sufficient payment for his life. But a good commander can inspire a soldier to give it to him. Archilochos' die-hard general is, in truth, an antithesis to Siegfried Sassoon's champagne-and-caviar general:

"Good morning, good morning!" the General said
When we met him last week on the way to the line.
Now the soldiers he smiled at are most of 'em dead,
And we're cursing his staff for incompetent swine.
"He's a cheery old card", grunted Harry to Jack
As they slogged up to Arras with rifle and pack.

But he did for them both by his plan of attack.[22]

It has been said of Marshal Joffre that while his dusty sweating columns fell back along the baking roads of northern France towards the capital, he stopped work exactly at noon, took his seat at a table laid with gleaming crisp cloth, silver and crystal outside his headquarters and spent the next two hours fortifing the inner man. For the professional hoplite, at least, the ideal Greek strategos needed to have a definite presence on (and off) the battlefield, like the Spartan king, Agesilaos, who toiled alongside

[21] Davenport 242. Or in the words of Napoleon: "Bravery cannot be brought with money" - *Correspondence*, 9.7527.

[22] Denmark Hill Hospital, Apr.1917. Sassoon, like most front-line warriors, had very little respect for - as the American's aptly call them - the *REMFs*. In *Base Details*, he explains:

If I were fierce and bald and short of breath,
I'd live with scarlet Majors at the Base,
And speed glum heroes up the line to death.

his men in simple dress and thereby gained not only "their obedience and their affection" but also their grudging respect (**Xen. *Ages.* 6.4-7, cf *Hell.* 4.1.30**). Joffre's sedentary role would have deeply puzzled Agesilaos. The Spartan would have noted that the Frenchman failed altogether to show himself to the enemy, and that he probably saw not a single German throughout the 1914 campaign...unless the German was a POW!

As well as good strategoi the professional hoplite needed to stand alongside good comrades within the serried ranks of a mercenary phalanx; men, according to Tyrtaios, who have already endured "the sight of bloody slaughter and stood firm and reached forward to strike the enemy" (**F.12.11-2**). Tyrtaios' veteran has already conquered the fear of the unknown. On the other hand:

> Γλαῦκ', ἐπίκουρος ἀνὴρ τόσσον φίλος ἔστε[23] μάχηται.
>
> **(F.14)**
>
> Glaukos, a soldier-of-fortune is a good friend,
> Until it comes to battle.

Here Archilochos sings of kinship and comradeship. But even boon-companions might prove cowards if life and limb were at stake. And thus an "old soldier's" natural suspicion is roused and his survivalistic instincts take command:

> -υ-υ- σὺ γὰρ δὴ παρὰ φίλων ἀπάγχεαι
>
> **(Lasserre 119)**
>
> Forget your enemies,
> It is your friends you've got to watch.

Glaukos, whose name occurs in several of Archilochos' fragments (**F.14; F.54; F.57; F.70; F.114**), may have been a good comrade as our poet addresses him in a familiar tone, which may even suggest that they were the sharers of the same military adventures. Of Glaukos himself, we now have a precious relic. A monument was discovered by the French in 1952 in the agora of Archaic Thasos with the following inscription in Archaic script: Γλάυϑο εἰμὶ μνῆ- ματό Λεπτίνεω ἔ- θεσαν δέμε οἱ Βρέντ- εω παίδες.[24] The inscription was on a marble block set in a stepped Poros base (still in-situ)

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[23] Lasserre 6: ἔσκε = *he was*, B-mss (Flick); τὸν σὸν (τὸν σοφὸν) φίλον = *a street-wise buddy*.

[24] Meiggs R. & Lewis D.M. *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, Clarendon Press (Oxford 1969) #3: Parian letters (C=β; Ω-ο,ου; O=ω; [-]=η). See also Jeffery L.H. *Local Scripts of Archaic Greece*, Clarendon Press (Oxford 1990) pl.58, 61. For honours paid to founders of colonies, see especially Thuc. 5.11.1. The monument is now tucked away in the Thasos Archaeological Museum.

dated circa 625-600 BC. It seems that it was erected not long after his death: Glaukos, we surmise, had lived in Thasos to a ripe old age.

V

The heart (ὁ θῦμός) is that part of the man where rage and courage, fear and desire stalk:

> Θυμέ, θύμ' ἀμηχάνοισι κήδεσιν κυκώμενε,
> ἀνάδυ, δυσμενῶν δ' ἀλέξευ προσβαλὼν ἐναντίον στέρνον ἐνδόκοισιν,
> ἐχθρῶν πλησίον καταστὰθεὶς ἀσφαλέως·
> καὶ μήτε νικῶν ἀμφάδην ἀγάλλεο
> μήτε νικηθεὶς ἐν οἴκῳ καταπεσὼν ὀδύρεο·
> ἀλλὰ χαρτοῖσίν τε χαῖρε καὶ κακαῖσιν ἀσχάλα μὴ λίην·
> γίγνωσκε δ' οἷος ῥυσμὸς ἀνθρώπους ἔχει.
>
> **(F.66)**

> Heart, my heart, torn by complexity,
> Stand tall and defend yourself against the enemy
> Setting a brave face in the attack, move back not an inch.
> But never crow in victory, or mope hangdog in loss.
> Overdo neither sorrow or joy,
> Knowing what temperament governs man.[25]

The instinct to kill comes with experience, it is not taught. To this, add self-confidence and professional skill, add resource, cunning, no nonsense about fair play, a strong disregard for human life and suffering - especially the other man's - and you have an efficient professional soldier. This is why "old soldiers" are best; they have survived the longest. The longer a man survives, the more battles he wins. The more he wins, the more deeply the killer instinct is graven upon his nature, a fact clearly understood by Archilochos. He also understood that bravery and boldness were not everything. All men were brave, all men were cowards, depending on the circumstances. This theme of conquering one's animal fear also crops up a number of times in the fragments of Tyrtaios' war poetry. For example:

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[25] Cf Wilfred Owen *Letter to His Brother*, 14 May 1917: "The sensations of going over the top are about as exhilarating as those dreams of falling over a precipice, when you see the rocks at the bottom surging up to you. I woke up without being squashed. Some didn't...Then we were caught in a tornado of shells. The various *waves* were broken up, and we carried on like a crowd moving off a cricket-field [cf Xen. *Hipp.* 2.7-9]. When I looked back and saw the ground all crawling and wormy with wounded bodies, I felt no horror at all, but only an immense exultation at having got through the barrage."

ὦ νέοι, ἀλλὰ μάχεσθε παρ' ἀλλήλοισι μένοντες,
μηδὲ φυγῆς αἰσχρᾶς ἄρχετε μηδὲ φόβου,
ἀλλὰ μέγαν ποιεῖσθε καὶ ἄλκιμον ἐν φρεσὶ θυμόν,
μηδὲ φιλοφυχεῖτ' ἀνδράσι μαρνάμενοι·

(F.10.15-8)[26]

Stand then, young men, shoulder to shoulder and fight;
Do not fear and thus start the foul flight,
But steel the heart within your breasts,
And never flinch when you fight the foe.

Tyrtaios, however, only portrayed his soldiery as bright shining heroes who stood four-square against all and sundry. In Archilochosian reality, you can call upon heart for courage but the result may not be what you want. Some men, records Polybios, are brave in single combat but simply fall to pieces when formed up in ordered ranks and are "sharing the risks with their comrades" (**4.8.9**). Even Field-Marshal Haig admitted that "men are not naturally brave". Pre-battle nerves are common place and, moreover, are not just confined to the ranks either. The Akhaian leader, Aratos, according to Polybios, was noted for his distinct lack of manly courage (**4.8.5**). In particular, he would suffer cramps in the bowels, palpitations of the heart and a sudden loss in colour prior to combat, or so says Plutarch (***Arat.* 29.5-6, cf *Aem.* 19.3; Xen. *Hiero* 6.7**).[27] Much has been made about Archilochos' anti-heroic stance at the dawn of the hoplite age. In the infamous *Shield Fragment* his very flippancy perhaps suggests a particular sensitivity or defensiveness about the loss of such a vital piece of hoplite equipment. However, we can be certain that the mercenary gave up its damnable weight only, as he says, when his very being was in danger.[28]

In fact the hoplite shield was probably the first piece of equipment to be discarded since it could be detached and cast aside most readily, and course, it was also the most awkward part of the panoply to carry. Polybios remarks, during one of his many battle accounts, that the fleeing Aetolians threw away their shields (τὰ ὅπλα) and "with the stigma of this disgrace" managed to evade pursuit (**14.58.11**). After the Syracusans had demolished the Athenians above the city on the heights of Epipolai, we gain the distinct impression that the latter had abandoned helmets, greaves, corslets as

[26] The theme of self-control occurs again in F.10.31-2; F.11.4-5; F.11.21-2 (verbatim repeat of F.10.31-2); F.12.18-9.

[27] Naval tradition has it that Admiral Lord Howe once turned to an officer serving on his flag ship and asked: "Pray tell me Mr- how fear feels. I can see very well how it looks." For pre-battle jitters see also: *Il.* 13.279-83; Polyain. 3.4.8; Thuc. 5.10.8; Ar. *Ach.* 349-51; *Eq.* 1056; *Lys.* 216; *Pax* 1175-6.

[28] For the "crime" of the ἀσπιδαποβλής see, for example: (i) Hdt. 5.95 ref. Alkaios; (ii) Ar. *Vesp.* 22 ref. Kleonymos. See also Plautus *Trinummus* 1028-34: a plea for a return to the "good old days" when a soldier did not throw away his shield.

well as shields in the ensuing rout (*ὅπλα μέντοι ἔτι πλείω ἢ κατὰ τοὺς νεκροὺς ἐλήφθη·*: **Thuc. 7.45.2**). Modern studies and reconstructions of the hoplite panoply have provided us with a number of estimated weights for the combined burden of greaves, corslet, helmet, shield, spear and sword; these estimates range from 50-70lbs.[29] During the Korean War, American GIs had carried a fighting-order which only weighed in at around 40lbs; their fighting-order had consisted of weapon, bayonet, ammunition, a full canteen and various sundry items such as knife, fork and spoon etc. The weight limit was set so as "to preserve tactical unity during an average march into enemy country, when fire was imminent."[30] In addition, when we consider the fact that the average hoplite himself probably weighed no more than 150lbs, his battlefield burden turns out to have been even greater than that of his modern counterpart. What accounts for the particular emphasis on the shield in literature is the natural Greek notion that its loss alone affected everyone in the phalanx: "men wear their helmets and breastplates for their own needs but carry their shield for the men of the entire line" (*ταῦτα μὲν ἑαυτῶν χάριν περιτίθεῖναι, τὴν δὲ ἀσπίδα τῆς κοινῆς τάξεως ἕνεκα*: **Plut. *Mor.* 220a.2**).

The shield was abandoned in the disorderly retreat of a soldier who might have stood his ground to kill or be killed, but as Archilochos relates in another poignant fragment:

> *Ἀσπὶσ μὲν οὐκέτ' ἐστίν,*
> *οὐδ' ἴχνος βέω*
> e.g. [*φίλων ἑταίρων*]
>
> **(F.200)**
>
> My shield is no more,
> Nor do I follow in the steps
> [Of my dear comrades].[31]

For in the utter chaos of the rout:

> *πόδες δὴ κεῖθι τιμιώτατοι*
>
> **(F.132)**
>
> Feet are the most valuable there.[32]

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[29] Hanson V.D. (ed.) *The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece*, Hodder & Stoughton (London 1989) 56.

[30] Marshall S.L.A. *Infantry Operations and Weapon Usage in Korea*, Greenhill (London 1988) 43.

[31] Edmonds.

[32] Ibid. N.b. Davenport 251/Lasserre 106: "Retreat, confusion. That army, they were strong. Hermes saved me."

By proclaiming that he regarded his life more precious than his shield, Archilochos was expressing the view which surely suited the needs of the mercenary who goes from one campaign to another in search of a livelihood, and not in pursuit of death with the unprofitable prospect of posthumous glory. Besides on the battlefield:

ἐρξάτω δ' ἐτήτυμον γὰρ ξυνὸς ἀνθρώποις Ἄρης.

(F.62)

Let him go ahead, for Ares is a true democrat.[33]

Archilochos simply promoted a common sense view which had its own amoral standard of individual integrity, a calculated endurance, linked with a will to survive. We can see, for example, a suitable parallel in Odysseus' dogged determination to live on and return home to Ithaka at all costs, or from Pindar when he says: "To the inexperienced war is pleasant, but he who has had experience of it, in his heart he sorely fears its approach" (***Dance Songs* 110**).[34] It goes without saying that, once experienced, the survivor never forgets this real Dantean nightmare:

The barrage roars and lifts. Then clumsily bowed
With bombs and guns and shovels and battle-gear,
Men jostle and climb to meet the bristling fire.
Lines of grey, muttering faces masked with fear,
They leave their trenches, going over the top,
While time ticks blank and busy on their wrists,
And hope, with furtive eyes and grappling fists,
Flounders in mud. O Jesus, make it stop![35]

Naturally, when the boot was on the other foot and the opposition had collapsed before the violent shove of your phalanx, the pursuers experienced the bloody chase as they ran down their victims with pitiless blood-lust that seemed to overtake soldiers when they themselves are suddenly released from the danger of death in closed-ordered ranks:

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[33] Unlike the "class" conscious poet, Alkaios: "For blazons wound not nor of themselves carry pain, except he that wields them, if he be a noble man" (**F.30**).

[34] Cf *Romeo and Juiliet*: "He jests at scars, that never felt a wound" (**2.2**).

[35] Siegfried Sassoon *Attack*, 6-13.

ἑπτὰ γὰρ νεκρῶν πεσόντων, οὓς ἐμάρψαμεν ποσίν,
χίλιοι φονῆες ἐσμέν·

(F.59)

Of the seven that lie dead whom we cut down in pursuit,
We are the thousand slayers.

Because:

ξείνια δυσμενέσιν λυγρὰ χαριζόμενος

(F.7)

In the hospitality of war
We left them their dead
As a gift to remember us by.[36]

Look at, for example, Siegfried Sassoon's *Remorse*:

Remembering how he saw those Germans run,
Screaming for mercy among the stumps of trees:
Green faced, they dodged and darted: there was one
Livid with terror, clutching at his knees...
Our chaps were sticking 'em like pigs..."O hell!"
He thought - "there's things in war one dare not tell
Poor father sitting safe at home, who reads
Of dying heroes and their deathless deeds".

The British Tommy may not openly talk of the ecstasy of the rout, but Greek hoplites, it seems, experienced no such qualms. Xenophon's Hiero explains: "Words fail one to describe the joy they feel in the rout of the enemy, in the pursuit, in the slaughter of the enemy" (***Hiero* 2.15**).

In terms of casualties, hoplite clashes tended to be one sided affairs.[37] The shock of the contending phalanxes would have been tremendous. The two opposing lines of thrusting-spears

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[36] Davenport 184.

[37] E.g. at Delion the Athenians lost a little under 1,000 men, the victorious Boiotians only suffered half that number (**Thuc. 4.101.1-2**); at Mantineia 1,100 Confederates fell, the Spartans only losing 300 hoplites, while their "allies did not suffer so that any number worth mentioning was missing" (**Thuc. 5.74.2**); at the Nemea the victors, "the Lakedaimonians and their allies", received some 1,100 casualties compared with the 2,800 dead of the Confederates (**Diod. 14.82.2**); the same year saw the battle at Koroneia where some 600 Boiotians fell and only 350 Spartans died in action (**Diod. 14.84.2**); finally Leuktra, where the Spartan army eventually experienced defeat and, according to Diodoros, lost "no less than 4,000 Lakedaimonians", the Boiotians losses only amounting to 300 men (**15.56.4**) - Xenophon reports that only 1,000 "Lakedaimonians as a whole" perished in the disaster, including 400 Spartiates (***Hell.* 6.4.15**).

crossed (and possibly snapped), and the leading ranks were immediately thrust upon each other's weapons by the irresistible pressure from behind. Thucydides, describing the encounter at Delion, tells us that the two sides were soon locked in "stubborn conflict with shield pressed against shield" (*καρτερᾷ μάχῃ καὶ ὠθισμῷ ἀσπίδων ξυνειστήκει*: **4.96.2**). It can be easily imagined that the whole front rank of each phalanx probably went down in the initial crash; however, their comrades stepped forward - or were shoved from behind - over their dead and dying bodies to continue the fight. Xenophon, who was serving under Agesilaos at Koroneia, witnessed for himself this sort of violence as the Spartans "crashed against the Thebans front to front; setting shield against shield they shoved, fought, killed, and were killed" (*ἀντιμέτωπος συνέρραξε τοῖς Θηβαίοις· καὶ συμβαλόντες τὰς ἀσπίδας ἐωθοῦντο, ἐμάχοντο, ἀπέκτεινον, ἀπέθνησκον*: ***Hell.* 4.3.19, cf *Ages.* 2.12**). When the masses of flesh and bronze had been for some time pushing against each other, their order became confused and their spears (if still intact) interlocked. Matters were now held in the balance:

]ῦσα[
]μη[
]μφα[
]ν δ' ἐρεισ[
σ[υμβαλόντε[ς ἀ]σ[πίδας
]ων ξεινίων φειδοίατ[ο
]ων ἀθρόοι γενοίμεθα
]σης τεῦχεσιν πεφραγμένοι
]. σφας ἀμφικουρίη λάβ[οι

(Lasserre 114)

Shield against shield
Keep the shield-wall tight.
And gift of death
They bring, let no man take.[38]

It was time for one side to crack! The crisis point of the contest had now been reached, when the decision would swing either way, depending on which side was most capable of delivering the last fearful push. Once one side flinched and *panique terreur* took hold, the vanquished suffered the most fearful losses in the rout.[39] Nevertheless, even in victory the sight of the wounded and near dead offered one of war's most grimmer realities. Look at, for example, Tyrtaios' gruesome snap-shot of

[38] Davenport 16.

[39] See above, 39 fn.37.

a casualty: "...with his entrails all bloody in his hands,[40] a sight so foul to see and fraught with such ill to the seer, and his flesh also all naked" (**F.10.25**). By reading Archilochos' poetry, the passive spectator can also be made to feel somewhat sickened:

πολλὸς δ' ἀφρὸς ἦν περὶ στόμα.

(F.139)

much foam covered his lips.

Or:

κοπόεν ξίφος

(F.174)

the sword that brings suffering.[41]

Not forgetting that there were also the dead which marked the killing-zone:

πρὸς τοῦ τοιούτου δ' ἤροσις πιαίνεται.

(F.148)

With such corpes the fields are fattened.

Which in the keen August sun:

ἔλπομαι, πολλοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν Σείριος καταυανεῖ
ὀξὺς ἐλλάμπων.

(F.61)

And may the dogdays
Blister the lot.[42]

Even the comic poet Menander saw fit to describe the unsightly remains of a battlefield which included the bloated corpses that had been left to rot in the sun for at least three days (***Asp.* 71; 109, cf Xen. *An.* 6.4.9**). Shakespeare was certainly right when he penned the line: "I am afeard there are

[40] N.b. the similar fate of Nikarchos the Arkadian (**Xen. *An.* 2.5.33**).

[41] Edmonds.

[42] Davenport 190.

few die well that die in a battle."[43] Here, we should revisit Koroneia and witness for ourselves the bloody aftermath of a hoplite battle through the eyes of Xenophon:

> Now that the fighting was at an end, a weird spectacle met the eye, as one surveyed the scene of conflict - the earth stained with blood, friend and foe lying dead side by side, shields smashed to pieces, spears snapped in two, daggers[44] bared of their sheaths, some on the ground, some embedded in the bodies, some yet gripped by the hand. (***Ages.* 2.14**).

And finally, in a vivid mirror-image that is timeless, there are Siegfried Sassoon's "dead":

> The place was rotten with dead; green clumsy legs
> High-booted, sprawled and grovelled along the saps;
> And trunks, face downwards, in the sucking mud,
> Wallowed like trodden sand-bags loosely filled;
> And naked sodden buttocks, mats of hair,
> Bulged, clothed heads slept in the plastering slime.[45]

Napoleon was so moved by the carnage left on one of his fields of battle that he scribbled the following in a despatch: "The countryside is covered in dead and wounded. This is not the pleasant part of war. One suffers, and the soul is oppressed to see so many suffer."[46]

VI

For Archilochos, like any other hoplite-mercenary, the spear not only brought death but also provided the soldier with his daily bread:

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[43] *King Henry V*, 4.i.149.

[44] Τό ἐγχειρίδιον = *dagger*; see also Hdt. 1.12; 214; Thuc. 3.70.6.

[45] *Counter Attack*, 1.7. Wilfred Owen, having read Sassoon's poem and just survived a particularly nasty phase of the conflict on the Western Front during the early autumn of 1918, wrote to him: "The Battalion [2nd Btn. Manchester Regt.] had a sheer time of it last week. I can find no better epithet; because I cannot say I suffered anything, having let my brain grow dull. That is to say, my nerves are in perfect order. It is a strange truth: that your *Counter Attack* frightened me much more than the real one: though the boy by my side shot through the head, lay on top of me, soaking my shoulder, for half an hour. Catalogue? Photograph? Can you photograph the crimson-hot iron as it cools from the smelting? That is what Jones' blood looked like, and felt like. My senses are charred" (***Letter* 10 Oct.1918**).

[46] Op.cit.14.11813.

Ἐν δορὶ μέν μοι μᾶζα μεμαγμένη,
ἐν δορὶ δ' οἶνος Ἰσμαρικός,
πίνω δ' ἐν δορὶ κεκλιμένος.

(F.2)

My spear is my kneaded barley-bread,
My spear is my Ismarian wine,
I lean on my spear and drink.

It has been suggested that this fragment is an allusion by Archilochos to a vainglorious trooper's song such as that of Hybrias the Cretan; his name, incidentally, can be translated as "Bully":

My wealth is great; it is a spear and a sword
and the grand hairy shield to guard my body.
With these I plough, with these I harvest,
with these I tread the sweet wine from the grapevine,
with these I am called master of the rabble.

And they who dare not carry the spear and sword
and the grand hairy shield to guard their bodies,
all these fall down before me, kiss my knee,
hail me their high king and master.[47]

On the contrary, here Archilochos, in his typical earthy way, is portraying the lot of a campaigning soldier, mercenary or otherwise. For example, we can catch a glimpse of a mercenary on his R&R:

πολλὰ δ' εἰς πόρνης γυναικὸς ἐρρυῖσκετ' ἔντερον
τὰ χρόνῳ μακρῷ πόνῳ τε συλλεγέντα χρήματα.

(F.142)

Long the time, hard the work
That went into heaping the wealth
He threw away on whores.[48]

[47] Lattimore; cf Ath. 15.695f.

[48] Davenport 98.

"Why are you so poor?" Erasmus once asked his soldier-of-fortune. "Why," he replied, "whatsoever I got from pay, plunder, sacrilege, rapine and theft was spent in wine, whores and gaming."[49] That stock character and figure of fun, the braggart-soldier-of-fortune, is always quick to remind his audience about his swashbuckling feats and his hard drinking habits. Two fragments from Menander's *Kolax*, for instance, capture part of an exchange that takes place between the swaggering braggart-soldier, Bias, and his "sponge", Struthias:

> BIAS: In Cappadocia, Struthias, I drank off three times a golden tankard holding ten half-pints, brimming full too.
> STRUTHIAS: You're drunk more than Alexander the King.[50]

During his meteoric conquest of Nicaragua, General William Walker found that many of his Californian *filibusters* turned to the local hard liquor when off-duty. This age old practice not only affected the health of his command, "but tended materially to prevent its growth in military virtue", i.e. his mercenaries took to plundering the native population.[51] Such was the fate of Corcyra in 374 BC when 1,500 hoplite-mercenaries in the pay of Sparta ran riot throughout the island, consuming only the best of the local vintage as they did so (**Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.5-6**). Such drunken behaviour, however, was not only confined to the off-duty hours alone. Polybios once recalls that a group of mercenaries in the pay of Carthage were already in an inebriated condition after their morning meal (**1.69.12, cf 4.57.3-4; Plut. *Dion* 30.3**). The lot of a fighting soldier has never been a happy one and Leon of Thurii, for example, knew this all too well. He was a member of the Ten Thousand and, as such, was once quick to complain to his fellow soldiers that he was dog-tired of "packing up and walking and running and carrying arms and being in line and standing guard and fighting" (*ξυσκευαζόμενος καὶ βαδίζων καὶ τρέχων καὶ τὰ ὅπλα φέρων καὶ ἐν τάξει ὢν καὶ φυλακὰς φυλάττων καὶ μαχόμενος*: **Xen. *An.* 5.1.2, cf Plut. *Mor.* 182d**).[52] Mercenaries in general,

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[49] Quoted by Hale J.R. *War and Society in Renaissance Europe 1450-1620*, Leicester University Press (Leicester 1985) 127. Cf Archil. F.4 & F.72 quoted above, 29-30.

[50] 293(K) & 297(K), cf *Pk.* 402-13.

[51] Gen'l Walker W. *The War in Nicaragua*, University of Arizona Press (Tucson 1985) 178; see also 301,310,314.

[52] The sacred right of the universal foot-soldier is to grumble and, as such, it is as old as warfare itself. The *Papyrus Anastasi III*, for instance, records the miserable daily existence of a Egyptian New Kingdom infantryman (*waw*). For a translation of this, see especially: Curto S. *The Military Art of the Ancient Egyptians*, (Turin 1971) 14.

according to Plutarch, find in their daily victuals and other "enjoyments" a solace for their perilous life style (***Dion* 52.2**).[53] This would include, of course, the foetid squalor of camp life:

φθειροσὶ μοχθίζοντα

(F.137)

Eaten by lice.

In the Greek camp depicted in his play, the *Aspis*, Menander does not mention the body lice but, on the other hand, he does have it populated with hard drinking mercenaries who are busy celebrating after having looted the local neighbourhood (**45-7**). During the night the drunken occupants of the camp fall prey to a surprise enemy attack (**Men. *Asp.* 53-61; 103-7**). Such dramatic incidents, however, were not just confined to comic theatre. Polybios, for example, records how the Akhaian mercenary-captain, Xenoetas, lost his army after the satrap of Media's forces launched a dawn attack against his camp. Xenoetas' mercenaries had feasted and drunk to excess the night before and, as a result, most of them were slaughtered in their beds (**Polyb. 5.48.1-4**).[54]

Let us now return to F.2. One cereal or another has formed the staple basis of the human diet in every corner of this planet since agriculture first began. In the ancient Mediterranean world wheat and barley were the two main grains - oats were considered fit only for animals (**Plin. *HN* 18.149**) while rye, the closest relative of wheat, was a "northern" grain. Barley was normally eaten in the form of a "kneaded thing" (ἡ μᾶζα) rather than leavened bread,[55] and was generally known as "fodder for slaves" (**Ath. 7.304b, cf Aiesch. *Ag.* 1041**) and considered far less nourishing than wheat (**Diosc. M.M. 2.86(W); Gal. 6.507(K)**).[56] And so, by the fourth century BC the preference for wheat and the bread made from it, in wealthy circles at least, had ousted barley from its prominent position in the Mediterranean diet; hence wheat had become the "corn" (ὁ σῖτος) or main grain of Greece, as in other parts of the Mediterranean basin. In the Roman army, for example, troops were

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[53] The Varangian Guard had the reputation of being a hard drinking unit, as Snorri's remarks in the tale of the Battle of Beroë suggests. John II Komnenos' army was being trounced by the Pechenegs and, according to Snorri, the Emperor grew "very angry with his soldiers, but they answered him that he should make use of his wineskins, the Varangians" (***Heimskringla* 3.371-2**).

[54] Cf Polyb. 6.42 passim for the lax way in which Greeks set up camp. The camp depicted in the *Aspis*, incidentally, was unpalisaded (**63**).

[55] E.g. Ar. *Vesp.* 610; *Eq.* 55; *Eccl.* 606; Antiphanes 226. Barley is normally husked and cannot be freed from its cover-glumes by ordinary threshing and is, therefore, roasted or parched prior to use. Unfortunately, this process destroys the gluten content of the grain - this determines the baking qualities of a flour - thereby making it unsuitable for leavened bread.

[56] On the other hand, Athenaios does mention a tasty recipe in which barley-meal is mixed with olive oil and then served on a bed of bay leaves (**4.140 c-d, f**). Again, Thucydides recalls that the Athenian sailors who rowed continuously to Mitylene ate barley-meal mixed with oil and wine (**3.49.3**).

fed on barley instead of wheat as a form of punishment (**Polyb. 6.38.2; Suet. *DA* 24.2; Plut. *Ant.* 39**).

On campaign each soldier normally served as his own quarter-master; "report with three days' rations" was the standing order in Classical Athens (σῖτος τριῶν ἡμερῶν: **Ar. *Pax* 311; *Ach.* 197; *Vesp.* 243, cf Lys. 16.14; Thuc. 1.48.1**). Barley was the regular staple of the hoplite's campaigning diet (ἡ μᾶζα) as Archilochos proclaims in F.2,[57] while a gentle browse through the *Anabasis* will reveal that the Ten Thousand also dined a great deal of the time on barley-meal (ἡ ἄλφιτα: **e.g. 4.5.26; 5.3.9; 6.1.15; 2.3; 5.1; 7.1.37, cf Thuc. 8.100.2**): barley-meal was barley grain that had been milled. Soldiers had to convert their grain into flour themselves; thus hand-mills or querns were to be found amongst the equipment necessary for a military expeditionary force simply because they were "the least heavy amongst implements used for grinding corn" (**Xen. *Cyr.* 6.2.31**). The weight of a hand-mill, according to Vegetius, was five Roman pounds (3.6lbs: **3.49.2**) and, in the new model army of Philip of Macedon, it was one of the items of equipment carried by each ten man section's servant (**Frontin. *Str.* 4.1.6**). Most soldiers, if not all, were used to seeing the daily supply of corn being ground out by hand on the stone quern at home. As a point of digression, during the campaigning season of 1706, the Duke of Marlborough's soldiers were issued hand-mills before crossing the Alps *en route* to joining Prince Eugene in northern Italy.[58] Handmills, in general, were carried so as to allow unground grain to be utilized, thus reducing the risk of spoilage as well as allowing the troops to take advantage of grain taken on the march.

The barley-bread was usually helped down with wine, cheese, olives, onions, garlic and thyme salt (**Thuc. 3.49.3; 4.26.5; Ar. *Ach.* 549-51; 1099; *Eq.* 599; Plut. *Mor.* 349a**), but "the good old days" of soldiering, even for part-timers, were less enjoyable to those who had to slog through them: Aristophanes' chorus rejoice at the return of peace which brought with it freedom from helmet, cheese and onions (***Pax* 1126-9**). These rations were usually carried in a haversack, to which the pungent aroma of onions always clung (**Ar. *Pax* 527-9; *Ach.* 1099-1101**). On active service, it may have been impossible to provide a regular supply of rations for the rank and file although, for example, good professional strategoi like Agesilaos recognized the value of a hot meal at the end of the day. The Spartan king once sent up fire enclosed in earthenware pots to troops bivouacking upon an exposed hillside in extreme weather conditions (**Xen. *Hell.* 4.5.4**). Xenophon himself stressed that

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[57] See also Plut. *Mor.* 230f, cf Hdt. 9.82; Xen. *Cyr.* 6.2.28.

[58] Trevelyan G.M. *England in the Reign of Queen Anne*, (London 1948) II: "Ramillies" 101 fn.

good rations and adequate billeting were of supreme importance in the exercise of command (***Hell.* 5.1.14-7; *Mem.* 3.1.6; *Hipp.* 6.3; *Cyr.* 1.6.9,12**).[59]

It must not be forgotten that, although armies were normally accompanied by a small herd of sacrificial beasts, to most ancient Greeks the lack of meat in their diet was an acceptable fact of daily life, but a shortage of grain was a great hardship. Recent research has put forward the following estimates for the ancient Greek diet: 65-70% cereals; 20-25% fruits, pulses and vegetables; 5-15% oils, meat and wine.[60] During the closing stages of their march to Cunaxa, the Ten Thousand could only obtain barley and wheat at impossibly high prices from the sharp Lydian merchants who accompained Cyrus' Asiatic contingents. As a consequence, the mercenaries pulled through on a meat diet (**Xen. *An.* 1.5.6**).[61] The soldiers were glad to be given meat when it meant it was a supplement to the barley ration, not a substitute for it. In the *Cyropaedia* Cyrus' troops were to survive on a basic ration of barley or wheat, while sharp pungent, salty foods, such as dried fish or meat, which kept well, were to be carried as appetizers or relishes (**6.2.31; 3.4**).[62] We also note that the Spartans' mess meal was fundamentally one of barley-meal, cheese, wine and a few figs, while relishes - if any - included fish and meat (**Plut. *Lyk.* 12.2**). It must also be noted that wheaten-bread (ὁ ἄρτος), if ever it graced the mess table, was considered a definite luxury (***Lak. Pol.* 5.3**).

Primarily, Archilochos has provided for us, in F.2, a concise vignette which vividly illustrates the basic everyday requirements of a campaigning soldier. Not only are the essential elements of food, drink and rest portrayed, but we also see the thrusting-spear (*τὸ δόρυ*), the weapon *par excellence* of the hoplite, and the kneaded barley-bread, the regular staple of his diet. I shall leave the last words on this subject to Xenophon, a veteran soldier and former mercenary himself: "It was a little before sunset and they [Chares' mercenaries] found the enemy at the fortification either bathing, or cooking, or kneading bread, or making their beds" (*...τοὺς μὲν λουομένους, τοὺς δ' ὀψοποιουμένους, τοὺς δὲ φυρῶντας, τοὺς δὲ στιβάδας ποιουμένους*: ***Hell.* 7.2.22**).

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[59] Cf Polyb. 3.72.3-5; 11.22.8; 24.5: the drastic consequences of not taking a morning meal before going into battle. Philip V, for example, made it a habit to order his men to have breakfast prior to battle (**Polyb. 4.71.3; 5.5.14**). In particular, at one of the soldier-assemblies held by the Ten Thousand, Xenophon turns to the men and says: "Well then, it is better to fight-today, with our breakfast already eaten, than tomorrow breakfastless" (*οὐκοῦν νῦν κρεῖττον ἠριστηκότας μάχεσθαι ἢ αὔριον ἀναρίστους*: ***An.* 6.5.21, cf 2.3.5**).

[60] Gallant T.W. *Risk and Survival in Ancient Greece*, Polity (Cambridge 1991) 68.

[61] See also: Xen. *An.* 1.4.2-3; 2.1.6-7; 4.7.17; 5.2.3, cf Caes. *BG* 7.17; Tac. *Ann.* 14.24.1. The Ten Thousand did, on the other hand, feast on meat at the occasional banquet (**Xen. *An.* 4.5.31; 6.1.4; 7.3.21,24**).

[62] Aristophanes also makes a couple of references to fish as a relish. These relishes include sardines, fish-fillets and the "leaf of a rotten fish", i.e. dried/smoked/salted/picked fish (***Ach.* 54; 1100-1**). In comparison to the hoplite's standard fare, we have that of the American Civil War soldier. His 3lbs daily ration consisted of the following: 18oz wheat flour, 20oz fresh beef, 2.4oz dry beans, 1.6oz coffee, .64oz salt, 32 gill vinegar, .04oz pepper: Engels D.W. *Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army*, University of California Press (Berkeley & LA 1978) 125 fn.14.

VII

In the final analysis, Archilochos has made strenuous attempts in his poetry to come to terms with the squalid and perpetual realities of the wandering soldier-of-fortune's way of life. His audience can easily imagine the awful wretchedness of a vagabond mercenary army mainly composed of broken, isolated men:

> ὡς Πανελλήνων ὀϊζὺς ἐς Θάσον συνέδραμεν.
>
> (F.52)
>
> How the dregs of all Greece has gathered here in Thasos!

Not colonists these men - they had originally come from Paros - but mercenaries from various parts of the Greek world. Compare this bald statement with the misgivings Colonel Mike Hoare had about the white mercenaries he commanded in the Congo during the early Sixties:

> The general standard was alarmingly low. There was too high a proportion of alcoholics, drunks, booze artists, bums and layabouts who were finding it difficult to get a job anywhere else and thought that this was heaven sent opportunity to make some easy money. I discovered to my horror that there were a fair sprinkling of dagge smokers and dope addicts, many of whom were beyond recall. Perhaps the greatest surprise of all, and it was to remain so during the three six-month contracts we served, was the incidence of homosexuals.[63]

A fallen corpse can nourish a field, a spear can enrich or satisfy, a disorderly drink may be a necessity, the odd bout of fornication a welcome relief. Archilochos was no ordinary example of a mercenary but a spokesman for this rough-tough adventuring way of life; the line of demarcation between the seventh century BC Parian colonist and an actual soldier-of-fortune was not necessarily clear or precise, either with regard to motives or habits. Our Parian poet expressed vividly the whole range of vicissitudes that such a life involved and simply spoke of things as he experienced them, both as a colonist and a mercenary. A frontier society wordsmith full of soldierly common sense. Dried out corpses, burning towns covered with a pall of smoke, mutilations, breeched and fallen ramparts, desperate moments, the killing without glory, all these images give an uncompromising but bitter picture.

Like the brutal but dashing *Landsknecht*, Urs Graf, both artist and warrior, or the *condottiere*, poet, military engineer and courtly amorist Sigismondo Malatesta of Rimini, Archilochos kept his two calling cards in an unlikely harmony. And so, Ares did not complain that this lyre-player sung poems,

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[63] *Congo Mercenary*, Robert Hale (London 1991(A)) 66.

and the Muses did not object that their horse-tail helmeted servant sometimes spoke with the vocabulary of a paratrooper sergeant. The lines of the wandering Archilochos could be sung around camp fires, on the march, in the agora or at singing contests. They were satire, salacity, private and public, but they were certainly not romantic or heroic.

4 *ET EX ARCADIA EGO*

He a poore mercenary serves for bread.

George Sandys[1]

Throughout history pastoral economies and areas of mountain and poor soil, which often go together, have been providers of surplus manpower and thus the prime recruiting grounds for large bodies of mercenaries: Switzerland, Scotland, Albania, Corsica and Catalonia are examples that spring readily to mind, especially during the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. Lykomedes, the first leader of the Arkadians after the establishment of the Arkadian League in 369/8 BC, is reputed to have boasted: "When anyone wants mercenaries, they choose Arkadians second to none" (*ὡς ἐπικούρων ὁπότε δεηθείέν τινες, οὐδένας ἠροῦντο ἀντ' Ἀρκάδων*: **Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.23**). In the same inaugural speech, Lykomedes also claimed that the Arkadian people were: a) the most populous race in Greece; b) the strongest physically; c) the bravest of peoples.[2] Although his points form the backbone of a political statement, Lykomedes' sentiments are echoed across the centuries and their like can also be heard in Baedeker's travelogue entry for the Arkadian town of Dimitzana: "As in many other mountain communities of Arkadia, its inhabitants have become more numerous than the land can maintain, and many of them emigrate to Athens or even abroad as traders or artisans."[3] There is, of course, a subtle difference here: the Arkadian emigrants of Lykomedes' day were artisans of war and not cobblers, blacksmiths, carpenters or labourers.

I

The simple mannered delights of "Arcady" are the creation of late and sophisticated city folk, but Arkadia has always been, and still is, a pastoral country. Her stock epithet in ancient literature was

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[1] Found in Sandys' *Paraphrase upon the Psalmes and upon the Hymnes dispersed throughout the Old and New Testaments* of 1636. Cf *Job* 7.10.

[2] Cf Pind. *Ol.* 6.80: "Hermes honours Arkadia and its brave men." Also Hdt. 1.66, recording the Delphic oracle to the Spartans: "Many Arkadians there are, stout heroes, eaters of acorns."

[3] *Greece*, 4th ed. (1909) 386. A similar observation was made by Col.W.M.Leake as he rode through the settlements of northern Arkadia; *Travels in the Morea*, (London 1830) III.26.159-60. In the 1940's, HM's Admiralty came to the same conclusion on this matter; The Admiralty, Naval Intelligence Division *Geographical Handbook: Greece*, (London 1944) III.176.

"of the many sheep" (πολύμηλος)[4] while Arkadia's population was traditionally portrayed as acorn-eaters (βαλανηφάγοι),[5] and her warriors as wild and uncouth highlanders who would rush helter-skelter into battle wearing only the skins of wolves, bears or sheep. In reality, the land of the Arkadians is still one of hard beauty, situated as it is in the elevated centre of the Peloponnese and surrounded by an irregular bulwark of high folded-limestone mountains which, until fairly recently, were the habitat of numerous wolves, bears, polecats and even jackals. On the whole the connections of Arkadia with the outer world were scarce, and somewhat limited to the eastern and south-western regions only. The natural obstacles that separate Arkadia from the Isthmus, the Argolid and Lakonia were, until the opening of the Corinth-Tripolis highway in January 1991, a hindrance to regular and easy communications. The isolated position of inland Peloponnesian states was stressed in a speech of the Corinthians to the assembly of the Peloponnesian League in 432 BC (**Thuc. 1.120.2**), a point taken up separately by Strabo and Pausanias when they specifically talked about Arkadia (**Strab. C.335; C.388; Paus. 8.1.3**). Furthermore, the mountainous character of Arkadia has never really been favourable to the forming of one central ruling power. Since the Arkadians were not united by any political league, and rarely acted in concert, until the foundation of Megalopolis, their history down to this date is the local history of their individual city-states and settlements.

Similarly, it was the rugged alpine terrain that went a long way towards preventing any one Arkadian city-state from dominating another as, for example, the Thebans accomplished in Boiotia. In particular, the Mantiniki and its water-supply was usually squabbled over by two inveterate rivals, the city-states of Tegea and Mantineia (**Thuc. 5.65.4**): the former commanded the southern half of the plain and barred the direct route into Lakedaimon, while the latter - whose existence depended on the maintenance of the neighbouring sink-holes[6] - held sway over the northern end. Further north, meanwhile, Orchomenos, from its acropolis perched high between two enclosed upland plains, was able to control the surrounding region and the mountain passes to Corinth. This control, however, could easily be curtailed if Orchomenos' more powerful southern neighbour, Mantineia, flexed its

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[4] E.g. *Il.* 2.605; Hes. *Her.* 1f; *Pan* 29; Bacch. 38.94-5; Pind. *Ol.* 6.100; Theokritos 22.157; *Anth. Pal.* 73.5; *IG* V^2 47.

[5] E.g. Alk. F.34; Hdt. 1.66; Paus. 8.1.5; 42.6; Artemidoros *On Dreams* 2.25; Philostr. *VA* 8.7. See also Leake op.cit.I.2.487. For the (pre)historical use of acorns in the human diet: Dikaiarchos F.48-9; Lucr. 5.939; Verg. *G.* 1.8; 148; 159; Ov. *Met.* 1.106; Strab. C.155; Gal. 6.620-1(K) cf 6.777ff; Polyb. 2.15.2-3.

[6] The hydrography of this area is interesting as the streams that flow off the mountains only find outlets for their waters by natural chasms or sink-holes (καταβόθρα), a common feature of limestone terrain. These, from time to time, become choked and as a result the elevated plains often suffer inundation and parts are often left undrained and uncultivated. Moreover, unlike many parts of Greece, there is a surfeit, not a scarcity of water in Arkadia. In antiquity, the same problem clearly existed: Thuc. 5.65.4; Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.4-5; Arist. *[Pr.]* 26.58; Paus. 8.7.1; 13.4; 22.3. Later travellers through Arkadia also tended to get their feet wet! See especially: Leake op.cit.I.3.110; III.24.55-6; Baedeker op.cit.349,352.

muscles, or if things went badly for the polis during one of the many border skirmishes it fought with Kleitor, a rival city-state to its north-west.

Although they finally bowed to Sparta's orders as to the disposition of their military forces as members of the Peloponnesian League, the Arkadians maintained their collective independence and never became her obedient subjects. The Mantiniki, Arkadia's largest upland plain, was linked directly with the Eurotas valley through the northern Lakonian hills by at least two major routes. Other routes out of this plain gave access to the Megalopolis plain to the south-west and thence Messenia, to Hysiai and Argos to the east, and to Orchomenos to the north. It was, therefore, desirable for Sparta to have the city-states of Mantineia and Tegea subservient to her interests. These two were the leading Arkadian powers[7] who, unless policed, could often establish a hegemony over the smaller and weaker western Arkadian settlements, which would, in turn, threaten Sparta's vital domination of Messenia. Hence the Mantiniki was often the cockpit in which pro- and anti-Spartan alliances thrashed it out, as in 418, 370/69 and 362 BC.[8] In addition, the existence of the polis of Mantineia was important because the security of walls encouraged Mantineian autonomy in foreign policy and the development of an independent democratic political system (**Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.1-2**). It was after the Persian Wars, according to Strabo, that both Mantineia and Tegea *synoecised* out of their respective village settlements (**C.337**), and it was this event which was obviously connected with the anti-Spartan movement which culminated in Herodotos' battle of Tegea (**9.35**). On the other hand, if *synoecism* had "democratic" overtones then life in village settlements fostered oligarchical rule backed by Sparta and thus encouraged loyalty to her own interests (**Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.7; 6.4.18; Paus. 8.8.9,10, cf Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.3-5**).

It was Polybios who once wrote that the harshness of the Arkadian character was the direct result of "the cold and gloomy atmospheric conditions" that prevail in Arkadia (**4.21.1**). The mountains and high plateaux of Arkadia have an alpine climate in modified form, and so, as elsewhere (e.g. the Pindhos), the altitude modifies the intense summer heat and lowers the winter temperature sufficiently for much of the precipitation to fall as snow.[9] The seasonal distribution of

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[7] E.g. even in Polybios' day Mantineia was second to none in Arkadia, both in wealth and power (**2.62.11**).

[8] It should be stressed that although Arkadia became a strategic thoroughfare during several ancient campaigns, the land routes to and from its upland plains traversed difficult terrain and were often snowbound from late autumn to mid-spring. For example, Philip V of Macedon, when he marched through Arkadia, encountered heavy snowstorms and his army suffered "many hardships" as a consequence (**Polyb. 4.68.5; 70.1**). Pausanias recalls how the Spartans were once beaten by the Tegeans because of the bitter and unforgiving Arkadian weather conditions: "as it was snowing, they [the Spartans] were chilled, and thus distressed by their armour," the Tegeans, on the other hand, "untroubled by the cold donned, they say, their armour, went out against the Lakedaimonians, and had the better of the engagement" (**8.53.10**). Leake also noted the presence of deep snow in March around Kleitor: op.cit.II.17.276.

[9] E.g. the Mantiniki (mod. Tripolitza) itself, sits at a height of 2,070 feet above sea-level.

rainfall is transitional in type: though summer is the season of minimal rainfall, the summer drought is not complete as in other parts of Greece with showers a common occurrence. Heavy and continuous rain is frequent in autumn and winter, while rain storms break all year round on the loftier ranges. When the redoubtable Leake rode through Arkadia he made the following observation:

> There is, indeed, a great difference between the maritime climate of the Peloponnesus and that of the Arkadian mountains. "E' un' aria troppo rigida" observed to me the Ragusan consul at Mothoni, speaking of the interior of the peninsula. The average climate of Arkadia is in fact cooler, by several degrees, than that of the consul's native town, though the latter is situated so much farther north.[10]

In general, the altitude of Arkadia - the "Switzerland of the Peloponnesus" - and its enclosed mountain setting result in annual mean temperatures as low as those in parts of northern Greece. In particular, this low temperature affects the winter growing season, especially if we consider that days of frost can easily extend into the month of April; the area lags some four to eight weeks behind Corinth, the south-west Argolid, southern Lakonia and Messenia in agroclimate classification.[11] And so, in Thucydides' catalogue of fertile regions, which certainly included the Peloponnese, Arkadia, as a whole, was excluded (**1.2.3, cf Hdt. 7.102**).[12] It seems that Arkadia, with its wild, lofty and bleak mountains, was a place to get away from!

II

Even so, not everyone from such a region was equally likely to become an emigrant let alone a mercenary. Mobility tends to be the last resort, with movement abroad frequently signalling final abandonment of the old way of life for pastures new. Tegean colonists, according to Arkadian tradition, crossed over to Crete and founded the city-state of Gortyn (**Conon 26 *FGrH* 36; Paus. 8.53.4**). In addition, other Arkadians, in this case of unspecific provenance, built a polis-settlement that retained the ethnic name of its founding fathers: "Arkades". This particular colony can be traced

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[10] Op.cit.II.12.20; see also his remarks about the Arkadian climate in I.3.88. Note also B.Taylor's shattered "Arkadian dreams" after having made the long climb up from the Argolid: *Travels in Greece and Russia*, (NY 1859) 166.

[11] United Nations *Economic Survey of the Western Peloponnese, Greece*, FAO and UN Special Fund Rome (1965) iii.7. Also, the mean temperature for Tripolis is 57.5F compared with 57.9F for Ioannia, and contrast Athens' 63.3F and Nauplion's 64.0F: The Admiralty op.cit.II.484 table 5. For example, in contrast with most areas of southern Greece the olive is not grown because of the high elevation and low temperatures, whereas seed crops can be grown but with yields that are low and variable: see especially Garnsey P.D.A. "Mountain Economies in Southern Europe", *PCPhS 14* (1988(A)) 198.

[12] Cf Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.2,4: Mantineia grew enough corn in one particular year to be able to supply Argos.

in the archaeological record from the Protogeometric period onwards.[13] But other Arkadian colonies from the Greek period of colonization are not in evidence. Christian von Callmer argues that a fifth century BC population explosion in Arkadia forced many Arkadian men to become mercenaries,[14] and this could help explain why, unlike many other parts of the Greek world, Arkadia had so few overseas settlements. Of course, Callmer's population explosion does not coincide with that of the period of colonization, yet there is evidence to suggest that Arkadian hoplite-mercenaries were common even as early as the Archaic period. Already, lord Agapenor, under the banner of Agamemnon, had led to Troy his Arkadians who were, even in those most fabled and ancient times, famed as excellent warriors: *ἐπιστάμενοι πολεμίζειν* (***Il.* 2.611**). It is interesting to note that Homer also categorizes the Arkadians as men who fought in close combat: *ἴν' ἀνέρες ἀγχιμαχηταί* (***Il.* 2.604**).[15] Along the same path of reasoning, Strabo, quoting Ephoros of Kyme, records that their martial skills were attested by both Greeks and barbarians alike since the very dawn of history (**C.221**). Earlier in his work the same author explains how "the cold mountainous regions [of Europe] furnished by nature only a wretched existence to their inhabitants" (**C.126**). In the following paragraph, this observation is then expanded upon and Strabo makes the interesting comment that in the mountainous parts of Europe "everything tends to make men warlike and courageous" (*τὸ δ' ἐν τῇ λυπρᾷ μάχιμον καὶ ἀνδρικόν*: **C.127**). In other words, prior to the fifth century BC, there may have been already a long tradition of Arkadian males serving abroad as mercenaries. To these generations of men, mercenary service, in view of this argument, was a necessary response to Arkadia's harsh physical environment which, like most rugged and mountainous lands, surrendered little in terms of human sustenance and material wealth. Before we delve any deeper into this particular topic, however, we should look at the human landscape that these men were forced to leave.

Our ancient sources, unfortunately, give little away, and what little they give tends to be conflicting. A late fourth century BC decree issued by Alexander the Great deals with the restoration of Tegean exiles, many of whom, incidentally, may have been mercenaries out in the East. One of its provisions allows each repatriated Tegean a house with a small garden (vegetable plot?).[16]

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[13] ΣΥΡΙΟΠΟΥΛΟΣ Κ.Θ *Εισαγωγή εἰς τήν Αρχαίαν Ελληνηκήν ιστορίαν: Οἱ μεταβατικοί χρόνοι - από της Μυκηναικής εἰς τήν Αρχαικήν περίοδον 1200-700* Π.Χ. *Τομ.Α*, (Αθήναι 1983) 214,348.

[14] *Studien Zur Geschichte Arkadiens, bis zur Gründung des arkadischen Bundes*, (Lund 1943) 99 - he quotes: Beloch K.J. *Die Bevolkerung der griechisch-römischen Welt, Studia Historica 60* (Leipzig 1886), repr. (Roma 1968) 128f.

[15] Can we make anything of the fact that Agamemnon also gave the Arkadians their ships...are these the first Arkadian mercenaries we have on record?

[16] *IG* V^2 3,6; Tod M.N. *Greek Historical Inscriptions, Vol.II*, Clarendon Press (Oxford 1948) #202. The inscription is now in the Delphi Museum, inv.#2988.

Xenophon, recording Agesipolis' siege of Mantineia, does mention that the city's corn supply was in abundance owing to the fact that there had been a bumper harvest the previous year (***Hell.* 5.2.4**). In his account of Second Mantineia, the same author also informs his reader that there were cattle grazing and labourers (*τοὺς ἐργάτας*) toiling outside the city walls. Whether the latter were hired or slave labour is not made clear, but earlier in the passage Xenophon says that the citizens themselves were also out working the fields (*πάντας δὲ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους*: ***Hell.* 7.5.14,15, cf 6.5.15**). It is from Polybios that we learn that the Arkadians worked the fields themselves (*τὴν ἑκάστων αὐτουργίαν*: **4.21.1**); perhaps this is what Perikles meant when he insultingly called the Peloponnesians *αὐτουργοί* (**Thuc. 1.141.3**). If we look at a much later source, that of Philostratos, we find Arkadia covered with grassland and forest, and populated with "a great many labourers, many goat-herds and swine-herds, and shepherds and drivers either for the oxen or the horses"; added to these are the wood-cutters, "a craft to which they are trained from boyhood" (***VA* 8.7.12**).[17] On the other hand, two hundred and thirty years earlier Strabo confessed to his lack of knowledge of Arkadia because of "the complete devastation of the country" through the recent civil wars. In earlier days, he continues, Arkadia was noted for its cities; however, "the tillers of the soil" (*οἱ γεωργήσαντες*) had disappeared with the foundation of Megalopolis. This might explain why the geographer saw many pastures for cattle, horses and asses (**C.388**).[18] On the other hand, another decree from Tegea, this time dated to the early fourth century BC, does give evidence that in Arkadia livestock formed a part of every farmer's strategy.[19] Finally, there are also the many Arkadian coins of the Classical period which bear livestock motifs on their reverse sides.[20]

Although it is difficult to imagine what would have been the state of the Arkadian landscape in antiquity, it is highly probable that ancient Arkadian settlements were characterised by their

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[17] N.b. Strabo said that the Arkadian breed of horse was "most excellent" (**C.388**); Pausanias records the legend concerning Odysseus' mares, saying he grazed them "in the land of Pheneos" (**8.14.5**); Varro says Arkadia was famed for its horses, while its mules and asses were especially esteemed (**2.1.14; 7.1**).

[18] Note also the line from the Roman satirist, Persius: "Arcadiae pecuaria rudere dicas" (**3.9**). For Leake's personal views on Strabo's observations see: op.cit.II.12.29.

[19] *IG* V^2 3.1-2. Other evidence does suggest that livestock holding - sheep, goats, cattle and pigs - extended well down the socio-economic ladder: e.g. (i) Thuc. 2.14.1 - the people of Attica send their sheep and cattle over to Euboia; (ii) Thuc. 7.27.5 - Athenian sheep and other livestock lost during Spartan raids out of Dekelea; (iii) Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.26 -large numbers of cattle in the countryside around Elis; (iv) Arist. *Pol.* 1252b5 - "oxen serve the poor in place of a slave"; (v) Ps-Arist. 1349b6-14 - Dionysios' general tax on oxen; (vi) Ps-Arist. 1348a19-23 - the satrap Kandalos of Caria imposes a tax on livestock.

[20] E.g. see Plant R. *Greek Coin Types and their Identification*, Seaby (London 1979) #'s 954,989,1188,1201,1217,1246,1450,1485.

pastoral life, with a small amount of arable farming and perhaps some hunting to boot.[21] It is particularly instructive to note the Arkadian bronze statuettes of the Archaic period which depict local peasants and shepherds. A number of these are dressed in high felt hat or conical leather cap, short embroidered cloak or tunic and a pair of stout walking boots; a few are armed with hefty sticks or crooks. Some have discarded cloak, tunic and boots, but not the hat which was, and still is a necessary protection against the blistering summer sun. Others appear wrapped from head to foot in a heavy sheepskin cloak, pinned at the throat with a large pin - appropriate protection against the hard Arkadian winters. In addition, there are a few that represent certain deities in the likeness of Arkadian shepherds and Arkadian women. More important, perhaps, are those statuettes burdened with animals: a ram tucked under an arm, a calf laid across the shoulders or a dead fox carried by its tail.[22] Seventy-five percent of these statuettes were discovered in south-west Arkadia around Mount Lykaios. A few came to light in the sanctuary of Zeus Lykaios itself, but the bulk of them were unearthed at Berekla, the probable site of a sanctuary to Pan as described by Pausanias (**8.38.5**).[23] Furthermore, two of the statuettes from this region were found in the sanctuary of Pan at Melpea near the modern village of Andritsaina and actually bear inscriptions - this certainly unusual for Arkadian bronzes. One, a shepherd in a conical felt hat and fringed cloak with tassles, sports the inscription: Φαυλεάς ἀνέθυσε τῷ Πανί.[24] The second, a similar bronze shepherd, has the simple inscription: Πανί Αἰνεας.[25] Incidentally, Aineias as an Arkadian name is well attested by both Xenophon and Pindar (**Xen. *An.* 4.7.13; *Hell.* 7.3.1; Pind. *Ol.* 6.88**): it was particularly rare outside the Peloponnese.

Traditionally, Arkadia was the favourite haunt of the pastoral god Pan, his birthplace being Mount Mainalos within its borders (**Paus. 8.36.8**) and whose worship was especially strong throughout the whole region: grottoes, springs, blasted trees and crags were especially sacred to

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[21] Leake saw for himself many an Arkadian settlement, especially in the west of Arkadia, which, clinging tenaciously to the side of a mountain, had terraced land around it which was being cultivated: op.cit.I.11.485; II.12.16; 13.66-8; III.26.159. He also observed that although the surrounding countryside produced very good wheat, it was not plentiful, the locals relying mainly on sheep and the products from them to supplement the meagre potential for arable farming: ibid.II.12.22 3; 13.55; 14.110-11; III.25.115.

[22] Lamb W. "Arkadian Bronze Statuettes", *BSA 27* (1925) 133-48, pls.XXIV-XXV.

[23] Ibid.146. For the archaeological report see: ΚΟΥΡΟΥΝΙΩΤΟΥ Κ "Ἀνασκαφαὶ Λυκαίου", *Ἀρχ. Ἐφ.* (1904) 153-214 & *πίν.*7-10.

[24] Ibid.138 #10. Dated by L.H.Jeffery to c.510-500 BC: *The Local Scripts of Archaic Greece*, Clarendon Press (Oxford 1990) 210,215 #7.

[25] *SEG* XI.1043. Dated by Jeffery to c.500 BC: Ibid.210,215 #8. See also: Richter G.M.A. (i) "Five Bronzes Recently Acquired by the Metropolitan Museum", *AJA 48* (1944) 5, figs.11-5; (ii) *Archaic Greek Art*, (NY 1949) 152, figs.240,241. Both these bronzes are still in the Metropolitan Museum: #'s 08.258.7,43.11.3.

him.[26] Not only was Pan commonly represented on the later Arkadian League coins,[27] but also the country abounded in sanctuaries and altars dedicated to him.[28] It appears, therefore, that the bronze statuettes were dedicated by the Arkadians in their own likeness and left to stand, in the main, within a shrine sacred to Pan, "lord of Arkadia" and guardian of flocks and herds. However, although most of these bronzes represent Arkadian shepherds and peasants, occasionally Hermes himself, the god of flocks and herds, is portrayed. Hermes, if not naked, is usually in typical Arkadian garb and carries a ram - in which case he is only distinguishable from his worshippers by his badge of office, the wings on his boots or on his cap.[29] Hermes, according to tradition, was also born in Arkadia, either on Mount Kerykaios or on Mount Kyllene. At the former location the god had two temples dedicated to him, and here he was worshipped as Κριοφόρος and Προμάχος.[30] As a final point, Pausanias records that the offerings from the Phigaleians to Demeter - Mount Elaios, hardby Phigaleia, has a cave sacred to the goddess - not only included grapes, cultivated fruits and honeycombs, but also "raw wool still full of its grease" (**8.42.11, cf 37.7**).

III

In ancient Arkadia the right to pasture animals was limited to citizens or those to whom a specific grant was made. Nevertheless, there are very sound political reasons for questioning the notion that the peasant-hoplites of Arkadia practised transhumance and thus migrated to upland summer pastures with their flocks or herds. This was the period when their military services were normally required on expedition or in defence of their city-state. In theory, P.D.A.Garnsey's model for the operation of an alternative system of cultivation and herding would have suited the city-states of Arkadia handsomely. In this way, the strategy of crop rotation would have provided summer fodder, and in return livestock would have supplied manure as well as consumed weeds.[31] By using this mini-

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[26] For Pan as an Arkadian god, see: Hes. *To Pan* 1ff; Pind. F.95; Simonides F.162; *Attic Scholia* 4; Kastorion *To Pan* 1; Ov. *Fast.* 2.272f; Hdt. 6.105, cf Paus. 8.54.6.

[27] Sear D R. *Greek Coins, Vol.I*, Seaby (London 1978) #'s 2686-94,2719,2720,2727,2731.

[28] For sanctuaries and altars: Paus. 8.36.8; 37.11; 38.5; 53.10; 54.4,6. For images: Paus. 8.30.2,6; 31.3; 37.2. Other references to the god in Arkadia: Paus. 8.38.11; 42.3.

[29] Lamb op.cit..135,137-8 #'s 2,4,5,9.

[30] For a collection of the evidence see: Immerwahr W. *Die Kulte und Mythen Arkadiens*, (Leipzig 1891) 73-8. Also of interest is: Hejnic J. *Pausanias the Perieget and the Archaic History of Arkadia*, Nakladatelství Československé Akademie (Věd 1961) 11.

[31] For the model: Garnsey (1988(A)) op.cit.196ff. For the ancient evidence used to support the model: Ael. *VH* 16.32; Dio Chrys. *Orat.* 7.10-80; Dem. 47.52-3; 76; Polyb. 9.17.6; Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.14-5; Xen. *An.* 5.3.7-10. For the recommendation of the integration of pastoralism and agriculture: Cato *Agr.* 10; Colum. 6 praef.1-5; Verg. *G.* 1.79-83; Plin. *HN* 18.187.

mobile system of pastoralism ancient subsistence farmers could have kept their livestock on or near their land all year round. If we return to the agricultural cameo painted by Xenophon in his account of Second Mantineia (***Hell.* 7.5.14-5**), we can glean from it the following pieces of information: (i) Epameinondas attempts a *coup de main* against Mantineia because as it was harvest time (*σίτου συγκομιδῆς οὔσης*), he reckoned that both its cattle and its people (*τοὺς ἀνθρώπους*) would be outside the city walls; (ii) when the Theban and Thessalian cavalry pull-up outside Mantineia, they find all the Mantineian cattle and the labourers (*τοὺς ἐργάτας*) without; (iii) likewise, there were many children and older men of the citizens of Mantineia (*τῶν ἐλευθέρων*) who were in the same predicament. Points ii and iii are later re-endorsed by Xenophon when he says that the timely intervention of the Athenian cavalry saved for the Mantineians "everything that was outside the walls" (*τὰ ἔξω πάντα σωθῆναι τοῖς Μαντινεῦσιν*: ***Hell.* 7.5.17**).

Unfortunately, Xenophon's account does, in turn, raise a number of delicate questions, the most pertinent of which being the actual whereabouts of Mantineia's hoplite force during Epameinondas' lunge against their city. According to Aristotle the peasant farmer was the backbone of the citizen army (***Pol.* 1291a30, cf Plut. *Ages.* 26.3-5**).[32] We would expect, therefore, since it was harvest time and the cattle were grazing outside the walls of Mantineia that her hoplites would be there also in their capacity as peasant farmers, i.e. reaping corn or tending to livestock (**e.g. Thuc. 4.88.1; Ain. Takt. 7.1**). This, however, may not have been the case. Earlier in his narrative dealing with the initial stages of the campaign, Xenophon tells us that the anti-Theban alliance opted to gather their forces at Mantineia itself (*εἰς τὴν Μαντίνειαν*), finally taking up "a strong position in the neighbourhood of Mantineia" (*περὶ μὲν τὴν Μαντίνειαν*: ***Hell.* 7.5.7,9**). We could now argue that the Mantineian hoplites were in the immediate vicinity of their city, perhaps even involved in the harvesting etc. On the other hand, if we follow Diodoros' account of the same campaign we soon discover that the Mantineians had left their city "in full force to assist the Lakedaimonians" (*Μαντινεῖς πανδημεὶ πάρεισι βοηθοῦντες τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις*: **15.84.1, cf Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.14**). Now, according to the same author, the arrival of the Mantineian hoplites in Lakonia gave Epameinondas the opportunity to out-wit the allies. Leaving his camp outside Sparta intact, the Theban strategos marched back to Tegea and "hurried to fall suddenly on those left behind in Mantineia" (*προσπεσεῖν τοῖς ἀπολελειμμένοις ἐν τῇ Μαντινείᾳ*: **Diod. 15.84.1**), i.e. Xenophon's labourers, old men and

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[32] Cf Eteonikos' saliors who, being short of means, subsisted upon "the produce of the season and working for hire" (*ἀπό τε τῆς ὥρας ἐτρέφοντο ἐργαζόμενοι μισθοῦ*: **Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.1**). Although paid rowers of the Spartan fleet, this little episode does demonstrate that the demarcation line between the servant of Ares and the son of toil was, in the main, somewhat vague. It is important to remember that one of the features of the polis included the raising of the peasant to the status of citizen. See for example: Austin M.M. & Vidal-Naquet P. *Economic and Social History of Ancient Greece: An Introduction*, Batsford (London 1977) 151. Moreover, Garnsey cogently argues that the vast majority of ancient Greeks were peasants: *Famine and Food Supply in the Graeco-Roman World: Responses to Risk and Crisis*, C.U.P. (Cambridge 1988(B)) 39-42.

children busy with the harvest who, according to Diodoros, never expected Epameinondas to swoop down upon them out of the blue (**15.84.2**). Meanwhile, realizing they have been fooled, the Spartans and Mantineians march north for Arkadia, finally making an "appearance outside Mantineia" (*Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ Μαντινεῖς ἐπεφάνησαν*: **Diod. 15.84.3**). It seems the Mantineian harvest of 362 BC was, despite the rude interruption, collected even though the majority of the city's hoplites were on campaign and therefore absent.

There is an old Maniote song which vividly describes the ability of women to gather the harvest while their menfolk are away at war,[33] and modern anthropological studies have demonstrated that in times of crisis the division of labour within a peasant household can enable male members to leave. H.A.Koster, for example, studied a number of subsistence farming households in the highlands of the Argolid, and his work revealed that a heavy portion of the herding tasks fell to the household head's spouse. Although this was due to such factors as the ability of the household head as a ploughman, it does show that women are capable of turning their hand to the tending of flocks and herds. In the month of May, for example, the spouse in Koster's study worked no less than three hundred and eighty-seven hours with the sheep (52% of the month): a key time for milk production as well as ploughing. The following month the spouse was again with the flock - this time with the aid of her son for two weeks during his school holiday - while her husband was grafting and planting new olives as well as sowing the summer crop of irrigated potatoes. The spouse, rather than being freed from the task of shepherding then assisted her daughter in the preparation of seed potatoes and their planting. Throughout the year, incidentally, the daughter ran the house; preparing meals, cleaning, feeding and caring for the house animals, washing clothes and baking bread.[34] Generally, these modern studies indicate that women's tasks are undemanding in terms of brute strength, but they are frequently tedious or involve bending over for long periods of time, e.g. weeding and reaping. Nevertheless, women regularly do jobs that are considered the man's preserve, e.g. climb olive trees, plough and dig vines. When push comes to shove, the household women can cope. Leake, on his travels through Arkadia, had already seen this for himself:

> Here [Krathis] we meet no less than one hundred women, each bearing on her back a great bundle of wood, equal to half a load of an ass. In these, as well as many other mountainous parts of Greece, agriculture and out-door labour of every kind are added to the domestic duties of the women; the men,

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[33] Quoted in Greenhalgh P. & Eliopoulos E. *Deep into Mani*, Faber & Faber (London 1986) 126; see also 62.

[34] *The Ecology of Pastoralism in Relation to Changing Patterns of Land Use in Northeast Peloponnese*, (Diss.) University of Pennsylvania (1977) 415 & table 75. On my travels through Arkadia, I have also witnessed the tending of flocks by women, some of whom were also engaged in crocheting while their charges busily grazed nearby.

for the most part, being employed with their horses as carriers, or tending the flocks, or residing abroad as artisans and traders.[35]

On entering Arkadia via the southern Arkadian settlement of Eutaia during the campaigning season of 370 BC, Agesilaos only found of its inhabitants the old men, women and children. The men of military age, according to Xenophon, had left town in order to join the Arkadian forces (*τοὺς δ' ἐν τῇ στρατευσίμῳ ἡλικίᾳ οἰχομένους εἰς τὸ Ἀρκαδικόν*: ***Hell.* 6.5.12**).

IV

According to Garnsey there was one crisis which was endemic in the ancient Mediterranean world, and that was the shortage of food. Harvest failure was the underlying cause of food shortage, but wars, shortfalls in yields and epidemic diseases all played their miserable part.[36] Indeed, crop failure and the resultant poverty could drive communities to emigrate in search of greener pastures. A seven year drought apparently forced the Therans to reduce their island's population by establishing a colony at Kyrene (**Hdt. 4.151-3, cf Pind. *Pyth.* 4.100**) - in all its provisions, the foundation decree suits these circumstances: (i) compulsory enlistment; (ii) severe limitations on the right to return to the mother-city; (iii) fierce threats against defaulters (***SEG* IX.3 28f,32f,37f**). Likewise, according to Strabo, the Chalkidians from Euboia participated in the foundation of Rhegium because of a failure of crops (**C.257**). We also have an anecdote from Plutarch whereby Archias' foundation of Syracuse was the direct result of drought and plague in Corinth (***Mor.* 773a-b**). Finally, Thucydides postulates that the underlying cause of Greek colonization was the need for land; cultivable land is precious while bare rocks are so plentiful, and it is of the former that he speaks (**1.15.1**).[37] It must be stressed that if food crises were common in antiquity, famine itself, on the other hand, was rare.[38]

To arm themselves against such calamities subsistence farmers, in general, would have had a number of survival stratagems up their sleeves, thereby arming themselves against a possible failure

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[35] Op.cit.III.26.172-3. In the years 1956-9, for example, 6.22% of the Arkadian male population emigrated; the national average for those years was only 3.56%: Centre of Economic Research (*et al*) *Economic and Social Atlas of Greece*, (Athens 1964) 2.17.

[36] Garnsey (1988(B)) op.cit.14-6. See, for example: Hes. *Op.* 238-45; Thuc. 2.5.4; Xen. *Oik.* 5.18 - diseases; Hdt. 8.115; Gal. 4.748ff - shortage; Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.9, cf Plut. *Mor.* 604c - war; Xen. *Poroi* 4.9 - the wretched combination of all three.

[37] For evidence to prove, in the main, colonization was caused through over population and the desire for land see: Gwynn A. "The Character of Greek Colonisation", *JHS 38* (1918) 88-123.

[38] See especially: Gallant T.W. *Risk and Surival in Ancient Greece*, Polity (Cambridge 1991) 37-9.

to produce enough food.[39] These included diversification of crops (**Theophr. *HP* 8.1.2**),[40] intercropping (**Theophr. *HP* 8.3.5; 5.6; 6.1; *CP* 3.6.1**), fragmentation of land ("**The Attic Stelai**" ***IG* I³ 421-30**),[41] storage (**Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.4; Ps-Arist. 1348b1-1349a3**)[42] and "sky-watching" (**Xen. *Oik.* 17.12-3; Theophr. *HP* 8.1.4; 6.1**). In the event of an actual crisis and his survival stratagems having been exhausted, the farmer would be forced to consider a number of emergency options, some of them dire in the extreme. Firstly, the household diet could be eked out with "wild things" such as leafy plants, nuts and berries (**Theophr. *HP* 3,7; *CP* 1-2; Ath. 2.50-8; Gal. 6.14; 15; 32; 38; 39, cf Thuc. 3.111.1**),[43] but these are low in calorific content and soon vanish if all and sundry are harvesting them. Coupled with this reliance upon the countryside, a hungry household could also hunt for small game and fish. A more extreme measure would have been that of asset stripping whereby a household would either slaughter or sell off its livestock: the Corinthians, for example, lived off their cattle when their city-state was threatened by the Spartans in 390 BC (**Xen. *Hell.* 4.5.1**). Into this category can also go the selling of valuable family land (***Od.* 11.488-91**): the rhetoric of Isokrates paints the lurid picture of broken peasant families roving overseas in vagabond bands looking for a means to survive (***Paneg.* 168**). Another desperate response to a crisis would have been that which involved the removal of dependents from the embattled household. One method was either to give up the children to better off relatives (**Lys. 3.6; Xen. *Mem.* 2.7.2**) or to try to "pawn" them (**Ps-Dem. 59.18, cf Hdt. 8.105**); a practice parodied by Aristophanes when he has the bumpkin from Megara passing off his daughters as piglets in order to sell them (***Ach.* 729-35**). To spare the innocent children, an adult male could opt to leave the household and thus attempt to earn a wage which would hopefully secure its fortunes. During the Classical period, for example, there was a ready market for rowers, especially in the service of Athens' busy Imperial fleet. In one of his forensic speeches, Demosthenes describes how an angry mob of rowers confronted a ship's captain who was short of

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[39] Gallant reckons that with survival stratagems the subsistence farmer could sit out two successive crop failures, but no more than that: ibid.110; see also his models 104-7 & figs.4.11,14,15.

[40] For this practice in modern Greece see: Forbes H.A. (i) "The "Thrice-Ploughed Field" : Cultivation Techniques in Ancient and Modern Greece", *Expedition 19* (1976) 5-11; (ii) *Strategies and Soils: Technology, Production and Enviroment in the Peninsula of Methana, Greece*, (Diss.) University of Pennsylvania (1982) 312-23.

[41] On these stelai see: Pritchett W.K. (i) "The Attic Stelai Part 1", *Hesperia 22* (1953) 225-9; (ii) "The Attic Stelai Part 2", *Hesperia 25* (1956) 178-317.

[42] Stockpiling might also explain why local peasants readily made foodstuffs available for sale to marching armies (**e.g. Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.9; 5.12; *An.* 2.3.24; 4.5**).

[43] Modern studies show that in the months October to December and April to June there is a 8-20% reliance upon wild things to supplement the daily diet of a peasant household: Clarke M.H. *Farming and Foraging in Prehistoric Greece: The Nutritional Ecology of Wild Resource Use*, (Amsterdam 1977) 52. Old habits die hard and even modern Athenians on a Sunday drive will suddenly stop their car and pick a plastic bag or two of χόρτα before returning home.

cash and thus failed to pay them their wages: they needed the money in order "to feed their families" (*τὰ οἰκεῖα διοικήσασθαι*: **50.11**). Not satisfied, the crew jumped ship *en masse*, leaving the Athenian captain high and dry and without rowers for his ship. However, after securing a loan through family connections, he promptly hired a new crew on the spot (**Dem. 50.18, cf Isok. *Pan.* 116**). But how does this all specifically relate to ancient Arkadia, a land noted for its hoplite-mercenaries and not its hired rowers?

Arkadia, as we have already seen, was (and still is) a rugged and mountainous region which, coupled with its harsh physical enviroment, its land-locked isolation and its lack of political unity, provided little in terms of human sustenance and material wealth. Add to this combination of factors the ever present threat of a food crisis, be it through the folly of man or the caprice of nature, and we have a potential scenario in which many an Arkadian subsistence farmer and his household, struggling to survive, eventually went under. There was, as alluded to earlier, a traditional economic life-line for Arkadian families who walked the razor-thin line between survival and extinction, and that was for one or more of their male members to serve abroad as mercenaries.

V

In general, mercenary service would have worked in two ways. Firstly, it provided the opportunity for peasant households to temporarily rid themselves of any excess male mouths to feed either because of poverty or short-term lack of victuals: a fragment of Menander's *Xenologos* merits note as it tells us how a young man seeks his fortune as a mercenary in order to save his father from poverty (**354(K)**). Often, campaigning mercenaries had families to return to (**Xen. *An.* 6.4.8**), provided of course, that they made the return trip (**Xen. *An.* 7.1.36; 2.6; Diod. 16.63.5**). Secondly, when faced with dire poverty and imminent loss of land or life, mercenary service presented a man with a full-time career. To be more specific, the survival of the peasantry in ancient Arkadia not only depended upon their success in following a low risk farming strategy, but also upon their readiness to take up the mercenary calling when needs must. And so, in the words of the popular fourth century BC proverb: "I'll do as the Arkadians", because the Arkadians fought as mercenaries and won victories for others.[44] In fact, the expression "I'll do as the Arkadians" was taken up by the Attic comic poet, Plato, in order to describe his wretched life-style:

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[44] E.g. Zen. ap. Mill. *Mél.* 366; cf Bekk. *An.* 218.19; Macar. 2.41: "*τοὺς Ἀρκάδας μιμήσομαι*"· *ταύτης μέμηται Πλάτων ὁ κωμικός, τάττεται δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν μάτην πονούντων, παρόσον οἱ Ἀρκάδες μισθοῦ στρατευόμενοι ἄλλοις ἐνίκων.* Or, Apost. 3.73; cf Suid.; Eust. 320.32: "'*Αρκάδας μιμούμενος*"· *ταύτῃ κέχρηται Πλάτων ἐν Πεισάνδρῳ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλοις ταλαιπωρούντων. μαχιμώτατοι μὲν γὰρ ὄντες αὐτοὶ μὲν οὐδέποτε ἰδίαν νίκην ἐνίκησαν, ἄλλοις δὲ αἴτιοι νίκης πολλοῖς ἐγένοντο. καὶ ὁ Πλάτων οὖν διὰ τὰς κωμῳδίας αὐτὸς ποιῶν ἄλλοις παρέχειν διὰ πενίαν, Ἀρκάδας μιμεῖσθαι ἔφη·*.

ΧΟΡΟΣ μαχιμώτατος δ' ὢν αὐτὸς ἰδίαν οὐδέπω
νίκην ἐνίκησ' ἀλλ<ὰ πολλ>οῖς αἴτιος
νίκυης ἐγενόμην 'Αρκάδας μιμουμενος.

(F.99)[45]

A fighter born, a victory of my own
I've never scored, though more than one or
two of people's, as Arkadians do.

Here, our poet claims that he survives in the manner of an Arkadian mercenary; shackled by his poverty stricken existence "he provides others with comedies he wrote himself" (**Apost. 3.73, cf Suid.; Eust. 320.32**).[46]

The first specific Arkadian mercenaries appear to be those who, after the battle of Thermoplyai, approached Xerxes and promptly offered him their services. This, however, was not another case of Greeks medizing in the Theban fashion. On the contrary, the motive that placed this small band of Arkadian hoplites into the camp of the Great King was purely financial and not political. For, in the words of Herodotos, these were "poor men, seeking employment" (*βίου τε δεόμενοι καὶ ἐνεργοὶ βουλόμενοι εἶναι*: **8.26**). Previously, Herodotos has told us that five hundred Tegeans, the same number of Mantineians, one hundred and twenty Orchomenians and 1,000 hoplites "from the rest of Arkadia" were present during the initial phases of Thermopylai (**7.202**). In addition, he imparts that the following campaigning season saw 1,500 Tegeans and six hundred Orchomenian hoplites turn out for the Hellenic League at Plataia (**9.28**); the Mantineian contingent arriving too late for the battle (**9.77**). Puzzlingly, Herodotos fails to mention if the 1,000 other Arkadian hoplites present at Thermopylai turned up at Plataia: are these the Arkadians who offered to hire themselves out to Xerxes?

Earlier evidence only hints at the existence of Arkadian mercenaries. According to Pausanias the southern Arkadian settlement of Oresthasion despatched one hundred *ἐπικούροι* to aid the Phigaleians in the attempt to liberate their city from the Spartans during the Second Messenian War. There are, unfortunately, one or two rather sticky questions to tackle before we can honestly look upon these Arkadians as mercenaries. Firstly, Pausanias does not specifically call these soldiers mercenaries; he describes them as "hand picked men" (*λογάδας*) who had volunteered for the mission (**8.39.4**). Secondly, he mentions that in the agora of Phigaleia stood the tomb of "the picked men of Oresthasion" (*λογάδων τῶν 'Ορεσθασίων*: **8.41.1**). It appears the Phigaleians worshipped these warriors as heroes, they having gloriously fallen to a man in the victorious battle against the Spartans

[45] *Peisander*, in Edmonds J.M. *The Fragments of Attic Comedy, Vol.I*, E.J Brill (Leiden 1957) 522.

[46] See above, 62 fn.44.

(**Paus. 8.39.5**). Last, but by no means least, can we even trust Pausanias' evidence here? His whole account is tainted by the "saga" of Aristomenes. It goes without saying that other evidence for Arkadian participation during the Second Messenian War is just as vague! In the second year of the struggle the Messenians received some form of military assistance from the Arkadians. Aid was forthcoming from those "goads of war", the Argives, and the Sikyonians also, which strongly suggests that all these Peloponnesian troops stood alongside rebel Messenians at the so-called battle of "The Boar's Tomb" as unpaid allies and not as hired mercenaries (**Paus. 4.15.7**). Much later in the war the Arkadians joined forces with the Messenians at the engagement which became known as "The Great Trench" (**Paus. 4.17.2**). Again, the question is: "Arkadian allies or Arkadian mercenaries?" Sadly, Pausanias even fails to put us out of our misery in book eight of his travelogue. He simply issues a bland statement concerning Arkadian help *given to the Messenians "in their* struggle against Lakedaimon" (**8.6.1**). If we turn to Strabo, however, there is a consolation prize on offer when the geographer mentions in passing one of Tyrtaios' poems in which the poet records the Messenians as having taken "the Argives, Eleians, Pisatans and Arkadians as allies and revolted" (*καθ' ἣν ἑλόμενοι συμμάχους Ἀργείους τε καὶ Ἠλείους καὶ Πισάτας καὶ Ἀρκάδας ἀπέστησαν*: **C.362**). Neither the text of Pausanias nor the extant fragments of his sources for this acount actually use the noun *ἐπικούροι*. However, Wade-Gery offers the quaint notion that the Phigaleians donated the twelve foot bronze image of Apollo Epikourios from Bassai to Oresthasion (Megalopolis' predecessor) for services rendered.[47]

Less hazy evidence for the employment of Arkadians as hoplite-mercenaries during the Archaic period is based upon a coin struck circa 514-10 BC by the Athenian Alkmeonidai clan. In 510 BC the powerful Alkmeonidai launched a successful coup to gain Athens from the Peisistratid tyrant, Hippias: their effort was militarily backed by Sparta (**Hdt. 5.62-5**). On the basis of a *triskeles* emblem[48] assigned to an Alkmeonidai mint and the fact that one such coin was unearthed in Arkadia, C.T.Seltman has suggested that the clan also used Peloponnesian mercenaries in this family enterprise. It goes without saying, if the clan really did employ mercenaries, these would have included Arkadians amongst their ranks.[49] We know from Herodotos that the opposing Peisistratid faction had often relied upon hired soldiery. Although Peisistratos began his long career with a humble bodyguard

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[47] *Studies Ehrenberg*, (1966) 301 fn.19. See also Fields N. "Apollo: God of War, Protector of Mercenaries", *Archaeology in the Peloponnese: New Excavations and Research*, (ed. K.Sheedy) Oxbow Books (Oxford 1994) 95-113.

[48] For *Λευκοποδής* as the clan device of the Alkmeonidai see Ar. Schol. *Lys.* 664.

[49] *Athens: Its History and Coinage before the Persian Invasion*, (Cambridge 1924) 83; see also 21 where the author identifies "White-legs" as being a device of a single white-leg or the *triskeles* - three running legs cojoined in the style of the arms of the Isle of Man. For the view that there was no general use of hereditary badges in Greece see: van Buchem H.J.H. "Family Coats-of-Arms in Greece?", *CR 40* (1926) 181-3.

of citizen club-bearers (**Hdt. 1.59**; ***Ath. Pol.* 14.1**), after his second come back from exile he had, in true tyrannic fashion, begun to surround himself with a more useful bodyguard, i.e. one composed of mercenaries (**Hdt. 1.64**). Moreover, before we leave the topic of the possible Alkmeonidai employment of hoplite-mercenaries, it is important to take note of the later Athenian tradition which supported such a view (***Ath. Pol.* 19.4; Dem. 21.144; Isok. *Antid.* 232**).[50]

The historical record is more substantial when dealing with Gelon, the aristocratic tyrant of Gela and master of Syracuse. One of the acts of this tyrant was to enlarge Syracuse by transplanting to it the whole or part of the populations of other Sicilian cities. In addition he also enfranchised over ten thousand "foreign mercenaries" (*ξένους μισθοφόρους*) who were in his pay (**Diod. 11.72.3, cf 11.68; Arist. *Pol.* 1304a6**).[51] Some of these soldiers-of-fortune, without doubt, would have been Arkadians, for there is evidence to show that a number of them became his *ἑταῖροι* and thus occupied positions of trust within the tyrant's Syracusan court. One of them is known from the ode which Pindar dedicated to Gelon. This was Hagesias of Syracuse, a victor in the Olympic mule-car race of 472 BC: he was formerly from the Arkadian city-state of Stymphalos (***Ol.* 6.80-4; 93-100**). Admittedly, we have no positive indication that Hagesias was a fighting man; however, we do know of another Arkadian, via a dedicatory inscription from Olympia, who was. Pausanias describes this inscription as belonging to a certain Phormis who had "crossed to Sicily from Mainalos to serve Gelon (*ὃς ἐκ Μαινάλου διαβὰς ἐς Σικελίαν παρὰ Γέλωνα*)...distinguishing himself in the campaigns of Gelon and afterwards of his brother Hiero" (*ἐς τὰς στρατείας ἀποδεικνύμενος*: **5.27.1**). Phormis, through his martial services to these tyrants, amassed a small fortune and, therefore, was able to dedicate not only at Olympia but also to Apollo at Delphi. Pausanias also informs us that the Olympic offerings consisted of two horses and two charioteers, a charioteer standing by the side of each of the horses. These impressive works were undertaken by Dionysios of Argos and Simon of Aigina. On the flank of the first of the horses ran the inscription: *Φόρμις ἀνέθηκεν Ἀρκὰς Μαινάλιος, νῦν δὲ Συρακόσιος*. Other offerings included three statues of Phormis in combat, dedicated by Lykortas of Syracuse - an Arkadian comrade-in-arms perhaps.[52] Each bears an inscription saying the soldier fighting is Phormis of Mainalos (**Paus. 5.27.7**). Again an Olympic inscription, in this case upon a stone statue base, verifies the existence of another Arkadian adventurer, this time from Mantineia,

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[50] When dealing with these three literary references it is crucial that the reader equates money with mercenaries!

[51] We know from Herodotos that Gelon commanded an extremely large body of hoplites, having offered, in exchange for the position of commander-in-chief, 20,000 of them to the Hellenic League (**7.158**).

[52] It should be noted that Polybios' father was called "Lykortas".

in the service of Gelon. Dated by L.H.Jeffery to the first quarter of the fifth century BC[53] it reads: Πραξιτέλης ἀνέθηκε Συρακόσιος τόδ' ἄγαλμα καὶ Καμαρινaïος· πρόσθα [δ]ὲ Μαντινέᾳ Κρίνιος υἱὸς ἔναιεν ἐν 'Αρκαδίᾳ πολυμήλῳ ἑσλος ἐών, καὶ ϝοι μνᾶμα τόδ' ἐστ' ἀρετᾶς.[54]

By at least the last-half of the fifth century BC, Arkadian mercenaries had become proverbial. From the Attic poet Hermippos, for example, we have the satirical poem *The Porters* - a catalogue of the provenence of Athenian imports circa 425 BC - in which we can read the following line: "Phrygia sends us servants; Arkadia soldiers for pay" (ἀπὸ δ' 'Αρκαδίας ἐπικούρους: **F.63.18**).[55] And so, with his ill-fated Sicilian Armada, Nikias took two hundred and fifty Mantineians "and other mercenaries" (**Thuc. 6.43.1, cf 22.1**). With the line from Hermippos' poem still in mind, we can safely assume that these other mercenaries were also from Arkadia. Later, in the same theatre of operations, the Corinthians despatched a number of Arkadian hoplite-mercenaries, under a Corinthian general, to the aid of the besieged Syracusans (**Thuc. 7.19.4**). Indeed, Thucydides does note that both sides employed Arkadian hoplite-mercenaries during the Sicilian Expedition, stressing that the Mantineians recruited by the Athenians "were accustomed to go against any who at any time were pointed out to them as enemies, and at this time were led by the *desire of gain* [my italics] to regard as enemies the Arkadians who were with the Corinthians" (ἐπὶ τοὺς αἰεὶ πολεμίους σφίσιν ἀποδεικνυμένους ἰέναι εἰωθοτες, καὶ τότε τοὺς μετὰ Κορινθίων ἐλθόντας 'Αρκάδας οὐδὲν ἧσσον διὰ κέρδος ἡγούμενοι πολεμίους: **7.57.9**). There are two very important inferences to draw from Thucydides' observation here. Firstly, the implication is made by the author that at the time of the Sicilian Expedition it was already common for the Arkadians to serve as mercenaries. Secondly, in a truly professional style the Arkadian soldiers-of-fortune fought purely for gain without due regard to whom they might come up against on the field of conflict - as the English mercenary, Sir James Turner, who soldiered in many an army during the Thirty Years War, shrewdly put it: "That soe we

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[53] Op.cit.160-1,211; see also 215 #20 & pl.41 #20.

[54] Dittenberger W. & Purgold K. *Die Inschriften von Olmpia Band V*, (Berlin 1896) 389-92 #266. See also: Hansen P.A. "A List of Greek Verse Inscriptions Down to 400 BC: an Analytical Survey", *Opuscula Graecolatina 3* (Copenhagen 1975) #398.

[55] Collected in Edmonds op.cit.306. Cf emendation "Anonymous" F.42 ibid.964: "There was Pegasos though - from Arkadia you know" (ἐξ 'Αρκαδίας [ἐπίκουροι]); i.e. add the noun "epikouroi" as the conjunction of Arkadia and mercenaries naturally springs to mind and tongue!

serve our master honestlie, it is no matter what master we serve."[56] Here we have the essence of the mercenary who has taken up soldiering as a way of life to alleviate a definite lack of means.

VI

Arkadians, it seems, were leaving their homeland and making mercenary service a permanent career. When the Arkadian general, Kleanor of Orchomenos, came to command one of the contingents that made up the remnants of the Ten Thousand, his force was described by Xenophon as *τὸ Ἀρκαδικὸν ὁπλιτικόν* (**Xen. *An.* 4.8.18**). More enlightening is Xenophon's later comment in which he says: "the rest of the army amounted to nothing (in truth more than half the army did consist of Arkadians and Akhaians)" (*τὸ δ' ἄλλο στράτευμα οὐδὲν εἶναι (καὶ ἦν δὲ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ὑπὲρ ἥμισυ τοῦ στρατεύματος Ἀρκάδες καὶ Ἀχαιοί)*: ***An.* 6.2.10**).[57] And so, at Pontic Heraklea, we find all the Arkadians and Akhaians - over 4,000 of them - separating from the rest of the survivors of the Ten Thousand and marching off for a looting spree under ten newly elected strategoi with collegiate powers (**Xen. *An.* 6.2.12,16**).[58] Scrutinizing the figures tucked away within the pages of the *Anabasis* reveals just how many Arkadians had signed up for this particular adventure. To begin with, we know, as Xenophon makes clear, that more than half of the Ten Thousand were composed of Arkadians and Akhaians. Furthermore, at this stage of the campaign the rest of the army amounted to some 4,140 men (**6.2.16**) and therefore, the combined strengths of the Arkadians and the Akhaians would have stood in the order of 4,200 hoplites minimum.

There is little reason to assume that any one body of hoplites had suffered more than another on the march until that point. True, the Arkadians and Akhaians lost heavily when they went it alone (**Xen. *An.* 6.3.4-9**), but that was later. Therefore, the original number of these mercenaries can be restored by applying the proportions given by Xenophon in *An.* 6.2.16 to the original hoplite strength of the Ten Thousand: i.e. 4,200 Arkadian/Akhaian hoplites to 3,100 others (+1,000 peltasts, +40 horsemen) when applied to the figure 10,400 (the original hoplite strength) gives us the approximate figure of 6,000 Arkadians/Akhaians, thus leaving us 4,400 as a total for the others. Unfortunately,

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[56] *Memoirs of His Own Life and Times*, Bannatyne Club (1829 (posthumous)) 14. A brief sketch of the life of the mercenary-captain Hugh Mackay of Scourie admirably illustrates this point. A Highlander from the west coast of Sutherland, Mackay had spent long years abroad serving with the Scots Brigade, a mercenary unit in the pay of the United Provinces. An uncomplicated man, he saw no paradox in his own military career and thus gladly received his British commission as a Major-General from James II as a reward for his part in crushing the Monmouth Rebellion of 1685. Three years later he brought his Scots back to England with William of Orange, and helped to drive James from his throne in the name of the same Protestant cause for which Monmouth's men had died.

[57] For an excellent article which deals with the composition of this mercenary army see: Roy J. "The Mercenaries of Cyrus", *Historia 16* (1967) 287-323.

[58] See also ibid.308-9.

Xenophon does not provide us with the relative proportions of the Arkadian and Akhaian hoplites, but some other considerations may help to divide them. K.J.Beloch once pointed out that the area of Akhaia was about half that of Arkadia,[59] and from Diodoros we know that under the reform of the Peloponnesian forces in 377/6 BC, Akhaia contributed one unit while Arkadia contributed two units (**15.31.2**). Beloch concluded his article with the idea that the population of Akhaia was about half that of Arkadia; all very dubious but useful nevertheless. This is especially so if we take into account the number of named individuals from those regions as provided by Xenophon: sixteen Arkadians and seven Akhaians. This certainly does bear out the 2:1 ratio of Arkadians to Akhaians almost exactly. Furthermore, Arkadians in particular are usually identified not only as such but also by their locality within Arkadia.[60] More importantly, however, by applying our 2:1 ratio to the total of 6,000 given above, we arrive at the tidy sum of 4,000 Arkadian hoplites and 2,000 Akhaian hoplites. To put it bluntly, the Arkadians made up 38.5% of the total number of hoplites within the ranks of the Ten Thousand, a mercenary force composed of no less than twenty-four different nationalities.[61]

More revealing is the fact that the vast majority of these 4,000 Arkadians appear to have been drawn from the pool of Peloponnesian hoplite-mercenaries under Cyrus' own satrapal garrison commanders (**Xen. *An.* 1.1.6; 2.1,3**). In other words, the Arkadians were already under contract within the Persian Empire before the Pretender's attempt to overthrow his elder brother, Artaxerxes. We know for certain that in 405 BC three hundred hoplites formed Cyrus' personal bodyguard under the command of the Arkadian, Xenias of Parrhasia (**Xen. *An.* 1.1.2**) and, according to one of Artaxerxes' court physicians, Ktesias of Knidos, it had been common practice for Arkadian hoplites to seek permanent employment within the Empire during the Peloponnesian War (**F.15 #52(J)**) - we should add here that Arkadia did not suffer devastation as did Attica during this war. J.Roy righly argues that even before his adventure, Cyrus the Younger could rely upon no less than 10,000

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[59] Op.cit.112,124,129. For the relative sizes of Arkadia and Akhaia - the former 4,327.0 sq.km., the latter 2,956.1 sq.km. (1936): see The Admiralty op.cit.I.477 appendix viii. For what it is worth, Polybios does say that the Arkadia's size and population far out weighed that of Akhaia (**2.38.3**).

[60] In the *Anabasis*, Xenophon provides us 66 named individuals and their provenence - 16 strategoi, 29 lochagoi, 7 other officers and 14 non-officers. Of these, 16 are Arkadian, mostly officers who pop up later in his narrative - 4 strategoi, 7 lochagoi (2 receiving promotion from the ranks), 1 taxiarchos, 3 individual hoplites (5 originally) and 1 mantis. The 4 strategoi: (i) Xenias the Parrhasian (**1.1.2; 2.1,3,10; 3.7; 4.7-8**); (ii) Sophainetos the Stymphalian (**1.1.11; 2.3; 2.5.37; 4.4.19; 5.3.1; 8.1; 6.5.13**); (iii) Agias (**1.2.9*; 2.5.31; 6.30; 3.1.47**); (iv) Kleanor of Orchomenos (**2.1.10; 5.37,39; 3.2.4; 4.8.18; 7.1.40**). The 7 lochagoi: (i) Agasias of Stymphalos (**3.1.31; 4.1.27 (H); 4.7.9,11; 5.2.15; 6.1.30; 2.7; 4.10; 6.7-21; 7.8.19 (L)**); (ii) Kallimachos of Parrhasia (**4.1.27 (H); 4.7.8,10-2; 5.6.14; 6.2.7,9 (L)**); (iii) Nikarchos (**3.3.5 (AWOL)**); (iv) Aineias of Stymphalos (**4.7.13-4**); (v) Smikres & Hegesander (**6.3.5 (2/10 elected "S")**); (vi) Arystas (**7.3.23-4**). The taxiarchos: Pyrrhias (**6.5.11**). The named hoplites: (i) Nikarchos (**2.5.33 (KIA)**); (ii) Basias (**4.1.18**); (iii) Eurylochos of Lusi (**4.2.21; 7.11-2; 7.6.40**). The mantis: Arexion the Parrhasian (**6.4.13; 5.2.8**).
* See: Parke H.W. *Greek Mercenary Soldiers: From the Earliest Times to the Battle of Ipsus*, Clarendon Press (Oxford 1933) 41-2 & Roy op.cit.288-9 for problems concerning this particular Arkadian strategos.

[61] If we include the figures for peltasts *et al*, this drops to 31%.

hoplite-mercenaries that were already in Asia Minor: (i) the 4,000 hoplites Cyrus lent to Aristippos of Larisa for a campaign in Thessaly against the latter's political rivals (**Xen. *An.* 1.1.10**); (ii) the 4,000 Peloponnesian hoplites Xenias of Parrhasia brought to Sardis (**Xen. *An.* 1.2.3**);[62] (iii) the three hundred hoplites Pasion the Megarian took to Miletos and then on to Sardis (**Xen. *An.* 1.2.3**); (iv) the skeleton force of Peloponnesian hoplites left to garrison the Ionian cities during Cyrus' march into the heartland of the Empire (**Xen. *An.* 1.2.1**). In the words of Roy, "mercenaries or potential mercenaries must have been numerous in Ionia."[63]

Each year, according to Xenophon, the Great King would review his troops under arms and amongst those inspected were the Empire's hired soldiery (*τῶν μισθοφόρων*: ***Oik.* 4.6**). Indeed, small bodies of Arkadians often acted as the *δορυφόροι* of the various imperial satraps during this period, if not before. In the year 428 BC, for example, the satrap of Sardis, Pissouthnes, despatched "mercenaries, both Arkadian and barbarian" (*ἐπικούρους Ἀρκάδων τε καὶ τῶν βαρβάρων*),[64] to aid one of the warring parties in Notium (**Thuc. 3.34.2**): the name of their Arkadian commander, Hippias, is also recorded (**Thuc. 3.34.3**). This family tradition of employing Arkadian hoplite-mercenaries[65] was kept up by Pissouthnes' bastard son and ally of Athens, Amorges. For, in 412 BC, Amorges led a revolt in Caria against his master, Darios II, which was backed with the experienced muscle of hoplite-mercenaries, many of whom were "from the Peloponnese" (**Thuc. 8.5.5**). Now, if we turn to a late fifth century BC monument, *The Xanthian Stele*, we can read the proud boast of one Lykian dynast, [?Gerg]is the son of Harpagos. He claims that he slew, in a single day, seven Arkadian hoplites in the pay of one of the Great King's satraps: these unlucky Arkadians may have been mercenaries recruited by Amorges.[66] Once Amorges' rebellion had been crushed and its leader carted off to the Great King in chains, his mercenaries promptly found further employment in the enemy camp, i.e. with the Peloponnesian forces in league with the satrap, Tissaphernes (**Thuc.**

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[62] It is possible that Kleanor of Orchomenos, who was not originally a strategos, took over the remnants of Xenias' contingent after the latter had deserted. If this is so, and as the original contingents were then still more or less intact (**cf Xen. *An.* 1.3.7**), the term *τὸ Ἀρκαδικὸν ὁπλιτικόν* used by Xenophon to describe Kleanor's contingent in *An.* 4.8.18 can also be applied to the contingent when it was first commanded by Xenias.

[63] Op.cit.298-9.

[64] These "barbarian" mercenaries are assumed to be none other than Carians: Hornblower S. *Commentary on Thucydides, Vol.I (Books I-III)*, Clarendon Press (Oxford 1991) 416. Already by this date Caria had a wide reputation as a supplier of hoplite-mercenaries (**e.g. Archil. F.24; Hdt. 2.152; Ephoros F.12(J); Strab. C.662**) and Hornblower, for this reason, advocates that Caria, especially in pre-Hekatomnid days, was not particularly prosperous: *Mausolus*, Clarendon Press (Oxford 1982) 4-5.

[65] Back in 440 BC Pissouthnes had lent a force of 700 mercenaries to the anti-Athenian party on Samos (**Thuc. 1.115.4, cf Schol. *Vesp.* 283; Diod. 12.27.3; Plut. *Per.* 25.2-3**)...Arkadians?

[66] Tod M.N. *Greek Historical Inscriptions, Vol.I*, Clarendon Press (Oxford 1946) #93.10.

8.28.4). The reason for this, according to Thucydides, was simple: "most of them [i.e. Amorges' mercenaries] were from the Peloponnese" (*οἱ πλεῖστοι ἐκ Πελοποννήσου*: **8.28.4**).[67] In other words, Amorges' mercenaries were Arkadians who had gone east with the intention of staying there.

To strengthen the claim that the Arkadians were already holding imperial contracts prior to 401 BC, we can call upon coins sporting the head of Pan which have been attributed to Cyrus the Younger.[68] J.Roy has argued that these coins cannot have been struck during Cyrus' advance into the Empire's heartland, since there would not have been the time available at Caÿstrupedion, the only occasion on which he paid the Greeks (**Xen. *An.* 1.2.11-2**).[69] If properly attributed to Cyrus, these coins are earlier. In other words, the coins were either struck to pay his Arkadian hoplite garrisons in Ionia, or part of the bonus the Prince handed out to Xenias' three hundred hoplites who escorted him to his father's court in 405 BC (**Xen. *An.* 1.4.12, cf 1.2**). In addition, we can also note the games held at Peltai in honour of the Arkadian god, Zeus Lykaios. These were organized by our old Arkadian friend, Xenias, and one of the spectators who graced this Arkadian festival with his royal presence was none other than Cyrus himself (**Xen. *An.* 1.2.10**). Xenias had honourably served the Prince for a good number of years and had even put roots down in the Empire. For, when he finally deserted the Pretender's cause at Myriandos - along with the Megarian general, Pasion - we learn that his wife and children, as well as those of Pasion, were still in Caria (**Xen. *An.* 1.4.8**).

It must be stressed, at this juncture, that Xenophon's objective judgment on the reasons why men joined Cyrus' adventure was biased, especially when we consider that he needed to defend his own actions. Despite this, we should consider the one explicit analysis of the mercenaries' motives he does offer (***An.* 6.4.8**). From this passage we quickly gain the following salient points:
(i) Xenophon is talking about mercenaries who "had sailed away from Greece" (*ἐκπεπλευκότες*);
(ii) the reason they had signed up was "not because their means was scanty" (*οὐ σπάνει βίου*);
(iii) indeed, some of these men had "brought other men with them," and others "had even spent money" to do so (*ἄνδρας ἄγοντες...προσανηλωκότες χρήματα*); (iv) once their contract expired, these men wanted to return "to Greece" (*εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα*). In other words, the passage is clearly referring to the mercenaries who had come out from Greece, and not those already serving in the East, i.e. the Arkadians (and Akhaians) who made up more than half of Cyrus' hoplite force. Furthermore, these newcomers were men of means, i.e. well-heeled Athenian adventurers like

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[67] These mercenaries were now put under the command of the Spartiate, Pedaritos, and detailed to garrison Chios (**Thuc. 8.28.5; 32.2; 38.3; 55.3**).

[68] Hill G.F. *Catalogue of Greek Coins of Arabia, Mesopotamia and Persia*, (London 1922) CXXV & fn.6; CXXVIIF; CXXIX-CXXX & fn.2; pl.XXV #14a; 156 #61.

[69] Op.cit.309 fn.85.

Xenophon himself, or recruiting officers who had collected recruits from mainland Greece.[70] In sum, this passage is no doubt true as regards part of Cyrus' force, but only a small part: Xenophon has simply opted to inflate the social standing of his fellow mercenaries (**cf Isok. *Paneg.* 146**). Indeed, the bulk of Cyrus' mercenaries had already made the profession of soldiering a perpetual vocation. Five years later, we find the remnants of the Ten Thousand still active and serving under the colours of Agesilaos when he campaigned in Asia Minor (**Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.20**). Furthermore, although the Spartan king had eventually left the East, their diminished ranks could still be counted amongst his command at the crucial battle of Koroneia in 394 BC (**Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.15,18; *Ages.* 2.10,11**), where, like true professionals, they rendered sterling service (**Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.17**).[71] Pausanias, incidentally, mentions that Arkadians had crossed over to Asia Minor with Agesilaos' command in 396 BC (**8.6.2**): a second generation of Cyreans perhaps, *en route* to boost the thinning ranks of the "Old Guard".

In the light of all this, we should consider other areas outside the Persian Empire in which Arkadians could readily pick up contracts. An isolated field for employment was under the native tyrants of the Tauric Chersonese. Satyros I employed a Greek, Sopaios, as commander of his army (**Isok. *Trap.* 3**): according to Lysias, Satyros was the king of the Kimmerian Bosporus circa 433-387 BC (**16.4**). It was the Stoic, Chrysippos of Soli (f.230 BC) who once asserted that if a wise man could not become a king then he should at least seek employment as a soldier and "go campaigning with a king of the kind Idanthyros the Scythian was or Leukon of Pontus" (**Plut. *Mor.* 1043c,d, cf 1061d; Strab. C.301; C.310; Dio Chrys. *Orat.* 2.77**). This advice, even if *post eventum*, was obviously taken up by one group of Arkadian hoplite-mercenaries as we have an inscription that was erected by them to honour Leukon, their wise employer.[72] Leukon was the powerful ruler of the kingdom of the Kimmerian Bosporus circa 387-347 BC, an important provider of Athenian corn and Satyros' eldest son. Aineias Taktikos, himself possibly an Arkadian and probably a mercenary for some part of his life, laconically records that the king sacked those of his bodyguard who fell into debt as a result of dice playing (**5.2**) and further testimony to Leukon's canniness can be found in Polyainos (**6.9**). A fitting parallel can be seen in the 1542 garrison regulations for Berwick-upon-Tweed which, quite naturally, also expected the worst from a soldier's nature when he was idle. These regulations prescribed penalties (varying from pay stoppages to terms of imprisoment and death) for, amongst other misdemeanours, gambling for money rather than drink. Before we leave the Spartokid dynasty, mention should be made of Leukon's not so wise grandson. Satyros II (f.310 BC) came to the family

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[70] Conversely, others have taken ἄνδρας ἄγοντες to mean "bringing slaves". See: (i) Parke op.cit.29; (ii) Mckechnie P.R. *Outsiders in the Greek Cities in the Fourth Century BC*, Routledge (London 1989) 80.

[71] We should note that most of Agesilaos' mercenaries actually wanted to remain in Asia Minor (**Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.5**).

[72] Tod op.cit. (1948) #115A.

throne after a bloody power struggle with his brothers. Both warring parties appear to have relied heavily upon hoplite-mercenaries, Satyros no less than 2,000, according to Diodoros, under the generalship of one Meniskos (**20.22.4; 23.6**). Satyrus II clung to the throne for a mere nine months, falling in a stubborn battle in which Meniskos and his mercenary command played the starring role (**Diod. 20.23.6-8**).

Of course not all Arkadians went east for full-time employment and we have already mentioned those who served the military tyrants of Sicily. In 432 BC the Corinthian general, Aristaios, was sent north to the Chalkidike commanding fellow citizen volunteers and other Peloponnesian hoplites whom he "persuaded by pay" (*μισθῷ πείσαντες*: **Thuc. 1.60.1**). Though not named Arkadians, it is probable that these hoplite-mercenaries were from Arkadia or even Akhaia: it seems wise to advocate that when the provenence for hoplite-mercenaries is given as Peloponnesians (especially in Thucydides) the mercenaries were Arkadian, and if not, from Akhaia instead.[73] In Peloponnesian service full-time mercenaries would have been useful on distant expeditions into the outer reaches of the Athenian Empire, especially so when we consider that the Peloponnesian hoplite-citizen, in the main, was not much accustomed to face the discomforts and perils of long campaigns.[74] Returning to those mercenaries hired by the Corinthians and despatched to Poteidaia; two years later the Athenians released them after their protracted siege of that city (**Thuc. 2.70.3**), and they can be identified as the mercenaries who turned up on the Chalkidian side at the battle of Spartolos in the following year (**Thuc. 2.79.3**). Five years later the Spartan commander, Eurylochos, led a distant campaign into darkest Akarnania; in his expeditionary force were a contingent of Mantineian hoplites. Later, during a clash with the Athenians and their local allies, it was these hoplites that demonstrated their professional skill in maintaining their hard pressed ranks as the rest of Eurylochos' command disintegrated around them (**Thuc. 3.108.3**). Thucydides does allude to the fact that this Spartan-led army was mainly composed of mercenaries; he refers to them later as *τὸν μισοθοφόρον ὄχλον* (**3.109.2**). More telling, however, is the Mantineians' willingness to go along with the surviving Peloponnesian commanders in agreeing to a treacherous desertion of the Ambraciots *et al* when given leave by the victors to return home unmolested (**Thuc. 3.109.2; 111.1-3**). From the

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[73] Akhaia, even today, is a poor region. Apart from its thin littoral plain that hugs the Corinthian Gulf, Akhaia's mountainous hinterland is very much like Arkadia in all aspects. In the 3rd century BC, if we follow Plutarch, most Akhaians resided in small cities (*μικροπολῖται*) and owned land that was neither fertile nor extensive (*γῆν οὔτε χρηστὴν οὔτε ἄφθονον ἐκέκτηντο*). He completes this miniature topographical survey by explaining that, although Akhaia was not land-locked, the Akhaians processed no harbours of note as the Corinthian Gulf mainly "washed a precipitous and rocky shore" (*τὰ πολλὰ κατα ῥαχίας ἐκφερομένη πρὸς τὴν ἤπειρον*: ***Arat.* 9.4**).

[74] E.g. Thuc. 1.60.1; 4.52.2; 76.3; 81.1; 7.19.4; 58.3; 8.100.3; Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.28,29,43, cf Diod. 14.33.5; 16.6.5; Lys. 12.59-60; Plut. *Dion* 42.1,4; 43.1. Prior to the invasion of Attica during the late summer of 428 BC, Thucydides notes that Sparta's Peloponnesian allies were somewhat slow in mustering at the Isthmus as "they were busy with harvesting their crops and tired of military service" (**3.15.2**).

Athenian point of view, one wonders if they were aware of the increasing importance of hoplite-mercenaries in mainland Greece and, consequently, had made a conscious decision to protect the commodity? They certainly, as we have already discussed,[75] ended up employing Mantineian soldiers-of-fortune at a later date.

VII

The pressures that drove Greeks to hawk themselves as mercenaries were manifold and we shall deal with other motives in the next chapter. In the case of Arkadians who, along with the Akhaians, provided a large percentage of the hoplite-mercenaries available for hire, the prime mover was poverty. On its own, the evidence dervived from the number of Arkadians seeking a full-time livelihood out in the East would sustain this hypothesis. It is fashionable for scholars who touch upon this subject to make the blanket claim that the root cause for the perceived rise of mercenary service during the fourth century BC was poverty. The literary evidence for this idea is readily available in the source material dealing with these turbulent years. Take, for example, Diodoros' account of the 307 BC campaign against wealthy Carthage. Here he tells us that many of the Greek soldiery hoped to get rich through this adventure, especially in view of the fact that Greece itself "had become poor and miserable" (**20.40.6-7**). Again, by simply skimming through Isokrates' polemic pamphlets we will be rewarded with the same argument (**e.g. *Paneg.* 168; *Phil.* 97; *Arch.* 15.57-8**).[76]

In his historical novel dealing with the life of Cyrus the Great of Persia, Xenophon relates how Cyrus reorganized his armed forces into an efficient fighting-machine. Amongst the soldiery recruited by Cyrus for this purpose were those from Chaldaea. These Chaldaeans, according to Xenophon, enjoyed serving as mercenaries for a number of interrelated reasons: "they are fond of war and poor of purse; for their country is mountainous and only a small part of it is productive" (*διὰ τὸ πολεμικοί τε καὶ πένητες εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ ἡ χώρα αὐτοῖς ὀρεινήτε τέ ἐστι καὶ ὀλίγη ἡ τὰ χρήματα ἔχουσα*: ***Cyr.* 3.2.7, cf 2.1.15; *An.* 4.3.4**). The *Cyropaedia* was written during Xenophon's comfortable old age and one wonders if, when looking back over his soldiering years within the ranks of the Ten Thousand, Xenophon recalled the many Arkadian soldiers-of-fortune he encountered there and thus used them as a convenient analogical model for his Chaldaeans.

Lykomedes, in his speech, implies that Arkadia, if she so wished, was now able to stand by herself. This was no idle boast, for under his leadership the Arkadian League had the backing of the *Ἐπάριτοι*, a recently commissioned body of 5,000 hoplites which was maintained and paid for by

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[75] See above, 66. Note also the fact that the Athenians had allowed mercenaries to go scot-free after they took Poteidaia.

[76] See also: (i) Garlan Y. *War in the Ancient World: A Social History*, Chatto & Windus (London 1976) 97; (ii) Griffith G.T. *The Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World*, (repr.) Ares (Chicago 1984) 283; (iii) Parke op.cit.228-31.

the League's members (**Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.22; Diod. 15.62.2; 67.2**). It is more than certain that these state professionals were recruited and selected from "among the numerous Arkadian soldiers-of-fortune who had hitherto taken service under foreign banners."[77] In other words, Arkadian professional soldiers were now utilizing their martial skills for the interest of the League instead of for foreign pay-masters. Initially, in order to pay for this standing army a special coinage was struck by the League.[78] By 363 BC, however, the Arkadian leadership had been sadly reduced to plundering the sacred treasures of Olympia so as to support the Eparitoi (**Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.33**). It was not to be long before Arkadia's first professional army dissolved. The ex-soldiers-of-fortune simply drifted back to their former mercenary careers as the coffers of the League ran dry (*ταχὺ δὴ οἱ μὲν οὐκ ἂν δυνάμενοι ἄνευ μισθόυ τῶν ἐπαρίτων εἶναι διεχέοντο*: **Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.34**), for, like Xenophon's Chaldaeans, these men were accustomed "to making their living through the business of war" (*εἰθισμένοι ἀπὸ πολέμου βιοτεύειν*: ***Cyr.* 3.2.25**). To close this chapter, it is particularly instructive to compare the fate of the Eparitoi with the rise of the Free Companies after the shattering French defeat at Poitiers. In his lengthy reminiscences to Froissart, the Bascot de Mauléon touches upon the fate of the paid soldiery of both sides after peace was finally declared between France and England: "large numbers of poor companions trained in war came out [of the forts and castles they once held] and collected together." He continues: "though the kings had made peace, they had to live somehow."[79] Each man had no option other than to turn away from peace and grasp the proffered mercenary contract.

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[77] Cary M. *The Cambridge Ancient History, Vol.VI*, C.U.P. (Cambridge 1927) 88.

[78] *The Cambridge Ancient History: Volume of Plates II*, C.U.P. (Cambridge 1928) 6.f.

[79] *Chronicles*, Penguin Books (London 1978) 282; see also 148.

5 *GENTLEMEN-AT-ARMS*

Not so much for the money as for the adventure.

Col. David Smiley; ex-SAS, Yemen mercenary.

From Classical Orchomenos in Arkadia - a polis that was generally ruled by an oligarchy - there are a series of interesting political documents. These include a group of eleven decrees giving citizens of other city-states privileged rights among the Orchomenians, the recipients being men of high status within their own communities[1] - there is very little point in cultivating good relations with men who have no political clout back home. These men are given the right to own land, pasture sheep, and in one case gather wood, in the territory of Orchomenos. On the other hand, the Orchomenian citizen lower down the social scale, the peasant-hoplite, had very little to rejoice about. As a result of such generous privileges being granted to these foreigners he would face still greater competition for grazing and wood-gathering in a land that surrendered little. Moreover, the situation at Orchomenos, about which we are well informed, was probably not uncommon in Arkadia; the men given honoured status at Orchomenos are mainly fellow Arkadians and this pattern of *élite* rule was certainly familiar to them, being paralleled in their own communities. Although the leadership of these oligarchies generally neglected rather than tyrannised the peasantry, such behaviour would have nevertheless reinforced oligarchic status and political control. A classic case of the rich getting richer and the poor getting poorer.

The theme of poverty took centre stage in the previous chapter, and rightly so, as it was the prime catalyst in the transition of hoplite-citizen into hoplite-mercenary. We now, however, look at the flip-side of the coin and concentrate our focus upon those men who commanded the social standing which allowed them the involvement in the daily political wheeling-and-dealing of their own communities. Such men, when in favour, would have benefited from the provisions of decrees as described above. Such men however, when out of favour, were alternatively forced to seek fame and fortune abroad instead of kicking their heels waiting for the clocks to be set back to pre-exile times.

[1] Plassart A. & Blum G. "Inscriptions d' Orchomène d' Arcadie", *BCH 38* (1914) 447-78.

I

Perhaps an extreme example of the exiled man turned soldier-of-fortune is the Spartan king Damaratos who, on being deposed in 491 BC, takes himself off to the Persian Empire (**Hdt. 6.67**). In Persia Damaratos finally ends up in the court of Xerxes, having supported his accession to the throne (**Hdt. 7.3**), and even accompanies the Great King on his expedition to Greece in the capacity of Xerxes' personal military adviser (**Hdt. 7.102; 209; 234**). As a reward for his imperial services Damaratos is granted the suzerainty of Teuthrania in western Asia Minor, where his descendants continued to rule until at least the end of the fifth century BC (**Xen. *An.* 1.2.3**). Nevertheless, to be in a state of permanent exile was not the ideal solution for men of such calibre and they normally sought ways of returning themselves to power back home. For example, Hermokrates of Syracuse - one of the city's leading oligarchic strategoi during the Sicilian Expedition - had first been deposed from his command and then finally banished altogether by the democratic faction after it had won increased influence within the city as a consequence of the final destruction of the Athenian expedition (**Thuc. 6.103.4; 8.85.3, cf Diod. 13.63 passim; Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.27**). Hermokrates was already abroad on the Asia Minor coast with the Syracusan fleet aiding the Spartans when the decree banishing him was passed, and it was in Asia Minor that he decided to raise and lead a mercenary army "in order to secure his recall to Syracuse" (*παρεσκευάζετο πρὸς τὴν εἰς Συρακούσας κάθοδον*: **Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.31, cf Diod. 13.75.2-8**). In truth, political exiles from the same polis tended to stick together and thereby act in concert so as to effect their return, and as such, did not take up mercenary service.[2] Nevertheless, there is some evidence for individual political exiles opting to become mercenaries. The most notable of these is perhaps Alkaios' brother, Antimenidas, who served as a mercenary under Nebuchadrezzar II during the king's Palestinian campaign of 604 BC which culminated in the siege of Ascalon (**Alk. F.48, cf F.350; Arist. *Pol.* 1285a35**).

Our only detailed eye-witness account of mercenary service in the classical Greek world is Xenophon's *Anabasis*. However, there is no reason to believe that any large percentage of the Ten Thousand were political exiles. Apart from the group of Milesian exiles whom Cyrus took under his

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[2] E.g. (i) the Athenian exiles under Thrasyboulos (**Xen. *Hell.* 2.4 passim**); (ii) oligarchs exiled from Elis (**Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.29**); (iii) the Corinthian oligarchs of 392 BC (**Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.9; 5.5,19**); (iv) the pro-Spartan Thebans of 378 BC (**Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.39**); (v) Zakynthian exiles (**Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.3**); (vi) Phliasian exiles (**Xen. *Hell.* 7.2.5, cf 4.11**); (vii) the Phigalian, Corinthian and Megarian oligarchs of 375/4 BC (**Diod. 15.40.2,3,4**); (viii) the pro-Spartan Tegeans of 370/69 BC (**Diod. 15.59.3**). Cf Isok. *Arch.* 68 where he claims that there are "more people in exile now from a single city than before from the whole of the Peloponnese." There are one or two exceptions, the most notable of which being the Messenians who, after the fall of Naupaktos in 403 BC, either took service with Dionysios I in Sicily or ended up in Kyrene under one Komon (**Diod. 14.34.3, cf Paus. 4.26.2**). Incidentally, in 395 BC Konon had a personal bodyguard of Messenians when acting as a Persian admiral (***Hell. Oxy.* 15.3**): Konon had once commanded at Naupaktos (**Thuc. 7.31.4; Diod. 13.48.6**).

royal protection (**Xen. *An.* 1.1.7,11**),[3] we read only of Klearchos and Drakontios from Sparta (**Xen. *An.* 1.2.9; 4.8.25**), Gaulites from Samos (**Xen. *An.* 1.7.5, cf.2**), Archagoras from Argos (**Xen. *An.* 4.2.13**), and Timasion the Dardanian (**Xen. *An.* 5.6.23**). The very fact that these mercenaries are distinguished by the epithet φυγάς points to them as exceptions and not the rule. As for the reasons why these men had been politically exiled from their native city-states and thus had adopted their new profession, we only know for certain the case histories for the two Spartans: Klearchos was an extreme case of the rogue Spartiate running wild when given a foreign command; Drakontios had commited a boyhood crime, albeit an accident. For Gaulites and Archagoras, Xenophon, unfortunately, provides no clues at all; these men are simply exiles. Timasion, on the other hand, may have been in exile from his home city of Dardanos[4] for as long as ten years for he claims to have campaigned in the Hellespont, Phrygia and Bithynia under Klearchos and Derkylidas during the Peloponnesian War (**Xen. *An.* 5.6.24**). It is Thucydides who informs us that in 412/11 BC the Spartans had despatched military aid to the Great King in order to stir up trouble in western Asia Minor for the Athenians, and it is for this reason that both Klearchos and Derkylidas had been instructed to cooperate with Pharnabazos, the Persian satrap of Lesser Phrygia and Bithynia (**8.8.3; 39.2; 61.1; 62.1; 80.2,3**). If Timasion was not exaggerating, then it is feasible that he kept up his association with Klearchos and thus took part in the latter's tyranny at Byzantion and the adventures that followed (see above, 14-5). This possible connection with Klearchos, coupled with the fact that by the time he joined Cyrus he was already a veteran mercenary, could explain why Timasion was elected strategos in place of the dead Klearchos (**Xen. *An.* 3.1.4**).

Klearchos' other colleagues in the *Anabasis* were Sophainetos the Stymphalian, Kleanor of Orchomenos, the fellow Spartan Cheirisophos, Agias the Arkadian, Sokrates the Akhaian, Proxenos the Boiotian, and Meno the Thessalian.[5] The Arkadians Sophainetos and Kleanor were probably of a similar age to Klearchos (**Xen. *An.* 2.1.10; 5.3.1; 6.5.13**), but it is not possible to judge their military abilities from Xenophon's narrative, and it is quite likely that they had never held a major

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[3] These Milesians went enthusiastically to Sardis to join Cyrus (**Xen. *An.* 1.2.2**), but never appear during the expedition itself; in fact the numbers given by Xenophon do not seem to take account of them. A few years later, however, some Milesian exiles do turn up in the satrapal court of Tissaphernes where they were employed as part of his bodyguard (**Polyain. 7.16.1**).

[4] Dardanos was at this time ruled by a local dynasty under the satrap Pharnabazos (**Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.10-14**). In Xen. *An.* 5.6.23 Timasion gives the impression that if the Ten Thousand follow him to the Troas and thus help him overthrow this dynasty, the citizens of Dardanos would be more than happy.

[5] The experienced mercenary commanders Xenias the Parhasian and Pasion the Megarian were soon to desert (**Xen. *An.* 1.4.7**), and so will not be considered here.

command; in fact Kleanor began the expedition not as a strategos, but as a subordinate officer.[6] Agias and Sokrates, young men of about thirty-five, apparently showed courage and loyal comradeship, but no more professional merits (**Xen. *An.* 2.6.30**). Proxenos and Meno were even younger, the former was about thirty years old (**Xen. *An.* 2.6.21**), while Meno was "still in the bloom of youth" (**Xen. *An.* 2.6.28**).

II

It is a natural thing for a young man, spurred by a youthful ardour to learn and to acquire reputation, to seek war as a roving volunteer. During the Renaissance period, for example, such men were known as *adventurers* or *voluntaries* in Tudor England, *soldati di fortuna* to the Italians, *soldats de fortune* to the French, and *adventureros* to the Spanish, and were the youths of gentle or aristocratic families who were much prized by commanders for their gallantry and cheapness. At a time when formal military training was rudimentary, thanks to their prior knowledge of sword and horse and the missile weapons of the hunt, and their habituation to shouting orders at their own or their fathers' tenantry, contact with an army quickly made effective soldiers of them. But campaigning was only an instant within their careers. Either they returned home when the rains of autumn spoiled the liveliest of play or becoming addicted, stayed on to join the larger and socially far more various sector of long-serving free-lances who served for pay and made of war a long-term avocation. To these thrusting young nobles going to war was treated as if going to a tournament, travelling at their own expense with a servant or two to quest adventure and renown. With romantic casualness, these gallant gentlemen would take themselves of to an army and risk life and limb for princes, pretenders, charlatans and emperors. Such quixotic notions, however, are not confined to the age of chivalry. General William Walker, remembering the fifty-seven Californian members of *La Falanga Americana* he had led to Nicaragua in the spring of 1855, said of them: "They were most of them men of strong character, tired of the humdrum of common life, and ready for a career which might bring them the sweets of adventure or the rewards of fame."[7] Further on in his memoirs, Walker wrote down a similar analysis of the *filibusters'* motives in joining him on his Latin American "crusade": "The roving and adventurous life of California had increased in them the thirst for action and movement characteristic of the American race..."[8] Colonel Mike Hoare would personally interview all new

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[6] Kleanor first appears in the parley between envoys of the Great King and Tissaphernes, and the Greek strategoi after Cunaxa (**Xen. *An.* 2.1.10, cf 7-9**).

[7] *The War in Nicaragua*, University of Arizona Press (Tuscon 1985) 32. The promised rewards, incidentally, comprised $100 per month (in silver Mexican dollars) plus 500 acres of land (ibid.75).

[8] Ibid.76, cf 385. For his views on "mercenaries", see especially 147,241,349.

volunteers wishing to join 5 Commando and, as a result, he found that a large number of recruits arrived with "romantic notions of mercenary soldiering, founded on half-understood stories of the French Foreign Legion." The "Beau Geste" syndrome, as he called it, meant that a large number of potential volunteers were turned away.[9] Even today we can read in our daily newspapers of British "dogs of war" who have simply turned up in the former Yugoslavia for a colourful adventure, or as one reporter casually puts it: "The simple thrill of killing "Checks", as they nicknamed the Serbs, and a curious fascination with Croatia's drama-filled history is often what pulls foreign fighters in and keeps them there."[10]

Xenophon makes it very clear to his readers that he did not himself join the ranks of the Ten Thousand as a mercenary (***An.* 3.1.4**); and he lays weight on the quality of those who served Cyrus in this capacity (***An.* 1.9.17-8**).[11] He also points out that neither he nor Proxenos nor any Greek except Klearchos knew the real purpose of the expedition (***An.* 3.1.10**). Furthermore, as already discussed above (see above, 70-1), Xenophon has probably chosen to inflate the social standing of the Ten Thousand; this was certainly not to be considered an unsavoury enterprise carried out by unsavoury and desperate characters.[12] Indeed, in his one explicit analysis of the mercenaries' reasons for soldiering under Cyrus the Younger's banner (***An.* 6.4.8**), we soon gain the impression that Xenophon is thinking primarily of gentlemen adventurers like himself who had "sailed away from Greece", and not those who were already in Asia Minor. Since the only hoplite contingents known to have been recruited in mainland Greece were those of Proxenos and Cheirisophos, this passage may throw some light on Proxenos' Athenian officers.[13]

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[9] *Congo Warriors*, Robert Hale (London 1991(B)) 65, cf 66.

[10] Tanner M. "British fighters' fatal attraction for the thrill of battle" *The Independent*, 10 Feb.1993. Here, we can also quote two British soldiers-of-fortune on some of the fellow mercenaries who took part in the Angolan debacle of 1976: "Such men were already earning more than the weekly £150 on offer, so it was the adventure rather then the money which appealed to them" - Dempster C. & Tomkins D. *Firepower*, Corgi (London 1979) 102. Colonel Hoare estimates that less than 5% percent of his recruits were drawn from the exclusive class, the real adventurer (op.cit.(1991(B) 129).

[11] In the Renaissance period it was a common complaint amongst the noble and gentlemen volunteers about the ease with which they could be confused with "mercenaries". The latter were generally considered greedy, pitiless, godless, cruel, brave but roisteringly self-indulgent, drawn from the very dregs of society against whose restraints they revenged themselves through theft, rape, pillage and intimidation: the image was shaped by fear and snobbery. Fear because the ranks did include villains; snobbery because many of these men, braggartizing it in their slashed silks and stained velvets, were of humble origin; men not fit to consort with even on the field of battle. Quite simply, they were looked down upon as being mere shoemakers, tanners, butchers, bakers and even peasants. Isokrates, who delivered himself of many a diatribe against them, bewails the fact that Athens employs hoplite-mercenaries to fight her wars while compelling her citizens to row in the fleet; the former are no better than "vagabonds, deserters and fugitives" (***Pax* 44; 48, cf 79; *Areop.* 9,54**).

[12] In particular, he praises Cyrus lavishly (**Xen. *An.* 1.9 passim, cf *Oik.* 4.16ff**). Isokrates, for example, simply looked upon the Ten Thousand as a "bunch of failures" (***Paneg.* 90**).

[13] Cheirisophos was a Spartiate sent by the Spartan state to co-operate with Cyrus. The 700 hoplites whom Cheirisophos brought to Issus were probably Peloponnesian mercenaries hired by Sparta (**Xen. *An.* 1.2.21; 4.3; *Hell.* 2.1.1**).

III

Proxenos the Boiotian was one of Cyrus' ξένοι. The Prince had instructed Proxenos to recruit as many men as possible and join him for a planned campaign against the Pisidians, who "were causing trouble to his domains" (**Xen. *An.* 1.1.11**). Proxenos duly arrived at Sardis with 1,500 hoplites and five hundred light-armed troops (**Xen. *An.* 1.2.3**). Also included in Proxenos' command was Xenophon, "an Athenian, who was neither strategos nor lochagos nor soldier, but had accompanied the expedition because Proxenos, an old friend of his, had sent to his home an invitation to go with him" (**Xen. *An.* 3.1.4**). For Proxenos, Xenophon had a great affection (**e.g. *An.* 5.3.5**), but he saw clearly that his Boiotian comrade-in-arms was not a leader of fighting men; Proxenos only felt at ease amongst his social peers (***An.* 2.6.19-20**). In Xenophon's eulogy for his friend we read that Proxenos had "embarked upon this enterprise with Cyrus, expecting to gain therefrom a famous name, great power, and abundant wealth" (ὄνομα μέγα καὶ δύναμιν μεγάλην καὶ χρήματα πολλά: ***An.* 2.6.17**); a hope that was undoubtedly shared by the members of Proxenos' immediate entourage who were, we must remember, also fresh from mainland Greece.

Proxenos' contingent was of course taken over later by Xenophon, and from his account it can be reconstructed more fully than any other. Initially, three surviving lochagoi of Proxenos' command are identified: Agaias of Stymphalos, Apollonides, a Lydian masquerading as a Boiotian and thus probably an ex-slave, and Hieronymos of Elis (**Xen. *An.* 3.1.31-4**). More crop up under Xenophon's command in the period before the original contingents become confused: Aineias of Stymphalos, Amphikrates, an Athenian, Archagoras, the Argive exile, Aristonymos of Methydrium, Eurylochos of Lusi, Kallimachos of Parrhasia, Kephisodoros, an Athenian, Polykrates, an Athenian (**Xen. *An.* 4.2.13,17; 5.23-4; 7.8-13**). Also there was the Boiotian, Thorax, who disputed Xenophon's right to assume command of Proxenos' contingent; he can be included in this list of known lochagoi as well (**Xen. *An.* 5.6.25**). Three common soldiers can also be identified: an Arkadian, Basias, and a Spartan Kleonymos, both hoplites (**Xen. *An.* 4.1.18**), and a Makronian, a tribesman from north-east Asia Minor who had been a slave at Athens and was now serving as a peltast (**Xen. *An.* 4.8.4**).

The Athenians of Proxenos' contingent were all officers. It is true that of the sixty-six named individuals listed in the *Anabasis*, fifty-two are officers of some sort, so that the evidence for other ranks is poor. Nevertheless, amongst the four nationalities of mainland Greece which form the great majority of those listed, four stand out as more numerous than the rest, namely Spartans, Arkadians, Akhaians and Athenians. Of the first three predominant nationalities, individual Spartans and Arkadians occur among the non-officers, and Arkadian and Akhaian hoplites are mentioned as groups, whereas no Athenian common soldier is mentioned at all. It is also true that the only three Athenians

who can be assigned to a particular contingent for certain are those serving under Proxenos. There are, however, the remaining four named Athenians of the *Anabasis* to be considered. Again, they are all officers, and, interestingly, three of the four can be linked with Xenophon when he commanded his friend's contingent and, therefore, they may quite possibly have served under Proxenos himself. The first of the three is Ariston, who has no given contingent or command but is one of the three ambassadors despatched by Xenophon to the Sinopeans (**Xen. *An.* 5.6.14**). Furthermore, his fellow ambassadors were both lochagoi serving under Xenophon: Kallimachos the Arkadian and Samolas the Akhaian (**Xen. *An.* 4.7.8; 6.5.11**). The second Athenian is Lykios, son of Polystratos, who is appointed hipparch of the fifty-strong cavalry unit organized by Xenophon after Klearchos' Thracian troopers had deserted to the Great King (**Xen. *An.* 2.2.7; 3.3.20**). It is emphasised later, after the army had split into three, that Xenophon alone "had horsemen, to the number of about forty" (i.e. Lykios' unit) under his command (**Xen. *An.* 6.2.16**). The third Athenian is Phrasias, a commander of one of the τάξεις detached by Xenophon to act as a rearguard (**Xen. *An.* 6.5.11**). There is one slight problem here: this particular Athenian officer only crops up after the reorganization of Xen. *An.* 6.2.16 and Xenophon's force now numbered 1,700 hoplites and three hundred peltasts even though the overall numbers had fallen from the original 12,900 to 8,340 (Proxenos' original strength was 1,500 hoplites, 500 peltasts). In other words, Phrasias may not have originally been part of Proxenos' command. Finally, the remaining Athenian, Gnesippos, is one of the lochagoi who dined with the Odrysian prince, Seuthes, but his contingent is not stated (**Xen. *An.* 7.3.21,28**).[14]

On the face of it, Proxenos may have attracted more Athenians than would normally have been found in mercenary service; he clearly had personal connections with Athens through his close friendship with Xenophon, and may have even studied there when he was tutored by the celebrated rhetorician and orator, Gorgias of Leontini (**Xen. *An.* 2.6.16**). Nonetheless, it is difficult to believe that this group of Athenian officers had no particular significance. Command generally went to men who held a leading social position within their respective communities. These Athenians, therefore, may have been well-to-do citizens, or even the sons of such citizens - remember, Proxenos himself was only thirty years of age (**Xen. *An.* 2.6.20**) - not caring for the restored democracy in Athens.

IV

Xenophon the son of Gryllos was born into a well-to-do Athenian family. As such he duly received the conventional, decidedly athletic education laced with instruction in Homer, which was deemed appropriate for the sons of the aristocracy simply because it provided these young men with "the right

[14] Theopompos, an Athenian (**Xen. *An.* 2.1.12**) is probably an alias of Xenophon: von Meyer E. *Geschichte des Altertums* Fünter Band (Berlin 1902) para.833.

stuff" for leadership (**Ar. *Nub.* 960-86; Thuc. 1.121.4; 123.1; Pl. *Lach.* 179c; Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.4; 3.5.3,9-11,22; Isok. *Areop.* 45**). Even the "Old Oligarch" could proudly boast that although the Athenian people craved personally profitable magistracies, they were more than happy to leave the important matters of generalship to the most capable men, i.e. *οἱ καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ* (**Ps-Xen. *Ath. Pol.* 1.3, cf Xen. *Mem.* 2.6.26**). Soldiering was not a profession as such and therefore was without a calculable career structure and the highest commands usually went to the members of the social and economic *élite* rather than to men who had definite military prowess. Despite this however, these young Athenian aristocrats were generally noted for their blatant pro-Spartan oligarchic leanings and anti-democratic views, an attitude that found a natural home in the very masculine atmosphere of the gymnasium. Indeed, in his dialogue, *Gorgias*, Plato points to the connection of an addiction to contact-sport with Spartan sympathies and a distaste for Athenian democratic politics: the "lads with the cauliflower ears" who maintained that Perikles had "made the Athenians lazy and cowardly and garrulous and covetous by his introduction of payment for service to the State" (**515e, cf *Prt.* 342b**). For these pugnacious young gentlemen the Sparta of their day was partly seen as a kind of replica-Athens from "the good old days", an Athens when the Homeric and aristocratic virtues of *κλέος*, *κῦδος* and *τιμή* were all important (**cf Ar. *Nub.* 961-83; Xen. *Mem.* 4.4.15-7**). The Aristophanic character Bdelykleon, for example, undoubtedly represents this class of rich young Athenian for two simple reasons. Firstly, he stands accused by the chorus of *Μαραθωνομάχαι* of being "a long-haired, tassle-fringed pro-Spartan, hand in glove with Brasidas" (**Ar. *Vesp.* 473-6, cf 1069-70**).[15] It is not for nothing that the audience is reminded of the fact that these fading "old soldiers" had defended and upheld Athenian democracy through the courage and patriotism of their younger days (**Ar. *Vesp.* 1060-1101, cf 678; 684-5; 709-11**). Secondly, Bdelykleon attempts to convert his staunchly pro-democratic father, Philokleon, to his own political and moral way of thinking. This comic socio-political metamorphosis is to be achieved by getting Philokleon to adopt exotic and unpatriotic attire, instructing him how to parade himself in a homosexual fashion, and suggesting that he talks of nothing other than the pankration, boar hunting, hare-coursing and the torch race when in polite circles (**Ar. *Vesp.* 1168; 1196-1204**). It is in the light of all this that we can begin to understand Xenophon's role during the short and bloody reign of the Thirty Tyrants.

[15] It is important to remember that *Wasps* was written and performed at a time when bellicose and anti-Spartan feelings were running high in Athens. Amphipolis had not long been captured by Brasidas, and recent news from the north informed Athenians that the city of Skione had just revolted from the Empire and promptly gone over to Brasidas (**Thuc. 4.102-6 passim; 120.1**).

Xenophon appears to be much younger than his friend, Proxenos (**cf Xen. *An.* 3.1.14; 2.37; 6.4.25; 7.6.34**).[16] Nevertheless, during those last agonizing years of the Peloponessian War, Xenophon, as a member of the *ἱππεῖς* (**cf Xen. *An.* 3.3.19; 4.47-9; 4.7.24; 7.8.6; *Oik.* 11.14-18**)[17] and by the detail of his account, probably saw action in Asia Minor either under Thrasyllos or Alkibiades (**Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.7; 3.6**). If he missed those campaigns, the possiblity exists for him of sailing with the fleet that was scraped together in 406 BC to rescue the Athenian forces blockaded in Mitylene. In this emergency, Xenophon tells us that even "the hippeis went aboard in considerable numbers" (*εἰσέβησαν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἱππέων πολλοί*: ***Hell.* 1.6.24**).

After Athens' final defeat, Xenophon may have joined the hippeis who backed the Thirty Tyrants. His narrative dealing with the events at Munychia strongly suggests that he wrote it as an eye-witness, but as a witness on the wrong side (***Hell.* 2.4.10-9**). Moreover, we gain the distinct impression that he was still with the Thirty when they fled to Eleusis, and was not among the seventy hippeis who deserted to Thrasyboulos after his victory at the Peiraeus (**Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.24,25**). To Xenophon the Thirty were harsh rulers in harsh times and this probably explains why he stood by them despite the catalogue of killings done under their name. Therefore, whatever he thought in 403 BC of the death throes of this tyranny he had supported, Xenophon could have felt no enthusiasm for staying in Athens after the restoration of democracy. Although the hippeis shared in the common pardon, they remained suspect. A notable example of this distrust manifested itself four years later. In 399 BC the Spartan harmost, Thibron, asked for three hundred Athenian cavalry to serve with him in Asia Minor. In response to this request the Athenians simply despatched "those who had served as hippeis in the time of the Thirty, thinking it would be a gain to the democracy if they should live in foreign lands and perish there" (*...τῶν τριάκοντα ἱππευσάντων...εἰ ἀποδημοῖεν καὶ ἐπαπόλοιντο*: **Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.4**). This was time for any young gentleman with a taste for war and a distaste for democracy to be off.[18]

For a young man to harbour the simple belief that he could easily secure for himself fame and fortune by taking part in a military adventure is not so far fetched. In Isaios' *On the Estate of*

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[16] N.b. during many battles, Xenophon can usually be found running at the head of the youngest hoplites (*τῶν ὁπλιτῶν τοὺς νεωτάτους*: **Xen. *An.* 4.2.16; 3.20; 6.4.25; 7.3.45-6; 4.6, cf 11**).

[17] N.b. Xenophon's two sons fought as members of the Athenian cavalry at Mantineia in 362 BC (**Paus. 1.3.4; Diog. Laert. 2.54-5**).

[18] It must be stressed that Xenophon was not exiled from Athens until after his adventures with the Ten Thousand (**Plut. *Mor.* 603b, cf Diog. Laert. 2.53,58; Dio Chrys. *Orat.* 8.1; Paus. 5.6.5**). Modern scholars generally fall into two camps when discussing the actual date of his exile: (i) in 399 BC on a charge of medism (**cf Xen. *An.* 3.1.5**) - see, for example, Anderson J.K. *Xenophon*, Duckworth (London 1974) 149; (ii) in 394 BC, after the battle of Koroneia, on a charge of Lakonism (**cf Xen. *Ages.* 2.6**) - see especially Rahn P.A. "The date of Xenophon's exile" in Shrimpton G.S. & McCargar (eds) *Classical Contributions. Studies in honour of M.F.McGregor*, Locust Valley (NY 1981) 103-19.

Menekles, two brothers describe how they sold most of their recently inherited property in order to provide a marriage-portion of twenty minas for each of their two sisters. Then, the brothers explain, "we ourselves, being of military age, took up the career of a soldier (*τὸ στρατεύεθαι ἐτραπομεθα*) and went abroad with Iphikrates to Thrace. Having proved our worth there (*δόξαντές του*), we returned home after saving a little money" (**2.6**). These two young men had chosen their profession voluntarily and had made a success of soldiering. This theme of having taken up the adventuring way of life abroad as a successful means to gaining riches is employed by the dramatist Menander. In his play *Aspis*, for example, the soldier-servant, Daos, tells the audience that his Athenian master, Kleostratos, went campaigning as a mercenary in order to secure booty with which he was to provide a dowry for his sister (**8-9**).[19] Later, Daos explains how "everyone came back with loads of money" (*χρήματα ἕκαστος ε[ἶ]χε πόλλ' ἀπελθων*: **Men. *Asp.* 33**), his master, in particular, having acquired no less than six hundred gold staters (two talents) in plunder, the going rate for a dowry (**Men. *Asp.* 35, cf 135-6**). Again, we meet the same theme in Menander's *Misoumenos*. Here, Thrasonides, the jealous soldier-lover, boasts that he found his newly acquired fortune on Cyprus "in the service of one of the kings" (**340(K)**). Interestingly, both Plautus and Terence use similar themes when dealing with the background histories of certain comic characters. In *Trinummus*, Charmides' wealth has been squandered by his good-for-nothing son, Lesbonicus. Although Charmides made his pot of gold as a merchant out in the Seleucid kingdom (**112; 772; 838; 1182**), Lesbonicus considers the life of a mercenary, either in Asia or Cilicia, as the easier option (**593-8; 698-702; 722**). Finally, in Terence's *The Self Tormentor*, the plot revolves around the son who, unhappy at home, takes himself off and enlists as a mercenary with one of the Successor armies in the East. Incidentally, Menedemos, the son's father and the central character of this play, had been penniless in his youth and thus found it necessary to go off to Asia Minor and fight there as a mercenary for the Successor rulers. In this capacity he had "won fame and fortune" (rem et gloriam: **110-2**) and on selling his property after his son had deserted him, Menedemos was worth no less than 90,000 drachmas (**145-6**).

In the previous chapter it was argued that many of the mercenaries of the Ten Thousand, though not natives of Asia Minor, were already there before Cyrus' march on Babylon; it is assumed that they intended to spend some years abroad. On the other hand, for a tiny minority of the Ten Thousand soldiering overseas would have been viewed as a lucrative means to taste adventure. In any mercenary army throughout history, there would be found men who wished to remain abroad long enough to make money and a name for themselves and then return home. Winston Spencer Churchill,

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[19] Daos, the soldier-servant, believes he has left Kleostratos for dead on the Xanthos in Lycia (**Men. *Asp.* 23-4**). Historically speaking, Kleostratos could have joined one of two Successor armies: (i) Eumenes' enrolment in Lycia c.318 BC (**Diod. 18.61.4**); or (ii) Ptolemy's storming of the city of Xanthos in 309 BC (**Diod. 20.27.1**).

who was destined to become Great Britain's most famous prime minister since Disraeli, left home at the age of twenty-one in order to fight for Spain in the Cuban Revolution. Three years later, as a volunteer, he was with Kitchener at Khartoum, and during the Boer War he made his heroic escape while a young cavalry subaltern with Her Majesty's Army. Such men willingly become soldiers-of-fortune so as to taste adventure and thus, for a short time, tread water until they have resolved their true vocation. Some would serve abroad for a few months, as did John Donne in 1596 or, for a few years, as did the philosopher René Descartes, who served as a volunteer in 1617 with Prince Maurice and again in 1619-21 under Duke Maximilian of Bavaria. From the *Anabasis* itself, we have the example of Koiratadas. He was a Theban gentleman who was travelling the length and breadth of Greece, not in exile, but because "he was afflicted with a desire to be a strategos, and he was offering his services to any city-state or people that might be wanting a strategos" (*στρατηγιῶν καὶ ἐπαγγλλόμενος, εἴ τις ἢ πόλις ἢ ἔθνος στρατηγοῦ δέοιτο*: **Xen. *An.* 7.1.33**). Koiratadas had a rather chequered career in the Peloponnesian War and we first meet him as the commander of the Boiotian mercenaries that formed part of Klearchos' garrison in Byzantion (see above, 14 fn.13). On betrayal of the city he was captured by the Athenians, but escaped on landing in the Peiraeus and reached Dekelea, then under Spartan control (**Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.22**). In 400 BC Koiratadas returned to Byzantion and attempted to hire the remnants of the Ten Thousand for a private enterprise he wished to conduct in the "Delta of Thrace". In return for their services, the hungry mercenaries were promised an abundance of much needed provisions and more besides once the army had reached the Delta. It was all pie in the sky. On the very first day of his new command everything fell apart after Koiratadas had failed to feed his troops (**Xen. *An.* 7.1.33-41**). So our Boiotian adventurer had to bid farewell to his generalship and five years later we eventually find him as a successful pro-Spartan politician back home in his native Thebes (***Hell. Oxy.* 17.1**). Xenophon, in particular, after he had handed over the command of the Cyreans to the Spartiate Herippides in the spring of 395 BC, went on the staff of Agesilaos and remained with the Spartan king at least until after Koroneia (**Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.20, cf 2.7**). The *Lak. Pol.* usefully details the members of a commanding king's staff on active service: "The staff consists of all peers who are members of the royal mess, seers, doctors, fluteplayers, commanding officers, and any voluteers who happen to be present" (*...καὶ ἐθελούσιοι ἤν τινες παρῶσιν*: **13.7**). It is not difficult to place Xenophon in the latter category.

Unlike the mercenary who has taken up mercenary service as a more or less permanent career, the impulse to seek war had not become habitual for these gentlemen. Those Viking chieftains and lesser nobles that survived the rigours of working for the Byzantine Empire and retired from the Varangian Guard in one piece could look forward to their homecoming and a life of ease:

> Bolli brought with him much money [from Constantinople], and many precious things that great lordship had given him, he was so nice in his dress when he came back from his journey that he would wear no clothes except those made of fine stuff [silk?] or velvet and all his weapons were inlaid in gold...He wore clothes of velvet which the emperor had given him, and over them a cloak of fine red cloth, at his side he bore his sword *Fótbítr* [*Foothiter*]; it's hilt was inlaid with gold, and so was it's blade; he wore a golden helmet and had a red shield at his side on which was drawn a knight in gold which he had brought from Byzantium; he carried a short sword in his hand, as is common abroad, and whenever they rested for the night the women did nothing but gape at the splendid adornment of Bolli and his companions (***Laxdaela Saga* 77**).

Although the description of this former imperial guardsman turned dandy seems somewhat exaggerated, it was certainly possible for Bolli to have earned the kind of wealth that permitted him something of the ostentation he proudly parades on his return, especially if he had held a position of responsibility within the Varangian Guard. One or two runic inscriptions support the hypothesis that some of these northern mercenaries accumulated riches out in the East. For example, a commemorative stone in Södermanland reads: "Gudrún raised the stone for Hédinn, who was the nephrew of Sveinn, he was in Greece, drew gold. Christ help [his] spirit."[20] Another from the same district simply says: "Prurikr raised a stone to his son, brave man. Oleifr went to Greece, divided gold..."[21] Or this more informative inscription from Upland: "Kar had this stone raised for Mursi [?Horsa] his father and Kappi [Kabi?] for his brother-in-law. He made much money for his heirs out in Greece."[22] It goes without saying that on his homecoming, Harald Hardradi, one of the most renowned members of the Varangian Guard and future king of Norway, brought back a vast fortune:

> Harald then had a great ox-hide shield spread out and poured thereon the gold and shared by weight. To all men who saw it, it seemed wonderful that so much gold should have come together in one place in the northern lands. In reality, it was the Greek King's possession and wealth, for as all men said, the houses there are full of red gold (***King Harald's Saga* 24**).

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[20] Runic stone from Grinda in Spelvik parish, Rönö district, Södermanland. See: Brate E. & Wessen E. *Södermanland Runinskrifter*, (Stockholm 1940-58) Sö 165.

[21] Rune stone from Rycksta, parish of Raby, district of Rönö, Södermanland. See: ibid.Sö 163.

[22] Runic stone from Ulanda Bridge in Tilling parish, Uppland. See: Wessen E. "Upplands Runinskrifter", *Sveriges Runinskrifter VI-X*, (Stockhom 1940-58) III,4 U 792.

Although obviously not in the same league as Harald,[23] we are reminded nevertheless, of Phormis of Mainalos who made his fortune as a mercenary-captain in the services of the Sicilian tyrants, Gelon and Hiero (see above, 65).

V

Harald also "went to war for fame and power" (***King Harald's Saga*** **100**), and to this end "surpassed all other men in shrewdness and resourcefulness" and "was exceptionally greedy for power and valuable possessions" (***King Harald's Saga*** **99**). He was certainly more ruthless than Proxenos who, despite craving fame, power, and wealth, did not wish to achieve these ends underhandedly. Quite the contrary, according to Xenophon, for "he thought that he must secure them justly and honourably, or not at all" (*τῷ δικαίῳ καὶ καλῷ ᾤετο δεῖν τούτων τυγχάνειν, ἄνευ δὲ τούτων μή*: ***An.*** **2.6.18**). However, if we can believe Xenophon's character assessment of Meno the Thessalian, then we do find a man who was prepared to "commit unjust deeds" in order to achieve such goals (***An.*** **2.6.21**). Unfortunately, Xenophon so detested Meno that he would probably have ignored any martial qualities which this young Thessalian strategos possessed; in any case the independent action of Meno's contingent in Cilicia in which two of his lochoi were cut to pieces suggests that Meno was not especially competent (**Xen. *An.* 1.2.20,25**).

Before starting his adventure, Cyrus had been able to supply a *ξένος* of his, Aristippos of Larisa, with 4,000 fully paid hoplite-mercenaries for a campaign in Thessaly. Cyrus, who sought to disguise his ultimate aims, had lent these troops on the understanding that Aristippos would not come to terms with his political rivals without first consulting with him (**Xen. *An.* 1.1.10**). Nevertheless, when the time came for Aristippos to effect a reconciliation with his enemies back home and thus return the hoplites to Cyrus, he in fact only despatched a quarter of their original number under the command of Meno (**Xen. *An.* 1.2.6; 2.6.28**). For what reason this came about we are not told.[24] We do know, however, that Meno was particularly favoured by Cyrus during the initial stages of the expedition. When, for example, Cyrus draws up his army for a royal inspection by the Cilician queen, Epyaxa, it is Meno's contingent that holds the position of honour on the right of the Greek mercenary army (*εἶχε δὲ τὸ μὲν δεξιὸν Μένων καὶ οἱ σὺν αὐτῷ*: **Xen. *An.* 1.2.15**).[25] A few days after

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[23] Always an opportunist, Harald Hardradi was the archetypal soldier-of-fortune. Throughout his turbulent but colourful life, Harald had donned many guises prior to taking the crown of Norway: prince, rebel, fugitive, mercenary, pirate, and pilgrim.

[24] Parke suggests that Aristippos retained the remainder of the loan-troops under his own personal command with a view to continuing his feud with his Thessalian rivals: *Greek Mercenary Soldiers: From the Earliest Times to the Battle of Ipsus*, Clarendon Press (Oxford 1933) 25.

[25] Custom held that a Greek strategos commanded from the place of honour, i.e. the army's right wing.

this review at Tyriaeion, Meno again receives Cyrus' royal favour when he is given the task of escorting Epyaxa back to Cilicia; not only was the Cilician queen a lover of Cyrus, but her husband, the king, was also an important potential ally for the Prince's cause (**Xen. *An.* 1.2.12,20,26-7**). Later, however, when Cyrus marshalls his forces for the crucial clash against his brother at Cunaxa, we read that it was Klearchos who commanded the Greek right wing and not Meno (Κλέαρχος μὲν τὰ δεξιὰ τοῦ κέρατος ἔχων: **Xen. *An.* 1.8.4, cf 7.1**).

Meno was no Klearchos. The latter was a tough character who lived for soldiering. The older man also enjoyed the hardships and the dangers which went with such a mercenary adventure as that put together by Cyrus: soldiering and action were synonymous for him. More importantly, Klearchos was cool in any crisis and was certainly well experienced in all the tricks and stratagems of campaigning aboard. It was Klearchos' destiny to be the *de facto* commander-in-chief of the Greek mercenaries and not Meno's. On the contrary, the Thessalian was too young, too conceited and too totally lacking in self-control for such a position; this much we can glean from Plato's sympathetic portrayal of Meno in the dialogue of the same name (**76a,b; 80b,c; 86d**). With so much at stake for Cyrus it is hardly surprising to find that he eventually showed Klearchos such favour that the latter became in effect the chief Greek commander. Cyrus, for instance, invited Klearchos, alone of the Greeks, to take part in the trial of the Persian noble, Orontas (**Xen. *An.* 1.6.5**). Finally, at Cunaxa, not only does the Spartiate hold the right, but also it was to Klearchos that the Prince gave instructions for the coming battle (**Xen. *An.* 1.8.12**).

Meno's bid for the leadership of the Ten Thousand probably collapsed after his clash with Klearchos over the flogging of one of the former's soldiers. In the ugly quarrel that followed, Meno lost face when he and his command took fright when they realised that Klearchos was quite prepared to resort to bloodshed in order to satisfy his grievance over almost being stoned to death (**Xen. *An.* 1.5.11-4**). When we read that Klearchos, after he had beaten the soldier, rode through the middle of Meno's camp with just a small escort, we are left wondering if the cunning old dog had set-up the whole episode in order to put the young pup back in his place!

If Meno was somewhat out of his depth when it came to the rough world of mercenary leadership, he was, on the other hand, more at home in the arena of political intrigue. Xenophon tells us, in his damning character sketch of Meno, that the Thessalian "prided himself upon ability to deceive, the fabrication of lies, and the mocking of friends" (τῷ ἐξαπατᾶν δύνασθαι, τῷ πλάσαθαι ψεύδη, τῷ φίλους διαγελᾶν: ***An.* 2.6.26**). Meno's "ability to deceive" certainly came to the fore when the army reached the Euphrates. This was the moment when Cyrus chose to inform the Greek commanders that he was intent on toppling his brother, the Great King. When the mercenaries heard that they were expected to march on Babylon they refused to go on, only doing so after Cyrus had

promised them a donative when the army had reached Babylon and their pay in full once they had returned to Ionia (**Xen. *An.* 1.4.12-3**). Meno, however, saw this mutiny as a golden opportunity to secure for himself the objectives upon which his heart was firmly set. Before it is clear what answer the Ten Thousand will give to Cyrus, Meno delivers to his troops an eloquent speech[26] in which he lays before them a devious plan by which Cyrus would be placed into their debt. Meno's scheme was to cross the Euphrates alone, and by doing so his contingent would be seen as true zealots for the Prince's cause and thus be well rewarded. Moreover, and this was the beauty of the plan, if the others refused to go on then Meno's troops could simply come back across the river and return with the rest to Ionia and look forward to a life of ease as garrison troops (**Xen. *An.* 1.4.14-5**).[27] Naturally, Meno's troops were persuaded to cross and, naturally, Cyrus was delighted that they did so; as a result the soldiers received rich promises, while their leader received rich gifts (**Xen. *An.* 1.4.16-7**).

Despite losing out to Klearchos, Meno never surrendered his burning desire to command the Ten Thousand, and during the uncertain days that followed Cunaxa our Thessalian was busy seeking ways to bring this about. Meno was an intimate friend of Ariaios (*φίλος καὶ ξένος*: **Xen. *An.* 2.1.5; 6.28**), Cyrus' lieutenant and commander of his native troops, and it is through him that he made his bid for power. For after Cyrus' death on the field of Cunaxa and having then refused Klearchos' loaded offer of the royal throne of Persia, Ariaios had thrown his lot in with Tissaphernes, the satrap who was acting on behalf of the Great King during the negotiations between the Greeks and Persians. Ever diligent, Klearchos not only suspected Meno of having clandestine meetings with Tissaphernes, but also of organizing a coup in order to take over the army (**Xen. *An.* 2.5.28, cf Ktesias F.27(J)**). With the leadership of the Ten Thousand under his belt, Meno would stand to gain for himself any benefits resulting from a reconciliation with Persia. This, of course, all came to nothing. Klearchos, wishing to secure his own position and pursue his own schemes, agreed to Tissaphernes' proposal that the Greek commanders should meet with him in order to discuss the future. And so, Klearchos, Agias, Sokrates, Proxenos and Meno all went to their untimely deaths, the last, retorts Xenophon, meeting the "death of a scoundrel" (*ὡς πονηρός*: ***An.* 2.6.29**). In sum, the young Meno was devious, manipulative, greedy, self-seeking and treacherous.[28]

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[26] Like Proxenos, Meno had also been taught by Gorgias (**Pl. *Meno* 70a; 76c**).

[27] Colonel Mike Hoare reckoned that many of his men had volunteered under erroneous impressions, one of which was the belief that they could opt for garrison duties, "which they thought, wrongly, would entail a minimum risk to their persons etc": op.cit.(1991(B)) 127.

[28] In his account of the *Anabasis*, Diodoros mentions that Meno was quite prepared to betray his fellow Greeks (**14.27.2**). Diodoros also sketches the rise - through treacherous means - of the mercenary-captain, Mentor of Rhodes. Initially recruited out of Egypt by Tennes of Sidon to resist Artaxerxes' invasion of 351/0 BC, the Rhodian promptly deserts the Sidonian king for the Great King. After commanding the Persian campaign against Nektanebis of Egypt the following year, Mentor quickly rises to become the satrap of western Asia Minor (**16.42.2; 47.4,6; 48.5; 50.7-8**)!

VI

It is reported by Cornelius Nepos, in his *Life of Timoleon*, that Timophanes was "headstrong and filled with ruinous passion for absolute power" and, as a consequence, had made himself master of Corinth through the use of hired soldiery (...milites mercenarios: **1.3, cf Arist. *Pol.* 1306a**). Moreover, according to Plutarch, the men who actually made up the tyrant's inner coterie were mercenary soldiers (*ξένων στρατιωτικῶν*) who had the reputation of being "impetuous and fond of danger in military service" (*ἔχειν τι δοκοῦντα ῥαγδαῖον ἐν ταῖς στρατείαις καὶ φιλοκίνδυνον*: ***Tim.* 3.3**). Diodoros, on the other hand, scathingly calls Timophanes' entourage nothing more than a "band of ruffians" (*τοὺς πονηροτάτους*: **16.65.3**), and this reminds us somewhat of those handy young aristocratic Athenians who surrounded the Thirty and did so because they were physically tough and lacked scruples (**Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.23, cf Thuc. 8.69.4**).

There is no hard evidence that there was any form of formal training for men who wished to become officers or strategoi. It is thus extremely doubtful whether even Spartan officers were trained in any modern sense and, therefore, we are led to believe that such men were generally picked for their social standing rather than any real leadership ability they might possess. In particular, during his first speech to the strategoi and lochagoi of the Ten Thousand, Xenophon appeals to them as the social superiors, both in peace and war, of the common soldiers (***An.* 3.1.37**). Renaissance Europe was different: there entering the military life on a strictly business basis could lead to social mobility and topsy-turvy fortune-making. Martin Schwarz, who led the 2,000 Swiss and German mercenaries to the service of Richard III's sister Margaret, and was killed in the challenge to Henry VII at the battle of Stoke-on-Trent, had started out as a shoemaker in Augsburg. One of Francis I's chief source of *Landsknecht* mercenaries was Sebastian Vogesberger, originally a baker. The extremely successful military entrepreneur Antoine, Baron de la Garde, came from peasant stock. In fifteenth century Italy the role-call of great *condottieri* also included such commoners. For example, Niccolo Piccinino was the son of a butcher while his contemporary, Erasmo de Narni (alias Gattamelata) was the son of a humble baker. Clearly, to escape from a destiny of mediocrity, this forceful breed of lowly men chose the mercenary life.[29]

It would be a useful exercise to ascertain whether or not any of the swashbuckling gentlemen we have discussed were actually equipped to be the leaders of fighting men. To pursue this problem to any great depth, it would be profitable to delve into a number of Xenophon's works and, in particular, those treatises which deal with those noble pursuits of "hunting, fishing and shooting" and the successful management of the aristocratic estate. Here it should be emphasised that Xenophon composed these instructive monologues from the point of view of an ex-soldier-of-fortune turned

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[29] See above, 79 fn.11. Incidentally, according to Plutarch, Iphikrates was a son of a shoemaker (***Mor.* 187a, cf b**)!

Peloponnesian gentleman-farmer. On reading sections of the *Oikonomikos*, for instance, we can hear the clipped tones of the retired "Major-General" loud and clear; this is especially apparent when the author is expounding upon his theories on training farm labourers (**5.15; 21 passim**). Indeed, when we compare this particular work with Hesiod's *Works and Days*, we soon gather that Xenophon's knowledge was superficial: Xenophon did not need to know how to construct a plough; the important thing for him was to know how to handle the ploughman. Again, there is a definite military flavour to that equestrian monologue, *Peri Hippikês*; throughout this book, Xenophon has an eye to the horse's use either in battle or as an officer's charger on parade. Finally, in the *Kynegetikos* Xenophon describes the aristocratic pursuits of hare-coursing, the hunting of fallow-deer and red-deer, and boar-hunting, with a brief notice of lions, leopards, lynxes, panthers, bears and all the other beasts of the chase to be found in foreign parts such as the Persian Empire.[30]

To Xenophon warfare constituted an expansion of the animal-hunting techniques common to tribal warrior societies (***Kyn.* 12 passim; *Cyr.* 1.2.10; 6.28-9,39-41; 7.5.62-4, cf Pl. *Euthyd.* 290 b-d**). It is through the pursuit of hunting that "men become good in war" (*γίγνονται τὰ εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ἀγαθοί*: **Xen. *Kyn.* 1.18, cf *Cyr.* 8.1.34-6; 6.10**) and, therefore, stresses Xenophon, it should be one of the first activities a young man should take up (***Kyn.* 2.1**). In fact, Xenophon almost labours this point when he later explains that those who take up the sport of hunting are the type of men who turn out to be "good soldiers and strategoi" (*ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων οὖν στρατιῶταί τε ἀγαθοὶ καὶ στρατηγοὶ γίγνονται*: ***Kyn.* 12.8**). Nevertheless, Xenophon was making a valid observation based upon the practical experience he had obviously gained both as a huntsman and as a soldier. The advantages derived from partaking in this outdoor pursuit, according to him, are many. For not only does it improve fitness in mind and body and thus slow down the aging process, but it also "affords the best training for war" (*τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον μάλιστα παιδεύει*: ***Kyn.* 12.1**). Firstly, men accustomed to bearing the arms of the chase will not easily tire when on campaign, especially when burdened with the panoply of a hoplite. Secondly, sleeping rough under the stars will be second nature to them. Thirdly, they will be familiar with the issuing and the receiving of orders. Finally, men acquainted with movement across difficult terrain, such as that encountered during any chase, will not blunder on the battlefield owing to difficulties in the ground (**Xen. *Kyn.* 12.2-5, cf *Lak. Pol.* 4.7; Arist. *Pol.* 1303b13**). This last analytical point is especially relevant when we consider the very mechanical nature of the hoplite phalanx and its obvious limitations with respect to where it could fight. Xenophon, however, did not restrict his findings to men of his own race, for he observed that the pursuit of hunting also prepared Persian nobles for the hardships of soldiering: it gave them

[30] On a more personal note, Xenophon mentions the excellent hunting to be had at Scillus, his estate outside Olympia, and how he and his sons would hunt boar, gazelle and stag during the local festival to Artemis (***An.* 5.3.9-10**).

courage to face the dangers of the battlefield; it practised them in the use of the tools of their trade, i.e. the spear and the bow; it acquainted them with the rigours of marching and running; it meant they could endure the elements (***Cyr.* 1.2.10**). According to Herodotos, Persians were not only taught to speak the truth but also to manage a horse and to shoot straight with the bow (**1.136**). Cyrus the Younger, for instance, was a skilled horseman, well practised in the use of bow and javelin, and not only enjoyed hunting but also "loved the danger incurred during the pursuit of wild animals" (*πρὸς τὰ θηρία μέντοι φιλοκινδυνότατος*: **Xen. *An.* 1.9.5-6, cf 2.7**). In sum, exposing the body to regular physical exercise promotes good health and builds up moral fibre, which in turn helps to foster success, especially upon the field of battle (**Xen. *Mem.* 3.12.4**).

Xenophon's motives here are quite clear. At a time when formal military training for the citizen body was not officially recognised by the city-state - Sparta being the notable exception of course - physical fitness and the ability to wield a weapon was the responsibility of the individual (***Mem.* 3.12.5**).

Closely connected with this gentlemanly pursuit of game hunting was that other important aristocratic occupation, the management of the country estate. In the *Oikonomikos* Xenophon implies the gentleman's estate provides the means for him to train for war (**11.12-8, cf 6.8-10; *Mem.* 3.6.14-8**). Indeed, the obvious harmony that exists between the pursuit of hunting and the management of an estate, and their respective advantages in the preparation of men for war is recognised by Xenophon and is discussed in an earlier part of the same monologue (***Oik.* 5.4-6**). However, there is a specific type of martial quality to be gained from estate management, and that is the ability to command. The author hammers this point home by means of an analogy: the well ordered and disciplined army on the march is used to portray the "regimented" household in which the daily events of the ideal estate run like clockwork (***Oik.* 8.4-7**). For the gentleman-farmer the strategies of successful farming were very much akin to the strategies of good soldiering (**Xen. *Oik.* 20.6-10, cf 4.4; 20-5**). When we consider that there were no *Kriegsakademien* such as Sandhurst or West Point to train eager young men in the art of war, the practical experience to be gained from the rural pursuits of hunting, riding and estate management becomes all too apparent.[31] For the ancient Greeks, these were the institutions that helped to mould their young aristocrats into potential leaders. In a nutshell, mercenary-service came naturally to these gentlemen as a direct result of their normal, peace-time pursuits.

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[31] Cf the step-by-step training for potential leaders in the British Army: (i) basic fitness and weapons training; (ii) the use of sand-table exercises to teach tactics, the giving of orders, and the administration of small units; (iii) TEWTs (tactical exercises without troops); (iv) field exercises, one unit against the other, the situation having been devised and laid on a sand table before hand; the tactical options being discussed and debated at length before any unit takes to the field to put them into practice.

Practicalities aside, it was also expedient for the commanders and officers of ancient Greek armies to have graduated from that Homeric school of philosophy which consciously promoted leadership in the style of Homer's heroes, i.e. leadership in its most literal sense. For even after the rise of the polis and the development of the hoplite phalanx, the *Iliad* - with its orthodox code of honour by which the warrior strives to be the best (ἄριστος) in a personal display of martial excellence (ἀρετή) - remained the basic text of aristocratic learning and thus defined the Greek heroic ethos of the day. Xenophon once set himself to inquire whether, in a more sophisticated world, the general still ought to make his own person the example of his army's courage or whether he ought not hold himself out of danger so that by observation and cool decision he could direct his army's efforts to best effect. After some discussion, he comes to the conclusion that it is still best for the general to exhibit bravery, because of the example that gives (***Oik.* 21.4-9, cf *Mem.* 3.3.8-15; *Hipp.* 6.4-6; 8.21-2**).

VII

There is an ancient Chinese proverb which says: "A general who is brave or stupid is a calamity." In other words, soldiers ask more of a general than mere bravery. Xenophon, conversely, having pin-pointed the central dilemma of leadership, decides that deeds are far more important than thought. Recently, John Keegan has laid down what he sees as the five basic categories of command:
(i) kinship - the creation of a bond between the commander and the commanded; (ii) prescription - the direct verbal contact between the commander and his men; (iii) sanctions - the system of rewards and punishments; (iv) the imperative of action - tactical/strategic preparation and intelligence; (v) the imperative of example - the physical presence of the commander in battle and the sharing of risk; this can be sub-categorised into three command styles - commanders who *always*, *sometimes*, or *never* enter battle.[32] Since a hoplite general led his troops from the front of the mêlée and had no mechanical means of communicating, his primary function was to maintain the morale of his command at the highest possible pitch by personal example, i.e. hoplite generals always entered battle.[33]

In all his works, Xenophon touches upon the subject of man management to some degree or other, and if this first-hand knowledge of his is pooled together it actually offers the student of military affairs quite an in-depth practical study in the exercise of command. By employing Keegan's

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[32] *The Mask of Command*, Cape (NY 1987) 315-38.

[33] Contra, see Wheeler E.L. "The General as Hoplite", *Hoplites: The Classical Greek Battle Experience*, (ed. V.D.Hanson) Routledge (London 1991) 137-54. See above, 32 fn.20 for hoplite generals who fell in battle.

theoretical categories of command, we can quickly and conveniently summarise Xenophon's personal thoughts upon this subject:

(1) *Kinship* - a leader should demonstrate to his command that he constantly thinks of their welfare and works for their benefit; in particular good rations and adequate billeting are of supreme importance in the exercise of command (***Ages.* 2.2; *Cyr.* 1.6.9,12,15,42; 6.1.23-5; 8.2.2,24-5; *Hell.* 5.1.14-7; *Hipp.* 4.13; 6.2-3; *Mem.* 3.1.6; 2.1-4; 3.4-5; 4.4; *Oik.* 7.37**). Perhaps the best example of the act of kinship is that demonstrated by Agesilaos. On hearing that the detachment he had bivouacked on top of a storm-tossed mountain was suffering, he promptly despatched fire in earthenware pots so they could keep warm and cook their supper (***Hell.* 4.5.4**).

(2) *Prescription* - a leader can strengthen his position through accessibility and constant visibility (***Ages.* 9.1-2; *Hell.* 1.1.30**). Teleutias, the step-brother of Agesilaos, on taking up his new command called all his men together and quietly explained that although he had no cash to pay them, he would endeavour to supply them with their victuals as well as share their hardships with them. On hearing this "they all set up a shout, bidding him to give whatever order was necessary, in the assurance that they would obey" (*οἱ δὲ πάντες ἀνεβόησαν παραγγέλλειν ὅτι ἂν δέῃ, ὡς σφῶν ὑπηρετησόντων*: ***Hell.* 5.1.13-8**).

(3) *Sanctions* - a leader must operate a just system of rewards and punishments; in particular unit morale can be fostered through the use of competition (***Ages.* 1.25; 2.8; *Cyr.* 1.2.12; 6.18,20; 2.1.22-4; 8.2.7-23,27; *Hell.* 3.4.16; 4.2.5; *Hiero* 9.1-3; 11 passim; *Hipp.* 1.26; *Oik.* 9.13-5; 13.10-2**). For example, Jason of Pherai would throw out of his army those mercenaries who were considered unfit for active duty, on the other hand, he would gladly reward those men who demonstrated their worth (***Hell.* 6.1.6**).

(4) *The imperative of action* - the safety and security of his command should be a matter of continual concern to the leader; the leader himself must command an eagerness for victory (***Cyr.* 1.6.13; *Hell.* 4.3.4; *Hipp.* 6.2; 6; *Mem.* 3.2.2-4; 4.3**). For example, the distinct lack of precaution taken by Anaxibios on his march through "friendly territory" resulted not only in his death, but also the destruction of most of his command in an ambush set up by Iphikrates (***Hell.* 4.8.35-9**).[34]

(5) *The imperative of example* - a leader should be endowed with stout courage and physical endurance in order to establish himself in his soldier's eyes; he should also excel above his command in all soldierly tasks (***An.* 3.1.36-7; 4.4.11-2; *Cyr.* 1.6.8,25; *Hipp.* 1.25; 2.6; 6.4-5; 8.21-2; *Mem.* 3.3.9-10; *Oik.* 4.24; 21.5-7**). For example, Xenophon relates that while mounted he once attempted

[34] Anaxibios did, however, exhibit stout courage at the end.

to lead a sortie of peltasts and hoplites against the Persians, only to dismount after a common soldier's criticism of his being on horseback (***An.* 3.4.46-9, cf 7.3.45**).

Although Xenophon rightly stresses the fact that personal leadership in battle demands heroism, he was also shrewd enough to realise that other qualities were needed in the exercise of command. In this respect, Xenophon's *Agesilaos* defines the model professional general. His Spartan simplicity of dress, his moderate consumption of food and drink, his indifference to the elements and the needs of sleep, and his delight in toils made Agesilaos his men's equal, but he was also their trusted leader by surpassing them in endurance and inspiring his army as a whole through personal bravery. Above all, by keeping close to the rank and file's daily existence Agesilaos was the embodiment of the "soldier's general" (for all these leadership qualities see: **Xen. *Ages.* 5.1-4; 6.4-7; 7.2; 8.1-4; 6-8; 9.1-2; 11 passim, cf *Cyr.* 1.2.1; 8.1.22-3,34-7; *Hell.* 3.4.18; 4.1.30; *Mem.* 3.1.6-7**).[35] Like Agesilaos, the Athenian mercenary-captain, Iphikrates (whom we shall meet in the next chapter), also used kinship to inspire morale: when his men were ill-clothed and poorly fed on a winter campaign, he dressed in summer clothing and went barefoot (**Polyain. 3.9.34**). If Xenophon recognised that the basis of leadership was the ability to care for one's command, he also fully understood that the bed-rock of man management was discipline, especially in a mercenary army. For example, when the Spartan admiral, Mnasippos, fails to pay his mercenaries and starts discharging some of them as a consequence, the rot sets in and discipline collapses: "there can be no worse state of mind for men going into battle" retorts Xenophon (ὅπερ ἥκιστα εἰς μάχην συμφέρει: ***Hell.* 6.2.19**). In his address to the mercenary officers of 5 Commando, Colonel Mike Hoare once emphasised: "Nothing is more certain than that you will obtain the best results with your men if you insist on a high standard of discipline."[36] The hard man Klearchos built morale on strict discipline (**Xen. *An.* 2.6.9-14**).

Long before Napoleon, du Picq, or Foch, Xenophon had fully understood that morale counted for more than mere numbers (***An.* 3.1.42; *Cyr.* 3.3.19, cf *Mem.* 3.3.7**). The morale of a citizen army had been determined too much by the feelings of each individual hoplite, and the strategos' power of punishing breaches of discipline, for example, had been limited to say the least,[37] especially as

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[35] Cf, for example, Isokrates' definition of a "good general" (***Antid.* 117-28**). In *Phil.* 105 however, Isokrates actually admits to having no experience of soldiering!

[36] "A lecture on Man Management and Leadership", *Congo Mercenary*, Robert Hale (London 1991(A)) 306.

[37] According to Aristotle, Athenian strategoi could either imprison, exile or fine a hoplite-citizen for breaches of discipline, but we gain the distinct impression that to do so the strategos would have to present the charges in the law court (***Ath. Pol.* 61.2**). The Spartan kings, on the other hand, did not suffer from such political hindrances. In the professional army of Sparta the cure for insubordination, for example, was to make the offender stand on guard duty carrying his shield (**Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.9**). Besides, in an army where "officers were commanded by officers" (ἄρχοντες ἀρχόντων: **Thuc. 5.66.4**), discipline would have been generally tight.

he was subject to political and judicial control.[38] The citizen-general dare not make himself unpopular by his strictness.[39] Mercenary commanders, on the other hand, tended to emancipate themselves from the framework of the polis. Therefore in the mercenary army, provided, of course, the strategos could secure his troops' pay, his authority could be absolute. Moreover, a successful mercenary-captain could wield his powers beneficially and thus foster a corporate spirit as well as keep a tight rein upon discipline within the mercenary ranks. Theoretically of course, mercenary leaders would need to hit a paternalistic mean between the excessive severity of Klearchos and excessive leniency of Proxenos. In practice, however, this was not generally feasible when commanding a mercenary army, as we shall discover in the next chapter. Apart from Klearchos himself, Cyrus' Greek strategoi fell well short of the mark when measured against the Xenophontic canons of leadership, the skills that were required if a mercenary-captain was to handle a professional army to any degree of success. Klearchos had his faults. He, for example, set a high standard of discipline for his men and applied the same rigid standard for himself. The net effect of this was to make him aloof and unapproachable. Of course, this unchanging attitude towards his men meant they knew exactly where they stood with at all times![40] On the other hand, however, Klearchos was not shackled by lofty idealism as was Proxenos, and although he sought fame and fortune, he did not single mindedly lust after power as Meno obviously did.[41] He was, in a sense, the archetypal military adventurer, comfortably playing the role of kingmaker-cum-soldier. His colleagues, due to their social and economic backgrounds, had certainly acquired the basic training of the day in order to make them reasonable if not good subordinate officers, but they were on the whole too young and inexperienced to lead a professional army in the field.[42] In a similar vein, Colonel Mike Hoare brings up some interesting points when he weighs up the differences between the modern mercenary officer and his regular counterpart:

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[38] Perhaps the most notorious example of this was the trial of the *victorious* Athenian strategoi after the naval battle of Arginousai (**Xen. *Hell.* 1.7 passim**). Politics and soldiering just do not mix, and in 4th century BC Athens, for example, we witness the advent of the strategos who is exclusively seen as a soldier and not as a politician (**cf Isok. *Pax* 54; Arist. *Pol.* 1305a10**). As Field Marshall Sir Nigel Bagnall recently put it: "If I ever saw a politician entering through the front door I would quickly slip out the back door." Soldiers should be men who execute the ultimate decisions of politicians.

[39] On the unpopularity of strictness, see especially Hdt. 6.12.

[40] Among the "Xenophontic leaders" Klearchos was not alone in having personal faults. Teleutias, for example, needlessly wasted his life outside Olynthos because he simply lost his temper during the assault on the city (**Xen. *Hell.* 5.3.3-6**). This episode is utilized by Xenophon to push home the point that leaders must keep a tight rein on their emotions, for "to attack under the influence of anger and not judgement is an absolute mistake" (***Hell.* 5.3.7, cf *Mem.* 4.5 passim**).

[41] And power, as Dr Henry Kissinger once observed, is for some an aphrodisiac!

[42] It goes without saying that the hoplite-citizen phalanx required little skill in its commanders (see above, 27-9,32).

> Mercenary officers are a breed totally different from those who graduate from military academies such as Sandhurst or West Point. Mercenary officers are less concerned with the administration of troops than regulars. Tradition and protocol are of zero importance. They are more concerned with the immediacy of action, the basic reason for their employment. As a result those soldiers who have proved themselves in combat are the ones who are promoted to officer rank, sometimes very speedily and often in the field. Promotion has nothing to do with a man's background, his education, who his parents were, whether or not his forebears served in the regiment, what sort of accent he speaks with, the colour of his skin etc. It has everything to do with his ability to lead men in the field.[43]

Hypothetically speaking, Xenophon would have found it almost impossible to have accepted a brother officer who was not his social equal. In reality, however, he would have had little difficulty in accepting the crux of Hoare's argument. He was certainly clearsighted enough to have noticed the inherent weaknesses of his fellow mercenary officers. Indeed, Xenophon himself admits as much when, after Cunaxa, he informs us that the strategoi and lochagoi of the Ten Thousand were ready to be commanded by Klearchos alone, "not that they had chosen him," he sagely adds, "but because they saw that he alone possessed the wisdom which a commander should have, while the rest were without experience (*οὐχ ἑλόμενοι, ἀλλὰ ὁρῶντες ὅτι μόνος ἐφρόνει οἷα δεῖ τὸν ἄρχοντα, οἱ δ' ἄλλοι ἄπειροι ἦσαν*: ***An.* 2.2.6, cf 3.11-2; 6.1,6-15**). War and adventure are not always the same thing and, even to this day, active service is the best of all military academies.

[43] Op.cit.(1991(B)) 66-7, cf 69.

6 *WARRIORS FOR THE WORKING DAY*

In the main the really vital things I looked for in a recruit were physical fitness and a keeness to learn.

Colonel Mike Hoare, 5 Commando

The development of the hoplite panoply, coupled with the native courage of the Greek heavy-armed foot soldier, secured for Greek arms a supremacy which would last until the rude arrival of Philip II's Macedonian phalanx. Even by the mid-seventh century BC, East Greeks and Carians were being hired as hoplite-mercenaries by Psammetichos, the rebel Saïte prince and future pharaoh of Egypt - Herodotos' well-known marauding χάλκεοι ἄνδρες (**2.152**). For despite the elementary character of Greek warfare (cf the ancient Near East), the Greeks were the unrivalled exponents of shock in the Mediterranean world during this period and, as a consequence, their martial excellence in close-quarter combat produced a demand for their services abroad. To the Great Kings of Persia, for instance, the hoplite offered a soldiery of high quality which helped to offset the martial weaknesses of the Empire's levy-host. The witty remarks made by one of the members of a Greek embassy recently returned from the court of the Great King, Artaxerxes II, have a ring of truth about them. The unimpressed Arkadian, Antiochos, was the ambassador in question, and he lost no time in debunking the Empire's so-called power by saying that although he had seen a myriad of palace servants during his official visit, he certainly had not observed any soldiers worth their salt (**Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.38**).[1]

I

When the tyrant of Miletos, Aristagoras, turns up in the court of the Spartan king, Kleomenes I, he paints a vivid picture of the Persian Empire's vast material wealth and the lack of valour displayed by its subjects. Of course, the cunning Aristagoras had sound political reasons for doing so: he desperately wanted Kleomenes to lend his support to the Ionians in the rebellion against their overlord, the Great King. Kleomenes, however, was not convinced, and the Milesian took himself off to Athens where he had much better luck. Despite the clamorous rhetoric of both speeches, Aristagoras did touch upon two relevant facts about the Persian style of fighting: (i) they carried

[1] Cf the down-to-earth behaviour of a fellow Arkadian, Arystas, when he visited Prince Seuthes' court (**Xen. *An.* 7.3.23-5**)!

"neither hoplite shield nor hoplite spear" (*οὔτε ἀσπίδα οὔτε δόρυ*: **Hdt. 5.97**); (ii) they carried "bows and short spears" (*τόξα καὶ αἰχμὴ βραχέα*: **Hdt. 5.49**).

In Herodotos' catalogue of the Imperial infantry Xerxes allegedly led against Greece we are given a precise picture of their arms and armour.[2] The Persians themselves, the Medes, the Kissians and the Hyrkanians were all similarly armed and carried wicker shields, long bows and short spears (**7.61; 62**). Other levies, such as the Bactrians, the Arians and the Parthians, were also armed with bows and short spears (*τόξα καὶ αἰχμὴ βραχέα*: **Hdt. 7.64; 66**). Others, however, like the Indians, the Kaspians, and the Arabs, only carried their native bows (**Hdt. 7.65; 67; 69**). For those troops that were armed with shield and spear, as were the Paphlagonians and the Phrygians, it is evident that these particular arms were of the small and short variety only (*ἀσπίδας δὲ μικρὰς αἰχμάς τε οὐ μεγάλας*: **Hdt. 7.72; 73**). Even the Imperial *élite*, the Immortals, were armed with a spear that was shorter than that wielded by the hoplite (*δόρασι βραχυτέροισι χρεώμενοι ἢ περ οἱ Ἕλληνες*: **Hdt. 7.211**).[3] Although the Lydians were wearing a panoply that was similar to that worn by the Greeks (**Hdt. 7.74**), it is plain to see that the vast majority of the Empire's foot soldiery was not equipped for the style of close-quarter fighting practised by the hoplite.[4] In his account of Plataia, Herodotos actually stresses the fact that the Persian army "fought as it were unarmoured against men fully armed" (*πρὸς γὰρ ὁπλίτας ἐόντες γυμνῆτες ἀγῶνα ἐποιεῦντο*: **9.63, cf 62**). The Persians and Medes, in particular, were bowmen first and close-quarter fighters second, relying on the power of the bow to initially soften up the opposition before they closed in to finish them off with short spear and dagger (**Hdt. 1.214; 7.218; 226; 9.61; 62; 99, cf Diod. 16.23.1-2; Xen. *An.* 3.4.14,25-6; 4.1.16**). Even Persian cavalry could not crack a well formed body of hoplites frontally (**Hdt. 9.18, cf 21; 6.29**), their prime function being to "shoot and scoot" by successive squadrons, thereby attempting to wear the enemy down through repeated attacks (**Hdt. 9.20; 22; 49**).[5] In short, what the Empire really lacked was shock troops. This weakness, however, was not fully realised until after Plataia. Prior to that date the Persians had experienced a run of victories against hoplites, first in

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[2] There is no valid reason to doubt the accuracy of what Herodotos' is describing here, although it is hard to believe that Xerxes' invasion force was as large as he reports. If Herodotos was using an official Persian source, which seems likely, then he has probably given us the total figure for the manpower available to the Empire. For an estimation of the possible size of Xerxes' army see especially: Lazenby J.F. *The Defence of Greece 490-479 BC*, Aris & Phillips (Warminster 1993) 90-2.

[3] According to Herodotos, the Immortals were armed as other Persians (**7.83**).

[4] For the full catalogue of Xerxes' foot-soldiers see Hdt. 7.60-83. In the Imperial fleet there were of course the East Greek hoplites who were serving as marines; with these can be included the Cypriots (**Hdt. 7.90; 93; 94; 95**). The Carian marines were also equipped with hoplite armour but carried scimitars and daggers (*δρέπανα καὶ ἐγχειρίδια*: **Hdt. 7.93**).

[5] For Persian tactics in general, see especially: Lazenby op.cit.31-3. For the catalogue of Xerxes' cavalry, see Hdt. 7.84-6.

Egypt (**Hdt. 3.11**) and then during the Ionian revolt (**Hdt. 1.119-20; 5.102; 118-20; 6.29, cf 5.121**). Indeed, Herodotos emphasises the confidence of the Persians at Marathon when he reports that they thought the Athenians plain mad to charge them without archers or the support of cavalry (**Hdt. 6.112**). Robert Graves was surely right when he has the Persians dismiss Marathon as a "trivial skirmish", and in one of Xerxes' councils of war we witness Mardonios mocking the Greek style of fighting (**Hdt. 7.9**). At Plataia, however, it was the Greeks who had the last laugh when Mardonios fell fighting and his army was conquered by the "Dorian spear". If we can believe the statement of Xenophon when he says the Persians do not go war, either against each other or against the Greeks, without the services of Greek mercenaries, then it is evident that by the fourth century BC hoplites had become an important and integral part of the Empire's armies (**Xen. *Cyr.* 8.8.26, cf Isok. *Paneg.* 135; *Phil.* 126**).[6] This reliance upon the hoplite was to increase as the century progressed, so much so that Darios III reckoned that 100,000 troops should be enough to conduct his forthcoming war against Alexander as long as "a third were Greek mercenaries" (*ἧς τὸ τρίτον Ἕλληνας ποιῆσαι μισθοφόρους*: **Diod. 17.30.3**).

After suffering a shocking defeat, the Carthaginians also found it expedient to recruit hoplites for the very first time. The disaster in question was the battle of Krimesos, where even the *élite* Sacred Band of Carthage was shattered by Timoleon's hoplite phalanx, the core of which was made up of mercenaries.[7] Following Krimesos the Carthaginians, in the words of Plutarch, "had come to admire them [i.e. hoplites] as the best and most irrestistible fighters in the world" (*ἀνυποστάτους καὶ μαχιμωτάτους ἀνθρώπων ἁπάντων*: ***Tim.* 30.3**), and, according to Diodoros, it was after Krimesos that the Carthaginians decided to rely more upon foreign soldiery and, in particular, Greeks "who, they thought, would answer the call in large numbers because of the high rate of pay and wealth of Carthage" (**16.81.4**).[8] Both sources agree that it was the debacle at Krimesos which prompted Carthage to look to Greece as a possible source of mercenaries and both report the city's utter shock over the loss of so many of its citizens, Diodoros adding that a decree was passed which curtailed the

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[6] Chapter 8 of book 8 of Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* may be a later addition to the text as it certainly does not fit in with the rest of the work. Nevertheless, we have already seen how satraps in the 5th century BC maintained Greek bodyguards (see above, 69-70).

[7] For an analysis of Timoleon's army at Krimesos, see: Parke H.W. *Greek Mercenary Soldiers: From the Earliest Times to the Battle of Ipsus*, Clarendon Press (Oxford 1933) 173 fn.4. It is impossible to accept as literally true the estimates given by our sources of the numbers of the enemy, but it remains sufficiently clear that Timoleon's army was heavily outnumbered (**cf Plut. *Tim.* 25.3**).

[8] The wealth of the Iberian silver mines not only allowed Carthage to hire mercenaries in large numbers, but also allowed her the liberty to hire the best on the market. This, says Diodoros, enabled the Carthaginians to win "many and great wars" (**5.38.2-3**).

practice of sending out a body of citizen soldiers as Carthage had done to Sicily with fatal results (**Plut. *Tim.* 28.6; Diod. 16.81.3,4**).[9]

Despite unexpected aid from the elements, Timoleon's complete victory over the Carthaginians at Krimesos was directly due to the superior discipline and experience of the Greeks, and these warlike qualities are undoubtedly attributable to the professional element in their army. For, unlike Persia, Carthage had in its citizen soldiery troops whose primary function was to fight at close-quarters. Indeed, both Plutarch and Diodoros emphasize the fact that her citizens were well protected by breastplates, helmets and large shields in their respective accounts of Krimesos (**Plut. *Tim.* 28.1,3, cf 27.3; Diod. 16.80.3,6**). In addition, Diodoros says they were armed with spears (λόγχαις: **16.80.2**) and, although we are somewhat uncertain of the spear's length in comparison to that carried by a hoplite, Plutarch does mention that "the struggle came to swords" (***Tim.* 28.1**), which suggests that the Carthaginian citizen was not intrinsically inferior to the hoplite. For the Carthaginians, therefore, the main lesson of the battle was that it demonstrated the martial superiority of the Greek hoplite-mercenary.

II

Marathon, Mantineia, Nemea, and Leuktra were not won by mercenaries. Nevertheless, Jason of Pherai's philosophy with regards to the advantages of professionals over amateurs is well worth looking at. Citizen armies, he is quick to point out, include men who are already past their prime and others who are still immature. On top of this, few citizens actually keep themselves physically fit (**Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.5**).[10] Jason was no man to argue with: he had the backing of no less than 6,000 mercenaries and as Tagos of Thessaly he had trained his private army "to the highest pitch of efficiency" (*τούτους ἐκπεπονημένους ὡς ἂν κράτιστοι εἶεν*: **Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.28**). This is the crux of Jason's argument: hoplite-mercenaries could be trained and then hardened through the experience of battle, i.e. they were in every sense of the word professionals. Indeed, professionalism was fostered because bands of mercenaries which had served through a particular campaign, instead of dispersing at its conclusion, could hold together and move off to fight another campaign under another paymaster. As Jason of Pherai rightly argued, the fundamental problem with hoplite-citizen armies

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[9] From now on the Carthaginian citizen body was regarded as a home defence force and thus citizens were only deployed in times of national emergency: (i) in 310 BC the citizens, including the Sacred Band, were led into the field to face the Sicilian invasion force of Agathokles (**Diod. 20.8.3; 10.5-6**); (ii) In 202 BC Carthaginian citizens formed part of Hannibal's second line at Zama (**Polyb. 15.11.2; Livy 30.33.5**). Incidentally, Hannibal looked upon his citizen-soldiers as a cowardly lot (**Polyb. 15.13.3, cf 6; Livy 30.34.5-8**), while Polybios himself reckons that the Carthaginians had always made poor soldiers (**31.21.3**).

[10] Inactivity is fatal in all walks of life, but especially in the business of war: for the importance of personal physical fitness in order to endure the rigours of a campaign and the hazards of the battlefield see above, 91-2.

was that they included troops who were likely to be inexperienced or ill-equipped both mentally and physically for battle, i.e. they were amateurs.[11] For Greek city-states, however, there was one major stumbling block which prevented them from fielding professional armies. Professional hoplite armies were often made up of seasoned veterans who would serve for as long as they received pay or could reasonably expect it; but the organization of such a mercenary force in any strength and for a prolonged period of time imposed too severe a strain on the financial mechanics of the individual Greek polis.[12]

If the polis could ill-afford the financial burden of raising and supporting a mercenary army there may be a case for suggesting that they could take on individual soldiers-of-fortune. According to N.V.Sekunda many fourth century BC Athenian lochagoi had spent their lives in military service, frequently as mercenaries abroad. He cites a passage from Isokrates in which the latter reveals that the Athenians elected as their strategoi those warriors who have "the most robust bodies and who have served in many campaigns" (*τοὺς εὐρωστατάτους τοῖς σώμασι καὶ πολλάκις ἐν τοῖς ξενικοῖς στρατεύμασι γεγενημένους*: ***Antid.* 116**). On the other hand, a "decent fellow" such as Timotheos, who had not "knocked about with itinerant armies" (*τοῖς στρατοπέδοις*: **Isok. *Antid.* 115**), only employed such men as lochagoi and taxiarchs.[13] Although Isokrates is grinding his favourite axe and, in particular, is making a political point at the expense of Chares (**cf *Pax* 42**), the fact remains that the well-seasoned mercenary would have made a sensible choice for an officer in the citizen-army simply because he would have provided a healthy leaven of practical experience.

Isokrates' guiding light throughout his long life was his fanatical devotion to pan-Hellenism. Many of his political pamphlets and epistles,[14] therefore, either deal with or revolve around the

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[11] See especially Thuc. 6.72.3-4 where the Syracusan strategos, Hermokrates, analyses the city's recent defeat at the hands of the Athenians and comes up with the following key points: (i) the Syracusans were "amateurs in the art of war" (*ἰδιώτας ὡς εἰπεῖν χειροτέχναις*); (ii) the army had far too many strategoi; (iii) the rank and file were "disorganized and indisciplined" (*τὴν ἀξύντακτον ἀναρχιαν*). Hermokrates' remedies for the army's problems include the suggestion that the citizen body of Syracuse should undergo some form of compulsory military training (*προσαναγκάζοντες*). By doing so, argues Hermokrates, "discipline would come as the result of training" (*εὐταξίας δ' ἐς τὰ ἔργα προσγενομένης*).

[12] In Cicero's words: "The sinews of war, unlimited money" (***Phil.* 5.2.5**). Even the professional army of the Arkadian League, the Eparitoi, eventually faded away through lack of resources (see above, 74). The later Akhaian League, for example, would impose a tax upon member states in order to maintain its mercenary army. No tax meant no mercenaries, and in 217 BC Aratos was forced to issue a decree so as to keep a League army in the field: this force consisted of 8,000 mercenary foot, 500 mercenary horse, 3,000 Akhaian foot and 300 horse, and 500 foot and 50 horse each from Megalopolis and Argos (**Polyb. 5.91.4-7, cf 4.59.2; 74.6; 5.30.6**).

[13] "Athenian Demography and Military Strength 338-322 BC", *BSA 87* (1992) 322. Cf the Athenians who served in Proxenos' contingent as officers (see above, 80-1).

[14] Of his 21 extant discourses, 6 are distinctly political. Of these, 3 preach the idea of a pan-Hellenic crusade against Persia: *Panegyrikos* (380 BC), *To Philip* (346 BC), and *On The Peace* (355 BC). In addition, there are 9 letters, all of which are political and not at all personal, 4 of which carry the same theme: *To Dionysios* (368 BC), *To Philip I,II* (342,338 BC), and *To Archidamos* (356 BC).

central theme of persuading his fellow Greeks to reconcile their selfish rivalries and to end their suicidal wars so as to unite in a crusade - initially under the leadership of Athens, later under powerful individuals such as Philip of Macedon - against the Persian Empire.[15] Needless to say, this never actually happened in Isokrates' lifetime. Nevertheless, in some respects it is useful to look at his political works as a whole as one of the topics that tends to push the author into moral overdrive is that of "hireling soldiers". Indeed, Isokrates' reserves his loudest and most biting comments for mercenaries in general and, in particular, was quick to accuse them of lawlessness and cruelty (**e.g. *Pan.* 116; *Paneg.* 135; *Pax* 44-7; 79; *Phil.* 120-2; *Epist.* 9.9-10**). Yet for all these complaints and moral out-pourings, even Isokrates seems to see a need for mercenaries. In *Archidamos*, for example, the notion of an army free "from ordinary cares and having no other duty but that of war" (i.e. *τοῖς ξενικοῖς στρατεύμασιν*) is promoted. Accordingly, such a force would have "no fixed government" and thus would be able to campaign at will (**75-6**). Perhaps realizing the fatal incapacity of the polis either to surrender any degree of its autonomy in the interests of Greek unity, or to leave inviolate the autonomy of other states, Isokrates was finally forced into opening his eyes to the practical advantages of raising and fielding a professional army. We see this idea of employing a mercenary army floated again by Isokrates in his *Address to Philip*. In this political pamphlet, Isokrates urges Philip of Macedon to recruit "from those who wander in exile" as opposed to those men who "live under their own politics" (**96, cf *Paneg.* 168; *Pax* 24**). Of course, we must be wary of utilizing Isokrates in this way, not only because of his vitriolic outburts, but also because he had an ulterior motive in suggesting to Philip that he employ these "homeless" Greek mercenaries. In other words, once used in the crusade against Persia they could then be settled upon the conquered lands of the now defunct Empire, thus establishing a series of military colonies that would act as buffers as well as fixing the now enlarged boundaries of Greece (**Isok. *Phil.* 120-3**).

A more rational source for dealing with this subject of professional soldier versus amateur soldier is the fellow demesman of Isokrates, Xenophon. In the *Hiero*, for example, Xenophon sets up an imaginary conversation between Hiero of Syracuse and Simonides of Keos. In book ten of this dialogue the tyrant turns to the poet and asks him whether or not he should employ mercenaries. Simonides, who is clearly Xenophon himself, not only agrees that a tyrant needs to hire mercenaries to act as his personal bodyguard, but also that a standing army, "armed and organized" (*τῶν ἀεὶ ἐν ὅπλοις τε ὄντων καὶ συντεταγμένων*: ***Hiero* 10.6**), offers the citizens and the polis the best form of defence. "For," concludes Simonides, "nothing equals an organized body of men" (*οἱ συντεταγμένοι*: ***Hiero* 10.7**).

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[15] To Isokrates' this is "the only war that is better than peace; it will be more like a sacred mission than a military expedition" (*μόνος γὰρ οὗτος ὁ πόλεμος εἰρήνης κρείττων ἐστί, θεωρίᾳ μὲν μᾶλλον ἢ στρατείᾳ προσεοικώς*: ***Paneg.*** 182).

In 375/4 BC the Great King of Persia, Artaxerxes II, hoped to raise a large mercenary army for his impending campaign against rebel Egypt. For this purpose he decided to effect a "King's Peace" throughout Greece so as to release hoplites "from their domestic wars and thus make them more willing to accept mercenary service" (*ἀπολελυμένους τῶν οἰκείων πολέμων ἑτοιμοτέρους ἔσεσθαι πρὸς τὰς ξενολογίας*: **Diod. 15.38.1**). The following year, Iphikrates is placed in charge of 20,000 hoplite-mercenaries after he had been "summoned for the campaign by the King" (*οὗτος μετάπεμπτος ἐπὶ τὴν στρατηγίαν ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλέως*: **Diod. 15.41.1, cf Nep. *Iphik.* 2.4** = 12,000 mercenaries).

Whatever their personal motives or ambitions, and be they statesman, soldier or sovereign, there were individual men at the time who fully recognised the cold logic of using professional armies for the trade of war. Here we should remind ourselves that mercenaries are professional soldiers in the twofold sense that war is both their way of life and the sole source of their livelihood. Today of course, not all professional soldiers are mercenaries. On the other hand, apart from the Spartan army and the one or two select city-state units trained at public expense, such as the Theban Sacred Band or the *χίλιοι λογάδες* of Argos, in the ancient Greek world professional soldiers were mercenaries.

III

At one point in his memoirs of the Spanish Civil War, Jason Gurney ponders about the differences between Republican volunteers like himself, and the mercenaries recruited by General Franco:

> According to our theories, because the men on our side were inspired with high ideals, we should be stronger than soldiers who are pure mercenaries. In reality, a mercenary soldier shows remarkable tenacity under fire because he is entirely committed to the military way of life and accepts its ethos - his pride is wholly concerned with putting up a good show as a soldier. He has real skill as well as courage, while we had only courage and good intentions.[16]

Leaving the spiritual aspects of soldiering aside for the moment, the essential tangible difference between the volunteer or the amateur soldier and the professional soldier is one of knowledge. Skill does far more in war than mere enthusiasm and its acquisition first comes through training and then ultimately, through experience. Take for example, the eight hundred Peloponnesian hoplite-mercenaries who joined Dion on his Sicilian adventure. These men, in the words of Plutarch, "were well known in consequence of many great campaigns, their bodies were exceptionally well trained while in experience and daring they had no equals" (*γνώριμοι δὲ πάντες ἐκ πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων στρατειῶν, καὶ τοῖς σώμασιν ἠσκημένοι διαφερόντως, ἐμπειρίᾳ δὲ καὶ τόλμῃ πολὺ πάντων κράτιστοι*:

[16] *Crusade in Spain*, Faber & Faber (London 1974) 111.

Dion **22.5**). Despite Plutarch's rhetoric, these hard-bitten mercenaries were seasoned warriors and we are given a nice demonstration of their obvious talents on the streets of Syracuse. Even though heavily outnumbered and in a difficult situation, Dion, not wishing to harm his fellow citizens, commands his foreign soldiery not to charge into contact, but simply to run towards the oncoming citizen body "with loud cries and brandishing of weapons". The Syracusans dissolve in a flash, and Dion immediately orders his men to about turn and then marches them out of the hostile city (**Plut.** ***Dion*** **39.2**). Recovering their shattered spirits, the Syracusan hoplites, with a body of horse in support, pursue Dion and finally catch up with him as he is negotiating a river crossing. Unperturbed by their numbers but out of patience with their base ingratitude, Dion wheels his mercenaries about and marshalls them for battle. The Syracusans are again put to ignominious flight (**Plut.** ***Dion*** **39.3**). In essence, this episode demonstrates that Dion's command had *training*, *experience*, and above all *discipline*.

Training - The basic aim of any military training is the creation of *esprit de corps*, a soldier's confidence and pride in his unit. Personal bravery of a single individual does not decide the issue on the actual day of the battle,[17] but the bravery of the unit as a whole, and the latter rests on the good opinion and the confidence that each individual places in the unit of which he is a member. Xenophon, however, informs us that formal military training was not recognized by the polis and thus it was down to the individual citizen to ensure that he was *physically* fit for battle (***Mem.*** **3.12.4-5**). Of course, most hoplite-citizens were also peasant-farmers and thus tied to their land. Perhaps this is what lies at the back of Xenophon's mind when he makes the comment that the hard manual labour of farming provides a man with physical strength, and as such is a benefit to both foot-soldier and horseman alike (***Oik.*** **5.4; 5, cf 14**). Nevertheless, as a former professional soldier himself, Xenophon fully appreciated the benefits that formal military training had to offer (***Cyr.*** **8.1.37-9**). On one level, Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* is a handbook for training a new model army and in book two, for instance, we witness one of Cyrus' taxiarchs organizing a mock combat between his troops. All had donned their breastplates, greaves and shields, but instead of weapons, one side wielded stout cudgels, while their opponents were instructed by the taxiarch to pick up clods of earth to throw. At first, the troops armed with the clods had the upper hand, but as soon as the fighting came down to close-quarter work the troops wielding the cudgels soon put their opponents to flight. The result was the same when the two sides exchanged roles, i.e. the cudgel-bearers again defeated the clod-throwers (**Xen.** ***Cyr.*** **2.3.17-20, cf Onasander** ***Strat.*** **9.4**). "Unless one has trained beforehand through mock battles," wrote

[17] This was especially so with the hoplite phalanx where maintenance of the formation was all-important. For example, the Spartiate Aristodemos was posthumously castigated for having left the ranks and sacrificed his life in heroic deeds (**Hdt. 9.71**). Again, Isidas the son of Phoebidas was first honoured for his individual heroism, and then promptly fined by the ephors for daring to risk his life in combat without his armour (**Plut.** ***Ages.*** **34.8**).

Roger of Hovedon, "the art of war will not be possessed when it is necessary to put it into practice."[18] The fictional Cyrus, being the model commander, obviously saw the advantages of exercising all of his men in this fashion. Xenophon, being the experienced soldier, obviously knew the advantages the close-quarter fighter (i.e. the Greek hoplite) had over the long-range fighter (i.e. the Persian bowman).[19]

In reality, specialized and continuous military training was the preserve of Sparta and, in some cases, for those city-states that kept small bodies of *élite* troops. Aristotle hit the nail right on the head when he pointed out that it was not so much how Sparta trained her young men for war, but the fact that it trained them at all (***Pol.* 1338b27-30, cf Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.8,10,11; *Lak. Pol.* 11.7; 13.5; Plut. *Pel.* 23.3**).[20] It must be emphasized, however, that it was not the skill-at-arms of the individual Spartan that was important, as his training as part of a unit, for the simplicity of hoplite battle left little scope for the display of personal skills.[21] When, for example, Xerxes quizzes Damaratos about the martial nature of his fellow Spartans, the latter admits that the Spartans fighting as individuals are as good as the next man but fighting together are the "best of men" (ἄριστοι ἀνδρῶν: **Hdt. 7.104, cf 211; 9.62; Thuc. 4.33.2; Xen. *Hell.* 4.5.15-6**). Effectively, the specialized military training of Sparta probably took the form of "square-bashing".[22] Nevertheless, it produced the right results, even for non-Spartans. In 381 BC, for example, Agesilaos gave cash and arms to the oligarchic exiles from Phleious and instructed them to set up military messes along Spartan lines and thus train themselves for war. Wisely, the Phleiasian exiles did so and the outcome resulted in a large contingent of men "in splendid condition of body, well disciplined, and extremely well armed" (ἄριστα μὲν τὰ σώματα ἔχοντας, εὐτάκτους δὲ καὶ εὐοπλοτάτους: **Xen. *Hell.* 5.3.17**).

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[18] *Chronica*, ii.166. In a modern army, for example, a bad soldier is not only a liability to his unit, he is also, in action, a positive menace and danger to his comrades. A high percentage of casualties on active service, more in action, are caused by accidents that can be attributed to a low standard of training.

[19] It is important to remember that when Cyrus reorganized his army, the Persians, who were originally bowmen and javelinmen (τε τοξόται καὶ ἀκοντισταὶ), were re-equipped to fight as swordsmen and thus armed with corslet, shield and scimitar (**Xen. *Cyr.* 2.1.16**).

[20] This point is ideally illustrated by Plutarch's witty anecdote in *Ages.* 26.4-5. See also, Thuc. 2.39.1 for Perikles' sneering remarks about Sparta's "laborious training" (ἐπιπόνῳ ἀσκήσει).

[21] E.g. Pl. *Lach.* 182a-d for the casual approach taken towards ὁπλομαχία (**cf *Ath. Pol.* 42.3**: the later ephebic training at the Peiraeus). In particular, it was not until after their victory at Leuktra - which secured for them the hegemony of Greece - that the Boiotians considered training themselves in "the craft of arms" (περὶ τὰ ὅπλα: **Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.23, cf 7.5.19**). According to Plutarch, Epameinondas advocated that a hoplite should have "his body trained not only by athletic exercise but by military drill as well" (τὸ σῶμα γεγυμασμένον οὐκ ἀθλητικῶς μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ στρατιωτικῶς: ***Mor.* 192c, cf d; 788a; Nep. *Epam.* 2.4,5**).

[22] See especially: Lazenby J.F. *The Spartan Army*, Aris & Phillips (Warminster 1985) 25-30.

In the review Cyrus held in honour of his lover Epyaxa, the Ten Thousand demonstrated to their audience with roguish *élan* that they were a well-drilled army, which ably executed the commands of its officers (**Xen. *An.* 1.2.17-8**). This quality can be seen again, this time off the parade-ground and on the battlefield of Cunaxa, when the army opened and closed its ranks and still preserved the battle-line; this order was also maintained during the pursuit of the enemy (**Xen. *An.* 1.8.16-20, cf Diod. 14.24.2-3**). During the difficult skirmish with the cavalry army commanded by Pharnabazos' generals, Spithridates and Rhathines, we once again witness their ability to execute battlefield orders with ease. The Ten Thousand were ordered to keep their spears on the right shoulder (*ἐπὶ τὸν δεξιὸν ὦμον ἔχειν*) until signalled to lower them (*εἰς προσβολὴν καθέντας*)[23] for the attack, which was then to be carried out at the march (*βάδην*) and not at the run (**Xen. *An.* 6.5.25**). On the trumpet signal, the hoplites struck up the paean, raised a battle-cry and at the same moment couched their spears (*καὶ ἅμα τὰ δόρατα καθίεσαν*: **Xen. *An.* 6.5.27**). Further instances of the Ten Thousand's ability to adapt military techniques to difficult conditions are quite abundant (**e.g. Xen. *An.* 1.5.13; 4.3.20-34; 8.9-13; 6.5.9-11**). In brief, the Ten Thousand were an excellently trained professional army by the standards of the day, and it is not surprising, therefore, that their disciplined military proficiency was highly regarded by even a Spartan harmost (**Xen. *An.* 6.6.35, cf 32**). Another mercenary army that impressed a Spartan with its professionalism was that of Chabrias the Athenian. The Spartan in question was none other than Agesilaos who, while campaigning against Thebes in 377 BC, encountered Chabrias' mercenaries who were supporting the Thebans. After failing to dislodge the latter from their uphill position, Agesilaos opted to lead a charge against the mercenaries in an attempt to decide the issue. To show his utter contempt for Agesilaos, however, Chabrias briskly ordered his men to receive the Spartan charge in the at-ease position, i.e. shields resting against legs and spears upraised. Agesilaos, "marvelling at the fine discipline of the enemy and their posture of contempt," halted and withdrew (*τήν τε εὐταξιάν τῶν πολεμίων καὶ τὴν καταφρόνησιν*: **Diod. 15.32.6**).[24]

We have already mentioned that the mercenary army of Jason, the Tagos of Thessaly, was composed of troops who had been highly trained (see above, 101-2). It appears that the basis of this training was personal physical fitness, for Jason prided himself on his own bodily strength and would set an example to his troops, both on and off the parade-ground, by marching at their head in full

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[23] Cf Xen. *An.* 1.2.17: *προβαλόμενοι τὰ ὅπλα* = "advance arms", again on a trumpet signal.

[24] Nepos, recording the same incident, calls Chabrias' manoeuvre a "novel tactic" which became the talk of all Greece (***Chab.* 1.2-3, cf Polyain. 2.1.2**). It should be noted, however, that the same tactic was in a sense employed by Klearchos when he formed up his contingent against Meno's troops (**Xen. *An.* 1.5.13**). Xenophon incidentally, in his account of the campaign of 377 BC, chooses not to mention the Chabrias episode (***Hell.* 5.4.47-55**).

panoply.[25] Furthermore, any man he found lacking in stamina he would instantly discharge from his army,[26] while those who, like himself, revelled in the pain of physical hardships and the dangers of war he would reward (**Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.6**). Antigonos "One-Eye", according to Plutarch, was once pleased by the sight of his soldiers playing ball in their panoply and thus sent for their officers in order to commend them. On learning, however, that the officers in question were busy drinking, Antigonos court-martialled them and promoted the soldiers in their stead (***Mor.* 182a**).[27] "If P.T. parade is at 06.00 hours," strongly advises Colonel Mike Hoare, "then you should appear on it and not be lying in bed, encouraging your men from the warmth of your blankets."[28]

If we pause to consider the actual weight of the hoplite panoply (see above, 37), then the practice of ὁπλομαχία can be easily looked upon as P.T. for hoplites. *Hoplomachia* is the art of fighting or dancing in full panoply[29] and is believed to have originated in Arkadia, the nursery of the hoplite-mercenary.[30] According to the Athenian strategos, Nikias, the benefits of *hoplomachia* are somewhat limited to the rout and pursuit phase of the hoplite battle, when one side gave way and the phalanxes broke up. It was at this juncture that such fancy weapon handling could be of use. He does concede, on the other hand, that the physical exercise dervived from *hoplomachia* did increase a soldier's strength, "since it is as good and strenuous as any physical exercise" (**Pl. *Lach.* 182a**).

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[25] The training programme instituted by Philip of Macedon for the Macedonian army actually included forced marches for the infantry, complete with arms, rations and equipment (**Polyain. 4.2.10, cf Frontin. *Str.* 4.1.6**). In the Imperial Roman Army, according to Vegetius, raw recruits were given frequent practice in carrying loads of up to 60 Roman pounds (43lbs) with which they marched along at a brisk military pace: "For on strenuous campaigns they will be faced with the necessity of carrying their rations as well as other arms" (**1.19, cf Joseph. *BJ* 3.95**). During their "Green Beret" course at Lympstone, Royal Marine recruits undergo timed 30km route-marches over Dartmoor in full fighting-order. Such arduous training, for example, enabled the Royal Marine Commandos to "yomp" across the Falklands carrying individual loads of 80-100lbs weight.

[26] The "soldier-camels" of the French Foreign Legion shouldered a vast amount of equipment, so much so that most *légionnaires* opted to carry a walking stick. This served three purposes: a tent pole; to help climb steep hills; and when placed beneath, to support the pack during halts on the march - throwing off the pack or lying on the ground to take the weight off the shoulders was the sign of an unfit raw recruit. See: Lamborelle L. *Cinq ans en Afrique: Souvenirs militaires d'un Belge au service de la France*, (Brussels 1862) 115, cf 109-10.

[27] Xenophon himself recommended training with heavy burdens so as to be able to bear arms (***Cyr.* 2.3.14**).

[28] "A lecture on Man Management and Leadership", *Congo Mercenary*, Robert Hale (London 1991(A)) 307. Hard physical exercise still forms a major and vital part of a soldier's basic training; there is little point, for example, in being a marksman with a rifle if you are unfit to use it after a hard day's "yomp". Physical fitness, to this day, is still the keynote.

[29] By looking at the pottery iconography which depicts ὁπλομαχία, we can see that the participants are portrayed either wearing the full panoply, or are simply naked and just wear the helmet, and carry shield and spear (i.e. "heroic nudity"). See especially: Poursat J-C. "Les Représentations de Danse Armée dans la Céramique Attique", *BCH 92* (1968) 552-65.

[30] See especially: Wheeler E.L. "Hoplomachia and Greek Dances in Arms", *GRBS 23* (1982) 225-6. For a general discussion on the subject of *hoplomachia*, see: Pritchett W.K. *The Greek State at War, Vol.IV*, University of California Press (Berkeley & LA 1985) 61-5.

Athenaios, quoting from Hermippos' *Lawgivers*, states that it was the Mantineians who were the inventors of gladiatorial combat (*νομοθετῶν τῶν μονομαχούτων*), "having been counselled there to by Demonax, one of their citizens" (**4.154d**). The author continues, this time by taking an extract from another lost work, in this case the *Histories* of Ephoros:

> The Mantineians and Arkadians used to practise the arts of war (*τὰ πολεμικά*) diligently, and, as a consequence, to this very day people call the ancient military uniform and mode of arming "Mantineian", since it is believed that the Mantineians are the inventors. In addition, regular courses of instruction in fighting under arms (*ὁπλομαχίας*) were first instituted at Mantineia, Demeas[31] being the instructor in the art (*τὸ τέχνημα*).

Ephoros himself actually suggests that instruction in *hoplomachia* had its origins in Mantineia sometime in the mid-sixth century BC (***FGrH* 70F54**), while Polybios, writing on the same subject, stresses the vital importance of music and dancing for the education of Hellenistic Arkadian youth. "For the practice of music," says Polybios, "I mean real music, is beneficial to all men, but to Arkadians it is a necessity." The historian continues by explaining that Arkadian men up to the age of thirty were not only under an obligation regularly to study music, but also to practise "military parades to the music of the flute and perfect themselves in dances and give annual performances in theatres, all under state supervision and at public expense" (*μετ' αὐλοῦ καὶ τάξεως ἀσκοῦντες...μετὰ κοινῆς ἐπιστροφῆς*: **4.20.4-12**). It seems, on the basis of Polybios' evidence at least, that the martial pursuit of *hoplomachia* was taken very seriously by the Arkadians. However, he could of course be echoing that marvellous description of the "Mantineian Dance" given by Xenophon in the *Anabasis*:

> The Mantineians and some other Arkadians arose, arrayed in the finest arms and accoutrements they could command (*ἐξοπλισάμενοι ὡς ἐδύναντο κάλλιστα ἦσάν*), and marched in time to the accompaniment of a flute playing the martial rhythm and sang the paean and danced (*αὐλούμενοι καὶ ἐπαιάνισαν καὶ ὠρχήσαντο*), just as the Arkadians do in their festal processions in honour of the gods (**6.1.11**).[32]

Naturally, as Xenophon hints, not all Arkadian dances were military. The *kidaris*, for example, was performed by the Arkadians in honour of Demeter in order to induce fertility (**Ath. 14.631d, cf Paus. 8.15.3**). Nevertheless, Athenaios does record that, according to Sokrates, the best dancers are likewise

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[31] Are Demeas and Demonax one and the same person, i.e the lawgiver of Hdt. 4.161?

[32] Cf the Spartans at the battle of Mantineia who advanced "slowly and to the music of many flute-players" (*βραδέως καὶ ὑπὸ αὐλητῶν πολλῶν*: **Thuc. 5.70**).

the best warriors (**14.628f**). Furthermore, Athenaios, having remarked that dancing was closely akin to a parade in arms and a display not just of discipline in general but also of concern for physical fitness (*τῆς τῶν σωμάτων ἐπιμελείας*), comes in due course to Spartan dancing, their marching songs (*ἐνόπλια*) and especially the war-dance (*πυρρίχη*), which among the Spartans was considered "as a preparatory drill for war" (*προγύμνασμα τοῦ πολέμου*: **14.630d-1c**). The *Pyrrhic* was a Doric war dance performed in armour to the sound of the flute; its measure was quick and light. Indeed, from Plato's description of the *Pyrrhic*, we quickly gather that this particular war-dance was certainly strenuous in nature by virtue of its rather energetic movements and dervish-like gyrations (***Leg.* 815a**).

Xenophon, throughout his works, laboriously stresses the vital importance of personal physical fitness for preparing men for the hardships of campaigning and the dangers of the battlefield (see above, 91-2,105), and even on active service soldiers were encouraged to undergo physical exercise in order to maintain unit excellence. On gathering his army in Ephesos, for example, Agesilaos wanted it to be in tip-top physical condition and thus offered prizes to encourage this. Xenophon reports that the city's gymnasia were full of "men exercising" (*ἀνδρῶν τῶν γυμναζομένων*: ***Hell.* 3.4.16, cf *Ages.* 1.25; *Hipp.* 1.26**).[33] To Agesilaos, of course, this was just the Spartan way of doing things. The Spartans fully recognized the vital importance of regular exercise - especially for the legs, arms and neck - and even on campaign Spartan hoplites kept their minds and bodies fit through gymnastics (***Lak. Pol.* 5.8-9; 12.5-6, cf Xen. *Cyr.* 1.6.17**). This was certainly the case when Xerxes' envoy arrived in front of the Greek position at Thermopylai and found, to his utter astonishment, some of the Spartans exercising just outside the Phokian Wall (**Hdt. 7.208**).

Experience - The Greek hoplites at Cunaxa, according to Diodoros, struck terror into the Persians both by the splendour of their panoply and by "the skill they displayed" (*ταῖς εὐχειρίαις*: **14.23.3**).[34] More importantly, in the very next paragraph Diodoros explains how the Ten Thousand had acquired its skill: the hoplites had been battle-hardened through the Peloponnessian War and were thus "far superior in experience" (*ταῖς ἐμπειρίαις διέφερον*: **14.23.4**). Although it is argued elsewhere that over half of the Ten Thousand were from Arkadia and Akhaia, and as a consequence had been employed by the Persian Empire for a number of years already (see above, 67-71), the essential fact remains that these professional soldiers had past-experience. Indeed, a year later no less than 5,000

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[33] It should be noted that the "specialized" arms of Agesilaos' army, i.e. the javelin-men and bowmen, practised with their weapons (**cf Xen. *Cyr.* 3.3.50**). Again, in the *Anabasis*, we hear of Cretan bowmen who "practised themselves in long-range work", i.e. skill-at-arms (**3.4.17**).

[34] Xenophon casually informs his readers that Tissaphernes still remembers with dread the skill of the Ten Thousand at Cunaxa 4 years after the actual event (***Hell.* 3.2.18**). Talking about his own Peninsula War veterans, the Duke of Wellington once exclaimed: "I don't know what effect these men will have upon the enemy, but, by God, they terrify me!"

of the surviving Cyreans[35] decided to accept the Thracian contract negotiated by Xenophon as "they had become accustomed to the life of a soldier" (*στρατιωτικὸν εἰθισμένοι ζῆν βίον*: **Diod. 14.37.1, cf 31.4**). Xenophon, himself, says that the Cyreans were "now exceedingly efficient through constant service" (δὲ καὶ μάλα ἤδη διὰ τὴν τριβὴν ἱκανούς: ***An.* 5.6.15**). If we return to the encounter between the Ten Thousand and Pharnabazos' generals discussed earlier (see above, 107), we can see for ourselves this efficiency first-hand. The Greeks, having already completed two successful charges against the enemy, now prepare themselves for a third. "Although they were tired", explains Xenophon, "they nevertheless thought that they must make as stout an attack as they could upon these troops also, so that they should not be able to regain courage and get rested" (***An.* 6.5.30**). Experience will beat battle fatigue at any time. Such men, however, were not an oddity during this period, for we have already discussed the professionals hired by Dion (see above, 104-5). Again, those hoplite-mercenaries quietly recruited by Leosthenes at Tainaron in 323 BC, had previously spent many years soldiering in Asia Minor and as a result "had become athletes of warfare" (*ἀθληταὶ τῶν κατὰ πόλεμον ἔργων ἐγεγένηντο*: **Diod. 18.9.3**).

Training for war is a means to an end and the real measure of any true professional soldier is his experience of battle, the central act of war. Training transforms a raw recruit into a trained-soldier, but battle (if he survives both mentally and physically) finally elevates him to veteran status. Battle is the "baptism of fire" that will eventually turn the soldier into a finely honed fighting instrument. Plutarch, for instance, has Antalkidas complaining to Agesilaos about the string of campaigns the king has recently conducted in Boiotia, and as a result the amateur Thebans have now become worthy opponents of the professional Spartans. In other words, through the "constant struggles" the Thebans, despite being part-timers, were rapidly turning into battle-hardened veterans (**Plut. *Pel.* 15.1**).[36] Those hoplite-mercenaries who returned to Arkadia in order to join the ranks of the newly commissoned Eparitoi, on the other hand, were already seasoned campaigners as the catalogue of their martial exploits of 369 BC clearly demonstrates (**Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.24-5**). Four years later, the Eparitoi were to prove their professional worth even against the Spartans. For at the battle of Kromnos they resisted the repeated attacks of the Lakedaimonian peltasts and cavalry, finally advancing against them and driving them back. Despite being outnumbered, the Arkadians then went on to attack Archidamos' phalanx which, as a consequence, was also sent packing.[37] Both sides now

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[35] Cf Xen. *An.* 7.7.23, where the figure is given as 6,000.

[36] See above, 106 fn.21 for the introduction of some form of military training by the Boiotians *after* their victory over the Spartans at Leuktra.

[37] Cf Xenophon's glee when he reports the thrashing of the Arkadians (and Argives) by the Spartans at the so-called "Tearless Battle" (***Hell.* 7.1.31-2**).

prepared themselves for another round, but as the Arkadians closed in one of the older Spartiates questioned the wisdom of continuing the fight and suggested a truce. Both sides willingly agreed, and the Spartans gathered up their dead and departed while the Arkadians erected a trophy (**Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.22-5**). Veteran soldiers are not only so because of the wealth of their experience, but also because of their ability to survive. The simple desire not to die in vain is what probably prompted the outburst from one of Agis' veterans when the king attempted to led his phalanx against the Confederate held hill just outside Mantineia (**Thuc. 5.65.2, cf 59.2-4; 60.2**). "The great difference between a veteran and a raw recruit," explains General William Walker, "is that one knows how to take care of himself, and the other does not."[38] Returning to Kromnos, the majority of the hoplites who battled it out on that field of battle would have been professional soldiers with long-service records: the Arkadians by virtue of their previous years spent as mercenaries, the Spartans because they had to spend at least forty years with the colours. Discipline will keep enemies face to face as long as it is able, but in the end it cannot supplant the human instinct of self-preservation and the sense of fear that goes with it (see above, 35-8).

Discipline - In a conflict of masses, however, success generally depends upon the subordination of self to the will of the group, upon obedience to orders, in short, upon discipline. The fundamental purpose of discipline is to make men fight in spite of themselves. In its purest form it is an institution, a tradition, a system, and as such it cannot be created or secured in a day. Such was the discipline which underlay the prolonged military success of the professional army of Rome during the rise and dominance of her empire. In the world of the Greek city-state, on the other hand, discipline was at best translated through the social duty that free men owed each other as fellow citizens. Outside the polis and in the world of the mercenary, however, discipline was usually bought. When Derkylidas had secured the pay for his army, which not only included *neodamodeis* but also the Cyreans and a contingent of δορυφόροι who had recently been in the employ of a local tyrant, he immediately broadcast the fact to some of his taxiarchs and lochagoi.[39] He did so, says Xenophon,[40] in order to improve the overall discipline of his command (***Hell.* 3.1.28**). The trick obviously worked, for straight after Derkylidas was able to take "nine cities in eight days" (**Xen.**

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[38] *The War in Nicaragua*, University of Arizona Press (Tucson 1985) 33.

[39] For the composition of Sparta's Asia Minor army in 399 BC: (i) under Thibron - 1,000 *neodamodeis*, 4,000 Peloponnesian hoplites, 2,000 Ionian hoplites, 5,000 Cyreans, 300 Athenian cavalry (**Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.4-5,6; Diod. 14.36.2; 37.1, cf Xen. *An.* 7.6.1; 7.23,57; 8.24**); (ii) Derkylidas, according to Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.28, commanded c.8,000 troops, i.e. if the Peloponnesians had returned to mainland Greece then his army consisted of 1,000 *neodamodeis*, 2,000 Ionian hoplites, 5,000 Cyreans, and Meidias' δορυφόροι (**Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.23; 2.7, cf 1.13,16-7,21**).

[40] Xenophon was actually in command of the Cyreans at this time, and remained so for next 4 years until replaced by the Spartiate, Herippidas, in 395 BC (**Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.7; 4.20**).

Hell. **3.1.29**). His predecessor Thibron, on the other hand, had not been so smart. Recalled home, Thibron was soon condemned and exiled by the ephors for allowing the army to plunder Sparta's allies in Asia Minor (**Xen.** ***Hell.*** **3.1.8, cf 10; 2.6-7**). Not that Sparta's Ionian allies always proved to be particularly disciplined upon the field of battle, and a notable example of their timidness occurred during the summer of 397 BC. Marching back from Caria, Derkylidas was caught on the hop by the combined forces of Tissaphernes and Pharnabazos which, instead of being elsewhere as Derkylidas assumed, were drawn up for battle just over the next rise. Spotting the Persians in the nick of time, Derkylidas kept his cool and deployed his outnumbered army for battle. Now, according to the eyewitness account from Xenophon, those men from the Peloponnese "kept quiet and prepared for battle" (*ἡσυχίαν εἶχε καὶ παρεσκευάζετο ὡς μαχούμενον*: ***Hell.*** **3.2.17**). The Ionian hoplites, on the other hand, decided otherwise; some of them by leaving "their arms in the standing grain" and simply fleeing, while the rest stood with flight to the rear as their next obvious move (**Xen.** ***Hell.*** **3.2.17**). Here it is important to point out that, apart from the 1,000 *neodamodeis*, the Peloponnesians of Derkylidas' command would undoubtedly have been the warlike Cyreans under Xenophon, i.e. hoplite-mercenaries mainly from Arkadia and Akhaia (see above, 112-3 fn.39,40). Machiavelli was correct when he penned the line: "Organization expels men's fears; disorder lessens their spirit."[41]

In serving Athens or a foreign power, Iphikrates usually managed to provide for his own interests, and his ruthless exploitation of Thrace as a refuge stands as a notorious example of this (**Theopomp. F.103**). On the other hand Iphikrates was certainly a commander who achieved victory on the field of battle and did so by using his brains and not by bravery alone: in the words of Nepos, he was "one born to command" (***Iphik.*** **3.1**).[42] Indeed, his ingenuity and his discipline were the subject of many later anecdotes. The most notable of these is his parable of the army whereby its head was the strategos, its chest the phalanx, its arms the *ψιλοί*, and its legs the cavalry (**Plut.** ***Pel.*** **2.1; Polyain. 3.9.29, cf Plut.** ***Mor.*** **187b; Xen.** ***Hipp.*** **5.13**). In particular, it is the picture of Iphikrates the strict disciplinarian who punished ruthlessly, the commander who never let his mercenary troops be idle, that concerns us here (**Frontin.** ***Str.*** **3.12.2; Polyain. 3.9.35**). This was the bedrock upon which Iphikrates placed his authority and his individualism as a commander. According to Nepos, for example, the army he commanded at Corinth in 390/89 BC was the best drilled and most disciplined "in Graecia" (***Iphik.*** **2.1**), and in speaking of Iphikrates' expedition of 374 BC to Egypt, he adds that he throughly trained his army "in all forms of military discipline" (omni disciplina militari: ***Iphik.*** **2.4**). Needless to say, such anecdotes could easily represent a body of traditional "old soldiers'" tales

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[41] *L'arte della Guerra*, (Florence 1521) 608.

[42] Cf Iphikrates' fellow mercenary-captain, Chabrias, who was a strong and courageous fighter who would distinguish himself in battle at whatever risk (**Dem. 20.82; Nep.** ***Chab.*** **4; Plut.** ***Phok.*** **11; Diod. 16.7.3**).

which could be spun with appropriate effect of any vigorous commander, but Xenophon does lend some weight to believing them to be true of Iphikrates. Reporting on Iphikrates' voyage around the Peloponnese *en route* to Corcyra, Xenophon brilliantly details Iphikrates' relentless training programme for his soldiers and seamen (***Hell.* 6.2.27-30**). More importantly, Xenophon saw in Iphikrates a commander who knew exactly how to keep a mercenary army in check and thereby exploit its strengths:

> Now I am aware that all these matters of practice and training are customary whenever men expect to engage in a battle by sea, but that which I commend in Iphikrates is this, that when it was incumbent upon him to arrive speedily at the place where he supposed he should fight with the enemy, he discovered a way to keep his men from being either, by reason of the voyage they had made, unskilled (ἀνεπιστήμονας) in the tactics of fighting at sea, or, by reason of their having been trained in such tactics, any the more tardy in arriving at their destination (***Hell.* 6.2.32**).

Iphikrates, by all accounts, had a rare talent: the disciplinarian who had the maturity that came from much experience in the handling of men. In direct contrast we can recall the valiant but fruitless attempts of Dionysios of Phokaia to train and prepare the Ionian fleet prior to its naval engagement with the Persians off Lade (**Hdt. 6.11-2**). In a city-state army the citizens were not usually amenable to martial law. Its soldiers were governed by a civilian code of discipline. Able mercenary commanders like Iphikrates, on the other hand, took the opportunity to instil a much stricter code of discipline in their men and thereby produce a superior organization and subordination within their armies. In brief, a well disciplined unit is an effective fighting unit (**Xen. *Oik.* 8.4-7; *Hipp.* 1.24, cf *Mem.* 1.6.9**).

IV

When Mnasippos failed to pay his mercenaries and started to discharge a number of them, morale took a rapid nose dive and discipline suffered as a consequence. His troops became "antagonistic to him personally" (**Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.19**). Kallippos also came unstuck through failing to pay his hired soldiery (**Plut. *Dion* 58.3**). Indeed, according to Xenophon, the largest sums of money to be spent by a tyrant, for example, will be upon his mercenary bodyguard. The simple reason was that "to curtail any of these means ruin" (***Hiero* 4.9, cf 11; 6.11**). Thucydides, for example, mentions the strict discipline that was maintained within the ranks of the mercenary bodyguard protecting Hippias, thereby guaranteeing his position as a tyrant (**6.55.3**). Good pay and conditions undoubtedly helped as well. His father before him had certainly strengthened his third spell as Athens' tyrant with a mercenary bodyguard and hard cash (**Hdt. 1.64**). More telling perhaps, is the example of the

mercenaries employed by Carthage who caused no end of trouble for the city by making it a habit to "cause many and serious mutinies", especially when their pay was not forthcomming (**Diod. 5.11.1**). In particular, one such mutiny was to drag Carthage into the Mercenary War of 240 BC (**Polyb. 1.65.7**). Ironically Carthage, which had always relied upon hired soldiery to one degree or another and was now to reap the consequences of such a dangerous policy, still had to enrol mercenaries so as to quash this rebellion (**Polyb. 1.71.2; 73.1, cf 75.2**). On the other hand, a more successful and obviously more understanding employer such as Sir Robert Knollys, "had a large number of mercenaries at his command and paid them so well that they followed him eagerly."[43]

One solution to this problem was to allow your hired soldiery to plunder the local neighbourhood, especially when it was hostile territory. According to Nepos - but not recorded by Xenophon - Agesilaos willingly allowed his army to lay waste Phrygia with the sole intention of enriching his soldiers, many of whom were mercenaries (***Ages.* 3.2, cf Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.16-7**). Timoleon did the same, despatching his mercenaries into enemy territory in order that they "might obtain booty" (ὠφελεῖσθαι: **Plut. *Tim.* 24.3**). For the Arkadians and Akhaians freebooting appears to have been a regular pastime for them both at home and abroad. For example, many Arkadians and Akhaians "came as volunteers" to join Agis' banner when he was marching through Elis. Their motive for doing so was quite straightforward: "to get a share of the plunder" (μετεῖχον τῆς ἁρπαγῆς: **Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.26, cf 5.2.19; 6.5.30**). More importantly, in the *Anabasis* we witness the Arkadians and Akhaians banding together under Kallimachos of Parrhasia and Lykon of Akhaia and then electing ten strategoi from their own number, these strategoi having to act upon whatever is decided by the vote of the majority (**6.2.9,12**). And the sole objective of the majority by making this break from the rest of the Ten Thousand was to descend upon the Bithynians so as to secure "the greatest possible amount of booty" (λάβοιεν ὅτι πλεῖστα: **Xen. *An.* 6.2.17**). Of course the rest of the Ten Thousand were not against looting. Xenophon tells us that individuals were allowed to go off and strip the locality of its riches, plundering was an acceptable practice both to the mercenaries and their commanders alike (***An.* 5.1.8,17; 2.18; 6.5.23**). Some predators struck it lucky judging by what Timasion the Dardanian managed to hoard for himself: a fine collection of Persian drinking cups and carpets, one carpet alone being worth at least ten minas (**Xen. *An.* 7.3.18,27**). On the other hand, the quest for plunder had its own inherent dangers, especially when it meant being scattered throughout the countryside or the locals had decided to defend their precious belongings (**Xen. *An.* 1.2.25; 3.5.2; 5.7.14-6**). Nevertheless, the practice of looting by hired soldiery has always been a

[43] Froissart J. *Chronicles*, Penguin Books (London 1978) 145.

necessary evil,[44] and in particular, although Cyrus forbade the looting of friendly territory, he did, for example, allow the Greeks to plunder Lykaonia "on the grounds that it was hostile territory" (**Xen. *An.* 1.2.19**).

Another solution to the lack of cash was for individuals to sell the spoils of war, such as captives. Timoleon's mercenaries, after their victory at Krimesos, walked off with most of the Carthaginian POWs and sold them in the local slave market, thereby enriching themselves (**Plut. *Tim.* 29.1**). The Ten Thousand certainly had captives along with their camp-followers (*τὸν δὲ ὄχλον καὶ τὰ ἀνδράποδα*: **Xen. *An.* 6.5.3, cf 4.1.12**), and these were probably sold off along with the other spoils of war when they needed to raise money for themselves (**Xen. *An.* 6.6.38**). At the end of the march, according to Xenophon, some of the mercenaries were so low on funds that they even resorted to selling their arms in order to procure enough cash for the return journey home, and he himself confesses to have had only his travelling expenses - after he had sold his horse - and a "boy" (***An.* 7.2.3; 7.2,6, cf 3.20**).[45] However, such practices would only alleviate the problem for a short-while and never really solved the fundamental fact that a mercenary expected to be paid by his employer for services rendered. Mercenaries, no matter how warlike they are, are only reliable to their employer as long as they are paid. To them war is purely a business proposition. One of the chief snags involved in the use of mercenaries, therefore, is to persuade them to continue the campaign when their wages are in arrears.[46]

In general, mercenaries will serve wherever pay and booty are most easily and regularly to be found, and both these incentives are closely bound up with the question of discipline. Mike Hoare's 5 Commando, for example, once ran amok in camp because their pay was in arrears. In short, they took matters into their own hands and mutinied. In response, Colonel Hoare simply rounded up his men, paraded them and then divided the trouble-makers from those who had no

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[44] E.g. although Colonel Mike Hoare warned his men that such an act would be punishable by death, he considered such an order "an absurd edict". He soon qualified his stern warning by saying that if any of his men were actually caught looting, he would offer them no mercy: op.cit.(1991(A)) 129, cf 76,137,212,239. When asked by the citizens of a city he was besieging how he was going to pay his mercenaries, Agathokles coolly replied: "If I take this town" (**Plut. *Mor.* 176f**). For the citizens of Syracuse who were being besieged by the Athenian strategos, Nikias, it was the same problem but with no solution. Stuck within their city and short of money, they could not meet the wage demands of their hired soldiery (**Thuc. 7.48.5-6**).

[45] Of course we must not forget that instead of serving till their objective was achieved, and then taking their discharge, the Ten Thousand were thrown unexpectedly upon their own resources, first by the loss of their employer and then by the assassination of their strategoi. In a curious way, on the other hand, the Ten Thousand became a roving mercenary army, thus heralding those of Medieval and Renaissance Europe.

[46] At Bicocca, for example, the out-of-pocket Swiss demanded an immediate action with the prospect of spoils, thereby forcing their French employers to fight an unfavourable battle which did, in fact, end in defeat for them. As Voltaire once said: "Point d'argent, point de Suisses." Or more recently, Colonel Hoare, when quizzed about pay: "No ticket, no laundry!"

complaints at all. Finally, in full view of all his men, he personally weeded out the hard core bad eggs from the first group and sent them packing.[47] The Colonel was a hard man who knew exactly how to handle hired soldiery. For during their first action, 5 Commando refused to carry on at one stage of the operation and mutinied on the spot. The ring leader was confronted:

> I imagine there comes a moment like this in every commander's life when his authority is challenged and everything stands or falls on his instant reaction. In a flash I whipped out my heavy Browning 9mm pistol and clouted him on the side of the head. He collapsed like a pricked balloon. There was no fight in him, no guts either.[48]

The mutiny evaporated there and then.

Cyrus the Younger was forced to spend twenty days idling in Tarsus because his mercenaries refused to go on. The Greeks presented their grievance by explaining they had not been hired to go against the Great King (*μισθωθῆναι δὲ οὐκ ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἔφασαν*: **Xen. *An.* 1.3.1**). Klearchos, being the strict displinarian, decided to tough it out and tried to force his men to proceed; they responded by pelting him and his pack-animals with stones. The mutineers finally opted, after being assured by the artful Klearchos that the army was not destined to go against the King, to ask Cyrus for an immediate pay rise. The equally artful Cyrus, on hearing the mutineers' deputation which, incidentally, was headed by Klearchos, promised to pay them half as much again as they had been receiving before, i.e. a daric and a half per month to each man instead of a daric (**Xen. *An.* 1.3.3-21**). All thought about going against the King was conveniently forgotten until the army had reached Thapsakos, a town situated on the banks of the Euphrates. It was here that Cyrus informed the Greek strategoi of his real intentions and their soldiers, on hearing the news, mutinied once more. Straightaway they demanded from Cyrus extra cash, but on this occasion the mercenaries wanted the money to be given to them in the form of a special donative similar to that once given to the Prince's *δορυφόροι* who had accompanied him to his father's court. He agreed, and thereby promised each man five minas in silver once the army had reached Babylon, and their "pay in full" (*τὸν μισθὸν ἐντελῆ*) once they were back in Ionia (i.e. after the campaign had *finished*). The mercenaries were once more mollified by Cyrus' promises (**Xen. *An.* 1.4.11-3, cf 1.2**). In fact, Cyrus had good reason readily to issue to his

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[47] Op.cit.(1991(A)) 181, cf 182. Later, 5 Commando was to mutiny again over pay. This time, however, Colonel Hoare's sympathies were with his men, the reason being that their Belgian paymasters had let the unit down on all accounts and as a result the men's pay was not forthcoming: ibid.245-6.

[48] Ibid.49-50.

mercenaries silver promises instead of hard cash: his war-chest was desperately short of the latter.[49] During an earlier stage of the campaign, when the army was halted at Caÿstrupedion, the mercenaries had repeatedly gone to Cyrus' tent and demanded their pay; at this point in time the Prince owed them more than three months' wages (**Xen. *An.* 1.2.11**). He was finally bailed out of trouble by his lover, Epyaxa, who generously handed over to Cyrus enough money for him to pay four months wages to each mercenary (*μισθὸν τεττάρων μηνῶν*: **Xen. *An.* 1.2.12**). A short while later, Cyrus also received "a large sum of money for his army" from his lover's husband, Syennesis of Cilicia (*χρήματα πολλὰ εἰς τὴν στρατιάν*: **Xen. *An.* 1.2.27**), and this gift, perhaps, enabled him to give the Greeks the fifty percent pay rise after they had mutinied at Tarsus.

V

The Swiss and German mercenaries of Renaissance Europe definitely owed no allegiances beyond the cash nexus. These men had to be subjected to a rigorous disciplinary code whose instruments were the drill sergeant and the drum head tribunal. It was custom among the German *Landsknechts*, for example, that the process of mustering after recruitment was turned into a positive rite of initiation. The new recruits entered the mustering ground via a gateway formed for the occasion by two halberds stuck in the ground with a pike laid across the blades to form a crossbar - the tools of the trade so to speak. They were then formally enrolled in the books of the unit, allocated their weapons and given their first pay, minus the appropriate deductions. They then formed a ring while the disciplinary code was read. To this the recruits had to swear by raising a hand with two fingers extended. Thereafter they were in a world which allowed for considerable personal eccentricity and an unusual degree of closeness between captain and men, but which was controlled with great ferocity. Absences were checked through an unusually strict system of leave passports. A gallows not only marked every mustering centre and stopping place but was used as an off-limits symbol, on doors of dwellings exempt from billeting, for example. And when a man's behaviour, by cowardice or in any other ways, had soiled a unit's honour, he was judged not by civilian law, but by the *Spiessgericht*, spear-law. After defending himself among his peers the decision - which could only be death or total acquittal - was given by a show of hands. The death sentence could then be carried out by running the gauntlet that allowed every man to strike at the criminal as he tried to dash between their files.

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[49] Even before his enterprise was in full-swing, Cyrus had already made various large payments from his coffers: (i) to Klearchos, 10,000 darics in order to maintain a mercenary contingent in the Chersonese (**Xen. *An.* 1.1.9**); (ii) to Aristippos of Larissa, enough cash to support 4,000 hoplite-mercenaries for 6 months (**Xen. *An.* 1.1.10**); (iii) to Pasion the Megarian and Sokrates the Akhaian, the funds to raise and support a force of 800 hoplites and 300 peltasts which was to aid the Milesian exiles (**Xen. *An.* 1.2.2,3**); (iv) the pay for no less than 4,000 hoplite-mercenaries who garrisoned the cities of Ionia for Cyrus (**Xen. *An.* 1.2.1,3**).

Klearchos firmly "believed there was no good in an army that went without punishment" (ἀκολάστου γὰρ στρατεύματος οὐδὲν ἡγεῖτο ὄφελος εἶναι: **Xen. *An.* 2.6.10**). The Spartan, having been a professional soldier for most of his life, probably only tolerated the camaraderie of fellow hard men who also, like himself, loved the adventure of this type of soldiering where survival not so much depended on rigid routine and formal training as on the ready acceptance of a necessary discipline, observed willingly by all. The latter was certainly the case when Klearchos was in command of the Ten Thousand, for the troops "yielded him implicit obedience" and "their fear of punishment at his hands kept them in a fine state of discipline (σφόδρα πειθομένοις ἐχρῆτο...τὸ τὴν παρ' ἐκείνου τιμωρίαν φοβεῖσθαι εὐτάκτους ἐποίει: **Xen. *An.* 2.6.13,14, cf *Mem.* 3.5.5**). And just in case there were any slackers within the ranks, Klearchos had to hand a stick which he would readily apply to their backs (**Xen. *An.* 2.3.11**). He was not alone, morever, in dealing out rough and ready justice in this fashion, for Xenophon himself freely admits to striking soldiers there and then for flagrant breaches of discipline (**Xen. *An.* 5.8.13-8**).[50] During a period of extreme weather conditions, for example, Xenophon had resorted to physical violence and struck at least one straggler because he had "behaved like a weakling and refused to get up, preferring to leave himself a prey to the enemy" (**Xen. *An.* 5.8.14, cf 4.5.15-6**). When, during a particularly desperate operation, Colonel Mike Hoare stumbled across a member of his unit who was lying on the ground and sobbing his heart out, he immediately responded by prodding him with a bayonet: "Sympathy at a time like this, even if warranted, is fatal." The man, now hysterical, was then punched back into line by one of Hoare's NCOs.[51] Besides, with such bad characters as Boïskos the boxer to contend with (**5.8.23-4**), it is quite understandable that wise mercenary leaders keep on top of the situation by getting tough with their men. In remembering the mercenaries he had once commanded in the Congo, Mike Hoare said:

> It is true to say that their behaviour at all times, in action or out of it, depended on the quality of the leadership and the discipline they were subjected to. Where this was lacking, their behaviour was frequently abominable and, as can be expected, attracted the attention of the press.[52]

Mercenary soldiers are ineffectual without a capable and autocratic leader. In the same vein, Xenophon himself reckons that "discipline (εὐταξία) keeps men in safety, while the lack of it (ἀταξία) has brought many ere now to destruction" (***An.* 3.1.38**). Moreover, at one of the soldier-assemblies held soon after the election of the new strategoi, Xenophon stresses to the rank and file

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[50] Whereas the wanton assault upon a citizen was punishable by confiscation of property or even death.

[51] Op.cit.(1991(A)) 51-2.

[52] Ibid.139-40.

of the Ten Thousand that they should be far more disciplined in their outlook and show more obedience to their commanders (εὐτακτοτέρους καὶ πειθομένους). He then proposes to the assembly of troops that a vote be passed in order that the disobedient be punished not just by their commanders alone, but by all. With danger within and without the army, the Ten Thousand were obviously missing the stern but vital leadership of Klearchos, and Xenophon ends his appeal for a stricter disciplinary code with a suitable punch-line: "Not one Klearchos, but ten thousand" (***An.* 3.2.30-1, cf *Hipp.* 1.24**). Xenophon's proposal is passed as is another disciplinary measure which he brings before the soldier-assembly at a later date which meant that from now on any man caught deserting from the ranks would be brought to trial (**Xen. *An.* 5.6.33**).

Once out of immediate danger, however, discipline in general appears to have lapsed somewhat. For without a common purpose, men's thoughts now turn to the securing of booty, to ways of returning home etc. As a consequence various "self-chosen generals" and "scoundrels" pop up who spend their time trying to entice the troops with vague promises of loot, pay and provisions. In a long and eloquent speech, Xenophon warns the army about its bleak future if the soldiers persist in lending their ears to the likes of Timasion the Dardanian and Thorax the Boiotian, men who willingly promise this, that and the other at a drop of a hat (**Xen. *An.* 5.7.13-33**). In a direct response to Xenophon's speech and in order to prevent the Ten Thousand from dissolving into a lawless mob, a military court is set up and all the offenders are put on trial for their lives[53] by the strategoi, with the lochagoi serving as the jury (**Xen. *An.* 5.7.34-5, cf 6.4.11**). In addition, the army is ritually purified and its strategoi themselves subjected to an inquiry with reference to their past conduct. As a result, three of them are handed out stiff fines (**Xen. *An.* 5.8.1**). In any professional army, the good conduct, discipline and obedience of its soldiers are of vital importance if it is to survive as a fighting force. It needs, therefore, competent tough officers to ensure that these qualities are to remain sacrosanct (**e.g. Xen. *Mem.* 3.5.21; *Cyr.* 1.6.21**).

V

According to Polybios, the opposing generals at Cannae stood up and made long pre-battle speeches to their respective armies. The theme adopted by the Roman consul, Aemilius Paulus, was one of duty whereby the citizen-soldier fights not only for himself, but also for the survival of his fatherland, family and friends (**3.109.6-8**). Hannibal, alternatively, strikes a different cord and harangues his hired soldiery not on duty, but on the wealth to be gained through victory (**Polyb. 3.111.8-9, cf**

[53] Cf Xen. *An.* 7.6.10, which mentions stoning to death as a suitable means of execution. There is also the attempted stoning of the *perioikos*, Dexippos, for deserting the army (**Xen. *An.* 6.6.7, cf 5.1.15**).

6.52.3-8; 11.28.7).[54] Philosophically, we have two opposing extremes: the dutiful and honest citizen-soldier versus the greedy and lawless hireling. In reality, however, even Republican Rome was eventually forced into fielding fully paid professional armies.

For the oligarchic or democratic Greek city-state a professional army was a mercenary army and, as such, was an army they could ill-afford. Nevertheless, those that were fielded - usually on the fringes of the Greek world - proved themselves to be valuble assets to their employers as long as they were regularly paid. In particular and for obvious reasons, we have discussed at length Cyrus' Greek army and, in comparison to the professional army of Sparta, have found it to have been just as formidable on the field of battle. Unlike the Spartan army, the Ten Thousand, just like any other mercenary army, could be temperamental if left to its own devices and, therefore, required firm handling from its leaders.

[54] It is interesting to note that at the battle of Mantineia, while the opposing army was harangued by its strategoi, the Spartans encouraged each other with their war-songs and reminders of what they knew they could do, "aware that long practice in action is more worthwhile than hurried exhortations, however well delivered" (**Thuc. 5.69.2**).

7 *SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONALS*

War is my country,
My armour is my home,
And in every season
Fighting is my life.

Sixteenth century Spanish jingle

War naturally generates a sense of unity, of pride, of identity, of excitement. But war also generates a human cost, and such costs are measured in death, wounds and profound personal suffering. The fear of war's price tag is the soldier's universal lot. So how does a soldier, beset by the danger of death, fear of wounds and the greatly increased risk of succumbing to disease which membership of an army has entailed for most of military history, sustain his will to combat?

I

Fighting spirit is what enables the warrior to cope with the very harrowing business of battle, what Jason Gurney clearly defines as "putting up a good show as a soldier" (see above, 104). Training, experience and discipline - the physical components of professional soldiering - all play their respective parts in its creation. Napoleon, nevertheless, maintained that morale is to the physical as three is to one, and in the same vein, Xenophon reckoned morale to be the single deciding factor in war:

> For you understand, I am sure, that it is neither numbers nor strength (οὔτε πλῆθός...οὔτε ἰσχύς) which wins victories in wars; but whichever of the two sides it be whose troops, by the blessing of the gods, advance to the attack with stouter hearts (ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐρρωμενέστεροι), against those troops their adversaries generally refuse to stand (***An.*** **3.1.42**).

Speaking to an assembly of strategoi and lochagoi, Xenophon continues, explaining that he had experienced this phenomenon first-hand. At Cunaxa we certainly witness the high morale of the Ten Thousand when they raise a loud war-cry to Enyalios, and as they do so they sprint towards the Persians, some of them even clashing their spears against their shields.[1] Little wonder then that the

[1] Cf Psellos' description of the Varangian Guard in battle: "These men carried shields and a kind of one-edged axe on the shoulder. They now beat their shields and roared as loudly as they could, and clashed their axes so that the sound echoed around" (***Chron.*** **II.165**). In his *Strategikos*, Onasander advises the general to send his troops into battle shouting and running so as to fighten the opposition (**29.1-2**).

Persians flinched and, "before an arrow reached them [the hoplites], the barbarians broke and fled" (*πρὶν δὲ τόξευμα ἐξικνεῖσθαι ἐκκλίνουσιν οἱ βάρβαροι καὶ φεύγουσι*: **Xen. *An.* 1.8.18-9**). In their second encounter at Cunaxa, the Greeks "once again struck up the paean and advanced to the attack much more eagerly than before (*αὖθις παιανίσαντες ἐπῆσαν πολὺ προθυμότερον ἢ πρόσθεν*); and the barbarians once again failed to await the attack, but took to flight when at a greater distance from the Greeks than they were the first time" (**Xen. *An.* 1.10.10**). Although technically the victor of Cunaxa, Artaxerxes was still "terrified by the approach of the [Greek] army" (*τῇ ἐφόδῳ τοῦ στρατεύματος*: **Xen. *An.* 2.2.18**). So much so at this point in time, that instead of demanding back their arms as he had done previously, he was now seeking a truce with the Ten Thousand (**Xen. *An.* 2.3.1-7, cf 1.8**). In essence, the mere sight and sound of the Ten Thousand at two hundred yards was enough to strike fear into any man's heart. This was their *tour de force*, and as such the ritualistic terror-tactic of striking up the paean, raising a war cry to Enyalios, crashing spear against shield and running into contact - usually as the enemy's missiles began to fly[2] - would be repeated again and again whenever the Ten Thousand came up against "barbarians" (**Xen. *An.* 4.3.19; 5.18; 5.2.14; 6.5.27,29, cf 3.2.16**).[3] This fighting spirit of the Ten Thousand was to live on, for at Koroneia the charge of the Thebans was quickly answered by the countercharge of the Cyreans, who where the first to run "from the phalanx of Agesilaos" (*ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀγησιλάου φάλαγγος*: **Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.17, cf *Ages.* 2.11**).

Fighting spirit is the mood a good commander strives most earnestly to generate and sustain in his army. Proper concern for his troops' welfare, by provision of good and regular food, pay and creature comforts - the "sinews of war" - is one means to it. Exhortation is another; a commander can appeal to the pride and loyalty of his men or manipulate them through promises of fame and material rewards. Punishment, of course, always threatens the soldier who will not yield to oratory; "pay well, hang well" was Sir Ralph Hopton's summary of the general's art. But no general can afford to be too draconian, and the wise general seeks, on the contrary, to make his men obey not because he forces them but because they so wish. And the most effective means of attaining that state

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[2] Cf Diod. 14.23.1 where Klearchos orders the hoplites to advance slowly at first so as to remain fresh for the fight, but once at close range (i.e. 200-150m) they are to run into contact as "the missiles shot by bows and other means" would then fly harmlessly over head. According to Herodotos, it was the Athenians at Marathon who were the first hoplites to charge at the run (**6.112**). N.b. Xen. *An.* 4.1.18: an arrow pierces Leonymos the Lakonian through his shield and corslet, while his comrade, Basias the Arkadian, is shot clean through the head (**cf 2.28**).

[3] In a speech to Proxenos' lochagoi, Xenophon told them that the Greeks, in comparison to the "barbarians", "have bodies more capable than theirs of bearing cold and heat and toil" (*...καὶ ψύχη καὶ θάλπη καὶ πόνους φέρειν*: ***An.* 3.1.23, cf 1.73**). Compare Colonel Mike Hoare on the subject of 5 Commando and its martial superiority over the "natives": "I was convinced then, as I was to be in every action we ever fought in the Congo, bar one, that the enemy were greatly overrated, and I was certain that they would run at the sight of a well-armed and determined group of white men" - *Congo Mercenary*, Robert Hale (London 1991(A)) 46, cf 76,162.

of consent is by fostering among them bonds of loyalty and regard for each other too strong for the violent strains of battle to break.

"Small group cohesion" is what modern Western armies call this relationship, the potent *mélange* of comradeship and firepower that steels the section, platoon and company. The "buddy-buddy system" is its rawest form,[4] whereby a man's natural fear of losing his reputation as a man among his immediate comrades armours him against the terrible experience of battle. It is a complex chemistry of individual and collective needs, loyalties and pressures that can urge men to go forward or stand firm even in the face of certain death. Experienced soldiers know what it is like to submit themselves to the ordeal of battle again and again more or less willingly. To do otherwise is to disgrace themselves in front of their fellow soldiers whose esteem is the foundation of their own self-respect.[5] Men will kill and die rather than lose face:

> Once you get out there and realise a guy is shooting at you, your first instinct, regardless of all your training, is to live...But you can't turn around and run the other way. Peer pressure, you know? There's people here with you that have probably saved your life or will save your life in the future; you can't back down.[6]

In a nutshell, small group cohesion is the warm spirit of camaraderie known especially to soldiers who have faced common hardship and danger time after time.

Small group cohesion is no new thing. The Roman legions made their smallest tactical unit the *contubernium*, the tentful of eight men under a *decanus* who slept, ate and fought together throughout their long years of service.[7] Similarly, even the hoplite-citizens of the city-state armies

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[4] Cf "5 Commando rules for battle", Rule 4, ibid.309: "Soldiers in pairs; look after each other; be faithful to your mate. Be loyal to your leaders."

[5] The face that is being saved, the image that is being preserved, is that of the tribal warrior of our pre-civilized past who fought for personal glory and stood a very good chance of surviving the fight:

> Man, supposing you and I, escaping this battle, would be able to live on forever, ageless, immortal, so neither would I myself go on fighting in the foremost nor would I urge you into the fighting where men win glory. But now, seeing that the spirits of death stand close around us in their thousands, no man can turn aside or escape them, let us go on and win glory for ourselves, or yield it to others (***Il.* 12.322-8 (Lattimore)**).

To put it more succinctly, as USMC Gunnery Sgt. Dan Daly did when urging his men through the infernal hell of Belleau Wood (06 Jan.1918): "Come on, you sons of bitches! Do you want to live for ever?" Clearly, the anarchic machismo of maleness found in the tribal warrior still forms part of our own modern day definition of masculinity.

[6] Interview with a Vietnam Veteran (USMC), quoted by: Dyer G. *War*, Bodley Head (London 1985) 106.

[7] Comparable with the modern squad or section. N.b. in the Neo-Assyrian Imperial armies, the smallest unit of organisation was one of 10 men under a *rab eshirte* or "Commander of Ten".

took their place in the phalanx at the side of close relatives and near neighbours whose good opinion counted more strongly with them than the mortal fear of the enemy. This idea of small group cohesion might explain why the seven hundred hoplites from the tiny city-state of Thespiai volunteered to a man to remain, and consequently die, with Leonidas on that final fatal day at Thermopylai (**Hdt. 7.222; 225-6**).[8] Again the gallant Thespians, seeing that all was up for them upon the field of Delion, chose to stand firm and face destruction, and those "who perished were cut down fighting hand-to-hand" (*ἐν χερσὶν ἀμυνόμενοι κατεκόπησαν*: **Thuc. 4.96.3**). Likewise, at the battle of the Nemea we witness the stubborn courage displayed by the men of Pellene who, despite the fact that their allies had left them in the lurch, "fought and fell in their places" (*ἐμάχοντό τε καὶ ἐν χώρᾳ ἔπιπτον ἑκατέρων*: **Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.20**).[9]

The late fourth century BC writer Theophrastos talks of a character, "Cowardice", having his messmates next to him in the phalanx (*τοὺς συσσίτους*: **25.3,4**). In the same character sketch we also witness this craven hoplite standing alongside his "fellow demesmen" (*τοὺς δημότας*) and "fellow tribesmen" (*τοὺς φυλέτας*), which does suggest that in the Athenian phalanx, at least, citizens who knew each other fought together as hoplites (**25.6**). The forensic speeches of Lysias provide three further examples of this phenomenon: (i) the eldest son of Polystratos, speaking on behalf of his father in 410 BC, informs the court that his father's *δημόται* could testify to the number of occasions he had served on campaign without shirking military service (**20.23**); (ii) Philon stands accused of not aiding the democrats in person and of failing to contribute funds to arm his own fellow *δημόται* (**31.15-6**); (iii) Mantitheos, when his *δημόται* assembled to march to the relief of Haliartos in 395 BC, donated thirty drachmas each to two of his fellow *δημόται* so they could buy provisions for the campaign (**16.14**). For an earlier example of this we have to rely on the much later evidence of Plutarch. In his *Life of Kimon*, Plutarch has Kimon, hot-foot from exile, attempting to join the Athenian army on the battlefield of Tanagra. Although forbidden to do so, Kimon's comrades nevertheless place his arms and armour along side them within the Athenian phalanx (*εἰς τὸν λόχον*: **Plut. *Kim.* 17.5, cf Frontin. *Str.* 4.1**). The earliest piece of evidence for demesmen fighting together comes from a fragment of a cheek piece of a Corinthian helmet found at Rhamnous, and bears the inscription: *Ῥαμνόσιοι οἱ ἐν Λέμνο[ι ἀ]νέ[θεσαν Νεμ]έσει*. The helmet could have been part of the

[8] The following year 1,800 Thespians turned out for Plataia, but without arms (**Hdt. 9.30**). This strongly suggests that all the polis' hoplite manpower fell at Thermopylai.

[9] Coincidentally, their opponents were the Thespians!

booty taken during Miltiades' expedition against Lemnos in 499 BC, and dedicated on behalf of the demesmen of Rhamnous who fought together during this campaign.[10]

In one respect the Athenian phalanx resembled the pike-blocks of the fifteenth century Swiss cantons:

> There was no need to waste days in the weary work of organisation, when every man stood among his kinsmen and neighbours under the pennon of his own town, valley or guild.[11]

In the case of the Swiss, however, their confederate cantons very soon became recruiting grounds for foreign powers, supplying corps of hard-bitten mercenaries armed with cross-bow and handgun, as well as pike, to those prepared to pay for them. This led to the emergence of the Swiss as the pre-eminent infantry mercenaries in Renaissance Europe. Thereafter the Swiss *Reisläufer*, unlike the Athenian hoplite-citizen, stood alongside his kinsmen and neighbours on many a battlefield, and as a direct result the bonds of loyalty and comradeship for them would have been far more secure.[12]

II

In his work, the *Poroi*, Xenophon advocates that Athenian citizens should once again serve together in the ranks of the phalanx and not be lumped in with "Lydians, Phrygians, Syrians, and barbarians of all sorts" - a rhetorical point concerning Athens' reliance upon such foreigners, but the idea is clear all the same (**2.3, cf Isok. *Paneg.* 115**). As a former mercenary himself, Xenophon certainly appreciated the importance of small group cohesion. In the *Cyropaedia*, for instance, the theme crops up on a number of occasions. The first is when Cyrus is busy organizing and training his army and in doing so decides to allot each τάξις to its own tent and thus promote group cohesion within these units (**Xen. *Cyr.* 2.1.25-7**). In particular, Cyrus reasoned that "comradeship would be encouraged by their messing together and that they would be less likely to desert one another (ὠφελεῖσθαι αὐτῷ ὁμοῦ τρεφόμενοι καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἧττον ἀλλήλους ἐθέλειν ἀπολείπειν: **Xen. *Cyr.* 2.1.28**). In reality, this is exactly what Colonel Mike Hoare had in mind when he was organizing and training 5 Commando:

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[10] For the inscription, see: Petrakos B. *PAE*, (1984) 197-8 pl.122b #92. For the date of the attack on Lemnos, see: Wade-Gery H.T. *JHS 71*, (1951) 217. For other examples of Athenian hoplites mustering by tribes see: Lys. 13.79; Thuc. 6.98.4; Plut. *Arist.* 5; 19; Paus. 1.32.3; Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 42.1; Isaios 2.42; *IG* I^2.929; 931; 943.

[11] Oman C.W.C. *The Art of War in The Middle Ages*, Burt Franklin (NY 1924) II.256.

[12] The formidable Swiss pike block was in essence a local band of brothers, while their much hated rivals, the German *Landsknechts*, prided themselves on their proto-trade union solidarity.

> I insisted that junior leaders should form small messes, pool their C-rations, appoint one of their men as cook, forage for fresh vegetables and produce hot meals daily without fail. The result, in terms of morale-building alone, was rewarding and fostered that spirit of camaraderie and self-reliance which is the soul of small-unit warfare. The poor leader, on the other hand, who allows his men to open tins and scoop out unappetizing cold meals, of a sort, will wonder why his men are unhappy with their food. Their performance will suffer accordingly.[13]

The second reference to group cohesion occurs just prior to Cyrus' planned invasion of "Assyria". Having trained his army to a peak of perfection and fostered this idea of comradeship within each *τάξις*, Cyrus realises that the petty jealousies of his men will soon vanish once they are exposed to the harsh realities of the forthcoming campaign: "For he knew that common dangers make comrades kindly disposed toward one another" (*εἰδὼς ὅτι οἱ κοινοὶ κίνδυνοι φιλοφρόνως ποιοῦσιν ἔχειν τοὺς συμμάχους πρὸς ἀλλήλους*: **Xen. *Cyr.* 3.3.10, cf 58**). The final example is probably the most important and occurs during the battle of "Thymbrara". The King of Susa and ally of Cyrus, Abradatas, plunges into the fray and only his comrades choose to follow him in death and glory. The moral of the story is obvious as Xenophon is quick to point out:

> Now, it has been demonstrated on many occasions that there is no stronger phalanx than that which is composed of comrades that are close friends (*φίλων συμμάχων*); and it was shown to be true on this occasion. For it was only the personal friends and messmates (*ἑταῖροι...καὶ ὁμοτράπεζοι*) of Abradatas who pressed home the charge with him, while the rest of the charioteers, when they saw that the Egyptians with their dense throng withstood them, turned aside after the fleeing chariots [i.e. of the enemy] and pursued them (***Cyr.* 7.1.30**).[14]

It must be emphasized that Xenophon has clearly used the professional army of Sparta as the role model for Cyrus' invincible army, and not the typical Noah's ark army of the Persian Empire. Furthermore, there is little doubt that he has also drawn upon his own personal experiences as a mercenary in order to portray not only the tactics of Cyrus' army, but also the human dynamics of soldiering within its ranks, as we shall see below. The argument for small group cohesion, however, cannot be pressed too far when dealing with ancient Greek citizen-armies. The Spartans appear to have been the only Greeks to have broken their citizen-army down into manageable tactical units, the smallest of which, the *ἐνωμοτία* commanded by the *ἐνωμοτάρχος*, probably had a campaigning

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[13] *Congo Warriors*, Robert Hale (London 1991(B) 96-7.

[14] Cf Onasander *Strat.* 24.

strength of no more than thirty-five men (**Thuc. 5.66.3; Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.12,17; *Lak. Pol.* 11.4**).[15] On the other hand, there is no solid evidence to suggest that the Athenian and Theban armies, for example, contained units smaller than a λόχος, which, though the number varied from army to army, almost always contained at least several hundred men.

Nevertheless, there was at least one other truly professional unit that did exhibit this idea of small group cohension, even to the extent that the "buddy-buddy system" was very much in evidence within its ranks. The three hundred members of the Theban Sacred Band (*ἱερὸς* λόχος) first fought as a unit at the battle of Tegyra where they played a prominent part in the defeat of two Spartan morai (**Plut. *Pel.* 17.2-4; 19.3; Diod. 15.81.2**). Thereafter, the Sacred Band was always deployed as a unit in its own right, and it was in this role that it truly became a crack force. Tradition has it that the Sacred Band was made up of paired homosexual lovers and, in the words of Plutarch, "a band that is held together by the friendship between lovers is indissoluble and not to be broken, since the lovers are ashamed to play the coward before their beloved, and the beloved before their lovers, and both stand firm in danger to protect the other" (*...οἱ δὲ αἰσχυνόμενοι τοὺς ἐρῶντας ἐμμένωσι τοῖς δεινοῖ ὑπὲρ ἀλλήλων*: ***Pel.* 18.2**). Whether or not we are prepared to accept the real possibility that the Sacred Band was composed of one hundred and fifty homosexual couples, the fact remains that the basic bonding process between paired males (i.e. the "buddy-buddy system") is built upon mutual self-respect and a special kind of love that has nothing to do with sex or even idealism. Very few men have died in battle when the moment actually arrived for "God, Queen and Country", for example, or even for their homes and families; if they had any choice in the matter at all, they invariably chose to die for each other and for their own vision of themselves:

> This is going to sound really strange, but there is a love relationship that is nurtured in combat because the man next to you - you're depending on him for the most important thing you have, your life, and if he lets you down you're either maimed or killed. If you make a mistake the same thing happens to him, so the bond of trust has to be extremely close, and I'd say this bond is stronger than almost anything, with the exception of parent and child. It's a hell of a lot stronger than man and wife - your life is in his hands, you trust that person with the most valuable thing you have.[16]

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[15] Each Spartan lochos apparently consisted of 4 pentekostyes, each of these latter units being formed of 4 enomotiai. For the whole organisation of the Spartan Army and its problems, see especially: Lazenby J.F. *The Spartan Army*, Aris & Phillips (Warminster 1985) 5-10.

[16] Capt.John Early: ex-US Army, Vietnam; ex-mercenary, Rhodesia. Quoted by: Dyer op.cit.88.

The Sacred Band was to remain unbeaten until its complete and utter annihilation at the battle of Chaironeia, and even during this tragic final act the unit subbornly stood its ground because all three hundred members had decided to fight to the death (**Plut. *Pel.* 18.5, cf *Alex.* 9.2; Diod. 16.86.3**).[17]

At first sight the Ten Thousand appear to have been organised rather loosely into national contingents under the various commanders who had initially raised them. We can see this rather ad hoc unit organisation at the military review at Tyriaeion, for example, with "each strategos marshalling his own men" (*συντάξαι δ' ἕκαστον τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ*: **Xen. *An.* 1.2.15**), or again at Xen. *An.* 5.5.5, when each strategos marshalled his troops "nation by nation".[18] Likewise, when the army split into three contingents, we witness the ethnic solidarity of the Arkadians and Akhaians (**Xen. *An.* 6.2.16**). There is also the vague use of technical terms such as *τάξις*, which can either denote a unit of cavalry, or peltasts, or hoplites, or can even be used to describe the contingent commanded by a strategos (**Xen. *An.* 1.5.14; 4.3.22; 4.8; 5.23; 7.2; 7.3.15**).[19] In spite of this, however, there is persuasive evidence to suggest that the army of the Ten Thousand was also well organized and even articulated down into small manageable units. As a consequence of this, therefore, we can cogently argue that each unit developed its own cohesive spirit.

Firstly, the *λόχος* under its *λοχαγός* remains the prime tactical unit for the Ten Thousand throughout the *Anabasis*, and is the vehicle by which the majority of tactical manoeuvres were accomplished (**4.2.11,13,16; 6.6,7; 8.14; 5.2.11; 4.22**). Secondly, the size of this unit remains, with one exception, fairly constant throughout the *Anabasis*, i.e. a unit of about one hundred hoplites. For example, at *An.* 4.8.15 we are told by Xenophon that the army now consisted of eighty lochoi of hoplites, with "each lochos numbering close upon one hundred".[20] The one notable exception to this appears to be when Xenophon gives the combined strengths of two lochoi from Meno's contingent as a hundred hoplites (***An.* 1.2.25**).[21] Thirdly, and more importantly, there are indications that the Ten Thousand had adopted at some point a quasi-Spartan system of unit organisation with the

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[17] Beneath the Lion of Chaironeia were discovered 254 skeletons laid out in 7 rows. Was this the final resting place for these diehard warriors of Thebes?

[18] One exception was to be the review inside Byzantion when the Ten Thousand formed up 8 deep with the men acting as their own marshals (**Xen. *An.* 7.1.23**). This does suggest, at the very least, that each hoplite knew his place within the phalanx. In addition, there was a point when the Ten Thousand saw the need for a single commander (*αὐτοκράτορα*) instead of leadership by committee; the general consensus was that one man could "handle the army better" (**Xen. *An.* 6.1.18**).

[19] The latter can also be described as a *στρατεύμα* (**Xen. *An.* 4.1.6**), or as *ἀμφὶ τινά* (**Xen. *An.* 4.3.21,22**).

[20] Cf at the first assembly of strategoi and lochagoi after Cunaxa we are told these amounted in number to about 100 (**Xen. *An.* 3.1.33, cf 2.5.30; 3.1.47**).

[21] Cf Xen. *An.* 4.7.8-9, where the combat strength of the lochos of Kallimachos the Parrhasian is given at about 70 men. However, battle losses might easily account for this figure.

articulation of its lochoi down into smaller tactical units. At Xen. *An.* 3.4.21-3 the strategoi collectively decide to reorganize their formation of march, for the hollow square first suggested by Xenophon was proving to be a little too cumbersome (**Xen. *An.* 3.4.19-20, cf 2.36**). We are told, as a result of this reorganisation, that the rearguard was now formed of six lochoi each of a hundred men and commanded by a lochagos, "adding also pentekonteres and enomotarchs" (*καὶ ἄλλους πεντηκοντῆρας καὶ ἄλλους ἐνωμοτάρχους*). The addition of these junior officers to the command structure of the lochos' organisation[22] strongly suggest that each lochos now consisted of two pentekostyes (@ fifty men each), with each of the latter consisting of two enomotiai (@ twenty-five men each).[23]

In *An.* 4.3.26 Xenophon mentions the *ἐνωμοτίαι* again, but this time we can actually see them in operation upon the battlefield. The Ten Thousand have reached the Kentrites, the river that separates Armenia and the land of the Kardouchians, only to find their way forward blocked by the forces of Orontas, the satrap of Armenia, and their rear under threat from the Kardouchians, a fierce and independent race of mountain people. Caught between an anvil and a hammer, the army is quickly divided into two divisons, Cheirisophos to take the lead with his division and attempt a crossing of the river while Xenophon's division is to remain behind and act as the rearguard. Xenophon now orders his lochagoi to deploy their lochoi by enomotiai, "moving each enomotia by the left into line of battle; then the lochagoi and the enomotarchs were to face towards the Kardouchians and station file closers on the side next to the river" (*παρ' ἀσπίδα παραγαγόντας τὴν ἐνωμοτίαν ἐπὶ φάλαγγος· καὶ τοὺς μὲν λοχαγοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἐνωμοταρχους πρὸς τῶν Καρδούχων ἰέναι, οὐραγοὺς δὲ καταστήσασθαι πρὸς τοῦ ποταμοῦ*). It sounds all very efficient and somewhat Spartan in its concept. Indeed, once the rearguard is deployed the Kardouchians advance to the attack, and Xenophon now orders his men to hold their charge until the sling-stones reach them and their "shields rang". When the enemy turn to flight,[24] Xenophon continues, the *σαλπικτής* will sound the charge in order to deceive the enemy, at which time the men were to face to the right and follow their

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[22] The lochagos also had under him a second-in-command (*ὑπολοχαγός*: **Xen. *An.* 5.2.13**). In addition, we should take note of the fact that, in the rearguard at least, the lochagoi would rotate the position of "officer of the day" (*τῶν ὀπισθοφυλάκων λοχαγῶν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ*: **Xen. *An.* 4.7.8**).

[23] Cf *Cyr.* 2.1.22, where Xenophon gives the small unit organization of Cyrus the Great's new model army: (i) 5 men = *πεμπάς* under a *πεμπάδαρχος*; (ii) 10 men = *δεκάς* under a *δεκάδαρχος*; (iii) 50 men = *λόχος* under a *λοχαγός*; (iv) 100 men = *τάξις* under a *ταξίαρχος*. We can see an earlier parallel in the real life organisation of the New Kingdom Egyptian armies: (i) 10 men under a "Greatest of Ten"; (ii) 50 men under a "Greatest of Fifty"; (iii) 250 men – *Sa*.

[24] Xenophon actually tells us that the Kardouchians were not equipped for "hand-to-hand combat" (*πρὸς δὲ τὸ εἰς χεῖρας*: ***An.* 4.3.31**).

οὐραγοί at the double, but in formation, across the river. Like clockwork, events went according to Xenophon's plan (***An.* 4.3.27-34**).

Unfortunately, there is no concrete evidence to suggest that the rest of the army's lochoi were organized in the same quasi-Spartan fashion as the six that formed its rearguard under Xenophon. Nevertheless, the fact remains that all these lochoi, when compared with those lochoi that usually made up a city-state army, were small tactical units in their own right. In a couple of general references, moreover, Xenophon does indicate that lochos members messed together in small groups: (i) Klearetos, a lochagos from an unspecified congingent, and his messmates (*οἱ ξύσκηνοι αὐτοῦ*) plan a night raid upon a local stronghold with the intention to secure booty and then desert the army (**Xen. *An.* 5.7.14-5**); (ii) Xenophon orders a muleteer to unload his messmates' (*τῶν συσκήνων*) baggage so that the mule can be used to carry a sick man (**Xen. *An.* 5.8.6**). In the light of this evidence alone, therefore, it appears that the unit morale of each and every lochos within the army of the Ten Thousand was strengthened through the ties of close camaraderie that undoubtedly existed between unit members who slept, ate and fought together.

III

The process of military training is designed as much to inculcate the group cohesion and solidarity upon which fighting spirit depends as it is to produce an adequate level of fitness or tactical expertise. Bonding is fostered early through a number of means. Firstly, there is oath taking, a ritual which goes back at least to the *sacramentum*, the Roman military oath. It is worth noting here that the ancient Greek word "*ἐνωμοτία*" means something like "sworn-band"[25] and, in particular, a new member of the Theban Sacred Band was expected to make an oath to Eros, vowing to die a glorious death in preference to a dishonourable and reprehensible life (**Ath. 13.561f**).[26] Secondly, individuality can be assailed by a hair-cut which today is at best short and at worst - like the French Foreign Legion's *boule-à-zéro* - totally comprehensive.[27] Although such *coiffures* are often defended on the grounds

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[25] Cf the word "*ἐνώμοτος*" = "a man bound by oath".

[26] To an ancient Greek, an individual's vow to a particular deity was normally a straightforward proposal of a bargain. For example, the oath could take the following form: "Deliver me from danger, and I vow to sacrifice to you." Likewise, there are similar examples of military oaths made collectively by soldiers: (i) after Cunaxa the Ten Thousand, on a motion of Xenophon, vowed to Zeus Soter that they would sacrifice thank-offerings for deliverance as soon as they reached a friendly land (**Xen. *An.* 3.2.9**); (ii) the Athenians prior to Arginousai make a collective vow to Zeus, Apollo and Erinyes, asking them for victory (**Diod. 13.102.2**); (iii) a mid-5th century BC inscription describes the vow of the citizens of Selinous to dedicate to certain deities in the event of victory in an impending war (***SIG*³ 1122**); (iv) the Hellenic League vowed to make a tithe for Apollo at Delphi if victorious against the Persians (**Hdt. 7.132**). See especially: Pritchett W.K. *The Greek State at War, Vol.III*, University of California Press (Berkeley & LA 1979) 327-31.

[27] E.g. the British Army's *Manual of Military Law*, Section 99: "The hair of the head will be kept short. The chin and underlip will be shaven. Whiskers if worn will be of a moderate length." To grow the latter, I might add, also requires your CO's permission.

that they promote hygiene,[28] their prime justification is that they create a uniformity of appearance. Indeed, the fashion for establishing this identity by cropping hair close to the scalp is comparatively recent. For many years long hair, elaborately arranged, was the hallmark of the warrior. Eighteenth century soldiers, for example, squinted under the strain of having their hair caught back into pigtails. Thirdly, there is the issue of uniform, a dress with symbolism all of its own. The identity of appearance that it helps to create assists the bonding process. Today, the badges of rank which accompany it emphasize the hierarchial structure of armies and encourage deference and due respect. For centuries it also included features clearly designed to make its wearer look broader or taller, and to promote the soldier's status in the eyes of comrades, civilians and the enemy alike. Uniform, in short, helps to foster a unit's identity and to strengthen the all-important bonds of comradeship between its members.

The army of Agesilaos at Koroneia is described by Xenophon as being "one solid mass of bronze and scarlet" (*ὡς ἅπαντα μὲν χαλκόν, ἅπαντα δὲ φοινικᾶ φαίνεσθαι*: ***Ages.* 2.7**). During this period the hoplite generally did not wear the bronze bell-corslet common to his archaic predecessor; he wore instead the lighter and more flexible linen corslet. Nevertheless, "bronze" could easily refer to either the bronze helmet,[29] or the bronze greaves, or the bronze facing of the hoplite shield or, as seems more likely, the overall effect produced by these bronze pieces of equipment when the Spartan phalanx was viewed as a whole. This would be especially so when we consider that prior to any battle the Spartans were ordered to polish their arms, which would have included their bronze-faced shields and bronze helmets (***Lak. Pol.* 13.8**). The term "scarlet", on the other hand, undoubtedly refers both to the Spartiate's linen tunic (*χιτών*) and to the Spartan military cloak (*φοινικίς*) he wore. It is Plutarch who informs us that the Spartans wore the scarlet uniform for a number of interrelated reasons: (i) it was a manly hue; (ii) it hid any loss of blood; (iii) and the actual colour struck terror in "the minds of the inexperienced" (*τοῖς ἀπείροις*: ***Mor.* 238f, cf Schol. Ar. *Ach.* 319**). Terror was undoubtedly struck in the minds of Sparta's enemies when they caught sight of the *lambdas* borne upon the shields of the Spartiates. This is the implication made by Xenophon when he describes how a Spartan cavalry officer, on seeing hoplites from Sparta's ally, Sikyon, being trounced by the Argives, dismounted his troop and, taking the shields from the Sikyonians, led some volunteers against the enemy on foot. The Argives, meanwhile, seeing the *sigmas* on the advancing

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[28] Cf Colonel Mike Hoare's views upon this sacred subject: "Beards rob a man of that feeling of super-cleanliness which comes from a good daily shave, the greatest morale-builder known to military science" - op.cit.(1991(B)) 49. In particular, the Colonel despised the Belgian mercenaries of his earlier Katanga days (i.e. 1961), *le plus affreux des affreux*, who donned sloppy dress and sported three day's growth of beard as a matter of course. "Fancy dress", as he called it, was his enemy and a decent soldierly appearance his foremost demand, and to the Colonel, therefore, these Belgians were no more than "a gang of ruffians, unkempt and ill-disciplined" - op.cit.(1991(A)) 68, cf 173.

[29] Cf Thucydides when he implies that the Spartans at Sphakteria wore helmets made of felt (*πῖλοι*: **4.34.3**).

shields, "did not fear these opponents at all, thinking that they were Sikyonians" (**Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.10**). It had been a different story at Mantineia, for the Argives had hardly waited to cross spears with the Spartans, but had promptly broken, some of them even being trampled underfoot by their own comrades in the rush to escape the battlefield (**Thuc. 5.72.4**).

No less than a uniform, and no less of a distinctly Spartan trait was the long hair grown specifically for its military function. The author of the *Lak. Pol.* imparts that one of the "laws of Lykourgos" not only permitted Spartiates to wear the red military cloak, but also to wear their hair long, the belief being that by doing so it would make them "look taller, more dignified and more terrifying" (*καὶ μείζους ἂν καὶ ἐλευθεριωτέρους καὶ γοργοτέρους φαίνεσθαι*: **11.3, cf 13.9; Plut. *Mor.* 189e; 230b**). Apparently, according to Herodotos, it was immediately after Sparta's victory over Argos at the "Battle of the Champions" that a law was passed which instructed Spartans to keep their hair long as a matter of militaristic pride (**1.82**). Whether or not we choose to believe in the historical truth of the "Battle of the Champions" is irrelevant here; the point is that the Spartans universally wore their hair long and took great pride in the fact that they did so (***Lak. Pol.* 13.8; Arist. *Rh.* 1367a27-31; Hdt. 7.208; Plut. *Lys.* 1.1**). They also valued their red military cloaks, so much so that, if we are to believe Plutarch, they were even buried with them (***Lyk.* 27.1**). Finally, in the Wadsworth Atheneum, Hartford, Connecticut, there is a bronze statuette of a Spartan - this is suggested by the fact that the warrior sports long hair and wears a cloak - wearing a Corinthian helmet with an unusual transverse crest. The positioning of the crest may be a badge of rank and thus denotes its wearer as an officer.

The Spartans were not the only professionals to use such military icons in order to promote unit identity and thus instil a feeling of elitism amongst unit members. The army of Agesilaos at Koroneia also included the Cyreans (**Xen. *Ages.* 2.11**) and, therefore, these also formed part of the "solid mass of bronze and scarlet". Indeed, Xenophon actually confirms the fact that the Ten Thousand had a common uniform much like that of the Spartans. In his description of the military review at Tyriaeion he informs us that "the Greeks all had helmets of bronze, scarlet tunics, and greaves, and carried their shields uncovered"[30] (*εἶχον δὲ πάντες κράνη χαλκᾶ καὶ χιτῶνας φοινικοῦς καὶ κνημῖδας καὶ τὰς ἀσπίδας ἐκκεκαλυμμένας*: ***An.* 1.2.16**). In addition, there is some evidence to suggest that these hoplite-mercenaries also wore a cloak, though whether or not it was the red military cloak of the Spartans we are not told (**Xen. *An.* 4.3.17; 4.12; 5.19**). Nevertheless, along with their obvious show of discipline (*τὴν τάξιν*), the brilliant appearance (*τὴν λαμπρότητα*)

[30] Off the battlefield, a campaigning hoplite would protect his bronze-faced shield with a leather covering. Incidentally, non-bronze hoplite body-armour is mentioned in the *Anabasis*, e.g. 4.1.18 = leather jerkin (*σπολάς*); 7.4.16 = linen corslets (*θώρακες*).

of the hoplite-mercenaries was enough to inflict sheer terror on both Cyrus' native troops and innocent bystanders alike (**Xen. *An.* 1.2.19**).[31] The same effect, according to Diodoros, was to be repeated again at the battle of Cunaxa. For, as the Ten Thousand struck up the paean and ran into contact, the Persians were immediately rattled "by the splendour of their arms and by the skill they displayed" (*τῶν ὅπλων λαμπρότητι καὶ ταῖς εὐχειρίαις*: **14.23.3, cf Xen. *An.* 1.8.18-9**).[32]

Soldierly pride also plays an important part in fostering and promoting a warrior's fighting spirit. Haranguing the troops prior to one engagement, Xenophon asks the Ten Thousand to remember how many battles they had won "by coming to close-quarters" (***An.* 6.5.23**). Here, Xenophon is appealing to the pride of each individual soldier by reminding them of their obvious martial superiority over that of their enemies. In the same pre-battle speech, he also offers each and everyone of them the chance of achieving immortal glory "through some manly and noble thing (*ἀνδρεῖόν τι καὶ καλὸν*) which one may say or do today" on the coming field of battle (***An.* 6.5.24**). Individual pride is also translated into collective pride - what the British Army aptly calls "*regimental pride*" - and the Ten Thousand also exhibit this all-important tribal spirit as the following episode demonstrates. At one point in the *Anabasis*, some of the mercenaries decide to join a local Mossynoecian raiding party, not under orders from the strategoi, but purely on their own initiative with a view to securing booty for themselves. Unfortunately, these free enterprising mercenaries, along with the Mossynoecians, are put to flight during an attempt to storm a nearby stockade and as a consequence the rest of the Ten Thousand are exceedingly angry, not because the enemy had been heartened by their action, but because their comrades had taken to their heels: "A thing which they had never done before in the course of the expedition" (**Xen. *An.* 5.4.16-8**). In other words, the honour of the "regiment" had been soiled. In an obvious attempt to play down this set-back and thus restore "regimental pride", Xenophon calls a soldier-assembly and before it analyses the defeat:

> Those among them who took little thought of the battle formation we use (*τῆς ξὺν ἡμῖν τάξεως*) and got the idea that they could accomplish the same results in company with the barbarians as they could with us, have paid the penalty, - another time they will be less likely to leave our ordered lines (...*τῆς ἡμετέρας τάξεως ἀπολείψονται*: ***An.* 5.4.20**).

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[31] Compare the climax of the Imperial review in Kipling's "Her Majesty's Servants", *The Jungle Book* (1899) 272: "The line grew and grew till it was three-quarters of a mile long - one solid wall of men, horses, and guns. Then it came on straight towards the Viceroy and the Amir...Unless you had been there, you cannot imagine what a fightening effect this steady come-down of troops has on the spectators, even when they know it is only a review." But here of course "the advance stopped dead" before the Amir had done more than "pick up the reins on his horse's neck and looked behind him."

[32] Incidentally, Diodoros also adds here that the Persians were protected by small shields and equipped with light weapons (*ὅπλοις τε μικροῖς...ψιλικά*: **14.23.4**).

Xenophon finishes by simply refering to these fools as nothing but a "disorderly mass" (*τοῖς ἀτάκτοις*: ***An.* 5.4.21, cf *Hipp.* 2.7-9**).

In the *Anabasis,* Xenophon also implies there existed within the army a friendly rivalry between individual lochagoi. Talking about four of his own lochagoi during a particularly difficult assault upon a Taochian stronghold, Xenophon imparts that "all four were rivals in valour (*ἀρετῆς*) and continually striving with one another" (***An.* 4.7.11-2**). This competitive and professional spirit undoubtedly permeated throughout their respective lochoi and the wise strategos was able to exploit the resultant unit rivalry and thereby put it to good effect upon the battlefield. On laying his plans for a difficult assault upon a stockade belonging to the Drilae tribe, for example, Xenophon commands each of his lochagoi to deploy his lochos "in the way he thought it would fight most effectively (*οἴηται ἀγωνιεῖσθαι*); for near one another were the lochagoi who had all the time been vying with one another in valour" (**Xen. *An.* 5.2.11, cf 15**). As a result of this order, each lochagos and his second-in-command formed up their lochos in such a fashion that they themselves and "those among the men who claimed to be not inferior to them in bravery" (*οἱ ἀξιοῦντες τούτων μὴ χείρους εἶναι*) were all grouped together in the line and, moreover, watching one another" (**Xen. *An.* 5.2.13**).

There is, however, a darker side to this concept of corporate spirit, namely its brutal ability to inspire the fostering and infliction of deliberate cruelty. The use of "improper violence" commonly occurs when the behaviour of a close-knit group of soldiers becomes impersonal and callous. The Ten Thousand, in particular, happily butchered one prisoner in front of another's eyes so as to encourage him to act as their guide (**Xen. *An.* 4.1.23, cf 6.2-3**). In an earlier grisly incident, they had spontaneously mutilated the bodies of the dead so as to inspire the utmost terror in the enemy (**Xen. *An.* 3.4.5**). Again, we have Herodotos' record of the tragic fate of the sons of Phanes after the Halikarnassian mercenary-captain had deserted Amasis' cause for that of Kambyses'. Falling into the hands of the hoplite-mercenaries their father formerly commanded, Phanes' sons were soon to become the victims of a macabre pre-battle sacrifice (**Hdt. 3.11**). When measured by humanitarian standards, the impropriety of such actions obviously shock. On the other hand, we must not forget that a group of fighting soldiers will often find themselves in circumstances of extreme personal danger and, as a direct result, the corporate mood of that group will be governed by its own rough-and-ready code of justice - alas, often by its own group ethics. In situations of life and death, therefore, ordinary soldiers do not think of themselves as subordinate members of whatever formal military organization it is to which authority has assigned them, but as equals within a closely bound group.

IV

There is a distinct mental frontier between a man of peace and a man of war and, as such, the hoplite-mercenary can be viewed as a polis outsider. But unlike Isokrates and his ilk, we should resist the easy temptation to look upon hoplite-mercenaries as just a mere collection of desperate and brutish itinerant men. On the other hand, when either Klearchos or Xenophon choose to stand before the soldier-assembly, for example, and then address the troops as "fellow soldiers" (ὦ ἄνδρες στρατιῶται: **e.g. Xen. *An.* 1.3.3,9; 5.5.8; 6.4.12; 6.12; 7.1.25**) they are being far more realistic and down to earth. By using this form of address, they are emphasizing that each and every one of them is an individual member of a society of professional soldiers and, being so, should take pride and strength from the fact.

We began by discussing how the high morale of the Ten Thousand enabled it successfully to dominate the battlefield, and how this fighting spirit had its roots in the bonds of comradeship that existed between soldiers who faced the constant dangers and hardships of professional soldiering. Moreover, we have seen how this spirit of camaraderie derives from the concept of small group cohesion, which certainly existed within the ranks of the Ten Thousand just as it did in any other professional army of the period, e.g. the Spartan army in particular, from which the Ten Thousand drew some of its inspirations.

The experience of professional soldiering and the close-knit bonds that it obviously formed, this is what qualifies the hoplite-mercenary's separateness from city-state society. In his *Life of Timoleon*, Plutarch records how the hoplite-mercenaries of two contending armies would often visit each other during a truce or during their off-duty hours and, in doing so, would spend the time fishing and conversing. Such men, who constantly risked their lives in battle, "had no reason for private hatred of each other" (**Plut. *Tim.* 20.2-3**).[33] In the same vein, Machiavelli noted that as soon as a man becomes a soldier he adopts attitudes and manners quite at odds with those of civilian life. Through an inversion of ideals the soldier signals his entry into a separate way of life.

[33] Interestingly, the Duke of Sully's *Memoirs* record that at the battle of Dreaux in 1562 "the Swiss soldiers of the two armies meeting, bullied each other with their pikes lowered without striking a blow."

8 *SITUATION VACANT*

Mercenaries Needed Now!

Soldier-of-Fortune advert, spring 1976

Colonel Faucitt scoured Europe for mercenaries. Colonel Faucitt, like so many colonels and captains involved in the hiring of mercenaries both before and after him, was an Englishman. What made our particular colonel rather different, however, from all the others was that the impeccable Faucitt was the official mercenary recruiting agent for His Majesty's Government.

There is something hypocritical about the occasional condemnations of mercenary activity issued by various British governments over the past three decades or so. British governments have always employed mercenaries when it suited their best interests, and indeed, do so even now. But at no time was their need for mercenaries more desperate, it seemed to the government of the day, than at the outbreak of the American War of Independence. The American rebels, they feared, could deploy 50,000 citizen volunteers into the field, whereas the whole of the King's Army numbered only 30,000 men and roughly half of that strength was, as so often in British history, permanently tied down by garrison duties in Ireland. In the summer of 1775 the first disastrous news of British defeats reached London; and His Majesty's Government began, discreetly, to panic.

Initially, the powers that be had hoped to hire no less than 20,000 Russian mercenaries to redeem the military situation. The British Ambassador in St. Petersburg was certain that in view of Catherine the Great's intimate affection for the British he could reckon upon a strong body of Her Imperial Majesty's infantry. London was delighted to hear it. It seemed a God-sent solution to all the government's military and manpower problems. As soon as the Ambassador's news reached the Cabinet, messages went out from London to America, promising the jittery British generals cooped up in Boston and elsewhere that this massive reinforcement of fearsome mercenaries from Tartary would definitely be sailing from the Baltic ports the following spring; and from London to St. Petersburg, with instructions to the Ambassador to offer the Empress seven pounds sterling per capita levy money, half to be paid at once and half when the 20,000 hired sons of Holy Mother Russia had actually embarked on the ships of the Royal Navy. Britain's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs' reply to the Ambassador in St. Petersburg informed him that expense was not so much an object as in ordinary cases. In other words His Majesty's Government was desperate enough to pay almost any price the Russian Empress might demand. Rumours of the most massive and outlandish mercenary deal ever suggested in British history spread all over the capital that autumn. "When the Russians

arrive," the author, Gibbon, wrote conversationally to a friend, "will you go and see their camp?"[1] Clearly he was looking forward to a spectacle of barbaric splendour such as many a mercenary-hiring Byzantine emperor would have witnessed in Constantinople, but such as no English scribbler could have dared hope to view in London.

In the rebellious colonies, meanwhile, fear of the Slavic hordes and the utter indignation at the threat of employing mercenaries at all against free-born citizens were growing. "He has plundered our seas, ravaged our coasts, burnt our towns and destroyed the lives of our people," as the American Declaration of Independence was later to put it. "He" - he being of course George III, the colonists' legimate sovereign - "is at the moment transporting large armies of foreign mercenaries to complete the works of death, desolations and tyranny already begun, with the circumstances of cruelty and perfidy scarcely paralleled in the most barbarous ages, totally unworthy the head of a civilized nation."[2]

In the end all was anticlimax. The Russian soldiery never reached the colonies, and the first ever clash between Russians and Americans failed to occur. Indeed, they failed even to reach England's fabled shores.[3] Catherine the Great delivered an elegant snub via the discomfited Ambassador to King George III, refusing to hire out a single Imperial soldier, on the grounds of principle despite the generous cash offer, simply to calm a rebellion that was not being supported by any foreign power.

Next the British government, barely daunted, tried the Dutch, hoping for more sympathy from a close ally and fellow colonial power. In particular they wanted to hire the Scots Brigade, formed over one hundred and fifty years earlier and still in the service of the United Provinces. The States General, the Dutch parliament, met to consider the British government's request. Two of the Provinces were very much in favour, one - the Province of Holland itself - very much against. Finally the States General agreed to hire out the Scots Brigade[4] on the condition that it was not used outside Europe. This was therefore a disguised refusal. It was less offensive to the British government than Catherine the Great's scathingly direct comments, but it was no more helpful. So with a certain reluctance the government turned to the traditional recruiting-ground for mercenaries in Europe, the one which charged the most extortionate rates, Germany, and to Germany in late 1775 despatched

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[1] Gibbon E. *Private Letters*, (ed.) Prothero (London 1896).

[2] "Declaration of Independence 4 July 1776", *Revised Statutes of the United States* (1878).

[3] An interesting foot-note to this episode is the famous legend that Imperial Russian soldiers were transported from Archangel to Leith, in 1914, and then carried south by train, ultimately to aid the Allied effort on the Western Front. See especially: Terraine J. *The Smoke and the Fire*, (London 1980) 21, quoting *The Times* of 08 Sept.1914.

[4] By this date the Scots Brigade, though still Scottish-officered, was composed of mercenaries from all over Europe.

Colonel Faucitt. But even there his first approaches encountered only rebuffs. The Elector of Saxony, Augustus the Strong, refused point-blank; so did all the Catholic princes. Charles Augustus of Saxe-Weimar, though only nineteen years old, also rejected an open offer for the use of some of his battalions.

Colonel Faucitt, finally, managed to hire a few hundred infantry from his Most Serene Highness the Hereditary Count of Hanau, 4,000 foot and three hundred dragoons from His Most Serene Highness the Duke of Brunswick, a spendthrift who needed the money, and above all - his real triumph - no less than 12,000 foot, four hundred Jägers armed with rifles, three hundred dismounted dragoons, three batteries of cannon and four major-generals from His Most Serene Highness the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel. The Hessian soldiery were the finest and best disciplined in Germany and equal to those of Prussia, which were usually considered the European *élite* of their day: the Landgrave, a lout but a cultured lout, took a special pride in the turn out of his crack regiments, and as usual, pride in appearance was matched by pride in performance. To obtain Hessian troops was the most important part of Colonel Faucitt's mission. But negotiations were long and hard, and the mercenary contract with the Landgrave was not signed till New Year's Eve.

Under its terms the Landgrave received twenty per cent more levy money per head than the Duke of Brunswick, a double annual subsidy for the duration of the campaign,[5] and the right to provide his own hospital and his own uniforms at Britain's expense. He revived a scandalous claim for 41,000 pounds sterling owing for medical bills incurred in "the late war": the Landgraves of Hesse-Cassel had first hired troops to the British in 1702 and had continued, at more exorbitant rates, to do so ever since. Finally he insisted that British pay should be paid into the Hessian treasury rather than directly to his own troops. As the British rate of pay was somewhat higher than the Hessian rate of pay, the reason for this was only too obvious - the Landgrave intended to pocket the difference himself. Colonel Faucitt rather feebly urged that the Hessians in the field should be paid as much as the British. He was quietly informed by the Landgrave that they were his own troops and, as such, he would treat them as he saw fit.

It was agreed that the Hessian soldiers should march for the embarkation ports on 15 February 1776; and throughout Europe and England it was confidently expected that, with the arrival of these highly professional troops in America, the amateurish rebellion of the upstart colonists would immediately and without further ado be crushed. Indeed the British Prime Minister, Lord North, proudly told a packed House of Commons that "in all human probability their mere appearance on the scene would induce the rebels to submit, probably without the need to shed any further blood at

[5] Subsidy money was an additional "sweetener" paid to mercenary contractors, which is what rulers who hired their soldiery out in effect were and still are.

all."[6] Rarely can such a misjudgement had been made by any British prime minister before or since, as history went on to prove.[7]

I

One of the favourite methods of obtaining hoplite-mercenaries was that of recruiting directly through diplomatic channels and by means of political influence and interest. A state or ruler that needed mercenaries would procure them from a friendly power that controlled a source of supply. This arrangement can be seen in operation from the very beginning of our period. The Saïte prince and future pharaoh of Egypt, Psammetichos, almost certainly obtained his Carian and East Greek hoplite-mercenaries from Gyges of Lydia - the political motives behind this deal will be dealt with in the next chapter. Peisistratos, having an Argive wife, managed to secure 1,000 mercenaries from Argos (***Ath. Pol.* 15.2; 17.4**).[8] In an attempt to prop up their tottering regime, the Thirty Tyrants of Athens raised 1,000 hoplite-mercenaries through the aid of their political and financial backers, Sparta (**Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.30,43**). Indeed, the Spartans appear to have had some influence over the traffic of hoplite-mercenaries from the Peloponnese and, as a consequence, the friends and allies of Sparta profited by being able to engage Peloponnesian mercenaries when necessary (**e.g. Thuc. 1.60; 3.109; 4.52.2; 76.3; 7.19.4; 58.3, cf 3.85.2-3**). Again, we will discuss the political implications of all this later. Although Sparta was eventually to extend her control over the supply and demand of Greek mercenaries to friendly powers during the first-quarter of the fourth century BC (**e.g. Diod. 14.44.2**), there was now increased competition from the Persian and Egyptian employers of Greek mercenaries. Both the Great King himself and his satraps, and his disaffected subjects used the city-states unscrupulously as suppliers of mercenary armies and strategoi, so that the best Greek commanders of their day are to been seen fighting for one eastern power against another, sometimes with soldiers sent officially by their mother-cities (**Diod. 14.39.1; 15.29.2-4; 90.2; 92.2; 16.22.1-2; 34.1-2; 44.1-3**). Perhaps the classic example of the use of diplomacy to corner the market for hoplite-mercenaries is that of Artaxerxes II. His notorious "King's Peace" of 375 BC was nothing but a direct attempt to settle the inter-city-state wars of the Greeks in order that hoplites might be released to serve as mercenaries in his own army (**Diod. 15.38.1, cf 41.1**).

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[6] Speech 04 Feb.1776, *Parl.Hist.*xix 172-4.

[7] This policy of hiring mercenary troops to suppress their own rebellious compatriots ended in total failure for the British with the surrender of the Hessians at the battles of Trenton and at Saratoga Springs, and the desertion of no less than 5,000 German mercenaries in all - they went to swell the ranks of German settlers already established in the 13 colonies.

[8] Herodotos also reports that Peisistratos hired mercenaries from Argos as well as receiving additional men and matériel from Lygdamis of Naxos (**1.61**).

When recruiting was not backed by diplomacy, the standard method was to despatch or hire recruiting officers (*ξενολόγοι*) to localities from which mercenaries were to be found or raised. Dion, for example, secretly collected the small mercenary army for his desperate Sicilian adventure through "the agency of others" (*ἐξενολόγει*: **Plut. *Dion* 22.3**). In recruiting mercenaries for his own adventure, Cyrus the Younger also sought to disguise his aims (*ἐπικρυπτόμενος*: **Xen. *An.* 1.1.6**). To this end, therefore, he had various agents recruit for several different supposed projects: (i) his Ionian garrison commanders were instructed to recruit locally in Ionia[9] as many suitable Peloponnesian hoplites who presented themselves, "on the plea that Tissaphernes had designs on their cities" (*ὡς ἐπιβουλεύοντος Τισσαφέρνους ταῖς πόλεσι*: **Xen. *An.* 1.1.6**); (ii) Klearchos was given money to recruit and fight in the Thracian Chersonese, an area he knew well as the former harmost and tyrant of Byzantion (**Xen. *An.* 1.1.9**); (iii) Cyrus asked two *ξένοι* of his, Sokrates the Akhaian and Sophainetos the Stymphalian, to recruit men as he "intended to make war on Tissaphernes with the aid of the Milesian exiles" (*ὡς πολεμήσων Τισσαφέρνει σὺν τοῖς φυγάσι τοῖς Μιλησίων*: **Xen. *An.* 1.1.11, cf 7**); (iv) he instructed another *ξένος*, Proxenos the Boiotian, to come to him with as many men as he could raise, "saying that he wished to undertake a campaign against the Pisidians" (*ὡς ἐς Πισίδας βουλόμενος στρατεύεσθαι*: **Xen. *An.* 1.1.11**).

Cyrus' mercenary army thus grew. Out of this he was able to loan Aristippos of Larisa 4,000 hoplite-mercenaries for a campaign in Thessaly against the latter's political opponents: "Thus the army in Thessaly, again, was being secretly maintained for him" (*οὕτω δὲ αὖ τὸ ἐν Θετταλίᾳ ἐλάνθανεν αὐτῷ τρεφόμενον στράτευμα*: **Xen. *An.* 1.1.10**). Aristippos was later to return only 1,000 of these hoplites, plus five hundred peltasts, under the command of Meno the Thessalian (**Xen. *An.* 1.2.6**). Meanwhile Xenias the Parrhasian, a commander already in Cyrus' service, as was Pasion the Megarian, brought to Sardis the 4,000 Peloponnesian hoplite-mercenaries that had been raised in Ionia by the Prince's garrison commanders; a skeleton force having been left there so as to maintain a presence in the Ionian cities during Cyrus' forthcoming absence (**Xen. *An.* 1.2.1,3**). In addition to these, Pasion also brought the three hundred hoplite-mercenaries and three hundred peltasts he had commanded during the siege of Miletos (**Xen. *An.* 1.2.3, cf 2**). At the same time, three of Cyrus' *ξένοι*, Sophainetos, Sokrates and Proxenos, produced a total of 3,000 hoplite-mercenaries between them and, in addition to these, the Boiotian had also raised five hundred light-armed troops as part of his contingent (**Xen. *An.* 1.2.3**). A month or so later at Celaenae, Klearchos arrived from the Thracian Chersonese with 1,000 hoplite-mercenaries, eight hundred Thracian peltasts, two hundred Cretan bowman and forty Thracian cavalry (**Xen. *An.* 1.2.9; 5.13**). During this time, Cyrus also

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[9] For the sound argument that these mercenaries were recruited in Ionia and not the Peloponnese, see especially: Roy J. "The Mercenaries of Cyrus", *Historia 16* (1967) 297-8.

received into his army three hundred hoplite-mercenaries commanded by Sosis the Syracusan (**Xen. *An.* 1.2.9**).[10] Finally at Issus, Cyrus was to receive two more mercenary contingents for his Greek army, one of which was expected while the other was not. Cyrus had asked Sparta to aid him in his enterprise (more of which later) and, in response to this request, the Spartans had despatched to the Prince seven hundred hoplite-mercenaries - undoubtedly Peloponnesian - under the command of the Spartiate, Cheirisophos (**Xen. *An.* 1.4.3, cf 2.21**). The surprise contingent, on the other hand, was composed of four hundred hoplites who had recently been *δορυφόροι* in the service of Abrokomas, the satrap of Phoenicia (**Xen. *An.* 1.4.3**).

Cyrus' hoplite-mercenaries[11] were thus recruited from the following localities:

(1) Mainland Greece:	Proxenos'	1,500 hoplites[12]
	Cheirisophos'	700 Peloponnesian hoplites
(2) Thracian Chersonese:	Klearchos'	1,000 hoplites[13]
(3) Asia Minor:[14]	Xenias'	4,000 Peloponnesian hoplites + garrisons in Ionia
	Pasion's	300 hoplites
	Meno's	1,000 hoplites
	Aristippos'	3,000 hoplites - in Thessaly
(4) Unknown:	Sophainetos'	1,000 hoplites
	Sokrates'	500 hoplites
	Sosis'	300 hoplites
	ex-Abrokomas	400 hoplites

[10] Sosis, who brought the smallest number of troops, does not reappear in the text; Roy postulates that he handed these hoplites over to one of the strategoi and may himself have served as a lochagos: ibid.287 fn.4. The second mention of Sophainetos and the 1,000 hoplites at 1.2.9 is best dismissed as a doublet of the first (**Xen. *An.* 1.2.3**). See especially: Parke H.W. *Greek Mercenary Soldiers: From the Earliest Times to the Battle of Ipsus*, Clarendon Press (Oxford 1933) 41-2.

[11] The original provenance of these can be established through groups which are mentioned, but more especially through the 66 individuals whose names and nationality are given by Xenophon. For the full list see: Roy op.cit.303-6.

[12] Cf Xenophon's statement at *An.* 6.4.8 which, in truth, probably refers to the members of Proxenos' contingent and not the whole Greek army as he would like to have us believe (see above, 70-1.9).

[13] It seems unlikely that these mercenaries mainly belonged to the Chersonese as no large body of hoplites from that area is mentioned in the *Anabasis* (**cf 5.6.22-6; 7.1.13-4**). However, Klearchos had recently employed a large body of mercenaries when he had set himself up as the tyrant of Byzantion; the remnants of these mercenaries were probably what made up the rump of this Chersonese contingent (see above, 14-5).

[14] The majority of the Peloponnesian hoplite-mercenaries recruited in Asia Minor would have been Arkadians and Akhaians who had held imperial contracts of one sort or another prior to this adventure (see above, 67-71).

Before leaving the actual composition of Cyrus' Greek army, we should note that the light-armed troops were clearly recruited locally by each contingent commander who had them. Meno in Thessaly hired Dolopians, Aenianians and Olynthian peltasts (**Xen. *An.* 1.2.6**), while Klearchos in the Chersonese recruited Thracian peltasts and Thracian cavalry (**Xen. *An.* 1.2.9; 5.3**). The known taxiarchs who commanded light-armed soldiers (*τῶν γυμνήτων ταξιάρχων*), apart from Aristeas of Chios (**Xen. *An.* 4.1.28**), all belong to mountainous regions which could supply such troops (**Xen. *An.* 1.10.7; 4.6.20; 8.18, cf 4**). For Cyrus hoplites were all important, but light-armed troops of little consequence, especially as the Empire had an abundance of its own light-armed levies.[15] It is therefore not surprising that the light-armed soldiers in the Greek army were not true professionals (cf Iphikrates' mercenary peltasts) but simply men belonging to areas in which skirmishing was the norm. The only exception is the band of two hundred Cretan archers, a small body but evidently specialists and professionals, whom Klearchos recruited in the Chersonese (**Xen. *An.* 1.2.9, cf 3.4.17**).

II

Cyrus recruited the greater number of his Greek mercenaries through the services of recruiting agents who were either trusted friends or were directly connected with the Princely court at Sardis. As to the actual mechanics of the recruiting process, however, we have very little evidence. Today, the quickest and most efficient way to recruit mercenaries is through the services of prime movers who have an intimate knowledge of the current mercenary market. Usually, the prime mover is either an official organ of a fully recognized government which works covertly through the agency of others or, alternatively, he is an entrepreneurial mercenary leader who first negotiates the contract with the employer and then recruits and leads the men to fulfil it. The following extract from the memoirs of two British mercenaries who had served in Angola in 1976 nicely illustrates the first point:

> The German, Reinhard Aimann, was a committed anti-Communist in his early twenties; he had become interested in signing on as an Angolan mercenary after seeing coverage of the war on West German TV. Following advice, Aimann went to Brussels where he made enquiries at the Café Renaissance, a bar frequented by French-speaking veteran mercs. The café owner, Charles Masy, a former commander of Belgian mercenary forces in the Congo, suggested he consult the Zairean embassy in Brussels. The embassy press attaché, a man called Boma, supplied Aimann with a printed leaflet referring all prospective mercs to S.A.S's [Security Advisory Services] Camberley head quarters.[16]

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[15] Incidentally, on the retreat the Ten Thousand's lack of light-armed troops was initially to be a serious defect in their organization.

[16] Dempster C. & Tomkins D. *Firepower*, Corgi (London 1979) 410.

For the contemporary example of the entrepreneurial mercenary-captain we have Colonel Mike Hoare himself. Once hired by the Congolese government, Colonel Hoare had two close friends set up and operate recruiting offices on his behalf, one in Salisbury Rhodesia, the other in Johannesburg South Africa. Through placing a number of advertisements in the "Situations Vacant" column of newspapers in Johannesburg and Salisbury, Hoare's two recruiting officers were able to sign on over 1,000 recruits in less than three weeks. These recruits were next flown directly up to Albertville where, on arrival, they were processed by the Colonel himself.[17]

Of course, Cyrus had neither televison nor newspaper to aid him in his quest for mercenaries. He did, however, have mercenary-captains who had been in his employ for a number of years, veterans such as Pasion the Megarian and, in particular, Xenias of Parrhasia. Xenias first comes to our attention in 405 BC when he commands the Prince's Arkadian bodyguard of three hundred hoplites that accompanied Cyrus to his father's court (**Xen. *An.* 1.1.2**). We next find him in overall command of the Peloponnesian mercenary force that garrisoned Cyrus' Ionian cities (**Xen. *An.* 1.2.1**); 4,000 of these hoplite-mercenaries he was later to lead as the largest contingent of the Ten Thousand (**Xen. *An.* 1.2.3**). In short, Xenias was an experienced mercenary commander who plainly had the Prince's trust. It would not seem unreasonable to suggest, therefore, that our Arkadian was a prime mover in the mercenary market and, as such, was commissioned by Cyrus to recruit as many suitable Peloponnesian hoplites as possible.[18] With the Ionian garrisons-commanders acting as his local recruiting officers, Xenias managed to collect and command the largest single part of Cyrus' Greek army. In the light of this, one wonders if he was also the contractor who negotiated the hiring of 4,000 hoplite-mercenaries that Cyrus supplied to Aristippos of Larisa?

Fifty years later the Great King, Artaxerxes Ochus, was to use Mentor the Rhodian in a similar capacity. Mentor was Artaxerxes' commander-in-chief in the western Asia Minor provinces (*σατράπην τῆς κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν παραλίας...καὶ στρατηγὸν αὐτοκράτορα*: **Diod. 16.52.2**); along with one hundred silver talents and a lion's share of the spoils, this Imperial appointment was a reward for Mentor's services during Artaxerxes' recent conquest of Egypt.[19] As super-satrap over the provinces of western Asia Minor, Mentor was undoubtedly able to exploit his influential position so as to recruit large numbers of Greek mercenaries and send them up to Susa for service in the

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[17] See: (i) *Congo Mercenary*, Robert Hale (London 1991(A)) 33,35; (ii) *Congo Warriors*, Robert Hale (London 1991(B)) 65.

[18] As the soldiers always hold the strategoi responsible for any failure by the employer to observe the terms of service (**e.g. Xen. *An.* 1.4.12; 7.5.7,16; 6.9**), the strategoi undoubtedly drew up an agreement with the employer on the mercenaries' behalf.

[19] Ironically, Mentor was occupying the same position of power which Cyrus the Younger himself had held! Indeed, it represents the supreme point to which a Greek did or could attain in Persian service.

Imperial Army (**Diod. 16.50.7-8**). Nevertheless, a military entrepreneur still needs intimate knowledge of the mercenary world he is attempting to deal with. As a former mercenary-captain, Mentor, who had not only served the Great King himself but also other rulers such as Nektanebis of Egypt and Tennes of Sidon, had the perfect credentials to be a successful military entrepreneur for the Persian Empire.

Klearchos' former contacts with the mercenary world undoubtedly served him well and thus allowed the Spartan successfully to recruit in the Chersonese his contingent of hoplites. Indeed, a number of them had probably soldiered under Klearchos during his spell as the self-imposed tyrant of Byzantion (see above, 142 fn.13). On the other hand, a younger strategos, such as Proxenos, needed to exploit his own personal and family connections in order to recruit mercenaries. That he did so is clearly reflected in the number of known Athenians and Boiotians serving as officers in Proxenos' (later Xenophon's) contingent.[20]

Finally, there were the casual methods of recruiting mercenaries. The most obvious of them was that of winning over mercenaries currently in the service of the enemy. Desertion and surrender on the part of the mercenaries are symptoms most common in the generation of Alexander's Successors, when the rapid rise and fall of the great employers was a hindrance to personal loyalty among soldiers, and an excuse for their keeping a weather-eye to the main chance.[21] Although not of such epidemic proportions, there are the odd instances recorded in the source material of hoplite-mercenaries deserting to the other side, the example of Abrokomas' four hundred *δορυφόροι* being one of them (see above, 142). Another good example of infidelity on the part of hoplite-mercenaries was when Timoleon lost no less than a quarter of his mercenary army through fear of the size of the opposing Carthaginian forces (**Plut. *Tim.* 25.3**). During the drawn out operations against Syracuse, according to Thucydides, the Athenians were finding that a number of their mercenaries were not only departing for home, but also deserting to the enemy with expectations of better pay and conditions (**7.13.2**). Similarly, Agesilaos was less than happy with his contract with Tachôs of Egypt and as a consequence, if we can believe Plutarch, took himself and his mercenary army over to Nektanebis,

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[20] The high proportion of Arkadian lochagoi (5) proves nothing in this respect, since Arkadian mercenaries are so numerous. On the other hand, Proxenos' command included the only named Boiotians of the *Anabasis* (2 including Apollonides) besides Proxenos himself, and the only 3 (plus another 3 under Xenophon's command) Athenians who can be assigned to a particular contingent. For the latter see above, 80-1.

[21] Such as the desertion of the troops of Perdiccas to Ptolemy, of Antigonos to Ptolemy, of Lysimachos to Antigonos (**Diod. 18.33.2; 20.75.1-3; 113.3**), or the wholesale surrender by the mercenaries of Krateros at the Dardanelles, Eumenes at Gabiene, Demetrios at Gaza, Ptolemy in Cyprus, and Antigonos at Ipsus (**Diod. 18.32.3; 19.43.9; 85.3-4; 20.53.1; Plut. *Demetr.* 29.3,5**).

a rival claimant to the Egyptian throne (***Ages.* 37.6, cf Xen. *Ages.* 2.31**).[22] In the main, however, it was the mercenary bodyguards that surrounded the military tyrants that tended to have the habit of switching allegiances, especially if there was an offer of earning some easy money by doing so. A small group of Dion's mercenary-hoplites, for example, were easily bribed into a conspiracy against him (**Plut. *Dion* 54.2, cf Nep. *Dion* 7.1-2**). In his dialogue, *Hiero*, Xenophon likens the members of a tyrant's bodyguard to harvesters who are for hire and, as such, argues that the most important quality they should possess is that of loyalty. But in reality, continues Xenophon, it is hard cash that supplies the security for the tyrant and, therefore, a guardsman has it in his power to make more money in the single moment it takes to assassinate his master than he receives from him in honest wages (***Hiero* 6.11**).[23] In comparison to those armies of the Hellenistic period, however, hoplite-mercenary forces were generally more stable commodities, especially when the chips were down. For example, despite the fact that the army was in a truly desperate situation after Cunaxa, only twenty hoplites and one lochagos deserted the Ten Thousand and went over to the Great King (**Xen. *An.* 3.3.7, cf 2.2.7**). It is more important that the great majority stayed with the army during this time.

III

The true objective of Cyrus' campaign, according to Xenophon, was originally known to Klearchos alone of all the Greek strategoi (***An.* 3.1.10**); according to Diodoros, on the other hand, all the Greek leaders knew (**14.19.9**). In any case it is clear that the troops did not know, which is what concerns us here.

The Prince initially used various campaigns as pretexts for recruiting, among them a proposed punitive expedition against the Pisidians. When he was ready to launch his adventure, the Pisidian enterprise was used as the ostensible reason for assembling the various Greek contingents.[24] When the army reached Tarsus in Cilicia, however, the soldiers strongly suspected that they were in fact being led against Artaxerxes. They therefore refused to march further, and their protests were quite

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[22] According to Diodoros, Agesilaos commanded no less than 10,000 picked Greek mercenaries (*μισθοφόρους δ' ἐπιλέκτους ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος μυρίους*: **15.92.2**).

[23] Examples of military tyrants slain in the presence of their bodyguard include: (i) Jason of Pherai (**Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.31-2**); (ii) Kallippos of Syracuse (**Plut. *Mor.* 553d**); (iii) Klearchos of Heraklea-in-Pontos (**Just. 16.4**); (iv) Philiskos of Abydos (**Dem. 23.142**). In addition, we also have the example of Hiketas of Leontini who, although not killed, was still betrayed by his bodyguard (**Plut. *Tim.* 32.1**).

[24] Diodoros says that a proposed campaign against rebel tyrants of Cilicia was used as the pretext for assembling the army (**14.19.3**). However, he fails to mention them again even when the army was actually in Cilicia (**14.20.1-3**).

explicit: "They had not been hired for that" (*μισθωθῆναι δὲ οὐκ ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἔφασαν*: **Xen. *An.* 1.3.1**).[25] In other words, a rudimentary contractual agreement had been made between the Greeks and their employer, Cyrus the Younger, before the march began, and this agreement was being violated. Cyrus then declared that he was marching against Abrokomas, the satrap of Phoenicia, and the contract was re-negotiated on that basis; the Greeks agreed to march to the Euphrates in return for fifty per cent more pay (**Xen. *An.* 1.3.20-1**).[26] This new contract ran out when the Euphrates was reached at Thapsakos. Cyrus was therefore at last obliged to reveal his true intentions, whereupon further negotiations took place. This time the Greeks agreed to follow the Prince against the Great King in return for a healthy bonus of five minas in silver per man, to be paid at Babylon, and full pay back to Ionia (**Xen. *An.* 1.4.11-3**). *It appears the employer was not free to violate the terms of* the contract as he might have wished, since the mercenaries could easily withdraw their services and thus refuse to march or fight. He could, however, modify the terms of employment by offering present or future compensation.

The evidence thus provided by the *Anabasis* for the contractual basis of mercenary service is clear. Moreover, it also illustrates when the mercenaries expected to receive their wages and at what rate. The standard rate of pay (*μισθός*) was either one daric or one Cyzicene per month per soldier,[27] and this wage was reckoned from the first of each month and paid at the end of that month (**Xen. *An.* 1.2.11-2; 3.21; 5.6.23,31; 7.6.1,7; 2.36; 3.10**).[28] The lochagoi and strategoi, on the other hand, received double (*διμοιρία*) and quadruple (*τετραμοιρία*) the standard rate respectively "as was customary" (*τὰ νομιζόμενα*: **Xen. *An.* 7.3.10, also 2.36; 7.6.1,7, cf 3.1.37**). Despite this, however, in the six months during which the Greeks marched under Cyrus' banner, he paid them only once, and even then only after they had protested vigorously (**Xen. *An.* 1.2.11-2**).[29] Similarly, at

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[25] Likewise, the mercenaries hired by Dion regarded his Sicilian adventure as pure madness and promptly blamed their recruiting officers for not having told them about the true nature of the contract. In a similar fashion, they are also finally won round with promises (**Plut. *Dion* 23.1-2**).

[26] Privately many suspected the truth (**Xen. *An.* 1.3.21; 3.1.10**), but this did not affect the formal arrangement.

[27] Both were ordinarily worth 25 Attic silver drachmas in this period: Heichelheim F. *An Ancient Economic History, Vol.II*, E.J.Brill (Leiden 1964) 22-3. Therefore, a hoplite-mercenary was technically receiving 5 Attic obols *per diem*.

[28] See also: (i) Xen. *An.* 1.9.17 - "monthly pay" (*τὸ κατὰ μῆνα κέρδος*); (ii) Xen. *An.* 5.6.26; 6.1.16; 7.1.3 - "regular pay" (*τὴν μισθοθοράν*); (iii) Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.5; 5.1.24 - "a month's pay" (*μηνὸς μισθόν*); (iv) Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.37 - "pay for a month" (*μισθὸν δοὺς μηνός*).

[29] Cf *Hell. Oxy.* 19.2: the Great Kings themselves apparently had the infuriating habit of being "mean and niggardly" when it came to paying their mercenaries. In the late 80's the French mercenaries fighting for the Maronite Lebanese army general, Michel Aoun, were claiming that they had been reduced to fighting for "beer and cigarettes" because their pay was so much in arrears. Such underhand behaviour, however, could easily cause serious repercussions for the employer. After the Kleomenic War, for example, Aratos was unable to recruit mercenaries because the Akhaian League had not paid their mercenaries in full during that conflict (**Polyb. 4.60.2**). The following year, on the other hand, old grievances appeared to have been forgotten and the League was able to recruit with some success. The mercenaries soon disbanded, however,

the end of their first month's service with the Odrysian prince, Seuthes, the Greeks were only paid twenty days wages: the troops' anger was bitter. Seuthes had expected as much, for he had attempted to bribe the Greek officers, evidently in the hope that they would pacify their men (**Xen. *An.* 7.5.2-4**).[30] The troops did not go on strike, but continued to show resentment over the money due to them (**Xen. *An.* 7.5.7,16**). During the second month of operations under Seuthes there was to be no pay at all (**Xen. *An.* 7.5.16**). Finally, they made it a condition of transferring to Spartan service that the Spartans exact the outstanding amount from Seuthes (**Xen. *An.* 7.6.40; 7.14-5,31**).

Other forms of income for the mercenary were booty and, as already alluded to, bonuses. The opportunities for taking booty were actually few during the six months service with Cyrus and the two months service with Seuthes. Cyrus did not wish the empire for which he was fighting to be pillaged by his own troops, and permitted only the plunder of Lykaonia as hostile territory (**Xen. *An.* 1.2.19**).[31] Seuthes, on the other hand, needed money and not good will. He therefore added a neat clause to the mercenaries' contract by which all booty would go to him in order that he might sell it and so raise money for the army's wages (**Xen. *An.* 7.3.10, cf 4.2; 5.2**).[32]

Several types of bonus are mentioned in the *Anabasis*. A bonus paid immediately on recruitment, for instance, was known; Xenophon remarked specifically on the fact that Seuthes did not pay such a bonus (*προτελέω*: ***An.* 7.7.25**), and later the mercenaries did receive one from the Spartans (***An.* 7.8.6**).[33] Another form of bonus was obviously that paid for special or distinguished service. Thus the three hundred hoplite-mercenaries who accompanied the Prince to his father's court in 405 BC received a bonus (**Xen. *An.* 1.1.2; 4.12**), and Xenophon implies in his obituary of Cyrus that Cyrus made such donatives fairly regularly to his mercenary officers at least (**Xen. *An.* 1.9.17, cf 4.17; 7.7**).[34] In the same way Seuthes promised to reward merit (**Xen. *An.* 7.3.10**), though in the event, as we have already discussed, he barely paid the basic minimum. Bonuses, on recruitment

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when their pay fell into arrears (**Polyb. 5.30.5-6**).

[30] Seuthes seems to have been chronically short of cash (**Xen. *An.* 7.3.10; 7.53**).

[31] There was of course the unauthorized sack of Tarsus by Meno's troops, but this was stopped by Cyrus who also restored to their owners the slaves taken (**Xen. *An.* 1.2.26-7**).

[32] The Greeks probably had better luck taking plunder when they later served under Thibron (see above, 113). Another method for raising money in order to pay *μισθός* to mercenaries was the ingenious device once used by Timotheus. Apparently, while he was besieging Samos in 366 BC, he set aside a part of the local land for his own foraging and sold the produce of the rest to the enemy, thereby raising the wages to pay his mercenaries (*ὥστε εὐπόρησε χρημάτων εἰς μισθοὺς τοῖς στρατιώταις*: **Ps-Arist. *Oec.* 1350b5-7**). Cf Isok. *Antid.* 111: *καὶ τούτοις ἅπασιν ἐκ τῆς πολεμίας τὸν μισθὸν ἀπέδωκε*

[33] Evidence for Cyrus' recruitment is not available.

[34] It is highly probable that Cyrus also donated the expensive golden stlengides that were offered as prizes at the games held at Peltai (**Xen. *An.* 1.2.10**).

or during service, nonetheless were clearly a regular feature of mercenary service and remain so to this day. Dempster and Tomkins, for example, relate how three of their fellow mercenaries left the FNLA in order to serve the rival faction operating in southern Angola, UNITA. The leader of the latter, Jonas Savimbi, was not only offering higher wages but also handsome bonuses for each MPLA tank knocked out and for Cubans and Russians killed or captured.[35]

IV

An army, said Napoleon, or so we are reliably informed, marches on its stomach. There are no truer words in the annals of military affairs than these. How to feed and water your men is probably the most important initial requirement on campaign, and one which finds its way down to the humblest command. It is a constant in every military plan.

When the remnants of the Ten Thousand took service in Thrace under Seuthes the contract of employment included the following provisions: (i) pay (*μισθός*); (ii) a possible bonus; (iii) the prospect of food and drink (*σῖτα καὶ ποτά*). With regards to the latter, Seuthes specifically tells the mercenaries that they are to acquire their rations "by taking them from the countryside" (*ἐκ τῆς χώρας λαμβάνοντες ἔξετε*: **Xen. *An.* 7.3.10**). In short, the troops were instructed to forage for their food.[36] While serving with Cyrus, on the other hand, Xenophon clearly tells us that the mercenaries normally bought their own daily provisions (*οἱ στρατιῶται ἠγόραζον τὰ ἐπιτήδεια*), either from the market (*ἀγορά*) organized by the Lydian sutlers travelling with Cyrus' native army (***An.* 1.3.14; 5.6**), or from local markets such as those found *en route* at Tyriaeion, Tarsus and Charmande (***An.* 1.2.18,24; 5.10,12**). During the crossing of the Arabian desert, however, local markets and their provisions were scarce, so much so that the soldiers were forced to eke out their rations by eating the local game they had hunted; this included wild ass, gazelle and bustard (**Xen. *An.* 1.5.2-3**). At one point, the mercenaries even ran out of grain. None could be had locally and the only supply available was that to be found in the Lydian market at the extortionate price of thirty Attic obols for a *capithê* of wheat-flour or barley-meal (*ἀλεύρων ἢ ἀλφίτων*).[37] Naturally the Greeks refused to buy at such

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[35] Op.cit.388.

[36] Teleutias, who had come empty handed from Sparta, likewise instructed his mercenaries to live on the enemy's country and was thus obliged to begin his campaign with an inglorious hunt for provisions (*ἐπιτήδεια*: **Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.14-7, cf 4**).

[37] *Capithê* = 2 Attic *choenices* = 1/24 Attic *medimnus* = c.2 Imperial quarts @ 30 Attic obols (5 Attic drachmas). In other words, the Lydian merchants were charging no less than 120 Attic drachmas per *medimnus* for their wheat flour or barley meal. For comparison: (i) Ar. *Eccl.* 547-8 suggests a price of 3 Attic drachmas per *medimnus* circa early 4th century BC; (ii) [Dem.] 34.39 provides a standard Athenian price circa 60 years later of 5 Attic drachmas per *medimnus*, and a famine price of 16 Attic drachmas per *medimnus*.

a steep price and survived by eating boiled meat (**Xen. *An.* 1.5.6, cf 2.1.6-7**).[38] Even after Cunaxa the Greeks were still prepared to buy their own supplies. In particular, as part of the terms of the Great King's treaty, Tissaphernes offered to provide the mercenaries with a market so that they could "obtain provisions by purchase" (ἔξειν τὰ ἐπιτήδεια: **Xen. *An.* 2.3.26-7, cf 4.5,28; 3.1.2,20; 2.21**). Of course, there was a drawback to this offer: the mercenaries were not at liberty to forage for their daily needs (**Xen. *An.* 2.3.27; 3.1.20, cf 2.4.27**). On the other hand, once the treaty had been broken and the Ten Thousand were on their own, the troops did resort to judicious foraging (**Xen. *An.* 2.5.37; 3.4.18,31; 5.1,14; 4.1.8; 2.22; 4.2,7,9; 6.27; 8.19; 5.1.6; 5.4.27-9; 6.1.1; 5.32; 6.1**).[39] In reply, the Persians attempted to initiate a strategy of scorched-earth (**Xen. *An.* 3.5.3**). Nevertheless, when local markets were available the Greeks did prefer to buy their provisions (**Xen. *An.* 4.8.8,23; 5.7.13,23; 6.2.8; 6.3; 7.6.24, cf 5.5.6; 7.33; 6.4.16**). Indeed, in a speech on behalf of the army to the ambassadors from Sinope, Xenophon informs them that when they have "no market at which to buy, we take provisions, not out of wantonness, but from necessity (ἀγορὰν μὴ ἔχωμεν...οὐχ ὕβρει ἀλλὰ ἀνάγκῃ λαμβάνειν τὰ ἐπιτήδεια: ***An.* 5.5.16**).[40] In sum, the Ten Thousand were not supplied with rations by their employers, Cyrus and Seuthes, but would either purchase them from a market or, if need be, procure them from the local countryside.[41]

The provision of food for mercenary armies of the Classical period has been discussed at some length by G.T.Griffith, who concluded that the employer either supplied rations (σῖτος) or ration-money (σιταρχία) in addition to the wage paid (μισθός).[42] On the other hand, Xenophon's

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[38] For the staple diet of the Greeks: see above, 47. Incidentally, some of the local market-clerks (ἀγορανόμοι) who dealt with the army also had the nasty habit of bumping-up the prices and, occasionally, the troops would retaliate by taking matters into their own hands (**Xen. *An.* 5.7.20-6, cf 3.2.21:** "small measures for large prices!"). Because they needed civilians, soldiers were open to exploitation by them. On the other hand, because civilians needed the profit dervived from filling the soldier's belly, slaking his thirst and satisfying his lusts, they were exposed to his unruly behaviour.

[39] At times the army's provisions were so low that the Greeks were forced into storming the local native strongholds so as to eat (**Xen. *An.* 4.7.1,3,17; 5.2.3-7**).

[40] Necessity, of course, included the lack of money. While at Cotyora, for example, "some of the men lived by purchasing from the market and others by pillaging the territory of Paphlagonia" (οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆν ἀγορᾶς ἔζων, οἱ δὲ καὶ λῃζόμενοι ἐκ τῆς Παφλαγονίας: **Xen. *An.* 6.1.1, cf 3.1.20; 5.1.6; 6.20; 7.1.7; 6.24**). At the same time, those *hors de combat* were being quartered in the houses of the city and survived by "paying their own expenses" (τὰ αὐτῶν δαπανῶντες: **Xen. *An.* 5.5.20**).

[41] The wagons loaded with flour and wine (ἀλεύρων καὶ οἴνου) were, according to Xenophon, secured by Cyrus to issue (διαδιδοίη) to the Greeks in an emergency and, thus, these cartloads of provisions were not intended for daily consumption (***An.* 1.10.18**). Furthermore, no importance can be attached to the references which inform us that Cyrus procured local supplies for the army (**Xen. *An.* 1.4.19; 5.9**) for the following reasons: (i) there is no implication that he actually issued the rations for free to the mercenaries on these occasions; (ii) Cyrus needed to support his own native army.

[42] *The Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World*, Ares (Chicago 1984) 264-73. See also: (i) Roy op.cit.311-2; (ii) Mckechnie P.R. *Outsiders in the Greek Cities in the Fourth Century BC*, Routledge (London 1989) 89. In truth, Griffith's best evidence for this practice actually comes from surviving documents which deal with the military finances of the standing forces of the Hellenistic Kingdoms of Egypt and Pergamum during the 3rd century BC (op.cit.274-90).

evidence strongly suggests that neither Cyrus nor Seuthes actually provided their mercenaries with rations whatsoever. Moreover, there is one solid argument against the notion that either Cyrus or Seuthes were paying the Greek mercenaries ration-money in addition to their monthly wage: we never hear of it. Besides, both Cyrus and Seuthes were desperately short of cash and, as a result, found it extremely difficult even to pay the mercenaries their basic wages. The term "corn-money" does, in a sense, appear once in the *Anabasis*. Lykon the Akhaian addresses his fellow soldiers:

> I am astonished, soldiers, that the strategoi do not endeavour to supply us with the money to buy provisions (ἐκπορίζειν σιτηρέσιον); for our gifts of hospitality [from Heraklea] will not make three days' rations (σιτία) for the army;[43] and there is no place from which we can procure provisions before beginning our march (**6.2.4**).

Lykon ends by suggesting that they demand from the Herakleots no less than 3,000 Cyzicenes; the sum proposed was raised to 10,000 by another speaker. In other words, what we are witnessing here is a crude case of extortion, plain and simple (**cf Xen. *An.* 6.2.7**). Furthermore, this passage does not by itself provide sufficient proof that the soldiers of the Ten Thousand expected to receive ration-money from their employers. The reasons for this are quite straight forward. Firstly, although some of the strategoi had initially recruited the mercenaries, they were not their employers. Secondly, to date the army had not received any pay for the past fourteen months and, naturally, the hungry soldiers were now desperate for money. Thirdly, since the army was now technically in friendly territory, the troops were not at liberty to forage off the countryside at will. As a final point, we should note that the army spilt into three contingents that went their separate ways soon after the Herakleots shut up their city and chose to ignore Lykon's threats (**Xen. *An.* 6.2.8-16**). In truth, Lykon was undoubtedly stirring up trouble for the strategoi in an attempt to galvanize them into finding the army a new paymaster. The citizens of Heraklea (and Sinope) had, in fact, recently broken their promise to provide the army with money to pay the troops (**Xen. *An.* 5.6.35-6, cf 21,23**); pay which would have enabled the latter to buy the provisions they sorely needed (**Xen. *An.* 5.6.19**).[44]

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[43] Untrue, as the 3,000 *medimni* of barley-meal donated by the Herakleots (**Xen. *An.* 6.2.3, cf 1.15**) should have been enough to feed the 8,140 surviving members of the army (**Xen. *An.* 6.2.16**) for at least 18 days (see below, 154).

[44] N.b. Timasion the Dardanian and Thorax the Boiotian, the two gentlemen who had initiated the negotiations for cash from Heraklea and Sinope, had also warned the Herakleots and Sinopians that if they failed to provide the pay there was a great danger that the army would remain in the locality! In 1338, for example, the Swabian knight, Werner von Ürslingen, and his Great Company employed similar methods so as to extract money from the Pisans. See especially: Oman C.W.C. *The Art of War in the Middle Ages*, Burt Franklin (NY 1924) II.292. In fact, during the Hundred Years War it was quite common for unemployed mercenary bands to make war on their own account. By doing so, they would seize castles and fortified towns so as to ransom them back to their owners or occupants, or would simply exact tribute from the open villages and countryside they were passing through. Consequently, these rapacious acts not only acquired money for them to survive as a band, but also the appropiate epithets of *Tondeurs* and *Écorcheurs*. Also, see above, 15.

In reality, there was no ration-money for the Ten Thousand. For food purchases at the local market, therefore, the mercenary was expected to spend his wages[45] or, once these were exhausted, rely upon money secured through looting.[46]

V

A hoplite serving in the ranks of the Ten Thousand was entitled to receive five Attic obols as his daily μισθός (see above, 147 fn.27).[47] To know that a man, however, earned five obols a day is to know nothing. The figure remains a mere figure unless we can attempt to evaluate its buying power, and how his own power of purchase compared with that of his contemporaries either in the same profession or following a different trade.

Firstly, we need to know what expenses other than food had to be met from this pay, i.e. whether or not the mercenary had to supply his own arms and equipment or maintain the services of a personal attendant or slave. What evidence there is for the first is generally very conflicting and, as a consequence, modern scholars have naturally fallen into two warring camps: (i) the unorthodox who firmly believe that the employer usually equipped the mercenary; (ii) the orthodox who firmly believe that the mercenary brought with him his own tools of the trade.[48] Now, the logical solution to this problem can easily be arrived at by taking on board the following four basic points: (i) without a hoplite panoply, a man was not a hoplite; (ii) the hoplite-citizen either inherited or purchased his own hoplite panoply; (iii) the hoplite-mercenary, being a former hoplite-citizen, also owned his own hoplite panoply; (iv) the citizen who turned to mercenary soldiering as a means to support himself

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[45] In a similar fashion, a campaigning hoplite-citizen was expected to provide his own provisions at his own expense (**Ar. *Ach.* 197; *Vesp.* 243; *Pax* 311; 1181-2; Thuc. 1.48.1; Lys. 16.14**). In the wake of the Sicilian Expedition, for example, there was a whole flotilla of merchant ships that followed the Athenian armada "voluntarily in order to do trade" (**Thuc. 6.44.1, cf 7.24.2**). It is hardly surprising, therefore, to note that the Athenian hoplites destined for Sicily also took money with them "for purposes of exchange" (**Thuc. 6.31.5**). For local markets selling provisions to campaigning city-state armies, see especially: Hdt. 7.176; Thuc. 1.62.1; 3.6.1; 6.44.3; 50.1; Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.11; 5.4.48; 6.4.9; 5.12; Diod. 14.79.2.

[46] The 4 darics which each man received at Caÿstrupedion (**Xen. *An.* 1.2.11-2**) were spent over the next 6 months. From Caÿstrupedion to Cunaxa was roughly 4 months and the mercenaries used this cash to buy their victuals in places such as Tyriaeion, Tarsus and Charmande as well as the travelling Lydian market (**Xen. *An.* 1.2.18,24; 3.14**). Immediately after the battle, the Greeks shifted for themselves as best as they could by eating the baggage animals (**Xen. *An.* 2.1.6, cf 2.4,16; 3.5**); they then bought food in the markets provided under truce by the Persians for about a month and a half (**Xen. *An.* 2.3.26-7; 4.5,28; 3.1.20; 2.21**). At the end of that period few had any money left (**Xen. *An.* 3.1.20; 2.21**). Occasionally during the retreat, however, the enemy's baggage train fell in to the army's hands and, as a consequence, individual mercenaries may have struck lucky (**Xen. *An.* 4.3.25; 4.21, cf 5.1.12; 3.4; 6.6.2,27**).

[47] Cf Griffth who believes that the Ten Thousand were not only receiving 5 obols a day in wages, but also σῖτος in kind as well: "a composite pay of 7 obols at least" (op.cit.308).

[48] For the latest skirmish between these two camps see especially: (i) Mckechnie op.cit.80-5 - employers did supply arms and equipment; (ii) Whitehead D. "Who Equipped Mercenary Troops in Classical Greece?", *Historia 40* (1991) 105-13 - mercenaries supplied their own arms and equipment.

or his family, did so before he was forced to sell his panoply. Secondly, attendants, some of them slaves, did serve the army.[49] On two occasions Xenophon definitely mentions the presence of baggage carriers (σκευοφόροι: **Xen. *An.* 1.10.3; 3.2.28, cf 5.8.6**) and these, along with the baggage animals, the camp-followers,[50] and the captives of war taken *en route* (τὰ ὑποζύγια καὶ τὸν ὄχλον καὶ τὰ ἀνδράποδα: **Xen. *An.* 3.3.6; 4.1.12; 2.10; 3.15,26; 5.4; 6.5.3; 6.1,38**), made up the general mass of non-combatants that formed the army's cumbersome baggage train (**Xen. *An.* 4.1.13; 2.13, cf 3.2.27-8; 3.1**). Nevertheless, although gentlemen such as Xenophon could afford the services of a shield-bearer in battle (ὑπασπιστής: **Xen. *An.* 4.2.20, cf 7.3.20**), common hoplites such as Soteridas the Sikyonian could not (**Xen. *An.* 3.4.47,49**). Furthermore, we also hear of ordinary soldiers performing menial tasks themselves, such as chopping (or gathering) wood (σχίζειν ξύλα: **Xen. *An.* 1.5.12; 4.3.11, cf 4.4.12**) or packing their own baggage (συσκευάζεσθαι: **Xen. An. 1.3.14; 3.4.36; 5.18; 4.3.14; 5.1; 5.1.2; 7.1.7,11**).[51] It seems unlikely, therefore, that all the hoplite-mercenaries had personal servants, and it was probably a matter of economics and logistics as to whether or not a soldier could afford to maintain one.[52]

Both Parke and Griffith take two obols *per diem* as the "existence-minimum" in the mid-fourth century BC, i.e. the smallest wage upon which a man could reasonably be expected to keep himself alive.[53] Both scholars then reckon that by the turn of the century a larger cash income would have been needed in order to survive.[54] Evidence from Menander, however, implies that two obols was still a possible bare minimum for subsistence even at the end of the fourth century BC:

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[49] Although free to take prisoners on the march back after Cunaxa - the men could easily use these as slaves - on one occasion, however, Xenophon actually implies that there were Greek slaves with the army (***An.* 2.5.32**).

[50] It is not surprising to find that a large number of these were actually women (γυναῖκες/ἑταῖραι: **Xen. *An.* 4.3.19; 5.3.1; 4.33, cf 4.1.14; 6.1.12**). For, although wives and children existed back home (**Xen. *An.* 3.1.3; 5.6.20, cf 1.4.8**), a number of the Ten Thousand had obviously started up "unofficial" familes during the campaign (**cf Diod. 17.84.2-6; Polyb. 1.7.4; 66.8; 67.7; 68.3**). In addition, some of the men had also struck up relationships with boys or young men (παῖδας: **Xen. *An.* 4.1.14; 6.3; 7.4.7-10**).

[51] Cf Xen. *Hell.* 7.2.22; Plut. *Tim.* 12.4-5. Moreover, Xen. *An.* 6.4.8 can scarcely refer to personal attendants, slave or otherwise (see above, 70-1).

[52] Even a slave needed to be fed and, as Xenophon righly points out, the greater the number of non-combatants that are attached to the army the greater the amount of provisions that have to be procured and transported (***An.* 4.1.13**).

[53] Parke op.cit.232; Griffith op.cit.308.

[54] Parke.233; Griffith.309.

SMIKRINES: He gives a pimp twelve drachmas a day.

CHAIRESTRATOS: Twelve! That fellow's got his affairs well in order.

SMIKRINES: A month's keep for a man, and six days over.

CHAIRESTRATOS: Well worked out. Two obols a day!

Enough if a chap only wants barley gruel (*πτισάνη*).[55]

As we are seeking the bare minimum daily *μισθός* per person for survival in the fourth century BC, then two obols will suffice for the purposes of our argument, i.e. what level of prosperity a hoplite-mercenary's wages could secure.[56]

Evidence from the *Anabasis*, as we have already discussed, has indicated that the hoplite-mercenary expected the standard daily wage of five Attic obols for services rendered. The evidence has also suggested that the only expense he really needed to meet out of this wage was that of his daily victuals.

Herodotos, in his account of Xerxes' invasion of Greece, reckons that the Persian troops were receiving a daily ration of one *choenix* (one Imperial quart) of cereal per man (*πυρῶν*: **7.187**). It was the Roman practice, according to Polybios, to issue a monthly ration of cereal equal to two-thirds of an Attic *medimnus* to each legionary (*σιτομετροῦνται δ' οἱ μὲν πεζοὶ πυρῶν Ἀττικοῦ μεδίμνου δύο μέρη μάλιστά πως*: **6.39.13**), which is more or less equal to the daily allowance of one *choenix* Xerxes' campaigning soldiers were getting by Herodotos' reckoning.[57] We can, therefore, safely assume that the basic daily diet of a hoplite soldiering with the Ten Thousand would have consisted of one *choenix* of grain[58] - normally in the form of barley-meal - which was then supplemented with

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[55] *Epit.* 136-41.

[56] See especially Mckechnie op.cit.89.

[57] Cf Thuc. 4.16.1: the Athenians allow the Spartans trapped on Sphakteria a daily ration of 2 *choenices* (*δύο χοίνικας*) of barley meal and a pint of wine (*δύο κοτύλας οἴνου*) and some meat, and for each helot-attendant half as much. On the other hand, apart from the wine and a little meat, there is no mention of other dietary supplements being supplied to these soldiers by the Athenians, which probably explains why they were receiving a double ration of barley-meal. As a matter of interest, Herodotos tells us that the Spartan kings were given double portions at public banquets or private dinners and, when they did not attend such functions, they were allowed 2 *choenices* of barley-meal and a *kotyle* of wine (**6.57**). At the other extreme, we have the example of Athenian POWs at Syracuse who were surviving on just 2 *kotylae* (1/2 *choenix*) of *σῖτος* per day: not only were these men living in squalid conditions, they were also being used as slave labour in the Syracusan quarries. Even so, some of them were still alive 8 months later (**Thuc. 7.87.1-3**).

[58] A choenix of barley-meal is equivalent to 20oz of sifted flour. This, when cooked (bread/cake/porridge) and digested, will provide 1,897 usable cals. plus 63g of protein (c.57g in the case of porridge). A 120lbs individual engaged in carrying a moderate load for 8hrs in addition to other normal activities requires 3,402 cals. In comparison, the US Army reckons that 3,600 cals. per day will sustain a soldier in combat conditions (= 38oz of barley-meal). The daily calorie intake should include at least 70g of protein in order to avoid malnutrition, and at least 2.25 litres of water to prevent dehydration (cf the US forces during the Gulf War required at least 10 litres per day). Even with such supplements as cheese, onions and olives, the US combat soldier would have found daily survival on the hoplite's basic diet somewhat taxing. See especially:
(i) weights & measures - *Mrs Beaton's All About Cookery*, Pan Books (London 1963) 50-2; (ii) calorific values of cereals and usable calories - Foxhall L. & Forbes H.A. "Σιτομετρεία: The Role of Grain as a Staple Food in Classical Antiquity"

such food-stuffs as cheese, onions, garlic, figs, wine, olive products and perhaps a little meat or fish as an appetizer (see above, 46-7).[59]

The normal cost of grain in the early fourth century BC was, according to Aristophanes, three drachmas per *medimnus* (***Eccl.* 547-8**). If we make the bold assumption that the cost of grain in any one local Asian market was the same as that found in the Athenian Agora, then we soon establish that the Ten Thousand were paying the equivalent of 0.375 obols per *choenix* for their barley-meal. However, if there was a shortage of local grain, as was the case when the army was crossing the Arabian desert, the cost of barley-meal could easily rocket. On this particular occasion, for example, the sharp Lydian merchants had set their price at 2.5 drachmas per *choenix*, forty times the Athenian price (see above, 149 fn.37). Unfortunately, prices for the other food-stuffs that a campaigning hoplite-mercenary might care to supplement his barley-meal with are not so readily available. Nevertheless, we can make the reasonable assumption that he was spending - provided, of course, food prices were generally stable - no more than one obol of his wages per day for food, and perhaps double this if he had one personal attendant in his service.

In the same period the dicast's pay of three obols *per diem* was apparently enough to meet the needs of a small Athenian family.[60] In theory our hoplite-mercenary was comfortably well off by comparison. In practice, however, this relative prosperity depended upon two important factors: regular employment and regular pay. Indeed, the idea that mercenary service was generally a remunerative profession becomes somewhat hollow when we consider that a manual labourer could guarantee to earn a standard wage of one drachma a day by working on a civic building project such as the construction of the Erechtheion in Athens.[61]

Chiron 12 (1982) 41 90, cf Clark C. & Haswell M. *The Economy of Subsistence Agriculture*, Macmillan (London 1970) 58; (iii) calorific requirements - Clark & Haswell ibid.11-3; (iv) US Army's statistics - US Army Reserve Officers Training Corps Quartermasters, quoted in Engels D.W. *Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army*, University of California Press (Berkeley & LA 1978) 123.

[59] Cf Xen. *An.* 7.1.37 in which Xenophon specifically mentions barley-meal, wine, olives, garlic and onions as part of the soldier's daily diet. Other references in the *Anabasis* to the dietary supplements include: (i) cheese (**2.4.28**); (ii) wine (**1.5.10; 2.3.14; 4.28; 4.2.22; 4.9; 5.26; 8.23; 5.4.29; 6.1.15; 2.3; 5.1; 6.1; 7.4.3**); (iii) dried fruit (**4.4.9; 6.6.1**); (iv) pulses (**4.4.9; 5.26; 6.6.1**); (v) olive oil or lack of it (**6.6.1**). Of course, there were times when the troops tightened their belts and simply went hungry (**Xen. *An.* 1.1.18-9; 3.1.3; 4.5.5,8,11; 7.1.9**), or even resorted to eating meat (**Xen. *An.* 1.4.2-3; 5.6; 2.1.6-7**). Persian nobles, according to Xenophon, were quite prepared to count one day's rations as two in order to harden themselves against possible shortages of food during a campaign (***Cyr.* 1.2.11**).

[60] See especially: Markle M.M. "Jury Pay and Assembly Pay at Athens", *Crux* (1985) 277-81.

[61] "Erechtheion Building Inscription XIII, col.1" in Paton J.M. (ed.) *The Erechtheum*, Harvard University Press (Cambridge Mass. 1927) 380-3,404, cf 409,422. As a comparison, we should also note that during the long siege of Poteidaia, Athenian hoplites are said to have received a drachma a day each, with another drachma in addition for their attendants (**Thuc. 3.17.4**). Or again, the Thracian peltasts hired by Athens in 414 BC who were considered too expensive a luxury to be kept for the war in Attica: "they received a drachma a day each" (**Thuc. 7.27.2**). Indeed, Aristophanes' "two drachmas a day Thracians" was probably a joke directed against the lavish expenditure of Athenians on military pay (***Ach.* 159-61**).

Fifty years later, Demosthenes, in drawing up plans for his standing army against Philip II of Macedon, believed he could actually find mercenaries willing to serve for as little as two obols a day (**4.20**).[62] A few years previously, on the other hand, the Phokians, with the wealth of Delphi secure in their war chest, had recruited men by offering wages fifty per cent above the going rate (whatever that was) and, on one occasion, they even managed to double the customary rate of pay (**Diod. 16.25.1; 30.1; 36.1**). Griffith assumes that the fourth century BC was the period of the "four-obol recruit" as mentioned in Menander's *Perikeiromene* (*τετρωβόλου βίος*: **261-3; 273, cf Plut. *Mor.* 233c; Eust. 951.54**).[63] There are two pieces of evidence, moreover, that can be used to support his assumption. In 383 BC Sparta made it possible for the city-states of the Peloponnesian League to contribute money instead of soldiers, at the rate of three Aeginetan (four Attic) obols per man and four times that amount for a cavalryman (*ἀργύριόν τε ἀντ' ἀνδρῶν ἐξεῖναι διδόναι τῇ βουλομένῃ τῶν πόλεων τριώβολον Αἰγιναϊον κατα ἄνδρα· ἱππέας τε εἴ τις παρέχοι, ἀντὶ τεττάρων ὁπλιτῶν τὸν μισθὸν τῷ ἱππεῖ διδόσθαι*: **Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.21**). It is important to note that Xenophon calls the four obols *μισθός*. In other words, the Spartans clearly intended to hire mercenaries at four obols *per diem* to take the place of their allies. Although fragmentary and comic, the second piece of evidence conveniently refers to the closing years of the fourth century BC. A fragment from Menander's play, *Olynthia*, informs us of a man who was "serving with Aristotle and receiving the wage of four obols a day" (*μετ' Ἀριστοτέλους γὰρ τέτταρας τῆς ἡμέρας ὀβολοὺς φέρων*: **357(K), cf *Pk.* 260-74**).[64] Aristotle, according to Diodoros, was the Athenian admiral who, after being given the command of twenty triremes by Demetrios of Phaleron in 314 BC, was despatched to Lemnos with orders to aid Kassander's fleet (**19.68.3**).

An indication of the low level of mercenaries' wages is provided by a comparison with the three Attic obols a day which were being paid at this time to an unskilled slave labourer for his food.[65] Or again, exactly four Attic obols were being paid to the ephebes as a ration allowance (***Ath. Pol.* 42.3**). The current Athenian price for grain, according to [Demosthenes], was five Attic drachmas per *medimnus* (**34.39**). This means, if we make the same assumptions as above, that a

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[62] Cf the pay of the Roman legionary c.150 BC, which was the equivalent of 2 obols a day. Moreover, the quaestor would deduct from the legionary's pay the cost - at a fixed price - of his monthly ration of corn (**Polyb. 6.39.12,15**). During the Vietnam War, a soldier of the ARVN was paid the equivalent of £25 per month. From this he was expected to purchase his own rations, the army undertaking to provide, at a cost, a supply of rice; the supplementary food-stuffs he obtained locally for himself.

[63] Griffith op.cit.308.

[64] Cf the rate of pay of Alexander's hypaspists: *ὑπασπιστῆι δραχμὴν καὶ τοῖς...ἑκάστης τῆς ἡμέρας·* (*IG* II² **1.329.9-10**). This Attic inscription is dated to 336/5 BC.

[65] *CIG* II.834,5; 834c - the accounts of Eleusis for 329/8 BC.

hoplite-mercenary was now paying the equivalent of 0.625 obols per *choenix* for his ration of barley-meal and, in total, roughly two obols for his daily victuals. If we take [Demosthenes'] famine price of sixteen drachmas per medimnus (**34.39**), the price alone of a campaigning hoplite-mercenary's daily ration of barley-meal could feasibly jump to at least two obols per *choenix* during a period of local shortage.

The mercenaries of the latter half of the fourth century BC, it seems, were less well off than their predecessors, the Cyreans. Indeed, the unprofitable nature of such an uncertain career becomes more apparent when we consider that an unskilled labourer working at Eleusis could earn one and a half drachmas a day, while his skilled counterpart could easily pick-up a day's wage of two to two and a half drachmas.[66] On the other hand, although the purchasing power of the military wage did fall as the century progressed, it hardly slumped to a level that meant the mercenary's very existence was in jeopardy.

VI

On the stage of New Comedy the mercenary is characterized as a boaster, a deep-drinker, and at all times as an arrogant lout (**e.g. Men. 293(K); 297(K); 388(K); 440(K); 562(K); 732(K)**). Moreover, the profession is usually represented as a miserable one: the earlier playwrights lay stress on the occupational hazards of the mercenary (**Antiphanes 267; Philemon 156, cf Men. 76a,b(K)**), while in the later writers his poverty is emphasized as well (**Men. 354(K); 382(K); *Pk.* 412; Phoenikides 4; Hipparchos 1**). His worldly-goods consist always of his panoply, a wallet, a blanket-roll, and a wine cup[67] (**Alexis 115; Hipparchos 1; Men. *Kolax* 29**). On the few occasions when he has acquired wealth, he has done so by dishonest means (***Asp.* 29-33, cf 35; Polyb. 10.17.1-5**). Later, this stock character of New Comedy would be taken up and exploited by the playwrights of Roman comedy and thus would become the infamous Miles Gloriosus, a much more conventionalized comic form as it ceased to have any relation to contemporary manners.

The writers of the Greek comedies needed to suit the tastes and opinions of their audience, the ordinary law abiding citizen. Nevertheless, the consistency of this presentation cannot have clashed completely with the known facts. The vibrant picture of the mercenary given in the comic fragments on the whole agrees with that picture sketched by our historical sources. Indeed, as we have witnessed in the case of the Cyreans, mercenaries could easily be reduced to living a hand-to-mouth existence, struggling to buy the necessities of life with wages that came irregularly, if they

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[66] See especially: Zimmermann H.D. "Freie Arbeit, Preise und Löhne", *Hellenische Poleis I*, ed. E.Ch.Welskopf (Darmstadt 1974) 92 107.

[67] Cf Archil. F.4 (see above, 29).

came at all. There were exceptions of course, and the ten bumper years for the mercenaries of the Phokians among the treasuries of Delphi undoubtedly stands out as the most notable of these. Turning from the sublime to the ridiculous we are left with Isokrates who, in truth, preferred to draw lurid scenes of improverished mercenaries that wandered at will in rag-tag lawless armed gangs.

War might bring death, disease, or a dearth of pay, but there was always the hope of a windfall. Hope was what motivated some of the Portuguese Angolans who were to be found fighting for all four warring factions during the Angolan civil war. The majority of these mercenaries were veterans of the anti-guerilla campaigns in Angola and Mozambique when both these African countries were still under colonial rule, and had chosen to stay on in independent Angola rather than return to the new left-wing Portugal. In the words of Dempster and Tomkins:

> These tough sun blackened fighters were not mercenaries in the true sense of the word in that they received little or no pay - some were politically motivated, while others fought out of sheer love of fighting or in expectation of the rewards they would receive if their side won the war.[68]

When Alexander finally reached Babylon, for example, he was able to distribute bonuses to his army, and this largesse included a bonus of two months' pay for the mercenaries of the original expeditionary force (*διμήνου μισθοφοραῖς*: **Diod. 17.64.6, cf Curt. 5.1.45**). In a similar fashion, Cyrus the Younger had promised to pay out a donative of five minas to each and every mercenary once his victorious army was in Babylon (**Xen. *An.* 1.4.13, cf 7.7**).[69] Undoubtedly such rewards were doubly attractive as the monetary value counted for much. Alternatively, there was always the off-chance of securing a lucrative bounty such as the talent of silver once requested by a Rhodian member of the Ten Thousand because he knew of a safe means to transport the army across a deep river (**Xen. *An.* 3.5.8, cf 2.2.20**).[70] Or, the "large sums of money" (*πολλῶν ἀποδόσθαι χρημάτων*) that lured the mercenary, Diokles the Syrian, into betraying the Acrocorinth to Aratos (**Plut. *Arat.* 18.2-4, cf *Mor.* 177e**). In all probability, however, the quickest road to wealth for the mercenary was by plunder, especially after victory upon the field of battle. It was certainly through looting that mercenaries made up any short falls in their wages; a complete explanation in itself of all the destruction wrought by such troops. But for all its prospects, the profession was generally unremunerative and, therefore, had been adopted by most men for want of a better one.

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[68] Op.cit.72.

[69] An Attic mina = 100 drachmas; Cyrus probably means a Persian mina, which was worth about one-fourth more than the Attic. In any case, the promised bonus would have equalled at least 20 months' salary for each mercenary.

[70] An Attic talent of silver, for example, weighed just less than 26kg and was equal to 60 minas...a small fortune!

In spite of the generally unencouraging financial nature of soldiering, the profession was one which already had definite terms of service. From the *Anabasis*, in particular, we know that a contract was drawn up between the original strategoi, who initially acted as the recruiting agents, and Cyrus, the employer. This agreement promised the troops wages at a rate which had become standard, and payable at the end of each month. Conditions for the payment of bonuses and the taking of booty might also be mentioned in the contract. The contract also included a definition, possibly loose, of the purpose for which the troops were being hired, but probably no time-limit on the duration of employment. In short, the terms of service were therefore negotiated on a contractual basis, and in some detail. To be treated as a commodity, therefore, was not to be treated inhumanly. Although employer-governments would not pay much for the convenience of having soldiers produced *en masse*, mercenary troops would not serve for less than the going rate. Moreover, if the agreed contractual terms were applied in practice amid considerable uncertainty, the troops could easily threaten mutiny and thus refuse to march or fight. The mercenary, though a hireling, was no mere chattel.

9 *POLITICAL PAWN*

> And, indeed, sometimes the only difference between a filibuster and a government lies in the fact the government fights the gun-boats of only the enemy while a filibuster must dodge the boats of the enemy and those of his own countrymen.
>
> Richard Harding Davies

La Légion étrangère was the 1831 brain-child of Louis-Philippe to clear his domains of foreigners and other agitated and turbulent elements. Consequently, refugees from Italy, Belgium, the German lands, and Poland, who often turned into vagabonds, delinquents, or public nusisances and contributed to the political turmoil and to unemployment, were gathered up into a Foreign Legion that could at least pay for itself by pacifying Algeria, annexed the previous year but still untamed. As usual, the temporary expedient designed to deal with a short term crisis was to become a long-term enterprise: a military organization by default. Africa ate up soldiers, and the French showed little enthusiasm for colonial enterprise. Sparing with her conscripts, France set about shovelling in her political refugees, foreigners who had overstayed their welcome, misfits of every sort. And so, ever since its inception the Legion has functioned as a social safety-valve, absorbing the sweepings of the country; the unemployed, the unemployable, trouble makers, but adventurous spirits too. It even became the dumping ground for problem soldiers of all-ranks from other corps. All in all, unpromising material, but virtually inexhaustible; and led by men almost as egregious as themselves, sometimes more so. For more than one hundred and sixty years, the Legion has offered a Faustian bargain not only to these troubled men, but also to desperate men from all around the world: refuge from their past, present and perhaps the law, in exchange for five years of hard-boiled soldiering. Yet despite the brutal image, the romance, the legends, and the mystique that has surrounded the Legion, the "Beau Geste" types remain a tiny minority and *légionnaires* look upon fighting as their *métier*, not a patriotic duty or a righteous crusade: "Mieux vache que con" has always been the general rule.

Conventional wisdom would appear to doubt that such heterogeneously poor material could produce an *élite* fighting force. Paradoxically, this is what the French Foreign Legion was and continues to be - a multinational, polygot crack mercenary force employed to protect France's political interests in the diverse and distant lands that once comprised her colonial empire; an empire which, incidentally, was largely won through the shedding of the Legion's own life-blood (i.e. a *unité de sacrifice*). And here we meet a second paradox. For one of the popular assumptions of modern European military history has been that conscripts, or at the very least national forces, are superior in most respects to those composed of mercenaries. The word "mercenary" has acquired an

unflattering connotation in both English and French because it suggests someone incapable of elevated sentiments, such as loyalty to a cause, but who acts in his own interests. In the West, mercenary forces are generally viewed as little more than dangerous congregations of ruffians with soldierly skills, a prejudice which certainly goes as far back as the writings of Isokrates. Citizen armies, on the other hand, express national purpose and fight for national goals, which potentially make them more forceful and more flexible instruments in the hands of energetic and innovative commanders. Nor are they as likely to threaten the integrity of the state. Nevertheless, Western governments have always been reluctant to send their own troops and often even to provide the hard cash for colonial ventures. Of course, by their very nature military empires demand the maintenance of large standing armies, the backbone of which are the yearly drafts of young male conscripts. In the case of France, therefore, her colonial officers were forced to recruit an army on the cheap in order to expand the boundaries of the empire and to garrison the lands already conquered. This meant creating an army specially tailored for colonial service - combinations of European mercenaries and native levies. The existence of a separate "two-army" tradition, however, is not unique to France - Britain, Belgium, Holland, and Spain have all used colonial and white mercenary forces in their imperial enterprises outside of Europe. Such armies were not only useful, but also, at times, expendable.

I

The apolitical mercenary as a commodity is an obvious tool to secure a political goal of one description or another. Thus, in the ancient Greek world, the mercenary was a readily available instrument which monarchs, tyrants and socio-political factions could seek out and exploit in their quest for dominance (**Thuc. 1.115.4; 2.33.1; 3.34.2; 73.1; 85.2-3; 4.52.2; 76.3; 8.100.3; Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.31; 2.4.43; 5.2.38; 7.3.4; Ain. Takt. 11.7**). In addition, when inter-city-state wars ceased to be mere frontier raids and were carried on for longer periods of time and at greater distances from the homes of the hoplite-citizens, it became impossible to rely totally upon their part-time services. In contrast, no matter how objectionable the hired foreigner might be to the moralists, he could at least be trusted to serve as long as he was regularly paid. City-state governments, therefore, found his professional services a necessity during prolonged periods of war, the Peloponnesian War being a notable example of this phenomenon. On the other hand, to the unconstitutional or oppressive ruler his existence was especially profitable as the two fostered each other: it was mostly by the lavish use of mercenaries, for example, that the Sicilian tyrants held sway in their domains. Generally speaking, however, the early tyrants employed mercenaries as a personal bodyguard, while it was the later military tyrants who used them for territorial expansion, as well as for private protection. Nonetheless, despotism could only begin when a ruler was able to surround himself with a strong

force of aggressive men whose desires and feelings were alien to those of the ruled. When the latter show signs of resistance, they are removed as a danger and, thus, a tyrant, says Xenophon, "delights to make the mercenaries more formidable than the citizens, and these he employs as bodyguards" (*ἀλλὰ τοὺς ξένους δεινοτέρους τῶν πολιτῶν ποιοῦντες ἥδονται μᾶλλον καὶ τούτοις χρῶνται δορυφόροις*: ***Hiero* 5.3**). The Greek tyrant found his natural support in foreign, hired soldiery.

From the mercenary's point of view, however, it is somewhat unrealistic to accuse him of simply acting as a paid thug and a hired assassin. In an age of considerable ruthlessness his actions do not stand out as particularly brutal. If the strong ruler - who is instinctively suspicious at the best of times - is to be protected from those who would gladly liquidate him, he must obviously have around him men who have no natural axe to grind, and will be unquestioningly loyal so long as their pay was large and regular.[1] And this the rub. For, in the words of Xenophon's tyrant, Hiero, "no burden presses more heavily on the citizens than that, since they believe that these troops are maintained not in the interests of equality, but for the tyrant's personal ends" (*τούτου δὲ βαρύτερον φόρημα οὐδέν ἐστι τοῖς πολίταις. οὐ γὰρ τυράννοις ἰσοτιμίας, ἀλλὰ πλεονεξίας ἕνεκα νομίζουσι τούτους τρέφεσθαι*: **8.10**). Take, for example, the famed mercenary unit known as the Varangian Guard. It was the habitual Byzantine practice to use the Varangians for the nastier kinds of political skulduggery, the sort that scarcely any Greek soldier would touch, such as the dragging of the Patriarch in full vestments out of church during the service, as Isaac I Komnenos had them do with Michael Keroularios, the torture of suspects such as Korax the Theologian, or the more brutal forms of execution such as the blinding of Michael V Kalaphates and his uncle. Little wonder, then, the Empire's mercenary troops naturally became unpopular.[2] Moreover, the elevated social position, large salary and high perquisites that went with the post were sure to make a guardsman the object

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[1] Compare, for example, the death of the satrap Oroetes at the hands of his own bodyguard, which consisted of 1,000 fellow native Persians. As the commander of the Great King's armed forces in Western Asia Minor, Oroetes was a redoubtable power much feared by the new king Darios I, and, for that reason, the latter instructed the satrap's bodyguard to liquidate him (**Hdt. 3.127-8**). Perhaps it was the memory of this treacherous deed that prompted later Imperial satraps on the western fringes of the Empire to surround themselves with a bodyguard of Greek hoplite-mercenaries.

[2] Throughout history mercenaries have been hired from time to time in order to carry out someone else's dirty work. For example, in 1381 the merchants of Ghent employed mercenaries so as to remove their immediate rivals, the 4 guilds of Bruges. According to Froissart's shocking account, "many houses were plundered and women raped and killed and chests broken open, on such a scale that the poorest man of Ghent became rich" - *Chronicles*, Penguin Books (London 1978) 240. Such barbarous acts did much to justify the typecasting of mercenaries as greedy, godless, cruel exterminators. Niklaus Manuel, an early 16th century popular dramatist, once put the following words into the mouth of a Swiss *Reisläufer*:

> If you pay us well
> We'll move against your enemy
> 'Til the very women and little children
> Cry "Murder!"
> That is what we long for and rejoice in.
> It's no good to us when peace and calm rule.

of envy to plain citizens of the Empire. Hence the popular Greek attitude to these outlandish barbarians from the frozen north can even be witnessed in a children's nursery rhyme: "Φράγγο, Μάραγγο, πίτζι, κακάραγγο."[3]

A Greek tyrant, like a Byzantine emperor, would also pander to his hired soldiery in order to bind them more closely to himself. In a vain attempt to secure his own regime in Syracuse, Dion, according to Nepos, handed out large amounts of cash and plots of confiscated land to his mercenaries. Naturally, this appealed to no party and resulted in the alienation of both oligarchs and democrats (**Plut. *Dion* 7.1-2, cf Theopomp. F.184 (Oxf)**). Euphron, tyrant of Sikyon, also treated his mercenaries - who were, incidentally, commanded by his son, Adeas - "with special consideration" in order to keep their loyalty and thus secure his newly won autocratic powers. This involved adopting the unpopular policy of stripping the civic and sacred treasuries of Sikyon (**Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.46; 3.8; Diod. 15.70.3, cf Xen. *Hiero* 4.9,11**). Tyrants would also rob their fellow citizens of cash so as to keep their mercenaries happy, just as Nabis of Sparta did once he had banished the city's aristocrats and doled out their property and wives to his immediate supporters (**Polyb. 13.6.3; 7.3**). Such tyrannical acts knew no bounds, and the hapless citizen could not only lose his property, wife and liberty, but, in the extreme, surrender his life as well. Klearchos, as the self-imposed tyrant of Byzantion, had trumped-up charges brought against a number of the city's leading citizens so as to have them executed. Once removed, he seized their wealth and the resulting ill-gotten gains were promptly added to his war-chest (see above, 14).

As a prelude to his account of the battle of Mantineia in 207 BC, Polybios philosophises upon what he considers the fundamental differences in combat-motivation for those mercenaries who serve for hire in a democracy, and those mercenaries who fight on behalf of a tyrant. The crux of Polybios' argument is that a democracy, once it has destroyed those who conspire against it, will no longer need the services of its mercenaries, whereas a tyranny, in order to flourish, must continue to hire mercenaries (**11.13.passim**). As far as the ordinary rank and file mercenary was concerned, it was need and not greed that forced him into his risk-ridden profession. From his point of view, therefore, serving a tyrant would seem preferable than defending a democracy. For the employers, on the other hand, the professional mercenary was a handy commodity that could provide unbiased support in the quest for power. There were occasions, however, when the mercenary was little more than a pawn on a political chess-board where mightier pieces struggled so as to dominate the game. As such, he was expendable.

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[3] "Frank, Marangian [Varangian], filth and dirt." Quoted in: Blöndal S. *The Varangians of Byzantium: An Aspect of Byzantine Military History Translated, Revised and Rewritten by Benedikt S. Benedikz*, C.U.P. (Cambridge 1978) 189.

II

The sequence of events that led to Psammetichos' domination of Egypt soon after 663 BC and his eventual elevation to the pharaonic throne is described in two main sources, the *Rassam Cylinder,*[4] which gives the Assyrian version, and Herodotos (**2.152-4**). According to the Assyrian version Gyges of Lydia fell foul of Ashurbanipal and entered into an alliance with Psammetichos, despatching troops so that the Saïte prince could throw off the yoke of Assyrian sovereignty.[5] Herodotos, on the other hand, speaks of a chance visit to the Delta by Carian and Ionian freebooters in full hoplite panoply,[6] with whose assistance the Saïte prince managed to crush his rivals and gain control of the whole of Egypt. Here there is no mention of Lydia or Assyria.

Herodotos' account is somewhat misleading, for it gives the distinct impression that the arrival of the "piratical" Carians and Ionians and their subsequent involvement was fortuitous. Moreover, Herodotos has Psammetichos skulking in the Delta marshes[7] after having been driven there by his eleven rivals for fulfilling an oracle that prophesised the reunification of Egypt by one man (**2.151**). These twelve "kings", incidentally, could perhaps symbolise the internal political fragmentation of the Kushite and Assyrian periods, especially as in neither period did the central authority experience the luxury of the complete domination of Egypt.[8] Returning to the fugitive Psammetichos, Herodotos has him consulting oracles in order to fathom his immediate fate; needless to say, the oracle answers that "he should have vengeance when he saw men of bronze coming from the sea" (ἦλθε χρησμὸς ὡς τίσις ἥξει ἀπὸ θαλάσσης χαλκέων ἀνδρῶν ἐπιφανεντων: **2.152**).[9] Herodotos was entirely at the mercy of his Egyptian sources, of which the Egyptian priests loom the largest; men who had the habit of manipulating historical tradition in order to avoid unpalatable facts.[10] Thus, the version of

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[4] Luckenbill D.D. *Ancient Records of Assyria and Babylon, Vol.II,* Greenwood Press (NY 1968) 297-8 para.784-5.

[5] As vassals of the Kushites and then the Assyrians, the Saïte princes had ruled the ancient and important city of Saïs and much else besides for decades (**Manetho *FH* 609.2-3c**). Saïs was particularly important for the festival of Neith, the goddess of wisdom, and, on the sacred lake of Saïs, Egyptians represented the allegorical history of Osiris, the ruler of the underworld and judge of the dead (**Hdt. 2.171**). On the death of Necho in 664 BC, the Saïte principality covered half the Delta and included the cities of Memphis and Athribis. The pro-Assyrian Necho was succeeded by his son Psammetichos.

[6] Cf *Od.* 14.253-65.

[7] Herodotos also has an earlier pharaoh seek refuge in the Delta marshes, namely one Anysis who was fleeing from the Kushite invasion which led to the end of the XXIII Dynasty (**2.137**). Anysis embodies the pharaohs of the XXIII Dynasty, while the account of his survival in the marshes of the Delta during the Kushite hegemony reflects the survival of the semi-independent Egyptian princes in that area throughout this period.

[8] Cf *The Annals of Ashurbanipal* which lists 20 individual petty kings who were installed in Egypt by Ashurbanipal's father, Esarhaddon. See especially: Luckenbill op.cit.294 para.771.

[9] Cf Polyain. 7.3, who gives another version of the oracle in which only the Carians are mentioned.

[10] For Herodotos' reliance on Egyptian priests see 2.99-142; the source here is almost certainly the Priests of Memphis.

Herodotos emphasizes the role of Psammetichos, who consults oracles, recognises their fulfilment, hires the mercenaries (ἐπικούροισι) and defeats the eleven in battle. This maintains the familiar picture of the almighty and masterful pharaoh with which Egyptian historical documents and sculptural reliefs frequently regale us. The mention of the king of Lydia and Psammetichos' reliance on his aid would hardly fit such an image and is therefore simply ignored. And so, by ignoring Gyges you have to ignore Ashurbanipal. Herodotos' version of the rise of Psammetichos is substantially the official Egyptian account.

Despite this, the differences between the Assyrian and Herodotean account of the rise of Psammetichos can be explained with little difficulty. They essentially refer to the same event and can be combined and used to supplement each other. If we do that, the outline of events becomes clearer. More subtly, the actual role played by the Carian and Ionian mercenaries can be seen in a whole new light.

Gyges of Lydia had once sought military aid from the Assyrian king Ashurbanipal against the Kimmerians, "who had been harassing the people of this land."[11] In return he had offered tribute to Ashurbanipal and thus effectively became his vassal. Gyges later revolted from Assyria, perhaps encouraged by the fact that the Empire was both waging a bitter and protracted struggle against Elam, and, putting down Ashurbanipal's brother, Shamashumkin, who had raised the flag of revolt in the city of Babylon where he ruled.[12] To further his cause, Gyges stirred up trouble elsewhere in the far-flung Assyrian empire by despatching military assistance to help the Egyptian rebel Psammetichos drive out the Imperial garrisons from Egypt. It is more than certain that this military aid package came in the guise of Carian and Ionian hoplite-mercenaries.

True, the *Rassam Cylinder* does not inform us of the actual nature of this Lydian expeditionary force but: (i) Herodotos' χάλκεοι ἄνδρες are described as Carians and Ionians who fight for Psammetichos as ἐπίκουροι after he has "promised them great rewards" (σφεας μεγάλα ὑπισχνεύμενος πείθει: **2.152**); (ii) Diodoros, in his account of the career of Psammetichos, explicitly speaks of the Saïte prince "calling mercenaries from Caria and Ionia" (ἔκ τε τῆς Καρίας καὶ τῆς Ἰωνίας μισθοφόρους μεταπεμψάμενος: **1.66.12**);[13] (iii) Herodotos, relating the rise of Gyges to power, informs us that once established upon the Lydian throne, the Mermnad king took an active

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[11] Luckenbill op.cit.298 para.784.

[12] The war with Elam: ibid.299-300 para.787-8; 305-9 para.799-809. Shamashumukin's rebellion: ibid.300-4 para.789-95.

[13] Interestingly, Diodoros dismisses the Herodotean account as a "fanciful story" (**1.66.10**), but like Herodotos he makes no mention of the Assyrians. He does, however, state that Psammetichos had "established his rule with the aid of mercenaries" (διὰ δὲ τῶν μισθοφόρων καταωρθωκὼς τὴν βασιλείαν: **1.67.2**).

interest in the coastal cities of the East Greeks, campaigning against Miletos and Smyrna,[14] and taking Kolophon (**1.15**); (iv) Gyges undoubtedly commanded the wealth to employ mercenaries (**Hdt. 1.14**);[15] (v) evidence, although not specific, confirms that the Heraklid and Mermnad dynasties did in fact employ mercenaries. Thus Plutarch (***Mor.* 302a**) says that Gyges' revolt against Kandaules was aided by Arselis of Mylasa who headed an army of Carian *ἐπίκουροι* (**cf Hdt. 1.8-13**);[16] Nikolaos of Damascus (**F.65(J)**) also mentions Lydian employment of mercenaries, although their provenance is not stated; Ephoros (**F.58(J)**) and Duris of Samos (**F.20(J)**) have the story of Eurybates of Ephesos, who was employed by Croesus to raise an army in Greece, but deserted to Cyrus the Great; Herodotos (**1.77**) mentions the disbanding of Croesus' mercenaries (*στρατὸς ξεινικός*) after his campaign of 547 BC against the Persians,[17] and also says (**1.154**) that Paktyas the Lydian, with gold from Croesus, hired mercenaries from the coastal region of western Asia Minor; and, finally, Polyainos (**7.2.2**) says that Alyattes hired Kolophonian mercenaries.

Gyges' appearance in the superpower arena was to be shortlived. In 657 BC the Kimmerians, at the instigation of Ashurbanipal, swept over Lydia's borders, sacked its capital, killed its king and then devastated its land. In the panic Gyges' son and heir, Ardys, begged Ashurbanipal's mercy and thus Lydia returned to the yoke of Assyria.[18] Meanwhile, Psammetichos had overwhelmed the remnants of Assyrian power in Lower Egypt and swiftly acquired control of all the Delta principalities. Clearly the Saïte prince had turned his Carian and Ionian hoplite-mercenaries against the sundry princes of Lower Egypt who had achieved a high degree of autonomy under the semi-

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[14] The attack on Miletos was unsuccessful and Gyges appears to have entered into an alliance with the city, allowing its citizens to plant Abydos on the Hellespont - Gyges controlled the Troad (**Strab. C.590**). He was also repulsed at Smyrna (**Paus. 4.21.5; Mimnermos F.13; F.14**).

[15] Here it is of interest to note R.M.Cook's theory that it was the Lydians who invented coinage, probably in the second half of the 7th century BC, in order to pay the wages of their mercenaries: "Speculations on the Origins of Coinage", *Historia 7* (1958) 260-1.

[16] Caria, like Arkadia, had a solid reputation as a supplier of mercenaries: (i) Archil. F.24 - "I shall be called a soldier-of-fortune (*ἐπίκουρος*) like a Carian"; (ii) Ephoros F.12(J) - "*πρώτοι μισοθοφόρησαι*" (**cf Schol. RS Pl. *Lach.* 187b**); (iii) Strab. C.662 - "the Carians roamed throughout the whole of Greece, serving on expeditions for pay (*μισθὸν στρατεύοντες*)"; (iv) Ael. *NA* 12.30 - "the Carians were the first to think of making a trade of war (*ἀγορὰν πολέμου ἐπενόησαν*), and to serve as soldiers for pay (*ἐστρατεύσαντο*), to fit arm-straps to their shields, and to fix plumes on their helmets." As a point of interest, tradition also has it that the Carians were responsible for the invention of the hoplite panoply: (i) crest, porpax and blazon (**Hdt. 1.171; Strab. C.661; Schol. Thuc. 1.8.1; Polyain. 7.3; Anak. 81b; 91d, cf Alk. F.58(D); Plut. *Artax.* 10.3**); (ii) corslet and greaves (***POxy.* VI.29; Plin. *HN* 7.200**). Finally, the nebulous biblical connections between Carians and their use as mercenaries: (i) *II Kings* 11.4 - Joash is aided to the throne by "Carite" mercenaries in the pay of Athaliah; (ii) *II Sam.* 20.23; *I Kings* 1.38 - Carians at the court of King David; (iii) *Isaiah* 22.5-7 -"Kir uncovers the shield."

[17] According to Herodotos, Lydians preferred "to fight on horseback, carrying long spears" and "were skilled in the management of horses" (*ἡ δὲ μάχη σφέων ἦν ἀπ' ἵππων, δόρατά τε ἐφόρεον μεγάλα, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἦσαν ἱππεύεσθαι ἀγαθοί.* **1.79**).

[18] Luckenbill op.cit.298 para.785.

chaos of Assyrian rule. In Upper Egypt, however, Psammetichos used more subtle means to gain control, for in 656 BC he arranged for his daughter, Nitocris, to be appointed High Priestess of Amon, which was, at this time, the most important religious office at Thebes and thereby gained control of an area which until recently had retained its loyalty to the old Kushite Dynasty.[19] Psammetichos was now "master of all Egypt" (*κρατήσας δὲ Αἰγύπτου πάσης*: **Hdt. 2.153, cf Diod. 1.67.1**).

Gyges' ulterior motive in despatching military aid to the rebel, Psammetichos of Saïs, is plainly obvious. By stirring up Psammetichos' rebellion against Ashurbanipal he was hoping to guarantee his own independence from Assyrian rule. Admittedly, such positive and material help in the shape of warlike Carian and Ionian hoplite-mercenaries surely demonstrated to the Saïte court Gyges' willingness to see them succeed. On a more sinister note, however, by only sending mercenaries, Gyges could easily wash his hands of the whole affair if events turned against Psammetichos. If things went right, then so much the better. Such a political compromise was adopted by France when she handed over the French Foreign Legion, lock stock and barrel, to Spain in the summer of 1835. Isabel II of Spain, her country having been embroiled in a chaotic and vicious civil war for the last two years and now on the verge of total collapse, appealed to her allies for something more substantial than their moral support:

> By sending the Legion, France could affirm diplomatic support short of binding commitment. If things turned sour in Spain, Paris would not confront the difficult problem of extracting her forces while at the same time struggling to save face, for, after all, wars are often easier begun than terminated. Once France turned over the Legion, its fate would be in Madrid's hands. For its part, Isabel's government may have preferred French support to come in the form of regular regiments. But this simply was not realistic given the political situation in Paris [i.e. the Citizen King, Louis-Philippe, was only just secure on his throne]. And besides, the Legion offered tangible evidence of French interest, with no strings attached. A substantial commitment of French forces most certainly would have required more French interference in the political and military affairs of Spain. But the Legion was a different matter - its was a gift, a disposable item, and so appealing to the politicians and diplomats precisely because it was expendable.[20]

Once cast into the Iberian maw, the brave Legion was sacrificed between the indifference of Paris and the criminal neglect of Madrid. When, in January 1839, the Legion was finally repatriated to France,

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[19] Caminos R. "The Nitocris Adoption Stela", *JEA 50* (1964) 71-101.

[20] Porch D. *The French Foreign Legion: A Complete History*, Macmillan (London 1991) 25. In a similar fashion, Britain sent her own semi-official body of mercenaries to Spain, the British Auxiliary Legion, which had been raised for the occasion by a Whig Member of Parliament, Gen'l Sir George de Lacy Evans.

it contained just sixty-three officers and one hundred and fifty-nine NCOs and *légionnaires*. Its peak strength in Spain had been no less than two hundred and ninety-eight officers and 6,134 other ranks.[21]

III

Soon after the Peloponnesian War, the Spartans "held the hegemony over all the Greeks" (*ἦρχον δὲ τότε πάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων*: **Xen. *An.* 6.6.9, cf 12,13; 7.1.28**). In order to pursue its imperialist designs, however, Sparta needed to over-come a major reoccurring problem: the chronic shortage of its citizen manpower.[22] One compensatory method employed by Sparta was to tap its abundant reserves of helots, whereby a member of this servile population was liberated purely for military purposes - normally overseas - and not incorporated into the social and political fabric of Sparta.[23] We first witness these *neodamodeis*, seven hundred of them, serving as hoplites with Brasidas during his Thracian expedition of 424-2 BC (**Thuc. 4.80.5**).[24] The *Brasideioi*, as they unofficially became known, were still serving Sparta's interests even after their commander's death, and thus can be counted amongst her forces present at Mantineia in 418 BC (**Thuc. 5.67.1; 71.3; 72.3**). In the spring of 399 BC Thibron took with him 1,000 *neodamodeis* (**Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.4**), and these were taken over by Derkylidas when he assumed the same Asia Minor command the following year (**Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.23**). Two years later, when Agesilaos himself arrived in Asia Minor, he brought as part of his reinforcements no less than 2,000 *neodamodeis* (**Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.2**).

Although the partially enfranchised hoplite-helot could act as a substitute for the hired soldier - he was probably cheaper to maintain - Sparta still found a need to recruit hoplite-mercenaries for her overseas adventures. Indeed, both the Thracian and Asian expeditionary forces had mercenaries serving alongside the *neodamodeis*: (i) Brasidas not only hired a large contingent of Thracian peltasts (**Thuc. 5.6.4**), but he also raised his contingent of 1,000 Peloponnesian allies *μισθῷ πείσας* like mercenaries (**Thuc. 4.78.1; 80.5**); (ii) Thibron took over the remnants of the Ten Thousand *en bloc* (**Xen. *An.* 7.6.1; 7.57; 8.24; *Hell.* 3.1.6; Diod. 14.37.1**) and they remained in Spartan service until Agesilaos had completed his stint in Asia Minor and indeed thereafter, since they fought under him

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[21] Ibid.43,48 9.

[22] For the decline in the number of Spartiates, see especially: Cartledge P. *Agesilaos and the Crisis of Sparta*, Duckworth (London 1987) 38 fig.4.2.

[23] Cf Muslim states, in order to maintain a standing army, would often use slave-units. The most famous (later, notorious) of the soldier-slaves were the *élite* Janissaries who served and protected the Ottoman Sultans.

[24] Technically these hoplites were still helots, since they were only freed after their service in Thrace. To be precise, the first known *neodamodeis* were those with whom the surviving *Brasideioi* were settled at Lepreon (**Thuc. 5.34.1**). Nevertheless, these helots, freed or not, were armed by Sparta solely for military adventures overseas.

at Koroneia (**Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.15,17**).[25] Likewise, on the first occasion that Klearchos was despatched to the strategically important city of Byzantion, the harmost's garrison force not only included a small number of *neodamodeis* and Lakonian *perioikoi*, but also a contingent each of Megarian and Boiotian hoplite-mercenaries who served under their own mercenary-captains (**Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.15**).[26] In 374 BC, when Mnasippos led his expedition to Corcyra, his landing party consisted of not less than 1,500 hoplite-mercenaries together with *neodamodeis* and Lakonian *perioikoi* (**Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.5**), and by this date, Sparta was even employing mercenaries for her campaigns on the Greek mainland (**Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.15,37,45; 6.4.9; 5.12,17,29; 7.1.27,41; 5.10**).[27] Finally, it is interesting to note that apart from those Spartiate officers who usually made up a Spartan commander's coterie,[28] no other Spartiates appeared to have served in these overseas armies.

To illustrate Sparta's use of mercenaries as a military means to project foreign policy it will be enough to look more closely at her relationship with Cyrus the Younger with regards to his bid for the throne of the Persian Empire. First and foremost, Cyrus had asked Sparta to aid him in his recruiting drive for hoplite-mercenaries. In the *Anabasis* Xenophon is somewhat vague about this particular point (**1.4.2-3, cf 2.21**) but, in the *Hellenika*, he comes right out with it and actually says that Cyrus had asked the Spartans "to show themselves good friends to him as he had been to them in their war against the Athenians" (*ἐν τῷ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους πολέμῳ, τοιούτους καὶ Λακεδαιμονίους αὐτῷ γίγνεσθαι*: **3.1.1, cf Diod. 14.19.4**). In fact, Cyrus was calling in a debt owed to him by Sparta, for, while posing as the liberator of the Greeks from Athenian tyranny she had been obliged to rely upon generous handouts from Persia, and the man most responsible for securing and channelling this decisive Persian money into their war-chest had been none other than Cyrus himself

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[25] It seems that some of the Cyreans were still in Spartan service in the Corinthia several years later (**Polyain. 3.9.45**).

[26] Deploying mercenaries as garrison troops does have two serious drawbacks: (i) mercenaries are too expensive for such a passive role - Klearchos was, in fact, relying upon Pharnabazos' satrapal purse in order to pay his command in Byzantion (**Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.17; Diod. 13.66.6**); (ii) mercenaries tend to make a wretched nuisance of themselves in no time through sheer boredom (the arch-enemy of all soldiers), and when boredom blossoms among the *mercenariat*, villainy and drunkeness are not far behind (**cf Ain. Takt. 12.1; 13.1-4**). Take, for example, the scorn of the free-lance, Captain Luigi da Porto, after hearing the news that he was soon to be posted to Friuli: "...a theatre where there are few troops, most of them in garrison and thus, I fear, given up to greed, idleness and self-indulgence, the mortal enemies of the martial spirit." Quoted in: Hale J.R. *War and Society in Renaissance Europe 1450-1620*, Leicester University Press (Leicester 1985) 133.

[27] The turning point was probably 383 BC when Sparta allowed her discontented Peloponnesian League allies to commute men for cash as their stipulated contribution for the League's forces (**Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.21**). With the cash Sparta could hire mercenaries, and these were later used in the Chalkidiki against Olynthos (**Xen. *Hell.* 5.3.10**) and in Boiotia against Thebes (**e.g. Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.15**). In the campaign against Olynthos, Sparta also deployed a 2,000 strong force made up of *neodamodeis*, *perioikoi* and *Skiritai* (**Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.24, cf Diod. 15.19.3; 20.3**).

[28] E.g. Agesilaos had 30 Spartiates who formed his staff, and one of their number, Herippidas, was actually put in charge of the Cyreans (**Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.20**). For the Spartan habit of attaching *ξυμβούλοι* to their kings, admirals and commanders in the field, see: Thuc. 2.85.1; 3.69.1; 5.60.1; 63.4; 8.39.2; 54.2, cf 3.79.3.

(**Thuc. 2.65.12; Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.2-3; 5.3-7; 2.1.14; 3.8**).[29] Furthermore, it is highly likely that the Spartans knew the real objective of the expedition. Indeed, if we are to take Diodoros' word for it, Cyrus' whole operation had the full blessing of the ephors, who were shrewdly "concealing their purpose, awaiting the turn of the war" (*κατέκρυπτον δὲ τὴν προαίρεσιν, ἐπιτηροῦντες τὴν ῥοπὴν τοῦ πολέμου*: **14.21.2, cf Isok. *Pax* 98; *Pan.* 104; Plut. *Artax.* 6.3**). Sparta's shrewdness in fact extended as far as giving the young pretender a modicum of military aid: the ephors despatched the Spartiate Cheirisophos with seven hundred Peloponnesian hoplite-mercenaries, and the admiral Pythagoras was ordered up with thirty-five triremes. They also conveniently overlooked Klearchos' recruitment of mercenaries and subsequent campaign in the Hellespont. Though formerly high up in the Spartan political hierarchy, Klearchos, lest we forget, was a renegade and thus still under a sentence of death for behaving despotically as harmost of the enormously sensitive city of Byzantion. To put it bluntly, Sparta, who still proudly wore the mantle of "champion of Hellas", was not only paying off her debt to Cyrus at a minimum cost, both in terms of hard cash and citizen manpower, but was also conducting a war against Artaxerxes by proxy. If the whole enterprise turned sour, Sparta could simply turn away without any loss of face.

"Cyrus' death at Cunaxa removed a key piece from the board",[30] and thus, to judge by Anaxibios' hostile reception of the Cyreans when they arrived at Chrysopolis - directly opposite Byzantion - the ephors had probably adopted a more conciliatory policy towards Artaxerxes. The Spartan admiral clearly wanted the Cyreans out of Asia and, at first, promised the soldiers regular pay (*μισθοφοράν*) upon the condition that they cross over to Byzantion (**Xen. *An.* 7.1.3, cf 6.1.16**). Once across the Bosporus, however, Anaxibios quickly renounced the deal and proclaimed that the army should quit Byzantion, lock stock and barrel, with all speed (**Xen. *An.* 7.1.7**). When questioned by Xenophon and the Spartan harmost of Byzantion, Kleander, Anaxibios simply replied that his orders stood and there would be serious repercussions if they were not carried out (**Xen. *An.* 7.1.11**). Kleander's official position in this affair is somewhat equivocal. Initially, he too had been hostile towards the Cyreans and even threatened to have them outlawed as common enemies of Greece, but after being impressed by their smart turn-out and good discipline he eagerly offered himself as their commander in order to lead them back to Greece (**Xen. *An.* 6.6.5-36, cf 7.2.6**). On the other hand, Anaxibios had more definite plans concerning the immediate fate of the Cyreans. Once the army had decamped from Byzantion and the city gates were firmly closed behind it, the admiral issued a further set of instructions to the strategoi and lochagoi. The Cyreans were to secure their own supplies from

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[29] According to Andokides the Persians gave the Spartans no less than 5,000 talents for the war against Athens (**3.29**).

[30] Cartledge op.cit.191.

the Thracian villages nearby and then proceed to the Chersonese where Kyniskos, the local Spartan commander who was currently engaged in a bush war against the Thracian tribes, would take them "into his pay" (*μισθοδοτήσει*: **Xen. *An.* 7.1.14**).

The troops decided otherwise. Exasperated by Sparta's high-handed treatment of them, the mercenaries took matters into their own hands and promptly forced their way back into Byzantion. Meanwhile, Anaxibios made good his escape to the citadel and, its garrison force being too small to cope with the situation, immediately sent for reinforcements from nearby Chalkedon (**Xen. *An.* 7.1.20**). Left to their own devices the mercenaries would have surely sacked the city which now lay at their mercy. Oddly enough, however, Xenophon claims that he managed to rally the men and then pacify them with a sympathetic speech. It also seems, from the general tone of his rhetoric, that the Athenian's political sympathies lay with Sparta (***An.* 7.1.25-31**). Sparta, on the other hand, was now finding the continued existence of the Cyreans a political liability. For their part, the Cyreans were in desperate need of an adequate Greek employer - it was at this juncture that the wandering strategos, Koiratadas of Thebes, had made his unsuccessful bid for the army's leadership - and it was this pressing matter which now divided the strategoi (**Xen. *An.* 7.2.1-2, cf 11**). Anaxibios, having once again rid Byzantion of the Cyreans and made proclamation that any mercenary left within its walls could be sold as a slave, gladly awaited the break-up of the army (**Xen. *An.* 7.2.4**). But he and Kleander were both relieved of their posts by the ephors back home.[31] Nevertheless, their successors continued the antagonistic policy towards the Cyreans and, in particular, Aristarchos, the new harmost of Byzantion, lost no time in following Anaxibios' example and sold at least four hundred of Cyrus' former mercenaries into captivity (*οὐκ ἐλάττους τετρακοσίων ἀπέδοτο*: **Xen. *An.* 7.2.6, cf 1.36**). Furthermore, Aristarchos made it known that he was quite prepared to use force in order to keep the Cyreans out of Asia and, again, the idea was to shuffle them off to the Chersonese (**Xen. *An.* 7.2.12-3,15; 3.3**). They had little choice now but to hire themselves to the Odrysian prince, Seuthes.

Finally, in the late autumn of 400 BC, a decisive initiative was announced that marked a definite weather change for the Cyreans. The ephors had undertaken to fight both Tissaphernes and Pharnabazos so as to secure the "autonomy" of the Greeks of Asia Minor and, as a consequence, Thibron was ordered east armed with a mandate to hire the remnants of the Ten Thousand (**Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.3-4, cf 2.12; 4.5; *An.* 7.6.1**).

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[31] In 389 BC Anaxibios was to return to Asia Minor as the harmost of Abydos. The ephors despatched him east with 3 triremes and "money enough for a thousand mercenaries" (*ἀφορμὴν εἰς ξένους χιλίους*: **Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.33**). Two years earlier and just after the death of Thibron, the ephors had sent out Diphridas to Asia Minor with orders to take over whatever was left of the former's command and then "to raise another army from all possible sources", i.e. by hiring mercenaries (**Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.21**).

IV

Grand politics aside, Sparta's hegemonial interests were also to be covertly served through two of the men who in turn held the overall leadership of the Ten Thousand. Although Cheirisophos was not, as one would initially expect, the chief Greek strategos under Cyrus, the job was to be eventually given in effect to another Spartiate, the hard man Klearchos. However, although this appointment was largely achieved through his own political cunning and soldierly skills (see above, 15-7,88), Klearchos' prominent position as the overall leader of Cyrus' Greek mercenaries still required Spartan compliance.[32] Moreover, Cheirisophos, no less than the other strategoi, recognized him as the *de facto* leader. It was he, for example, who acted as one of Klearchos' ambassadors entrusted with the delicate mission of offering the throne of Persia to Ariaios; the other willing ambassador, incidentally, was that unscrupulous opportunist, Meno (**Xen. *An.* 2.1.4-5, cf 2.1**).

After Tissaphernes' treachery had cost the Greeks Klearchos, Cheirisophos, however, soon acquired a similar pre-eminence as their commander-in-chief. He took charge of the meeting of all the surviving officers, presided over the subsequent meeting of the whole army, and acted as the spokesman for all the strategoi to the King's envoys (**Xen. *An.* 3.1.32-47; 2.1-3,33; 3.3**). Thereafter, in books three and four, he is almost the only strategos named, apart from Xenophon himself. In other words, just as his fellow Spartiate Klearchos had done before him, Cheirisophos naturally took charge of the army, but not in any official capacity as Diodoros would like us to believe - that was to come later (**14.27.1**).[33] More to the point, Xenophon actually proposes to the soldier-assembly that Cheirisophos "takes the lead" (*ἡγοῖτο*) since he is a Spartan, that the two oldest strategoi, Kleanor and Sophainetos, take charge of the two flanks, while Timasion and himself, the two youngest strategoi, should command the rear: the motion was carried (***An.* 3.2.37-8**). Although Xenophon obviously plays a prominent part in his own account, there are the occasional hints that he had, along with the other three strategoi, accepted a subordinate role under Cheirisophos. After the encounter with Mithridates, for example, both Cheirisophos and Kleanor found fault with Xenophon for leaving the main body of the army in hot pursuit of an enemy that he could do little harm to (**Xen. *An.* 3.3.11**). During a later engagement, we actually witness Cheirisophos "summoning" Xenophon from the rear and, despite the lively tone of the conversation that ensued between them, the younger man did grudgingly recognize the Spartiate as the *primus inter pares* (**Xen. *An.* 3.4.38-42, cf 4.1.17**). It was only after Cheirisophos' departure in order to secure ships from his friend, the Spartan admiral

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[32] Although an exile, Klearchos was also under a sentence of death for running amok as harmost of Byzantion. Hence his position was utterly different from that of another Spartan exile, Drakontios, who had been exiled as a boy for the manslaughter of another boy and had therefore joined Cyrus as a common soldier-of-fortune (**Xen. *An.* 4.8.25; 6.6.30**); as had another Spartan by the name of Leonymos (**Xen. *An.* 4.1.18**).

[33] Cf e.g. Niese B. *RE III* (1901) 2220, art. *Cheirisophos*.

Anaxibios, that Xenophon appears to have taken charge of the affairs of the army (**Xen. *An.* 5.1.5-13; 2.1, cf 6.25**). Eventually, at Sinope, Cheirisophos having been absent for more than two months, the soldiers felt that a single commander-in-chief should be appointed: Xenophon was the army's first choice (**Xen. *An.* 6.1.17-9,25**). He refused, and Cheirisophos, now returned from his mission, was duly appointed (**Xen. *An.* 6.1.31-2**).

Cheirisophos' formal period of sole command was to be short lived; he did not pander to the troops' wishes (i.e. to extort and plunder Greeks and natives alike), and apparently fell into a deep depression, besides having contracted the illness from which he soon died (**Xen. *An.* 6.2.6,14,18; 4.11**). Cheirisophos' contingent (i.e. the seven hundred Peloponnesian hoplite-mercenaries officially sent by Sparta) now fell under the command of his Messenian hypostrategos, Neon of Asine (**Xen. *An.* 6.4.11,23, cf 5.6.36**). It is interesting to note that during his strategos' absence, Neon had stirred up trouble for Xenophon in a blatant attempt to undermine the latter's growing influence with the troops (**Xen. *An.* 5.7.1-4, cf 6.2.13-4**). Neon, although only a *perioikos*, had obviously become assimilated into the Spartan military establishment[34] and, therefore, had aspirations to becoming the army's next leader. He certainly had high hopes of the Spartan authorities and thus was more than keen to see that the mercenaries obey Sparta's wishes by marching off to the Chersonese (**Xen. *An.* 7.2.2, cf 1.13**). But that was not to be, and Neon, along with eight hundred other men, was to remain with the Spartans when the rest of the army, which for the very first time was now out of hand and beyond the reach of Sparta's normally long arm, joined Seuthes (**Xen. *An.* 7.2.11; 3.2,7, cf 2.17,29**). It was in fact through his negotiations with the Odrysian prince that Xenophon was to eventually emerge as the third unofficial leader of the Cyreans (**Xen. *An.* 7.1.5; 2.2,10; 2.17-3.14, cf Diod. 14.37.1-3**). Equally, the Spartan officials in Byzantion certainly regarded the Athenian as holding the prime influence within the troublesome army (**Xen. *An.* 7.1.8-11,39; 2.8**), and he was to maintain this position until Thibron finally took over the Cyreans.

V

As well as using mercenaries for achieving her own imperialistic goals, Sparta also had a tradition of contracting out to foreign powers her own military personnel. A foreign commission of this type usually allowed the officer in question to act as a mercenary-captain for a friendly foreign power but,

[34] Cf the Spartan fleet operating in the eastern Aegean during the summer of 411 BC was commanded by Diniadas, a *perioikos* (**Thuc. 8.22.1, cf 6.4**).

on some occasions, it also gave him much wider operational scope and thus enable the officer to act in an advisory capacity, or even assume a supreme commander's role.[35]

It is into the last category that we can place the first attested Lakedaimonian mercenary-captain, the Spartiate Gylippos, who, in 415 BC, was seconded to the embattled Syracusans by the ephors with explicit instructions to act as their commander-in-chief (*προστάξαντες ἄρχοντα τοῖς Συρακοσίοις*: **Thuc. 6.93.2, cf 91.4; 7.2.1**). And so, once he had joined forces with the Syracusans, he immediately takes on the role of their supreme commander (**Thuc. 7.3.1,4; 4.2; 5.1-6.2**).[36] Next we have Dexippos, not a Spartan but a Lakonian *perioikos* (**Xen. *An.* 5.1.15**). He first appears in 406 BC at the siege of Akragas commanding 1,500 mercenaries in the fight to keep the eastern two-thirds of Sicily Greek in the face of a massive Carthaginian thrust from the west that had begun three years previously. Diodoros, quoting Timaios of Tauromenion, relates that before his appointment by the Akragantines Dexippos had been residing at Gela and was in high repute because of his Lakedaimonian origins (**13.85.3-4**). Unfortunately, Diodoros does not inform us as to how and why Dexippos had come to Gela in the first place. According to H.W.Parke, "he was merely an adventurer."[37] P.Cartledge, on the other hand, reasons that Dexippos' presence in Gela was part of an official Spartan policy of providing limited military aid to the Sicilian Greeks with a view to receiving reciprocal support in their war against Athens. Cartledge backs his argument by pointing out that it is somewhat odd that Dionysios, who was busy setting himself as master of Syracuse, sent Dexippos packing back to Greece in case the Lakonian should frustrate his plans rather than simply liquidate him on the spot.[38] In 404 BC, Sparta certainly sent official aid to Dionysios to prop up his tottering tyranny in the person of Aristos (**Diod. 14.10.2-3; 70.3**),[39] while six years later, the Spartans even granted his recruiting agents permission "to enlist (*ξενολογεῖν*) as many mercenaries from them" as they had need (**Diod. 14.44.2, cf 58.1**).[40] Indeed, Dionysios was to prove a long-

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[35] A suitable modern parallel is the British officer or NCO who is seconded to or contracted to (but in both cases paid by) the Arab Gulf States. In 1958, for example, David Smiley was offered the command of the Sultan of Muscat and Oman's armed forces. He accepted and held this position for 4 years while still a serving member of the British Army

[36] A couple of years later, Sparta was to despatch to Syracuse a 600 strong hoplite force consisting of helots and *neodamodeis* (*τῶν τε Εἱλώτων...καὶ τῶν νεοδαμωδῶν*: **Thuc. 7.19.3, cf 58.3**).

[37] *Greek Mercenary Soldiers: From the Earliest Times to the Battle of Ipsus*, Clarendon Press (Oxford 1933) 64 fn.2.

[38] Op.cit.320.

[39] And other Spartan "advisers" were to follow: Aristoteles in 396 BC (**Diod. 14.78.1**); Aristomenes sometime after 397 BC (**Polyain. 2.31.1**).

[40] As her fortunes waned, Sparta increased her stake in the business of supplying mercenaries. So much so, that by the end of the 4th century BC, Tainaron - the southernmost tip of Lakonia, ideally situated for traffic both east and west - became a flourishing mercenary mart (**Diod. 17.111.1; 18.9.1,3; 21.1; 20.104.2, cf 16.62.3**).

standing ally of the Spartans for, in 369 BC and 368 BC, he was to reciprocate their earlier support of his regime by despatching much needed military aid in the form of two large contingents of mercenaries (**Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.20,28, cf Just. 20.5.6**).[41] As for Dexippos, he next appears in Asia Minor among the survivors of the Ten Thousand (**Xen. *An.* 5.1.15**), which does at least tie in with the above hypothesis. For Dexippos, like his fellow *perioikos* Neon of Asine, was undoubtedly a member of Cheirisophos' entourage that headed Sparta's official contribution of seven hundred hoplite-mercenaries to Cyrus' adventure (**cf Xen. *An.* 6.1.32; 6.9-33**).[42]

Sparta's imperial sun had well and truly set during the aftermath of Leuktra. Nevertheless, the most notable example of a Lakedaimonian being hired out by the Spartan authorities to a foreign power and thereby "rending the service of a ξεναγός", is that of Agesilaos (**Plut. *Ages.* 36.1**). Despite Xenophon's sad attempt to represent this episode of his hero's life as another dubious example of Agesilaos' panhellenic quest to liberate the Asiatic Greeks (***Ages.* 2.29, cf Isok. *Epist.* 9.11**), the truth is far more mercenary. The motivation for despatching the aged Spartan king to act as a mercenary-captain for Tachôs of Egypt was more materialistic than imperialistic as Sparta sorely needed the cash - two hundred and thirty silver talents was to be Agesilaos' Egyptian bounty - so as to augment her shrinking military strength with mercenaries (**Plut. *Ages.* 36.2; 37.4-5; 40.1; *Mor.* 214d; Nep. *Ages.* 7.2**),[43] although it could be argued that the master plan was to use these mercenaries in the struggle to recover Messenia. When he sailed to Egypt Agesilaos took with him 1,000 hoplites and thirty Spartiate officers to act as his military staff (συμβούλοι), as on his early Asiatic expedition (**Diod. 15.92.2; Plut. *Ages.* 36.3**). Diodoros provides no clue as to the actual identity of these hoplites, but the presence of the Spartiate officers does indicate the gravity with which the ephors viewed Agesilaos' mission.[44] On arrival, Agesilaos was to be bitterly disappointed to find that he was not to act as the pharaoh's commander-in-chief, but was required to subordinate himself to Tachôs, and thus only commanded the 10,000 picked Greek mercenaries that had been hired for the occasion (**Diod. 15.92.2; Plut. *Ages.* 37.1-2, cf Ath. 14.616d**). Moreover, his advice

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[41] The first contingent, according to Xenophon, was large enough to fill 20 triremes and was composed of Celts and Iberians (***Hell.* 7.1.20**). Diodoros places the number of troops in this batch at 2,000 and says their wages had been paid already for 5 months, i.e. Sparta was receiving their services *gratis* (**15.70.1**). The composition and size of the second contingent is not specified by our sources.

[42] J.Roy, in particular, lists Dexippos as a lochagos on the basis of his previous career in Sicily: "The Mercenaries of Cyrus", *Historia 16* (1967) 304.

[43] Cf the case of Agesilaos' old opponent, Chabrias, who went to Egypt in a private capacity as Athens, although an ally of Tachôs, had declined the pharaoh's plea for military assistance (**Diod. 15.92.3; *IG* II² 2.119**).

[44] Parke reckons that these hoplites were in fact *neodamodeis* (op.cit.111), while Cartledge disputes this and argues for mercenaries with a smattering of *déclassé* Spartans who had been deprived of full citizenship through the loss of their κλάροι in liberated Messenia (op.cit.328).

to Tachôs that the Egyptian army should wait and meet Artaxerxes' forces on Egyptian soil fell on deaf ears. Hence, in the spirit of a true *condottiere*, Agesilaos set his eye to the main chance and treacherously went over with his command to Nektanebis, who had set his sights on the Egyptian throne (**Plut. *Ages.* 37.6, cf Xen. *Ages.* 2.28-31**).

Agesilaos was not the last Spartan officially to serve as a mercenary-captain in the defence of Egypt's independence from Persia: Gastron and Lamias were to follow in his footsteps (**Polyain. 2.16; Frontin. *Str.* 2.3.13; Diod. 16.48.2**). Nor was he the last Spartan to act as a mercenary commander in the service of a foreign power: the Spartiate Xanthippos, general of the Carthaginians during the First Punic War, surely ranks as one of the most celebrated of Agesilaos' *condottieri* successors (**Polyb. 1.32.1,7; 33.5-7; 34.1-6**). But Sparta's days of imperial expansion had gone and Agesilaos' service abroad was a definite sign of the times which set a precedent for future Spartan kings. Indeed, his son and successor, Archidamos III, who strove doggedly to restore Sparta's direct rule of Messenia and her hegemony in the Peloponnese and beyond, was to end his reign in the same manner as that of Agesilaos. Having backed the wrong horse during the Third Sacred War and thus emptied Sparta's coffers, Archidamos took the opportunity to restore Sparta's bankrupt finances abroad. After pausing to rescue the supposedly Spartan colony of Lyktos on Crete from the mercenaries employed by neighbouring Knossos,[45] he made his way to southern Italy to fight as a mercenary-captain in the pay of Sparta's only true overseas colony, Taras, against the native Lucanians (**Diod. 16.62.4-63.1; 88.3**).[46]

VI

In the arena of foreign politics, where efficacy of force is the general rule, the mercenary is a professional soldier whose sacrifice, if events take an unexpected turn for the worse, would hardly raise a murmur of public protest. Moreover, his actions can be totally disowned. In such a situation, it is the mercenary himself who is liable to shoulder the blame and, if expedient, to suffer as a consequence. To this day, world states still prefer to turn a blind eye to the "sordid" activities of mercenaries. In 1976 the UK authorities, for example, allowed the British mercenaries destined for Angola to leave the country via Heathrow totally unhindered. Many of the recruits did not hold their own passports, while a number of them had well known criminal backgrounds and a few were even

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[45] These mercenaries were none other than the remnants of those that had, until fairly recently, been in the employ of Phokis and were, in fact, still under the command of the Phokian strategos, Phalaikos. Even more of a coincidence is the fact that Phalaikos' mercenary band had been hired by Knossian recruiting agents at the Malean promontory in Lakonia (**Diod. 16.62.3**).

[46] Ironically, Archidamos was supposedly killed in battle on the very day that Chaironeia was fought in Greece (**Diod. 16.88.3**). J.F.Lazenby expresses the feeling that Archidamos ought to have been at Chaironeia: *The Spartan Army*, Aris & Phillips (Warminster 1985) 169.

escaping from the consequences of a criminal offence.[47] Some of those lucky enough to survive and thus escape the Angolan fiasco, suddenly found on their return to the UK that the police were now more than interested in them.[48] But of course, Britain is not the only place where such things happen. There was official South African involvement in the abortive Seychelles coup of 1981, the end result being that Mike Hoare and his mercenaries were quickly brought to trial and imprisoned by the South Africans once international fingers started to point. Again, although the United States of America actually has a law against mercenary activity on the statute books,[49] there is still official (but covert) connivance when such activities suit. Latin America, in particular, has been the last resting place for many an American "anti-Communist" mercenary. In a nutshell, as long as individual governments, especially Western ones, see a need to undermine another power through covert military action, the mercenary will remain a convenient disposable tool of foreign policy. Little has changed in this respect since individual men first found a need to sell their swords.

On capturing some 2,000 Greek mercenaries that were in the pay of Darios III, Alexander sent them bound in chains to Macedonia so they could end their lives as slaves (**Arr. *Anab.* 1.16.6; Plut. *Mor.* 181a, cf *Alex.* 16.6-7**). Clearly Alexander wished to make an example of these mercenaries, especially as he was armed with the mandate of the Corinthian League which meant he could legally treat any Greek who stood against him as a traitor to Hellas. The fact that he had just crossed the Hellespont with an expeditionary force that included 5,000 Greek mercenaries did not enter into the moral equation. Once the Great King had been removed from the game, however, such high principles were soon forgotten. Alexander, after receiving the unconditional surrender of the remnants of Darios' hoplite-mercenaries, simply discharged those Greeks who had enlisted in Persian service prior to the founding of the Corinthian League, while the rest were hired at the customary rates of pay (**Diod. 17.76.2; Curt. 6.5.8-10; Arr. *Anab.* 3.24.5, cf 23.8-9**). Hypocrisy, not morality, often finds a place in the risk-ridden world of high politics. And so, as the ancient Greek proverb has it: ἐν Καρὶ τὴν πεῖραν (**Polyb. 10.32.11, cf Eur. *Cyc.* 654; Pl. *Euthyd.* 285b; *Lach.* 187b**).

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[47] Cf Anomimalle *Chronicle 1333-81*, 63: "[Sir Robert Knollys] took into his company, to his later utter confusion, various relapsed religious men and apostates and also many thieves and robbers from different gaols."

[48] Tickler P. *The Modern Mercenary: Dog of War, or Soldier of Honour?*, Patrick Stephens (London 1987) 200-3, cf 70.

[49] Likewise, Britain has the Foreign Enlistment Act which does make enlistment as a mercenary for a UK citizen a criminal offence. After Angola, the Diplock Commission was set up to investigate the recruitment of mercenaries in Britain, but concluded that the law as it stood was unworkable: the insurmountable problem was that of definition, i.e. how does the law differentiate between an "official adviser", an "idealistic freedom fighter" and a professional soldier-of-fortune? And so, Britain continues to be one of the main recruiting grounds for mercenaries.

CONCLUSION

The great majority of hoplite-mercenaries viewed mercenary service as a more or less permanent career. For these men it provided an economic life-line. This is hardly surprising when we consider that Greek hoplite-mercenaries were above all Peloponnesians, and especially Arkadians and Akhaians, who were by nature such natural warriors. Mountainous regions, with their harsh climates, poor soils and pastoral economies, have traditionally been the prime recruiting-grounds for mercenary forces.

To the small number of mercenaries who were not pressed by immediate economic needs, mercenary service offered a chance to secure for themselves wealth, power and fame. Because of their elevated social standing these men, qualified or not, invariably formed the leadership of a mercenary army. Individuals in this category ranged from the thrusting young aristocratic gentlemen who looked upon war as a sporting adventure, men such as Xenophon and his close friend, Proxenos the Boiotian, to the diehard professional belliphiles who, although they hardly ever died in their beds, hoped to carve out a pocket-sized kingdom for themselves as a retirement for their old age. Men of such stamp included the Spartiate, Klearchos, or the Rhodian brothers, Mentor and Memnon.

As a member of a society of professional soldiers, the individual hoplite-mercenary had snapped the traditional socio-political ties that connected the mores of the city-state with those of the battlefield and camp. By its very nature, a professional army is a social organism founded on steadfast and intimate camaraderie and governed by its own peculiar rigid social code.

Although physical training, which was generally neglected by the vast majority of city-state armies, was a definite advantage to the professional soldier, especially if he was to survive the rigours and hazards of a long campaign, it was the necessary virtue of military discipline that was to be one of the crucial elements which the hoplite-mercenary added to the ancient battlefield. The other was his aggressive and warlike fighting spirit, that vital intangible quality whose roots lay in male bonding and was fostered and preserved through a definite unit identity. It was this complex chemistry which allowed the professional hoplite unflichingly to face death, battle after battle. The close-quarter encounter was a "thing of fear". During the destructive collison of phalanxes, a hoplite required these basic raw ingredients of unshakable discipline and stout physical and moral fortitude in order to confront a stranger toe-to-toe and strike to kill him without provocation or compunction. Such martial qualities, nurtured and hardened through actual bloody experience, made the hoplite-mercenary a particularly attractive proposition to employers who could afford his professional full-time services. Employers such as the Persian Empire, whose imperial armies were chiefly composed of bow-armed

levies and horsemen, or wealthy Carthage, who came to rely almost exclusively upon hired-soldiery. In brief, professional hoplites were esteemed as the shock troops *par excellence* of their day.

Hoplite-mercenaries were normally secured through diplomatic channels and/or through the agency of prime movers who had intimate connections with the mercenary market. These military entrepreneurs would negotiate a contract first and then raise - through their own recruiting agents - and lead the men to fulfil it. The agreement between employer and mercenary-captain promised troops wages at a rate which, by the time of the *Anabasis* at least, had become standard, and payable at the end of each month of employment. The agreement also included a definition of the nature of the enterprise for which the troops were being hired. The terms of service were therefore negotiated on a contractual basis, and in some detail. If violated by the employer, the mercenaries could, and would, refuse to march or fight.

Although above the subsistence level of the time, the basic monthly pay (*μισθός*), from which he had to secure his own daily rations (*σῖτα καὶ ποτά*), certainly did not guarantee riches to the mercenary. Moreover, if the employer was short of cash or fraudulent, promised wages were often in arrears or left unpaid. And so, it was always the prospect of bonuses and rewards, and, first and foremost, of booty, which provided the main hope for enrichment. A lack of wages coupled with the expectation of booty meant that mercenaries did not hesitate to resort to profitable violence and thereby plunder the local neighbourhood for provisions and booty.

There was, of course, a much darker side to the vocation. Not only were hoplite-mercenaries prone to looting, but, also, liable to commit other acts of improper violence such as intimidation, rapine and the use of deliberate cruelty. Such nasty habits were further exacerbated through gambling, drunkenness and lechery, pastimes which, incidentally, alleviated the hardships and perils of their dangerous occupation. Mercenary forces, albeit professional, were of a temperamental nature. To maintain (and exploit) their superior *esprit de corps* and cohesion they required a fully competent leadership that was strict, if not ferocious, in its control.

ABBREVIATIONS

1. Ancient literary sources, unless stated otherwise, are taken from the Loeb Classical Library.

Ael.	Aelian of Praeneste
NA	*De Natura Animalium*
VH	*Varia Historia*
Ael.	Aelianus
Tact.	*Tactica*
Ain. Takt.	Aineias Taktikos
Alk.	Alkaios
Anak.	Anakreon
Anth. Pal.	*Anthologia Palatina*
Archil.	Archilochos
Ar.	Aristophanes
Ach.	*Acharnians*
Eccl.	*Ecclesiazusae*
Eq.	*Equites*
Lys.	*Lysistrata*
Nub.	*Nubes*
Vesp.	*Vespae*
Arist.	Aristotle
Ath. Pol.	*Athenaion Politeia*
Eth. Nic.	*Ethica Nicomachea*
[Oec.]	*Oeconomica*
Pol.	*Politica*
[Pr.]	*Problemata*
Rh.	*Rhetorica*
Arr.	Arrian
Anab.	*Anabasis*
Tact.	*Tactica*
Asklep.	Asklepiodotos
Ath.	Athenaios
Bacc.	Bacchylides

Bekk.	Bekker
An.	*Inedita*
Caes.	Caesar
BG	*Bellum Gallicum*
Cato	Cato the Elder
Agr.	*De Agricultura*
Cic.	Cicero
Phil.	*Orationes Philippicae*
CIG	*Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum*
Colum.	Columella
Curt.	Curtius
Dem.	Demosthenes
Dio Chrys.	Dio Chrysostomus
Orat.	*Orations*
Diod.	Diodoros Sikoulos
Diog. Laert.	Diogenes Laertius
Eur.	Euripides
Cyc.	*Cyclops*
Eust.	Eustathios, *ad Iliadem*
FGrH	*Fragmenta der griechischen Historiker*
Frontin.	Frontinus
Str.	*Strategemata*
Gal.	Galen
Hdt.	Herodotos
Hell. Oxy.	*Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*
Heraclid. Pont.	Heraclides Ponticus
Pol.	*Politica*
Hes.	Hesiod
Her.	*To Hera*
Op.	*Opera et Dies*

Hor.	Horace
Epist.	*Epistulae*
IG	*Inscriptiones Graecae*
Il.	*Iliad*
Isok.	Isokrates
Antid.	*Antidosis*
Arch.	*Archidamos*
Areop.	*Areopagitikos*
Epist.	*Epistulae*
Pan.	*Panathenaikos*
Paneg.	*Panegyrikos*
Phil.	*To Philip*
Trap.	*Trapezitikos*
Joseph.	Josephus
BJ	*Bellum Judaicum*
Just.	Justinus, *Epitome*
Lak. Pol.	*Lakedaimoniôn Politeia*
Livy	Livy, *Epitome*
Lucr.	Lucretius
Lys.	Lysias
Macr.	Macrobius
Men.	Menander
Asp.	*Aspis*
Epit.	*Epitrepontes*
Pk.	*Perikeiromene*
Nep.	Nepos
Ages.	*Agesilaos*
Chab.	*Chabrias*
Epam.	*Epameinondas*
Iphik.	*Iphikrates*
Nik. Dam.	Nikolaos of Damascus
Od.	*Odyssey*
Onasander	Onasander
Strat.	*Strategikos*

Ov.	Ovid
Fast.	*Fasti*
Met.	*Metamorphoses*
POxy.	*Oxyrhynchus Papyri*
Paus.	Pausanias
Philostr.	Philostratos
VA	*Vita Apollonii*
Pind.	Pindar
Ol.	*Olympian Odes*
Paen.	*Paeans*
Pyth.	*Pythian Odes*
Pl.	Plato
Euthyd.	*Euthydemos*
Lach.	*Laches*
Leg.	*Leges*
Prt.	*Protagoras*
Plin.	Pliny the Elder
HN	*Naturalis Historia*
Plut.	Plutarch
Mor.	*Moralia*
Vit.	*Vitae Parallelae*
Aem.	*Aemilius Paulus*
Ages.	*Agesilaos*
Alex.	*Alexander*
Ant.	*Antony*
Arat.	*Aratos*
Arist.	*Aristides*
Artax.	*Artaxerxes*
Demetr.	*Demetrios*
Kim.	*Kimon*
Lyk.	*Lykourgos*
Nik.	*Nikias*
Pel.	*Pelopidas*
Per.	*Perikles*
Phok.	*Phokion*
Tim.	*Timoleon*
Polyain.	Polyainos
Polyb.	Polybios
Psellos	Michael Psellos
Chron.	*Chronographia*

SEG	*Supplementum epigraphicum Graecum*
Strab.	Strabo
Suet.	Suetonius
DA	*Divus Augustus*
Tac.	Tacitus
Ann.	*Annales*
Theophr.	Theophrastos
CP	*De Causis Plantarum*
HP	*Historica Plantarum*
Theopomp.	Theopompus Historicus
Thuc.	Thucydides
Verg.	Virgil
G.	*Georgics*
Xen.	Xenophon
Ages.	*Agesilaos*
An.	*Anabasis*
Cyr.	*Cyropaedia*
Hell.	*Hellenika*
Hipp.	*Hipparchos*
Kyn.	*Kynegetikos*
Mem.	*Memorabilia*
Oik.	*Oikonomikos*
Zen.	Zenobios, *Greek Proverbs*

2. Periodicals and Journals cited.

AC	*Archaeologica Classica*
AJA	*American Journal of Archaeology*
AJP	*American Journal of Philology*
Ἀρχ. Ἐφ.	*Ἐφημέρις Ἀρχαιολογική*
BCH	*Bulletin de Correspondance Héllenique*
BMNE	*Bulletin Medelhausmuseet*
BSA	*Annual of the British School at Athens*
CA	*Cahiers Archéologica*
CJ	*Classical Journal*
CQ	*Classical Quarterly*
CR	*Classical Review*
CW	*Classical Weekly*
GR	*Geographische Mitteilungen*
GRBS	*Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies*
JEA	*Journal of Egyptian Archaeology*
JHS	*Journal of Hellenic Studies*
PCPhS	*Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society*
REG	*Revues des Études Grecques*
RSA	*Rivista Storica dell' Antichità*

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